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ABSTRACT
SILENT DEMOCRACY, NOISY MEDIA
The aim of my research in Silent Democracy, Noisy Media is to study representative democracy 
and the public sphere as a domain of democracy through four specific decision-making processes.
According to Habermas, the public sphere is an analytical category between the state and civil 
society, and embraces more than just the media, serving as a common theatre for citizens, with free 
access and quality of discourse.
The structural transformation of the public sphere includes the trends of modernity, specifically 
globalization and mediazation.  These trends have also affected the nation state and its exercise of 
power.  Mediazation has made the exercise of power transparent but, at the same time, fragile 
because of political scandals, leaks and outbursts.
I explore modernity s tendency to globalize through two cases: Finland s decision to enter the 
European Union s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) among the first countries and the
development of trade policy during the early stages of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  To 
analyze the role of mediazation two more cases are studied: the privatization of Sonera, including 
the political scandal which led to the dismissal of Pekka Vennamo as CEO and the resignation of 
Matti Aura as a Minister, and the Ministry of Labour s attempts to restructure labour policy, which
led to the so-called Black Lists scandal and the fear of a threat to freedom of the press.
The thesis is a case study, based upon interview material, which is analyzed and cast as narrative, 
using grounded theory . Media response is analyzed with the help of content analysis.
The interpretation and conclusions of the study are based upon comparison of the actors in each 
case, the information and communication (I&C) structures, along with the impacts of mediazation 
and globalization. My major conclusions are that:
there is oligarchy with oligarchy in Finnish political life, which means that part of the
political elite is excluded from the I&C structures;
information flows but no communication takes place; the commitment of the political elite to 
its decisions, including rational-critical debate, is weak;
globalization is seen as a given, neither analyzed or challenged by the elite; there is no 
strategy other than making sure that the country is represented in the forums where the 
decisions are made;
mediazation is powerful, with the media being able to change the direction and focus of 
political news without any internal checks or scrutiny, particularly in the case of scandals;
the role of entertainment, including the phenomenon of tabloidization, is a strong factor in the 
new ethos of journalism; the public sphere is far from being the ideal domain for rational-
critical debate serving the needs of democracy;
the media merely make noise rather than analyze;
Finnish governance is technocratic rather than political, so that democracy is silent.
TIIVISTELMÄ
HILJAINEN DEMOKRATIA, ÄÄNEKÄS MEDIA
Tutkimuksen Hiljainen demokratia, äänekäs media tarkoituksena on selvittää edustuksellisen
demokratian suhdetta julkiseen sfääriin ja saada näin käsitys demokratiamme toimivuudesta neljän
eri päätöksentekoprosessin avulla.
Julkinen sfääri on Habermasin määrittelyn mukaan analyyttinen kategoria valtion ja 
kansalaisyhteiskunnan välillä. Julkinen sfääri on enemmän kuin joukkotiedotusvälineet. Se on kuin 
yhteinen teatteri, jonne kansalaisilla tulee olla pääsy ja jonka tulee tarjota mahdollisuudet kriittiselle 
yhteiskunnalliselle keskustelulle. 
Julkinen sfääri on muuttunut modernin myötä. Globalisoituminen ja medioituminen ovat modernin 
keskeisiä tendenssejä, jotka ovat muokanneet myös julkista sfääriä. Samat muutokset ovat 
muokanneet myös poliittista päätöksentekoa niin, että kansallisvaltioiden ohella globaaleilla 
rakenteilla on merkitystä. Medioituminen puolestaan on tehnyt päätöksenteosta avointa mutta 
samalla lisännyt poliittisen järjestelmän alttiutta haavoittuvuudelle poliittisten skandaalien ja 
vuotojen kautta.
Tutkimuksessani selvitetään seuraavia eri päätöksentekoprosesseja: Suomen liittymistä 
ensimmäisten maitten joukossa Euroopan raha- ja talousliittoon (EMU), Suomen Maailman 
Kauppajärjestöpolitiikan (WTO)muotoutumista globalisoitumisen vaikutusten analysoimiseksi, 
Soneran yksityistämistä ja siihen liittynyttä poliittista skandaalia (Ministeri Auran ero ja pääjohtaja 
Pekka Vennamon potkut) sekä työvoimapolitiikan uudistamista ja siihen liittynyttä skandaalia 
mustista listoista, joiden uskottiin vaarantavan lehdistön vapautta medioitumisen analysoimiseksi.
Tutkimuksen metodeina on käytetty sekä case study-metodia hyödyntämällä haastatteluaineiston 
analysoimisessa myös grounded teoriaa että sisältöanalyysia lehdistökirjoittelua tutkittaessa. 
Jokainen tapaus esitellään narratiivisessa muodossa.
Tulkinta esitetään vertailemalla tapauksia, niitten toimijoita, informaatio- ja 
kommunikaatiorakenteita ja medioitumisen ja globalisoitumisen vaikutuksia poliittisen eliitin 
argumentointiin, toisiinsa. Keskeiset johtopäätökset ovat seuraavat:
oligarkian sisällä on oligarkia , osa poliittisesta eliitistä on suljettu informaatio- ja 
kommunikaatiorakenteiden ulkopuolelle;
informaatio virtaa poliittisen eliitin sisällä ilman että käytäisiin yhteistä keskustelua ja 
sitouduttaisiin tehtyihin valintoihin;
globalisoituminen nähdään annettuna tosiasiana, johon poliittinen eliitti ei katso voivansa 
vaikuttaa;
medioituminen on johtanut siihen, että poliittisten skandaalien syntyessä aloite asioiden 
hallitsemisesta siirtyy poliittiselta eliitiltä medialle;
median viihteellistyminen ja tabloidisaatio korostuu journalismin uudessa eetoksessa; 
julkinen sfääri ei toimi ideaalilla tavalla rationaalis-kriittisen keskustelun foorumina;
suomalainen media on enemmän äänekästä kuin analyyttista; 
suomalainen hallitsemistapa on teknokraattista poliittisen sijaan, demokratia on hiljaista. 
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Introduction
I became politically active when I was fifteen years old. I was elected to the Finnish 
Parliament on the same day I had my 29th birthday. I lost my seat on my 45th birthday. 
Suddenly I had an opportunity to concentrate on issues and questions that had always 
puzzled me.  
One of these questions is what we mean by democracy. Is it enough that the decisions are 
made in democratic order and follow constitutional procedure – prepared first by 
administrators, handled in government and finally accepted in Parliament – or is 
democracy something more?   
Democracy seems skilled at forming “an aura of legitimacy” around its various intentions 
and objectives. For me legitimacy means that decisions are not only made in democratic 
order, but are also understood, accepted, and supported by both the populace and the 
decision-makers themselves.  
For Jürgen Habermas (1989) the idea of democratic decision-making is based on an 
assumption that, through communicative action or communication itself, people establish 
a sphere of commonly shared meanings in which to transact politically. This is the basis 
on which real democratic participation can take place. People should be informed of all 
relevant alternatives when they make their choices. Very often this is considered the task 
of the mass media. According to critics, Habermas’s ideas of communicative rationality 
and democracy may be so abstract that we will never see them working in real life. 
However, Habermas’s idea about the public sphere as a forum of democracy is worth 
scrutinizing in more detail to analyze democracy – or at least how it should function. 
A layman would argue that political debate should give tools to the public in order to help 
people make up their minds. It would be logical to think that decision-makers have had an 
opportunity to discuss the matters in hand, to evaluate the alternatives, the pros and cons 
of any matter, in order to allow them then to mediate these to, and seek support from, the 
public. Is this not an ideal picture for how power should be exercised? Indeed, what 
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should the actual role of political argument and critical discussion be with respect to the 
exercise of power? 
When I was a Member of Parliament, and as I participated in that capacity in the group 
meetings of the Social Democratic Party, I very seldom had a feeling that either my 
arguments or critical notions had any effect on any decision or conclusion, if such were 
reached. I found this strange because, after all, the work of Parliament was originally 
organized around the idea that political groups could formulate their opinions and 
statements in service of whatever policy was currently being debated.  
I was told that the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party, and especially the 
group of Social Democrats in the Government, were the places where the power is 
located, and where the debate exists. After being a member of the Government for two 
and half years, and active in that capacity, as well as observing the work of the executive 
committee of the Party, I can now say that I seldom found either communication or 
critical debate. What communication did exist was merely to bring messages from the 
“field” or constituency as a frame of reference. Seldom, if ever, did I find myself in a true 
debate among equals. Perhaps even less often did those efforts at debate that we did make 
lead a common conclusion or action.  
Granted, as a member of a Parliamentary Committee I had more opportunities to 
influence matters of importance to the group or to our supporters than I did as simply a 
politician. It is also true that critical notions voiced by Committee members would very 
often lead to improvements in specific legislation. However, such improvements would 
typically be more at the level of legislative detail. 
This was also the case when I was a Minister in the Ministry of Finance. All in all, my 
work in Ministry was very rewarding and I developed a feeling that political governance 
was really needed, even respected. I also learned, however, that the fences between 
various ministries were very high. Because of this alienation – because there were no 
common forums of debate – I was forced to create the forums myself. I had very 
interesting discussions with civil servants, researchers and specialists, which helped me to 
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formulate arguments. This seems to be a common experience and a former Minister of 
Health and Social Services, Osmo Soininvaara (2002), has written about the same kind of 
situation in his recent book. 
But if the policy of the Cabinet was not discussed around the same table, how could I do 
my job to mediate various arguments to the public? How could I defend the policy 
adopted if I had no tools for it? Questions and issues which were common to all, and 
which demanded political solutions from us as a collective, were out of my hands. For 
example the goal of halving unemployment, stated in the Government Programme, was 
not a task for only one particular branch of the administration, rather common to all. The 
task itself was adopted unanimously by the multi-party Government but, in reality, there 
were various kinds of approaches and solutions, very often in conflict with each other. 
Over time, I could not help but ask the question: was the political decision-making 
process really so fragmented, or was it only my impression? More importantly, if real, 
could such fragmentation explain distrust towards the political system? 
Certainly, I am not alone in my confusion. Many other people, the voters, seem to be 
confused or disappointed. The level of activity in electoral participation is very often said 
to symbolize the status and capacity of a particular society’s democratic governance. In 
Western countries voting activity during the 1960s through to 1978 maintained itself at 
about 80% of the population. Within the general range of participation, the Finnish 
population always scored highly when compared with other Western countries.  
However, the municipal elections of 1984 forecast some fundamental changes in our 
political system. Voting activity decreased to 71.5%, with much of the decrease 
attributable to younger voters’ choosing to stay at home (Martikainen, 1988). This was 
the first sign that Finland, unlike other Nordic countries, was losing its interest in public 
participation. By 1999, the Finnish population’s participation in the Parliamentary 
elections had declined to 68.3%. The participation in the elections of 2003 was 69.7%  
(www.tilastokeskus.fi/vaalit). 
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Tuomo Martikainen and Hanna Wass (2002) have analyzed changes in electoral 
participation with a comparison of the elections in 1987 and 1999. Those who stayed at 
home are called the silent partners of democracy and are more often blue-collar workers 
than white-collar workers. The conclusion of the researchers is that politics based on the 
present party system is unclear to the voters. 
Analysis of various studies (e.g. World Values Survey 1996) confirms the fact that, 
compared with Swedes, Finns are less committed to the Western concept of democracy. 
The majority of Finns value highly democratic governance and the pluralistic political 
system, but at a figure of 70% in comparison with Swedes’ 92%, and at the same time a 
large number of Finns are also ready to give governing power to the experts, some 60%, 
whereas in Sweden the figure is 38%. There are also Finns who would prefer a strong 
leadership (27%) that is to say that a leader should be free to act regardless of the will of 
the Parliament or the result of the elections (Nurmela, Pehkonen & Sänkiaho, 1996). 
Particularly during the years of economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, Finland’s 
political leadership has been in flux. In a study by Elinkeinoelämän Valtuuskunta (EVA) 
in 1993, people expected that the political leader should be some kind of paternal figure, 
strong and solid, yet also open-minded and respecting the various interests of the society.1
According to the research, the desire for a strong leader was as high as 77%.2 There was 
also evidence of a mistrust of politicians and the system on the part of the elderly, blue-
collar workers and the unemployed. This was less true of white-collar workers, those with 
high incomes, and youngsters. The latter group were not so suspicious towards the system 
and seemed more willing to defend their democracy (Kansa tienhaarassa, EVA-raportti, 
1993).
1
   EVA (the Finnish Centre for Business and Policy Studies) represents “the various sectors of the Finnish 
business community”, and is effectively “a ‘think tank’ that identifies social phenomena and explores future 
challenges” (www.eva.fi/eng). 
2
   The question was formulated: “Our country needs strong leaders who are capable of bringing back 
discipline and order to our society, as well as respect of proper values” (”Maamme kaipaa vahvoja johtajia, 
jotka kykenevät palauttamaan yhteiskuntaamme kurin ja järjestyksen sekä oikeiden arvojen  
kunnioituksen”). 
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Based on these studies and polls Finns do not trust the political system. What, therefore, 
is the legitimacy of our political system in the light of the above research findings? 
Legitimacy is based upon how the citizens value the power of the political decision-
makers and how people evaluate the importance of the state and the political system. 
Therefore, the conclusion of the various researchers mentioned above is that the 
legitimacy of the political system in Finland is vulnerable and at risk, though the 
problems connected to its legitimacy are considered natural. People are used to tolerating 
the periodic challenges to this legitimacy (the reports of EVA 1987-1999). Does a 
converse notion also mean that the political system has been used to tolerating the distrust 
of the people and, therefore, is not forced to re-evaluate its activities? 
Recently Anu Kantola (2002) studied political governance during the economic crisis of 
the early 1990s. Her conclusions drew a picture of a situation where the imperative of the 
economy was extremely strong, perhaps even dominant, and where the exercise of 
political power was primarily in management of state affairs. She argues that 
“managerialism”, based on an expertise that is essentially neutral, does not encourage 
public debate. This tendency leads to the political process being located somewhere other 
than in the public sphere; it is not transparent, it is not based on communication, rather it 
is hidden and non-communicative. 
Risto Ranki (2000) also suggested that the role of the Cabinet Committee on Economic 
Policy (which is generally considered the most powerful body in the exercise of power) 
was weak in governing and that, during the crisis, most financial business was focused 
more on spending cuts than any sort of policy-orientated approach. His study shows that 
most often the Committee functions as an institution and its policies were set by key 
actors in other forums. Ranki uses the term “the garbage-can model” to illustrate one 
mode of decision-making. In this model it is typical that preferences as well as 
participation are unclear, decision-making shifts all the time and final decisions are 
unclear. His conclusion is that in decision-making the Committee was more waiting for a 
“fairy godmother” to produce a solution than a supreme master of developments.  
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Both these studies express their disappointment in the capacity of the political system for 
governing. However, distrust towards one’s political system is common in Western 
countries and may be inherent in the process of modernization and the transformation of 
the public sphere, too.  
Sociology’s power lies in its capacity to interpret our daily life in a manner which is able 
to see the social in the individual, the general in the particular. Zygmunt Bauman (1990) 
highlights the differences between sociology and common sense. According to him, the 
sociologist has to have the capacity to analyze our everyday life beyond his or her own 
experiences and to see the complex web of dependences, how things are connected to and 
subordinate to other elements, rather than to understand the world through the actions of 
individuals. He also emphasizes the rules of responsible speech, making sense of human 
reality. 
So I raise the question: does a truly open communication exist? Are politics more to do 
with information than debate? If so, what kinds of information flows are to be found 
among the political elite, and how are the decisions really made? How does the response 
of the audience, represented by the media, affect the decisions made by the elite?  How 
does reflexivity affect the exercise of power? Are politics more to do with managing than 
governing, as Kantola claims? Has politics lost its capacity to interpret the world and 
create some vision of our common future? 
To answer to my questions sociologically, I concentrate first on democracy and on the 
public sphere as a domain of democracy. Regardless of whether decisions are made 
according to democratic procedure, my interest is to explicate the argumentation mediated 
to the public by the political elite. Therefore the structural transformation of the public 
sphere seems to be essential in order to understand the new demands and challenges faced 
by the political system. How to characterize this process? 
My intention is to introduce the contours of democracy based on both liberal and Marxist 
traditions. I will focus on representative democracy, that is to say, how the political elite 
is using its mandate to govern. My focus is upon the political system itself, taking account 
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of the arguments of Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, and David Held in order to 
understand the challenges faced by contemporary democracy. The political system is 
understood here as a complex, which includes political parties, Parliament and the 
Government. Nevertheless, some aspects of governing expressed by Jan Kooiman and 
Nikolas Rose are scrutinized too, since the practices of government are as important as 
democratic values in the exercise of power.  
The structural transformation of the public sphere is studied in the context of Habermas’s 
analysis, though some critical comments, voiced by Peter Dahlgren, Nancy Fraser, 
Nicholas Garnham, Hannu Nieminen, and John Thompson are introduced. Yet to explore 
democracy and the structural transformation of the public sphere, it is not enough to 
analyze the practice of the exercise of power. It is also necessary to understand the 
contours of democratic society from another perspective than that which political science 
alone can offer. Related structural changes in social life should be analyzed as well. 
Therefore my intention – to analyze the exercise of power in modern Finland – will also 
be located within the context of modernity.  
I focus on globalization and mediazation – significant consequences of modernity which 
have shaped the public sphere, the analytic category located between state and civil 
society, which gives legitimacy to democracy and provides a stage for governance within 
society. Before concentrating on globalization and mediazation, however, the work of 
thinkers such as Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Scott Lash, and Niklas Luhmann is 
considered, as well as the feminist contribution offered by Lisa Adkins, in order to 
understand the importance of reflexivity.  
The question of reflexivity is related to the changing relationship between social 
structures and social agents. According to Beck, agents tend to become more 
individualized, that is, decreasingly constrained by structures. For Giddens reflexive 
modernity is related his concept of the “double hermeneutic”, whereas Luhmann’s notion 
is close to “autopoiesis”. However, reflexivity is not a synonym for reflection. Rather 
reflexivity moves beyond the classic model of capitalism and the social production of 
wealth, to a system which is inevitably accompanied by the social production of risks. 
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Beck even claims that political utopias – democracy and the welfare state – have been 
established to constrain us. However, the intensity of knowledge is related to reflexivity. 
The basis of reflexive modernity resides not in the mode of production rather in the mode 
of information, in which citizens are either included or excluded. 
Mediazation of culture as a general phenomenon refers to the development of media 
organizations and their expanded activities. Indeed, mediazation has also affected 
political decision-making. The new visibility has made the exercise of power more open 
and transparent but at the same time more vulnerable or even fragile than before. Political 
scandals, leaks and outbursts have become entertainment which is followed around world.  
This has happened at the same time as globalization has changed the exercise of power. 
As a consequence, while the nation state has not lost its importance, the global economy 
has significantly restricted the potential for practising policy based on the configuration of 
the nation state.  
A good number of people consider that global governance is undemocratic. Even among 
the political elite, many global questions are considered more as “givens”. It is often said 
that the ability to adapt global rules is more important than the capacity to try to influence 
them. The global economy has taken a leading role in governing the world without any 
specific control systems by which people can influence the global rules, ethics, and 
outcomes.  
Giddens and Held in particular, argue in favour of double-edged democratization in a 
very convincing way. Democratization upwards and downwards is required, which means 
dialogic democracy in various arenas, along with the importance of the public sphere’s 
being more open and transparent, both locally and globally.  
Finally, I will also introduce the setting of my thesis, methodology and data in the first 
part of my study. My research is a case study of the exercise of power in Finland. 
In the second, empirical part of my study, I will explore four particular decision-making 
processes as contexts for my interests, political debate and arguments presented in the 
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public sphere. I will concentrate on the components of communication: the producers, 
that is, who the key communicating actors were; the messages themselves, that is, what 
kinds of arguments were presented; and the audience, that is, the media response. At root 
the issue is about the “holy trinity” of electors, elected, and mass media, although the 
opinions of electors are not studied rather the mediated public response. 
All four of the processes took place in Finland in the mid- to late-1990s. I use two of 
these, which are linked to wider historical processes, as the basis for exploring 
modernity’s tendency to globalize. The decision making processes are: 
• the decision to enter Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); 
• the question of free trade, and particularly, the role of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
I use the other two cases to explore the mediazation of modernity. These are: 
• the privatization of the state-owned  telecommunications company Sonera, and the 
political scandal which led to the resignation of Minister Matti Aura; 
• the labour reform introduced by Minister Liisa Jaakonsaari, and the political 
scandal called the “Black List”. 
These cases are relevant to studying the political debate characterized by globalization 
and mediazation. The liberalization of trade and capital movements has influenced nation 
states and their capability to govern economic policy. Regulation of international trade 
and monetary systems by technocrats of the world’s central bankers, economists at the 
IMF, World Bank and the WTO, rather than by politicians, may be the future. Yet, new 
cosmopolitanism demands strategies to be implemented by the international institutions, 
including the European Union (EU), in order to achieve democratic accountability. What 
is the input of the Finnish political elite in this task?  
The particular decision to join the Economic and Monetary Union had many potent 
symbolic dimensions. Having one’s own currency was considered one of the key 
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elements of independence – something precious to the Finns. Yet the decision to join 
EMU was made without any specific discussions among the political elite. EMU was seen 
a side-effect of the EU and no critical debate in the public sphere was instigated or 
supervised by the political system, nor did the citizens have an opportunity to vote about 
the matter. EMU was relegated to – and in sense, hidden as – a detail of the EU, and as 
such, was considered more a political than an economic issue. Why did the whole process 
seem to be drifting in the wind? Was it because nobody wanted to take unnecessary risks 
in seeking confirmation from the voters or was it because this small country felt that it 
could not really have an effect on globalization?
During this same time frame, Finland ratified the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the 
World Trade Organization, the WTO. The WTO was a new and powerful structure for 
governing the global economy. The issues of the WTO were included within the 
framework and competence of the EU. However, it would be quite natural to assume that 
this kind of new organization would raise some interest among politicians, particularly 
with respect to the rules of trade.  
Trade policy had been an essential part of Finnish foreign policy during the time of the 
Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, trade became more about business 
and less a core focus of politics. So who thought about the goals of Finland and its 
strategy in EU discussions? Who considered all the associated issues?  How was our 
policy debated? Which issues were underlined and addressed by us? The Finnish 
Parliament seems to have shown some political interest, creating a special organ to follow 
the questions of the WTO after the Ministerial Conference of Seattle in 1999, but this 
may also have been little more than a reaction or awakening to the associated world-wide 
demonstrations. 
In the past, political leaders were invisible to most of the people over whom they ruled. 
Governance today requires a continuous process of decision-making regarding what is 
made public to whom, when and how. On the one hand mediated visibility makes the 
exercise of power transparent but on the other hand more fragile. Scandals have been 
consistently interwoven into the development of mediated communication and visibility. 
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There are some types of norms or standards which are more scandal-sensitive than others. 
Both scandals studied in my research have their origins in financial transactions. Non-
participant knowledge is another necessary condition of scandal, as it was in these cases.  
The story of Sonera is a particularly powerful example of modern Finnish privatization 
policy. The purpose of this effort was to create a new success story out of Sonera for 
Finland, a country already known as a leading country for new technologies because of 
Nokia. In this example, it is interesting to know how the privatization was debated. What 
were the parameters and rules adopted, and how were they followed? However, political 
scandal overshadowed the process of privatization, and made Sonera extremely 
vulnerable in its first stages of privatization to external threats by multi-nationals. The 
scandal reviewed here was the first of several scandals to hit Sonera, and led to the 
resignation of Minister Aura. This resignation, among others, was considered a key to 
fundamental changes that followed in the Finnish political system, now charged with 
significantly more political responsibility for its actions. But did this really occur? 
As my final case I will study the labour policy reform and a political scandal or a leak 
connected to it. If there was on especially pressing group of problems for Finnish society 
during the late 1990s, they were not associated with EMU, the WTO, or Sonera, but 
rather with unemployment. It was realized that new initiatives were absolutely needed to 
fulfil all the political promises that had been made to halve unemployment. How were 
these new initiatives debated and adopted?  Why did it then erupt into scandal, what kind 
of scandal was it and what happened after the scandal? 
It is also important to note that at this period I was actively involved in the Government 
but, in these cases, in the position of an outsider. This is something I considered important 
in terms of achieving objectivity. I was later involved more closely in matters related to 
EMU entry and integration, but I am specifically focusing here on the year 1995 – the 
time the decision to join was actually made. 
The third and final part of my thesis summarizes my aggregate findings, which includes 
the actors and arguments of the cases, and my sociological interpretation of the public 
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sphere in Finnish society. I also suggest some perspectives on and possible solutions to 
how the problem of opening up of politics can be articulated and intellectual debate be 
stimulated. 
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SOCIOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Democracy 
Power is generally understood as the capability of an individual or a group to exercise its 
will over others. For Michel Foucault (1978) discursive formations both constitute and 
exert power over social objects. Power is therefore a social relationship. Max Weber, in 
Economy and Society (1978; 1926), regarded power as the fundamental concept of 
stratification characterized by the dimensions of class, status, and party. Weber also made 
further observations concerning the nature of power in what he termed domination, the 
attempt of ruling groups to legitimate their power, concluding that there are three bases of 
domination: traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic.  
Weber among others has also pointed out that the capacity of state to command authority 
depends on its capacity to exercise two related but distinct forms of power, for which 
John B. Thompson (2000) uses the terms coercive power and symbolic power. The state 
can threaten or use physical force, various forms of coercion. However, the exercise of 
political power in the normal flow of social life is based on symbolic power in order to 
sustain the belief in legitimacy. Symbolic power is exercised by means of the production 
and transmission of symbolic forms (pp. 97-98). Governmental or state power is defined 
as the capacity for effective political action.  
For David Held (1987) politics is about power: “…it is about the capacity of social 
agents, agencies and institutions to maintain or transform their environment, social or 
physical” (p. 275). Politics is a phenomenon that is present across all dimensions of 
human life. Politics is also “at the core of the development of problems in society, and in 
the collective modes of their resolution” (ibid. p. 277). Anthony Giddens (1991) argues in 
favour of an emancipatory politics that is concerned with reducing or eliminating 
exploitation, inequality and oppression. Justice, equality and participation correspond to 
the types of power division. Many sociologists therefore locate power in situations of 
conflicting interests. 
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In democracy people rule. What does this mean?  The determination of what is meant by 
true democracy is a rich and complex subject. According to Held (1987), within history 
there have been numerous debates to determine whether democracy is a kind of popular 
power or an aid to decision-making. He suggests that democracy can be divided into two 
models: liberal or representative democracy, and direct or participatory democracy. He 
continues that the whole task of analyzing these models of democracy must consist of an 
analysis of complex networks of concepts and generalizations about aspects of the 
political, economic, and social. 
My interest, in this research, is representative democracy. According to John Stuart Mill 
(1806-73), the ancient Greek idea of the polis – the notion of a social forum comprising 
all concerned citizens, the city-state – could not sustain in modern society. Instead, a 
representative system offering freedom of speech, the press and assembly, has at least 
three advantages. The representative system provides not only the mechanism, but also an 
arena (parliament) in which to watch and control the exercise of power. It also acts as a 
watchdog of liberty. Finally, it guarantees, via electoral competition, the qualities of the 
leadership, chosen by all for the benefit all (Mill, 1951, pp. 195, 239-40). 
It was natural to Mill that the leading political role in society should be the privilege of 
the intellectual class; however, he underlined the importance of education in promoting 
emancipation of the masses and stated that women should have suffrage at both 
parliamentary and municipal levels. Indeed, the history of representative democracy has 
been marked by successful struggles to expand voting rights and to broaden 
representation. Mill also argued in favour both of free-market economy and minimal state 
interference, as well as that the liberal state should be neutral concerning the goals and 
styles of life of individuals (Mill, 1948, 1997). 
Max Weber (1864-1920) and Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1946) shared the idea that living 
in a modern, industrial society has its price. In representative democracy the price is that 
there is minimal democratic participation in political life. Their concept of democracy is 
very restrictive, limited to the processes of choosing decision-makers and controlling their 
exercise of power.  
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For Weber (1978), “bureaucracy” characterizes all forms of large-scale organizations, 
from the state to political parties and enterprises. According to Weber, bureaucracy forms 
a “steel-hard cage” which is the price to be paid for living in an economically and 
technically developed world. Progress towards the bureaucratic state was linked to 
capitalist development, and state power used by officials was controlled by parliamentary 
government and the party system. Marx, on the other hand, described bureaucracy as a 
particular closed society within the state: “The aims of the state are transformed into aims 
of bureaus, or the aims of bureaus into the aims of the state. The bureaucracy is a circle 
from which no one can escape” (1970, p. 47). 
Weber considered parliamentary government vital, both as a forum for debating public 
policy, but also as a context where alternatives and competing ideas could be expressed. It 
was also a good context within which to test whether political leaders were capable of 
mobilizing opinion, offering plausible political programmes, and negotiating to a close. 
Weber argued that politicians made decisions by criteria which were distinct from the 
logic of bureaucratic processes and market operations.  
Democracy for Schumpeter (1976) was a political method. Democratic life was the 
struggle between various political leaders, arrayed in parties, for the mandate to rule. 
Democracy legitimates the position of those in authority. Schumpeter was satisfied as 
long as governments could be changed, and people could choose between different 
parties. He had a very low estimation of the political and intellectual capacities of the 
average citizen, which led him to argue that people were nothing more than the producers 
of governments. According to Held, Schumpeter’s theory of democracy highlighted many 
existing features of modern liberal democracies, which could be described as comprising 
a “technocratic vision”, which is both anti-liberal and anti-democratic (Held, 1987, p. 
180).
In contradiction, Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (1820-95) attacked the idea 
of a neutral liberal state and free-market economy, key concepts of liberal tradition. Marx 
wrote in The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: “Man is not an abstract being 
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squatting outside the world. Man is the human world, the state, society” (Marx, 1970 p. 
131).
Marx’s and Engels’s conception of direct democracy is important in developing the 
theory of participatory democracy by which institutional arrangements are based on 
mediation, negotiation and compromise with struggling fractions, groups and movements. 
It is not self-evident that participation per se leads to desirable outcomes. Also models of 
democracy which assume that state could be replaced by civil society or vice versa should 
be treated with caution. Nor did Marx agree with the liberal claim that there is a clear 
distinction between private and public. For example, he did not regard economy as non-
political, so that by defending private ownership of the means of production, the state 
does not stand in a neutral space between the world of civil society and that of the 
political.  
For Marxists, the question of the state has always been a question of power. More 
importantly, civilization is intimately connected with the means of production. In a 
capitalist mode of production, labour force is oppressed. Indeed, capital is a collective 
product and therefore it cannot be personal. For Marx, liberty is impossible while human 
exploitation continues to be supported by the state. The key to understand the relations 
between people is class structure.  
Marx underlined that the transformation of society and the state would be a slow process. 
He stressed that human beings can and must actively, purposefully and creatively master 
their environment to survive, to “make their own history”. However, alienation is a 
situation where the mass of people are estranged from the products of their labour, the 
process of their work, their fellow human beings and their fundamental capacities. The 
state representing common interests is only an illusion (Marx & Engels, 1970).  
According to Marx and his followers, it is obvious that the state no longer enjoys a 
monopoly on power. For example, Michel Foucault (1980) showed later, in the 1970s, 
that power is dispersed. According to Boris Kagarlitsky (1999), this does not mean that 
the question of power can be decided outside and apart from the state. While capitalist 
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society is determined by the antagonistic relations of the classes, it is also today organized 
on an international scale. That is why Joachim Hirsch (1999) and Kagarlitsky underline 
the emancipatory possibilities of a modern world that requires the cultivation of the new 
internationalism. Defending parliamentary institutions and the constitutional rights of 
citizens is essential, but quite inadequate.  
For pluralists, who put particular weight on individuals combining their efforts in groups 
and institutions in the competition for power, power is non-hierarchically and 
competitively arranged. It is an endless process of bargaining between various groups like 
trade unions, political parties and business organizations. In the pluralist model there is no 
single powerful decision-making centre. This means that elections and parties do not 
guarantee democracy. For the democratic process to unfold, the existence of active groups 
is essential (Dahl, 1956). Indeed, a system to promote discussion, debate and competition 
between various views, a system to promote the formation of movements, pressure groups 
and political parties forms the premises of participatory democracy. 
However, not all citizens are active or concerned about politics. Some authors of the 
pluralistic persuasion consider such political apathy to reflect the health of a democracy. 
Some even suggest that democracy does not seem to require a high level of participation. 
This would further suggest that democracy is guaranteed by the existence of multiple 
groups or multiple minorities. In support of this position, Robert Dahl argues that 
democracy can be defined as “minorities government” (ibid. p. 133). In this context it is 
interesting that according to Weber, direct democracy demands the relative equality of all 
participants. While this is very seldom possible – as it is also according to many pluralists 
– direct democracy would lead among other things to ineffective administration, political 
instability, and even the probability of oppressive minority rule (Weber, 1978).  
Recently, both Giddens (1998) and Held (1987) have used the terms “the New Right” and 
“the New Left”. Thinkers representing either the New Right or the New Left have 
conflicting arguments on democracy, the roots of which lie in liberal and Marxist 
tradition. The New Right thinkers emphasize liberty and equality, which means that the 
modern state should only provide the necessary conditions for individuals to pursue their 
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own interests. The state is seen as a burden which individuals have to tolerate in order to 
achieve the maximum freedom of every citizen. The New Left thinkers emphasize that 
liberty, equality, and justice cannot be achieved in a world of private ownership and 
capitalist economy. This argument leads to recognition that society, as well as the state, 
should be democratized in order to guarantee these values. Giddens (1998) clarifies the 
need in his demand for the democratization of democracy. Upward democratization 
cannot be only local or national – the state must have a cosmopolitan outlook and it is 
important, for example, to expand the role of the public sphere towards greater openness 
and transparency. Downward democratization presumes the renewal of civil society, 
including the protection of the local public sphere that is also a physical public space. 
This local physical public sphere or space is seen as important by several thinkers, such as 
Sennett (1978) and Drache (2001). 
Held (1987) argues in favour of a broader conception of the political than that of either 
the Marxist or the liberal traditions. In the liberal tradition, the political is equated with 
governments and politics, and is regarded as a separate sphere from the economy or 
culture. Furthermore, the domain of politics is restricted and excluded from the spheres of 
production and reproduction relations. On the other hand, the Marxist conception, which 
reduces the political to the economic and to class and champions “the end of politics”, 
marginalizes certain issues from politics, for example the development of power in 
organizations or household and child-rearing. 
Held argues strongly in favour of a double-sided process of democracy, a position which 
is quite similar to Giddens’s. On the one hand, there is a need to re-form state power. On 
the other hand, there is a need to restructure civil society. The problem is twofold: how 
can the sovereignty of parliament be established over the state, and how can the 
sovereignty of society – of all its citizens – be established over parliament. Held 
underlines the fact that we cannot escape an involvement in politics when trying to draw a 
picture of democracy today. Frederick J. Fletcher (1994) crystallizes the challenge: 
“Politics is too important to be left to the politicians – or the political scientists” (p. 146). 
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What is essential, with respect to my purposes in studying the exercise of power and 
decision-making processes in Finland, is to acknowledge the importance of representative 
democracy as a fundamental power centre, but at the same time to recognize the need to 
broaden a variety of opportunities for participation. Participation and rational-critical 
debate are vital for democracy, as I shall show. Democratization of democracy, both 
upwards and downwards, is the current challenge for our society. 
The Political Elite
The elite as a term in social sciences is used to illustrate the power of a minority over the 
majority of the people. The terms “the ruling class” or “the oligarchy” are familiar near-
synonyms. The best-known theories of the political elite are based, for example, on 
Vilfredo Pareto’s The Mind and Society, Gaetano Mosca’s The Ruling Class, Robert
Michel’s Political Parties, James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution and C. Wright 
Mills’s The Power Elite. In general, these theories assume that the elite or ruling class is 
an inevitable feature of societies and that the opposite force or the counterpart of the elite 
is the mass. The political elite is characterized by a group consciousness, coherence and 
conspiracy. Conspiracy in this context indicates the capacity of the political elite to 
cooperate. (Ruostetsaari, 1992) 
Ilkka Ruostetsaari has studied the Finnish elite, and I shall return to his conclusions and 
general picture of its structure in my final chapter. Elina Haavio-Mannila (1981) has 
made particular study of female representation in that elite. Her conclusion is that women 
are under-represented in economic, administrative and corporative systems, whereas they 
are doing quite well in the political elite. In the years between 1980 and 1990, the 
percentage of women increased most in policy areas. According to Lauri Karvonen and 
Per Selle (1995), even if women are not equally represented, their extensive share in all 
fields of political life means that they are no longer excluded from any part of the 
decision-making process. Arja Alho (1989) has shown that women in the political elite 
are seldom emancipated, that is to say that women in general bring with them female 
consciousness but seldom feminist consciousness. 
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The question of the ruling class can also be understood by using the concepts of politics 
and hegemony, as suggested by Antonio Gramsci. Hegemony is defined as intellectual 
and moral leadership whose principal constitutive elements are consent and persuasion. A 
social group or class has a hegemonic role when it articulates cultural and ideological 
belief systems which are accepted as universally valid by the general population (Fontana, 
1993, p. 140). Mill had already argued in the nineteenth century in favour of a class of 
intellectuals who should assume a particular role in society and its governance (see 
above).
There are several approaches to studying the nature of the political elite. Very often these 
approaches have been categorized into four groupings: positional, decisional, and 
reputational approaches, and an approach that concentrates on analyzing the social 
background and recruitment of the elite (Moring, 1989; Ruostetsaari, 1992). The 
decisional approach focuses on actors or particular decision-makers through key decisions 
of societies, as suggested by Dahl (1958). However, decisions are often processes and 
therefore it is difficult to separate preparatory work, solutions, implementation and 
evaluation from each other, which can be a weakness of the decisional approach. Nor 
does participation in decision-making mean that a participant is a powerful member of the 
elite.  
For Marx, the question of knowledge or consciousness is a product of practical activity, 
so that a revolutionary movement should be seen as a process of building a new 
hegemony. In Gramsci’s thought, the political party is the modern equivalent of the 
Machiavellian prince. There is a fundamental point in both – the question of knowledge. 
However, it is interesting that Gramsci’s ideas also emphasize that every teacher is a 
student, and every student is also a teacher (ibid. pp. 148,151).  
Benedetto Fontana (1993), who has compared the major Machiavellian ideas of thought 
and action to Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, claims that despoteia is the condition 
where the civitas, the political space where discourse is possible, has been possessed or 
appropriated by a particular individual, group or class to the exclusion of all others. The 
despot or master narrows the political space to only himself. The relation, therefore, 
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between the despots and the others cannot be political because the relation is no longer 
based on discourse and persuasion. In this sense, all forms of despotism and domination 
are pre-political or apolitical. As Fontana puts it: “despotism and domination represent the 
use of public space for private ends, which means that the realm of the public has been 
destroyed” (p. 119). 
Weber saw threats in the competition between various political parties. According to 
Weber, party machines produced well-disciplined “yes-men” (ibid. p. 106), and he was 
critical of Robert Michels, who in contradiction, perceived this same tendency as “the 
iron law of oligarchy”, in which, “It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of 
the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over 
the delegators. (One) who says organization, says oligarchy” (Michels, 1915, p. 401). 
Michels goes on to argue that no popular movements, regardless of how energetic and 
vigorous they may be, can produce profound and permanent changes in the social 
organism. According to Michels, leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of 
social life. For him the formation of oligarchies within the various forms of democracy is 
the outcome of organic necessity: “The mass will never rule expect in abstracto” (ibid. 
402). Michels’s condemnation is clear: democracy is an ideal we can never hope to 
realize in practice. 
How to Govern? 
It is not enough to analyze the structures or the models of democratic decision-making 
processes but it is also necessary to examine the way in which decisions are made. For 
Habermas democracy is understood as a mode of government based on the general will, 
constituted through public critical debate. Democracy is an idea that is based on the 
elimination of inequalities. Because of antagonistic interests, consensus is impossible; 
only negotiated compromises can eliminate the relations of domination. What is needed 
according to him, is to bring the constitutional principle of publicness into practice, to 
harness all quasi-public institutional structures (public authority, special interest 
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organisations) to the constitutional obligation of democratic accountability and public 
critical scrutiny (Nieminen, 1997). 
Giddens argues in favour of dialogic democracy. He does not think that democratization 
is somehow implied by the very act of speech or dialogue as Habermas does. Dialogic 
democracy is not the same as an ideal speech situation, and it is neither an extension of 
liberal democracy, nor a complement to it. Dialogic democracy creates forms of social 
interchange which can contribute substantially to the reconstruction of social solidarity: 
“the potential for dialogic democracy is instead carried in the spread of social reflexivity 
as a condition both of day-to-day activities and the persistence of larger forms of 
collective organization” (Giddens, 1994, p. 115). It is also possible that no consensus is 
achieved – though mutual tolerance is required. Therefore dialogic democracy stands, 
according to Giddens, in opposition to fundamentalisms of all types. 
In Giddens’s view, there are four arenas of dialogic democracy. These arenas range from 
personal life, covering communication skills, social movements and self-help groups 
(subpolitics, in Beck’s term), to larger organizational ones. These post-bureaucratic 
organizations are dependent on trust and on expanded dialogic space. The fourth arena is 
that of dialogic democratization as it relates to the larger global order. Very often the 
international arena has been seen as “above” the level of nation states and, indeed, 
globalizing connections do not flow through the nation state, but often bypass it. The 
model of cosmopolitan democracy has the same limitations as state-based liberal 
democratic systems unless dialogic democracy takes place. There is no arena in which the 
capacity of dialogue to create and sustain active trust is more important (Giddens, 1994).  
Nevertheless, the term “governance” is used generally as a kind of catch-all to refer to 
any strategy, tactic, process or procedure for controlling, regulating, shaping, mastering or 
exercising authority over others in a nation, organization or locality. According to Nikolas 
Rose (1999), the term seems a useful substitute and analogue for regulation, 
administration, and management. However, there are certain important themes associated 
with governance that should be acknowledged.  
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The first is normative. Governance can be good or bad. Governance tends to be judged 
good when “it means less government, politicians exercising power by steering (setting 
policy) rather than rowing (delivering services)” (ibid. p. 16). This normative 
interpretation of governance is today very popular – urging political actors to privatize 
state organizations, to encourage competition, to downsize the political apparatus, and to 
ensure budgetary discipline, among other things. The second theme is descriptive. 
Governance is in fact the outcome of interactions of a range of political actors – of which 
the state is only one. According to Rose, governance refers to the outcome of various 
kinds of interactions and interdependencies. He argues that recent political strategies 
prefer to govern, neither through centrally controlled bureaucracies (hierarchies), nor 
through competitive interactions between producers and consumers (markets), but 
through self-organizing networks. The phrase the “hollowing out of state” is currently 
used to describe this tendency: “Politics is seen as increasingly involving exchanges and 
relations amongst a range of public, private and voluntary organizations without clear 
sovereign authority” (ibid. p. 17). 
Private individuals have formed organizations and pressure groups aimed at influencing 
governing policy – thus blurring the very boundary between public and private. Also 
governments are either expanding public services and investments or, alternatively, 
removing concerns from the public sector through privatization. Yet Daniel Drache 
(2001) argues that the state is back. The current crisis of neoliberalism has put onto the 
agenda the improvement of public services, the emergence of new public goods, and 
limiting the ‘public bads’ – the failure of markets to be self-organizing and to control 
greed and other short-term manias (p. 3). These notions also underline that the boundary 
between public and private is undergoing change. 
Jan Kooiman (1993) has theorized about the notions of governance and governability, 
taking into consideration complexity, dynamics and diversity as basic qualities, since the 
nature of our world is complex, dynamic and diverse. The question is: how can social-
political systems, which reflect these qualities, be governed in a democratic and effective 
way?  
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Complexity is an excuse often used to explain a problem or issue that is difficult to 
understand or address. However, complexity has to do with the manifold interactions of 
many parts within a system. Complex systems may have hierarchical structures: a 
structure within a structure, within a structure. Dynamics is about systems going from one 
place to another, pushed, drawn or moved in other ways, influenced by natural, 
technological or social forces. Recent developments in the natural sciences have 
stimulated concepts such as (neg)entropy, non-equilibrium dynamics, chaos theory, and 
the notion of dissipative structures to explain social phenomena.  
According to Kooiman, the dynamics of a socio-political system cannot be understood 
without insight into interactions. There is significance to most aspects of socio-political 
interactions, and within each interaction, a variety of important tensions. Kooiman 
describes diversity as a concept that covers the growing individualization, differentiation, 
specialization and variety of the modern world. He then characterizes complexity in terms 
of relations, whereas diversity addresses the components of these relationships. He does 
so because he believes that growing diversity is one of the features of our time. 
We can empirically see that the capacities of political/administrative governing systems 
have either crossed the threshold of diminishing returns (policies cancelling out each 
others’ effects), or are very close to these boundaries (implementation difficulties). In 
these situations, governing systems typically try to reduce the need of governing (e.g. by 
deregulation), and/or to shift the need (e.g. privatization), as mentioned above (Kooiman, 
1993).
There are several alternative approaches to the question of governance. One approach is 
to make greater systematic use of the insights of cybernetics. Such concepts as positive 
and negative feedback could be explored more thoroughly than has been done so far. 
From the angles of complexity and diversity, traditional governing is also problematic. 
One possibility may be to consider diversity in new ways that might enable one to govern 
better through representation, as Kyösti Pekonen has argued in his article in Modern
Governance: New Government-Society Interactions (1993). However, in this case one 
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must also take into account the fact that large numbers of people will be involved when 
large interests are in question.  
In the new forms of governance one can see a change from a unilateral (government or 
society as separate) to an interactionist (government with society) focus. Socio-political 
subsystems, such as health care, education and environmental protection, are better 
governed than left alone, regardless of our awareness of the inherent complexity, 
dynamics and diversity of each one. In these new forms of governance, social-political 
systems may find a better and more profound treatment than in most traditional models of 
governing. According to Kooiman, the concept of governability should be seen as a 
permanent balancing process between governing needs on one hand, and governing 
capacities on the other.  
Governing requires well-articulated problems, and the articulation of a problem implies 
the desire for a solution. The governing capacity consists of the interplays and 
interventions between the public and the private, between government and society or, as 
said before, between the state and civil society. The essence of social-political governance 
capacity lies, therefore, in both interventions and purposeful, directed forms of social-
political interaction. Indeed, the dialogue and the public debate are once again 
emphasized. 
However, Rose has some critical notions concerning this development which he calls 
governmentalization, a term already used by Foucault (1978). Habermas’s thesis about 
the state that is colonizing the “life-world” is misleading, according to Rose. It is true that 
state institutions extend the scope of their operations and the depth of their penetration 
into the lives of their citizens.  
But they do so by a complex set of strategies, utilizing and encouraging the new 
positive knowledge of economy, sociality and the moral order, and harnessing 
already existing micro-fields of power in order to link their governmental 
objectives with activities and events far distant in space and time. 
(Rose, 1999 p. 18) 
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Rose underlines that governing should be understood nominalistically: it is neither a 
concept nor a theory, but a perspective to invent new forms of government, to embrace, 
recode, reshape those that existed prior to the discovery of new problems for government. 
However, it seems that there is agreement on the importance of interaction for governing 
with society. This notion is important when the public sphere is scrutinized. 
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2. The Public Sphere as a Domain of Democracy 
The public sphere as an analytic category is important in order to analyze the interchange 
and interplay between the political elite, representing the interests of the state mediated by 
the media, and the citizens, as electors of representative democracy. 
In ancient Greece the sphere of the polis, which was common to free citizens, was strictly 
separated from the sphere of the oikos, each individual is in his own realm. Public life, 
bios politikos, was constituted in discussion including the forms of consultation and of 
sitting in a court of law, as well by common actions, for example, by war or by 
competition in athletic games. The private sphere was attached to the house. The political 
order was based on a patrimonial slave economy. Poverty and a lack of slaves would 
prevent the access to the polis (Habermas, 1989, p. 3).  
To the Greeks and Romans the ruling activity within the public sphere was discourse and 
rhetoric. Discourse and speech were the primary vehicles through which the struggle for 
power was conducted. Neither slaves nor women were public beings, and Jean B. Elshtain 
(1989) further clarifies the dichotomy: men were “public” and women “private”. Those 
silenced by power were not people without anything to say but were people without either 
a public voice or the space in which to say it. Where mutual discourse and recognition are 
not the basis of a relation between two actors, the relation is one of the subjection and 
domination. Therefore Elisabeth Frazer (1998) underlines, in her feminist contribution, 
the importance of public and publicity as a value:  
Questions about the limits of publicity and privacy, about the kinds of institutions 
in which women’s and other hitherto marginalised voices can properly be heard, 
and in which standards of public deliberation and dispute might be improved, and 
about the proper bases of political power, are now central to the agenda of 
feminist political theory. (p. 59) 
However, the concept of the public sphere can be used in a common-sense manner as a 
synonym for the processes of public opinion or for the news media themselves. For 
Jürgen Habermas the public sphere is an analytic category. It is a new social space 
between state and civil society. In Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action (1984
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and 1987), where he introduces the central distinction between system and life-world, the 
public and private spheres fall within the domain of the colonized life-world. 
For Habermas the ideal public sphere is what happens when private people using their 
own critical reason come together to create a public. This public sphere was achieved in 
bourgeois culture with its critical discussions and writings generated during the struggles 
against the powers of the absolutist state. However, today it is not possible to reconstruct 
the situation of regular face-to-face communications, and in this sense Habermas’s ideal 
public sphere is even a romantic notion, impossible in the world of today, which is 
characterized by the electronic media and mass public. However, the public sphere should 
provide “a place and a practice in which people as citizens may address together issues of 
political and social concern in a way that gives access to all those with interest, 
constitutes real dialogue between those involved, and leads to action” (Chouliaraki & 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 62) 
For Peter Dahlgren (1991) the public sphere is a concept that points to the issues of how 
and to what extent the mass media can help citizens learn about the world, debate their 
responses to it and get information on decisions and actions which have been adopted. 
Dahlgren underlines the importance of the public sphere as an analytic category, like 
Habermas, in which theoretical perspectives of history, social structure, politics, and 
media sociology are incorporated. Therefore whoever is interested in the dynamics of 
democracy should be interested in understanding the public sphere.  
The category of the public sphere can help us to order configurations in a cohesive 
manner from the standpoint of the criteria of citizens’ access to and participation in the 
political process, as well as to provide a focused political angle of vision. According to 
Dahlgren, it is important to emphasize the transformations in media and society. The 
concept of the public sphere should have evocative power. It should provide us with 
concrete visions of democratic society: “It must also fuel our utopian imagination, not 
leave us apathetic or paralytic” (Dahlgren, 1991, p. 9). If politics is not responsible for the 
defence and expansion of the public sphere, who or what else would be?  
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In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989), Jürgen Habermas analyzes 
the development of publicity and public opinion through historical context. Conflicts of 
interests are settled through a process of democratic will-formation and decision-making. 
Habermas asks, what are the social conditions for a rational-critical debate about public 
issues? Ideally, rational-critical argumentation achieves a consensus, “as an objective 
agreement among competing interests in accord with universal and binding criteria” (p. 
234).
In a nutshell, according to Habermas, a public sphere which serves the needs of the 
democracy is dependent upon both the quality of discourse and the quantity of 
participation. Public discourse (communicative action) is a mode of co-ordinating human 
life within the context of state power and market economies. However, money and power 
are non-discursive modes of co-ordination. Habermas shows analytically the degeneration 
of the public sphere and argues that progress must lie in a democratic accommodation to 
the conditions of mass society (Calhoun, 1992). 
Habermas explores his concept of the public sphere through three phases: the feudal 
publicness of representation, the bourgeois public sphere, and the publicity in the social-
welfare state. Feudal publicness was based on the power of the ruler. The nature of 
exercising power had to be secret. Publicity and openness would benefit the enemies of 
the existing order. Later “public” referred to the state, and “private” was excluded from 
the sphere of state. The public was the public authority, and the servants of the state were 
public persons. On the other hand there were private individuals, private offices, private 
business and private homes. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, civil society developed as the genuine 
domain of a private autonomy that stood opposed to the state. Unlike the ancient notion of 
the public, the modern notion depended on the possibility of counterposing state and 
society. Habermas joins with Hannah Arendt in stressing how the private sphere of 
society could take on public relevance. According to Habermas: “Civil society came into 
existence as the corollary of depersonalized state authority” (Habermas, 1989, p. 19). 
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The exercise of power was seen more as an administrative task. However, the practice of 
rational-critical debate developed gradually. Habermas is referring to the salons and 
coffee-houses. The new sociability was dependent on the rise of national and territorial 
power, and on the basis of the early capitalist commercial economy.  
There were various reasons which led to the structural transformation of the bourgeois 
public sphere, and two processes which were important in institutionalizing the public 
sphere. First, the family was reconstituted as an intimate sphere; and secondly, the public 
sphere was constituted in the world of letters. According to Calhoun (1992), just as state 
and society were split, so were economy and family (the intimate sphere) distinguished 
within the private realm. The public sphere in the political realm evolved from the public 
sphere in the world of letters. Through the vehicle of public opinion, the public sphere put 
the state in touch with the needs of society (Habermas, 1989, p. 30, 31). 
Hannu Nieminen summarizes Habermas’s argument in the following way: the 
bourgeoisie as the ruling force had to take responsibility in negotiating and forcing 
compromises between competing interests. This led to the fact that the state becomes an 
essential element in the exercise of power. Also the antagonistic interests of the working 
class made it impossible to achieve consensus through a public rational-critical debate. 
Therefore, the public sphere lost its function in promoting bourgeois unity (Nieminen, 
1997, p. 31). The consequences of this development changed the essence of the public 
sphere: it was no longer a public of private people, but rather, a public of private interests 
produced by the state bureaucracy and big private-interest associations. These interests 
were not articulated via an open rational-critical debate, but instead, behind closed doors 
among the social and political elite (Nieminen, 1997, p. 32). 
As a result of the collapse of the public sphere, many social-structural changes occurred 
such as: the tendency towards a mutual infiltration of the public and private spheres, the 
polarization of the social and intimate spheres, and the change from a culture-debating to 
a culture-consuming public. The latter change can be seen as the replacement of the 
public sphere within the world of letters by a pseudo-public or sham-private world of 
consumption. When the family unit lost its link with the world of letters, the bourgeois 
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salon went out of fashion. Habermas argues that “the communication of the public that 
debated critically about the culture remained dependent on reading pursued in the closed 
privacy of the home” (ibid. p. 163). At the same time there is a tendency towards the 
rational public-debate. Habermas takes as an example the fact that you have to pay for 
books or theatre but not for the conversation you heard or participated in. However, the 
conversation is often administered. For example round-table discussions and conferences 
have become commodities to consume. The world fashioned by the mass media is a 
public sphere in appearance only. Moreover, the integrity of the private sphere is an 
illusion (ibid. p. 171).  
The model of the bourgeois public sphere – private people gathered together as a public, 
and articulating the needs of society within the state – became inapplicable. The public 
was relieved of this task by other institutions. “The process of the politically relevant 
exercise and equilibration of power now takes place directly between private 
bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties and public administration” (ibid. p. 
177). Habermas argues that originally, publicity guaranteed the link between the rational-
critical debate and the exercising of power. “Now it makes possible the peculiar 
ambivalence of a domination exercised through influence over non-public opinion: it 
serves the manipulation of the public as much as legitimation before it” (ibid. p. 178). 
This means that critical publicity is replaced by manipulative publicity. Habermas claims 
that the consumption of mass culture increases with wealth, status and urbanization. 
Through these transformations the public sphere has become more an arena for 
advertising than a setting for rational-critical debate, which has impact on the political 
parties (Calhoun, 1992, p. 26). 
Habermas underlines the separation between the state and civil society which had created 
an institutionalized space for the bourgeois public sphere. When state began to have a 
more interventionist role in managing the welfare of citizens, organized groups became 
more important in the political process, and launched the refeudalization of the public 
sphere. This means that the masses are excluded from public discussion and the decision-
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making processes, and are treated as a managed resource for legitimating the power of the 
political leaders with the help of the media (Thompson.1995, pp. 73-74). 
The political public sphere of the social-welfare state is marked by two competing 
tendencies. Insofar as it represents the collapse of the public sphere of civil society, it 
makes room for a staged and manipulative publicity displayed by organizations that 
becomes manifest as a continual sequence of communications, which fly over the head 
and above the understanding of a mediatized public not literate in the type of 
manipulation practised by these organizations. At the same time, to the degree to which it 
preserves the continuity of the liberal constitutional state, the social welfare state clings to 
the mandate of a political public sphere through which the public experiences a critical 
process of public communication, conveyed by the very organizations that mediatize and 
manipulate it (Habermas, 1989, p. 232)  
Not only organs of state but all institutions that are influential in the public sphere are 
bound to publicity because political power is in need of criticism and control to legitimate 
the exercise of its political domination of society. However, the political public sphere of 
the welfare state’s mass democracy is not advanced. Habermas refers to studies which 
show that it is not so important for parties to have members but only, rather, to come to 
life at election time.  
Institutionalized within the mass democracy of the social-welfare state . . . the idea 
of publicity . . . is today realizable only as a rationalization . . . of the exercise of 
societal and political power under the mutual control of rival organizations, 
themselves committed to publicity as regards both their internal structure and their 
interaction with one another and with the state. (Habermas, 1989, p. 210) 
In these circumstances, it is no longer possible to restore the old liberal public sphere. 
Habermas suggests that parties and bureaucracies of all sorts must both become internally 
democratized and be subjected to critical publicity. In the case of the media, Habermas 
suggests various mechanisms to guarantee a wide spectrum of diversity within the media 
(Calhoun, 1992, p. 32). 
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The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was originally published in 1962 but 
it was only translated into English in 1989. Habermas’s book has been very inspiring in 
prompting attempts to understand the relationship of state and civil society, the origins 
and prospects for democracy, and the influence of the media. Among the responses it has 
provoked, it has also generated some critical perspectives which have been very fruitful in 
further theory-building about the public sphere. 
Nicholas Garnham (1992) sees three virtues in Habermas’s approach. First, Garnham 
underlines that the institutions and processes of public communication are themselves a 
central and integral part of the political structure and process. The second virtue is these 
institutions’ tendency to focus the necessary material base for the required public sphere. 
Finally, he points out that Habermas distinguishes the public sphere from both the state 
and the market.  
Habermas is analyzing threats to democracy that come both from the oligopolistic 
capitalist markets and from the development of the modern interventionist welfare state. 
The virtues of his approach are, in Garnham’s view, even more relevant because of 
globalization and because of the change of public information from a service for the 
public good to a privately appropriable commodity, a transformation examined here under 
the heading of “mediazation”. In a global economy nation states are undermined, because 
citizenship and the relationship between communication and politics are traditionally 
located within the structure of nation state (Garnham, 1992, pp. 360, 361). 
Garnham argues that Habermas’s concept of the public sphere offers:  
a sounder basis for the critical analysis of current developments, both in the media 
and democratic politics, and for the generation of the analysis and political action 
necessary to rebuild systems of both communications and the representative 
democracy required by the contemporary world. (ibid. p. 364)  
Mediazation raises two separate problems. Once communication is mediated, universal 
equalities (freedom of assembly and freedom to impart and receive information) can no 
longer be guaranteed. In mediated communication, access is dependent on resources. 
Moreover, the content of communications and the subject of debate (the experience of the 
life-world) are mediated. Our everyday social relations and our individual social identities 
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are constructed in a process of mediation. Our roles, for example, as husbands and wives, 
are constructed in and through mediated communications such as soap operas, novels, 
films, and songs (ibid. p. 366). Indeed, our very identities are mediated by the 
communications resources upon which we draw. 
Garnham further clarifies his position concerning representative democracy in a manner 
which some might see as suspicious: “It is for me axiomatic both that representative 
structures cannot be bypassed, and that the processes of rationalization and alienation 
involved in the modernizing process are a liberating gain rather than any sort of loss of 
supposed pre-existing authenticity” (ibid. p. 366). He follows the argumentation given by 
Norberto Boppio that direct democracy works best with simple “either/or” questions, but 
cannot deal with multiple variables in a complex and pluralistic modern society. 
Michael Schudson (1992) asks the question if there ever was a public sphere. The focus in 
his arguments is on two features of the political public sphere: what is the level of 
participation, and how is it carried out through rational and critical discourse?  His 
conclusion, based on studies about American politics in the colonial era, is that there 
existed no rational-critical discussion in any general sense. However, Schudson 
underlines the necessity of the concept of the public sphere as a model of what an ideal 
society should achieve. 
According to Nancy Fraser (1992) Habermas’s idea of the public sphere is similar “to a 
theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium 
of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, and hence, 
an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction” (p. 110). This arena is conceptually 
distinct from the state and also from the official economy. The public sphere can be 
critical towards the state. Moreover, it is not an arena of market relations. The public 
sphere is “a theater for debating and deliberating rather than buying and selling” (ibid. p. 
111).
Fraser argues that an adequate conception of the public sphere requires the elimination of 
social inequality. Otherwise Habermas’s claim that the public sphere be open and 
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accessible to all is not fulfilled. Feminist research has shown how social inequalities can 
effect deliberation even in cases where there are no formal exclusions. For example, 
Fraser refers to Jane Mansbridge, who has shown how deliberations can serve as a mask 
for domination not only concerning gender but also other kinds of unequal relations such 
as those based on class or ethnicity. Mansbridge also emphasizes the importance of a 
multiplicity of publics. Her argument is that the ideal participatory parity is better 
achieved by a multiplicity of publics than by a single public. (ibid. p. 119)  
Fraser argues that in both stratified and egalitarian multicultural societies, it is important 
to constitute alternative publics. She describes these publics as “subaltern counterpublics” 
in order to underline their similarity/parallelness as discursive arenas in which 
subordinated groups can formulate their interests, needs, and identities. As an example 
Fraser mentions the feminist subaltern counterpublic during the late 20th century. Fraser is 
defending subaltern counterpublics in stratified societies, but also in other cases where the 
possibility to combine social equality, cultural diversity, and participatory democracy 
exists (Fraser, 1992). 
Fraser also brings into question the concepts of public and private in bourgeois society. 
She argues that a tenable conception of the public sphere should also include issues 
which, in masculinist ideology, have the label of privacy. Fraser also analyzes the 
assumption that a sharp separation between civil society and the state is necessary for a 
well-functioning public sphere. She has formulated two concepts which are useful in her 
analysis – a distinction between a weak and a strong public. A weak public participates in 
opinion-formation but not decision-making. On the other hand, a strong public and its 
discourse encompass both opinion-formation and decision-making. Sovereign 
parliaments, for example, represent a strong public (Fraser, 1992). 
According to several critics, the public sphere should be analyzed as consisting of 
multiple public spheres (e.g. the subsidiary, oppositional, alternative, and competitive 
public spheres). Norman Fairclough (1995) asks “if the media is not sustaining a political 
public sphere, where else can it be constructed in our mediatized society?” (p.11). 
Nevertheless, Habermas favours and proposes a single form of universalized public 
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discourse – and in the process, acknowledges his critics. Garnham (1992) also argues in 
favour of a single public sphere, even if it is made up of series of subsidiary public 
spheres: “If, whether we like it or not, the problem faced has a general impact upon us all, 
then there can only be one rationally determined course of interventionist political action” 
(p. 371). 
Habermas has suggested that the restrictive nature of the public sphere is problematic, and 
that the main restrictive mechanisms are those based on class and gender. Though it is 
clear that Habermas was neither unaware of the marginalization of women in the 
bourgeois public sphere, nor the patriarchal character of the bourgeois family, he did not 
highlight the fact that the masculine character was a fundamental feature of the bourgeois 
public sphere, and was rooted within a set of assumptions about gender differences. 
The idealisation of the bourgeoisie’s internal cohesion and unity is problematic, as is the 
downplaying of the role of the mass media in political communication. Habermas’s basic 
conception of communication is that it is non-mediated and non-representative in nature, 
emphasizing interpersonal, dialogical, conversational modes of communication, which 
leads him to pessimistic conclusions concerning the relationship between democracy and 
the mass media (Nieminen 1997, pp. 40-42). Habermas also assumes that the recipients of 
the media products/services are passive consumers who are easily manipulated, an 
assumption which exaggerates the passivity of individuals.  
Again in response, Thompson argues that the development of communication media has 
created entirely new forms of interaction and new kinds of visibility that make any kind 
of comparison between mediated politics and the practice of feudal courts superficial. 
Unlike Habermas, Thompson argues that, in the modern world, publicness means that 
individuals are now able to interact and observe persons and events without having to be 
physically located in the immediate spatial-temporal locale of the event (Thompson, 
1995, p. 74-75). 
Thompson is critical of this kind of idea, which he calls the thesis of refeudalization. To a 
degree Habermas, indeed, found a close relationship between modern publicity and feudal 
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publicity (Habermas, 1989, p. 200), but refeudalization is an inadequate approach to 
analyze the possibilities of developing the critical communication within the public 
sphere that is necessary to cultivate the essence of democracy.  
Habermas argues that a public sphere that functions politically requires not only the 
institutional guarantees of a constitutional state: rather the supportive spirit of cultural 
traditions and patterns of socialization is needed, as well as a populace accustomed to 
freedom. The position of civil society is therefore interesting. The institutional core of 
civil society is, according to Habermas, constituted by voluntary unions outside the realm 
of the state and the economy, and ranges from various associations, unions, groups and 
independent media to political parties. Political parties have become fused with the state 
and therefore political parties are not real opinion-forming associations (Habermas, 
1992).
Habermas’s fundamental problem seems to be that he tries to integrate two incompatible 
concepts: the concept of social progress with the formation of the bourgeoisie. Later in his 
work, Habermas finds more satisfying answers in the form of a theory of “communicative 
action” which intends to bring into the open a rational potential intrinsic in our everyday 
communicative practices (Habermas, 1992, p. 442). From that time on, Habermas has 
considered: 
state apparatus and economy to be systematically integrated action fields that can 
no longer be transformed democratically from within, that is, be switched over to 
a political mode of integration, without damage to their proper systemic logic and 
therewith their ability to function. (ibid. p. 444) 
For Habermas, a radical-democratic change in the process of legitimation is about a new 
balance between the forces of societal integration, so that the communicative force of 
production prevails over the powers of other control resources, money and administrative 
power, and, with this rebalancing, guarantees the demands of the life-world. 
Daniel Drache (2001) has a further interesting contribution concerning the public sphere. 
He argues in favour of a public domain which widens the concept of the public sphere. He 
locates the public domain between the state, market and civil society having overlapping 
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and multiple dimensions. At the neighbourhood level, the public domain is synonymous 
with the public park or the local library. Beyond the local community there exist more 
important sets of interdependencies. According to Drache, the most important are the 
public spheres which are the site of political life as well as the provider of public services.  
The…critical issue for our times is not statelessness – defined in its most extreme 
form as the end of nation-state and the irreversible diminishment of national 
authority – but ‘state-ness’ finding the appropriate model, strategy, and resources 
for maintaining public authority in contrasting market economies. (p. 7) 
Building state capacity, revitalizing public institutions, promoting collective goals, and 
empowering citizens all require an activist state mode. The challenge is to take this 
pivotal notion of the public domain into the public sphere and make it credible, 
accessible, and intelligible. Therefore, according to Alasdair Roberts (2001), it is 
important to protect informational goods. Without the right of access to information, 
human rights cannot be fulfilled. Crucial to democracy in a marketized sphere is not so 
much rational discourse as rational choice.  
The public sphere as a domain of democracy challenges the political system as well the 
media: what kind of a theatre they are able to offer for citizens. Even if it is a utopia to 
create a domain in which people have the equal access and in which the rational-critical 
debate gives the legitimacy to power-exercising, it is one worth striving towards. 
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3. Reflexive Modernity  
Modernity has shaped the bourgeois public sphere as it continuously modifies the 
publicness of the social welfare state. Modernity as a term is associated with the concept 
of “Enlightenment.” Its institutional dimensions are capitalism and industrialism, and it is 
very often associated geographically with Europe. Anthony Giddens, among others, has 
been concerned with the emergence and development of modernity throughout his works. 
According to him, we have entered a period of high modernity.  
Beyond modernity we are facing the “post-modern,” which is distinct from what is called 
“post-modernity.” Some speak about the arrival of post-industrial society, in which a new 
social order is based on information and knowledge as opposed to manufacturing (e.g. 
Bell, Touraine). Some speak about the end of modernity, and perhaps even the end of 
history (e.g. Lyotard, Fukuyama). For Nicholas J. Rengger (1995) post-modern is best 
summed up using the words of Charles Dickens: “it will be the best of times and worst of 
times” (p. 206).  According to Giddens, “we have not moved beyond modernity but are 
living precisely through a phase of its radicalisation” (Giddens, 1991, p. 15). 
When contemporary society calls itself “modern,” it identifies itself by differentiation 
from the past. This retrospection is achieved, according to Niklas Luhmann in his 
Observations on Modernity (1998), not through identification, but rather through 
disidentification: “Whether we like it or not, we are no longer what we were, and we will 
not be what we are now” ( p. 3). Luhmann also underlines in his theory the fact that when 
contemporary society is observed, it is observed through its own eyes – as contemporary 
society. The observers’ objectivity is limited because of their use of the very language 
upon which the society is built, because of their operation within the very society they are 
analyzing.  
The modern period has gone through many social changes. It is not possible to find a 
single factor or theory to explain these changes. Yet these factors are linked to the 
physical environment, political organizations and culture. To summarize the ideas of 
Giddens, modernity is a complex of four institutional dimensions including but not 
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reducible to capitalism: industrialism, capitalism, surveillance and state violence 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 78). 
Ulrich Beck (1992) refers to a three-stage structure of social change, comprised of pre-
modernity, simple modernity, and reflexive modernity. Theories of simple modernisation 
from Marx to Habermas – and even to Parsons – share some kind of strong belief in 
evolution. However, Beck points to the other side of the coin of modernization, the 
negative. He is especially attuned to the consequences of scientific and industrial 
development with respect to the dangers, hazards and risks. For Beck, modernity is 
coextensive with industrial society, reflexive modernity with the risk society. Industrial 
society is based on social classes whereas the risk society is individualized. Accordingly, 
Beck suggests that the parliamentary system is a product of industrial design, and it is 
worth bearing this in mind in the context of the demands to democratize democracy 
discussed above. 
Beck’s main argument in his Risk Society: Towards a new Modernity is to witness not an 
end but the beginning of modernity, modernity beyond its classical industrial design. 
While industrial modernity had clear visions concerning gender and family and strong 
beliefs in science and progress, “a new twilight of opportunities and hazards come into 
existence – the contours of the risk society” (1994, p. 15).  
Beck (1994) summarizes the distinction between epochs of simple and reflexive 
modernization with five contrasts. The first contrast is connected to life situation, life 
conduct and social structure, which suggests that class theories are different from theories 
of the individualization of social inequality; the second means that the problems of the 
functional differentiation of action are replaced by the problems of the functional 
coordination, networking and fusion of subsystems, as well as their communicative codes; 
the third contrast is that the linear models based on a faith in progress are replaced by 
self-modification, self-endangerment and self-dissolution in the power centres of 
industrial modernization, the return of uncertainty; the fourth contrast concerns the 
distinction between reflection and the reflexive – while simple modernization locates the 
motor of social transformation in categories of instrumental rationality (reflection), 
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reflexive modernization considers the motive force of social change in categories of the 
side effect (reflexivity); and the final fifth contrast, located beyond left and right, 
theoretical conflicts familiar to industrial society, both political and ideological, can be 
captured from the dichotomies of certain-uncertain, inside-outside and political-
unpolitical (p. 183). 
Luhmann (1998) analyzes risks, too. He highlights the problem-solving of risks and 
underlines the importance of seeing technology in its broader sense as a functional 
simplification. This explains, according to Luhmann, the fact that “contemporary society 
tends toward humanistic and ecological self-criticism, but also that, in a reaction against 
this tendency, it can only respond technologically, for example, by expressing humanistic 
and ecological problems as financial problems” (ibid. p. 7). 
On the other hand Scott Lash (1994) emphasizes that the theory of reflexive 
modernization is a creative departure from endless debates between modernists and 
postmodernists. Beck and Giddens have raised the question as to what happens when 
modernity begins to reflect on itself. An example of the power of this reflective approach 
is in serving social rights. Simple modernization has enabled the bureaucratic and 
impersonal welfare state to produce social rights. However, reflexive modernity 
understands that welfare services should be seen both as a client-centered co-production 
and as an alternative set of welfare arrangements (p. 113).  
Indeed, reflexive modernization is a concept common to Beck, Giddens and Lash. 
Autopoiesis, a concept used by Luhmann has similarities with reflexive modernization. 
Luhmann (1998) takes the concept of autopoiesis from theoretical biology as a means of 
characterizing the organs of society as living organisms. Analyzing social order within 
contemporary society, communication is the key concept to understanding autopoiesis. 
For Giddens (1990) the reflexivity of modern social life means that “social practices are 
constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very 
practices, thus constitutively altering their character” (p. 38). Giddens (1994) also refers 
to the expansion of social reflexivity. This means that individuals now have to filter the 
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information relevant to their life situations, and to act on the basis of that process (ibid. p. 
6). Social reflexivity has its impact on bureaucracy and the sphere of politics, too.  
Beck (1992) analyzes the idea of reflexive modernization with two arguments: firstly, via 
the logic of risk distribution and secondly, via the theory of individualization. The 
concept of risk is “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and 
introduced by modernization itself” (ibid. p. 21). The reflexivity of the modernization 
process can be illustrated through an example of the relationship between wealth and risk 
production. The central point is that “the structural social conditions are radically 
transformed in the wake of reflexive modernization: as the risks of modernization are 
scientized, their latency is eliminated” (ibid. pp. 153-154).  
Traditional forms of coping with anxiety and insecurity in socio-moral milieus, families, 
marriages and male-female roles are failing. However, risk society is also a self-critical 
society. As an example he mentions how politicians encounter the resistance of citizens’ 
groups, and industrial management encounters morally and politically motivated 
organized consumer boycotts (ibid. p. 11). 
There have been some specific historical developments leading to the process of 
individualization. Individualization is not scrutinized profoundly but it is important to 
emphasize how people have lost their traditional support of networks and have had to 
learn to rely on themselves. According to Beck, individualization is a product of the 
labour market, which also explains the fact that the relations of inequality remain stable. 
Individualization means market dependency in all dimensions of living via the mass 
market and mass consumption. It delivers people over to an external control and 
standardization, then isolates and standardizes their experience. Beck illustrates the 
connection with an example: television isolates and standardizes. Everyone sits isolated at 
the set, but at the same time there is a standardized collective existence of isolated mass 
hermits which occurs simultaneously transculturally and transnationally (Beck, 1992, p. 
132).
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For Beck individualization means the disintegration of certainties for oneself and others 
without them. Individualization, therefore, represents the idea that we are called upon to 
constitute ourselves as individuals or, more particularly, as individualized individuals. 
But, as Beck underlines, this does not represent simple freedom. On the contrary: “People 
are condemned to individualization. Individualization is a compulsion, but a compulsion 
none the less for the manufacture, self-design and self-staging of not just one’s own 
biography, but also, of its commitments and networks as preferences”(Beck.1994, p. 14). 
For Luhmann (1998) the social imperatives of individuality can be seen in the change of 
question from “What should I be?” to rather “How should I be?” An individual in the 
modern sense is someone who can observe his or her own observing (p. 7). However, 
Beck argues that this type individualization does not remain private: it becomes political 
in a very definitive and new sense. In fact, it suggests that a contradictory world is 
coming into existence. On the one hand, a political vacuum emerges within the 
institutions; on the other, a non-institutional renaissance of political will evolves on the 
part of citizens. Beck puts his polemic argumentation in the following way: 
The issues that are disputed in the political arenas – or, one would be tempted to 
say, whose antagonisms are simulated there – scarcely still offer any explosives 
that could yield sparks of the political. Accordingly, it is becoming less and less 
possible all the time to derive decisions from the party-political and corporatist 
superstructure. Conversely, the organizations of the parties, the trade unions and 
similar interest groups make use of the freely available masses of issues to 
hammer together the programatic prerequisites for their continued existence. 
Internally and externally, so it seems, the political is losing both its polarizing and 
its creative, utopian quality. 
    The diagnosis rests, in my view, upon a category error, the equation of politics 
and state, of politics with the political system; the correction of that error does not 
deprive the diagnosis of its elements of truth, but it does none the less turn it into 
its opposite. People expect to find politics in the arenas prescribed for it, and 
performed by the duly authorized agents: parliament, political parties, trade unions 
and so on. If the clocks of politics stop here, the political as a whole has stopped 
ticking, in that view. (Beck, 1994, p. 17) 
Processes associated with individualization may be also the key, according to Lisa Adkins 
(1998), to the current organization of gender. In this sense Adkins supports Beck’s view 
that many sociological categories especially those associated with industrial society are 
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now inadequate: “Individualization is therefore not emptying out gender but may be 
creating new lines of social domination, for instance, those of community, of networks 
and of knowledge and forms of communication” (Adkins, 1998, p. 47). 
While reflexive modernization is very strongly attached to the programme of 
individualization, Lash (1994) wants to highlight the ontological foundation of the 
recurrent phenomenon of community in late modernity. Lash refers to Habermas and his 
communicative rationality when he criticizes the substance of reflexivity given by Beck 
and Giddens. According to Lash, reflexive human science should interpret itself as 
another ethnomethodology, which is a polar opposite to the perspective of Beck and 
Giddens. Reflexivity in this sense involves bracketing subject-object knowledge and 
situating knowers in their life-world (ibid. p. 156). Therefore communities are not about 
shared interests. This means for example that political parties are not communities. 
Neither are communities about shared properties. Rather, communities are first and 
foremost a matter of shared meanings. As an example of a taste community Lash 
mentions the travelling supporters of Manchester United or Arsenal. 
People who read the same newspaper or watch the same soap opera share only 
imagined community. To be in taste community, which takes on the facticity of 
community, one must share meanings, practices and obligations. Community 
entails the transgression of distinction between consumer and producer. (ibid. p. 
161)
Lash also argues that new social structures are actually informational and communication 
structures. He also wants to pay attention to the aesthetic dimension of reflexivity as 
opposed to the cognitive dimension which is underlined by Giddens and Beck, and which 
is the tradition of the Enlightenment (ibid. p. 111). 
Furthermore Lash argues that the core thesis of reflexive modernization is the gradual 
freeing of agency from structure. As an example of this process, Lash refers to the 
economy. The structure forces agency to be free in order to make possible capital 
accumulation. It demands getting rid of the rule-bound “fordist” structures. This is the 
concept of flexible specialization which together with specialized consumption leads to 
more flexible ways of production. Also the knowledge-intensivity involves reflexivity. 
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Reflexivity is based neither on the structures of Marxism, nor upon the social structures of 
Parsonsian functionalism. Rather, it is based on “the web of global and local networks of 
information and communication.” The identity of the winners or losers of reflexivity is 
dependent on their places in the mode of information. This also means that the classes-in-
struggle are determined by their place not in the mode of production, but rather, in the 
mode of information (ibid. pp. 121, 166). 
Lash refers cogently to the concept of information structures and information flows 
developed by the Japanese researchers Koike and Aoki when they made a comparative 
study of Japanese and American firms. They found that the information flows are 
optimized between the firm and its workers, and between firms and financiers in Japanese 
firms. The information flows are blocked in low-trust, market-governed firms in the USA 
and UK. This gives evidence for Lash to argue that the information structure impacts 
upon the formation of the working and middle classes. Reflexive modernity’s upgraded 
working class, as well as the middle class, find their place in the informational 
displacement of the motor of history. This means that there now emerges a third class 
who are excluded from access to the information and communications (hereafter “I&C”) 
structures: “And as both civil society and the public sphere become increasingly 
superimposed on the I&C structures, exclusion from them becomes exclusion from 
citizenship – effectively both the political and cultural exclusion from civil society” (ibid. 
pp. 130, 133). 
Lisa Adkins’s focus is particularly upon Lash’s argumentation regarding the re-ordering 
of the labour market: that is, who will be reflexivity’s winners and losers. Women are, 
according to Lash, often reflexivity’s losers and, therefore, a part of the new lower class 
or underclass. There are two reasons for this, following the argumentation presented by 
Adkins. First, women’s economic activity has often been non-cash nexus and non-market. 
Secondly, there has been a change from exclusion to segregation in women’s position 
within labour markets. The research (e.g. Leonardo) supports the claim that both the 
exclusion of women from reflexive occupations and the intensity of women’s welfare 
servicing in the family have restructured the current labour market. Individualization – in 
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the context of labour markets – appears to be a gendered process which relies on the 
appropriation of women’s labour within the private sphere (Adkins, 1998, p. 43). 
The arguments in favour of reflexive modernization are certainly controversial. 
According to Beck it is fruitful to work out these differences through the following 
questions: 1) who is the subject of reflexive modernization; 2) what is the medium; 3) 
what are the consequences; and 4) what is considered the motor of reflexive 
modernization? In their answers to these questions, the differences between Beck, 
Giddens and Lash are not so great. The subjects are individual and collective actors, each 
related to structures. The medium is knowledge in its different forms. The consequences 
are characterized by Giddens with terms such as “disembedding” and “re-embedding,” by 
Beck with “individualization,” and by Lash with “aestheticization” and “community 
formations.” The motor of reflexive modernization is not a new process of modernization, 
but the global and reflexive feature of the capitalistic and democratic Western model 
(Beck, 1994, p. 175). 
Information and communication structures actually form an essential factor in reflexive 
modernity or autopoiesis, through which also democracy can be restructured. Governing 
capacities lie in both interventions and forms of social-political interaction. However, 
according to all the thinkers referred to here, reflexivity gives prosperous possibilities for 
the political system in spite of the fact that internally and externally, so it seems, the 
political is losing both its polarizing and its creative, utopian quality.  
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4. Mediazation 
Thompson (1995) has characterized the interaction between social organizations in face-
to-face communication, technically mediated interaction and mediated quasi-interaction. 
Furthermore Thompson (1990) argues that the mediazation of culture is a fundamental 
constitutive feature of modern societies.  
Social life is today increasingly made up forms of interaction which are not face-to-face 
in character. The rise of new kinds of “action at a distance” is one of the consequences of 
mediazation. The quasi-interaction created by television has led to discontinuous space-
time experience and people are like space-time travellers. Dan Steinbock (1990) has also 
analyzed television’s dramatization of political life from the same starting point. This fact 
has its impacts in politics, too, since the relationship between elected and electors is more 
or less mediated. Richard Sennet (1978) puts it: “one sees more and interacts less” (p. 
284).
Mediazation, according to Garnham (1992), raises two separate problems. Once 
communication is mediated, universal equalities (freedom of assembly and freedom to 
impart and receive information) can no longer be guaranteed. In mediated 
communication, access is dependent on resources. Moreover, the content of 
communications is mediated and, indeed, our very identities are mediated by the 
communications resources. 
4.1. Development of Mediated Communication 
The trends which have shaped the modern media, and particularly the media industries, 
have also affected the environment of the exercise of power – both challenging and 
threatening the public sphere. These trends are, according to Thompson (1995):  
• the transformation of media institutions into large-scale commercial concerns;  
• the globalization of communication; and 
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• the development of electronically mediated forms of communication.  
First, multinational, large-scale communications conglomerates have played an 
increasingly significant role in the media domain. The spectrum within these media 
production conglomerates includes newspapers and magazines, television, film, music 
and even theme parks. But even corporations that are not directly involved in media 
production can influence cultural activities through their role as advertisers and sponsors.  
According to Habermas (1989), the press has concentrated more on its commercial 
potential. Both the process of commercialization and the commodification of the press 
have been accompanied by a decline in the political press. For Habermas, the birth of a 
culture-consuming public signifies the structural transformation of the literary sphere into 
the terrain of the mass media.  
Commodification in Marxist tradition means the transformation of relationships into 
commercial relationships, i.e. relationships of buying and selling. Peter Golding and 
Graham Murdock argue that “the history of the modern communication media is not only 
an economic history of their incorporation into a capitalist economic system, but also a 
political history of their increasing centrality to the exercise of full citizenship” (Golding 
& Murdock, 1996, p. 18). 
The rise of communications conglomerates has reduced the diversity of cultural goods. 
Those who survive in the competition for market share offer similar products and 
similarly tested editorial formulas. With digital technology, diversity and opportunity 
among the masses to communicate and participate in the information economy is said to 
be greater, but in reality the power of the media moguls does not diminish. This is 
because: 
power will lie with those who own the key building blocks of new communication 
systems, the rights to the key pieces of technology and even more importantly, the 
right to the cultural materials – the films, books, images, sounds, writings – that 
will be used to put together the new services. (ibid. p. 21) 
Historically, state interventions have made it possible to influence the development of the 
communications industry through regulation and various forms of public subsidy to 
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ensure diversity of cultural production. In spite of this, concentration and conglomerate 
ownership have increased in all media. According to Golding (1996 b), ever increasing 
incentives drive the complex of privatization, globalization and regulation, and certainly 
the composition and nature of the current telecommunications market environment. So-
called horizontal and vertical integration of ownership have also increased. For example, 
Microsoft has captured an eighty percent share of the word processor market. The 
dilemma is, as someone recently said: “The problem is that you cannot have less 
government interference and less Gates at the same time” (Barney, 2000, p. 120). 
In Finland the media have also concentrated. SanomaWSOY and Almamedia are the 
major media conglomerates. Sanoma Group (also translated as Corporation), an 
independent subsidiary of SanomaWSOY Corporation, is the leading Finnish and Nordic 
media corporation listed publicly. SanomaWSOY’s companies have a long history in the 
Finnish media: the publisher Werner Söderström Corporation (WSOY) was founded in 
1878 and the newspaper company Sanoma in 1889. Today, SanomaWSOY’s 
five divisions cover a broad field from news and information to books, television and 
entertainment, and it operates in 16 European countries.  
The Sanoma Group is one of the five divisions and publishes major newspapers in 
Finland, as well as providing a range of financial information services, and commercial 
printing. Helsingin Sanomat is the Nordic region’s largest daily newspaper, reaching over 
1.2 million people daily. Ilta-Sanomat, its tabloid afternoon paper, is Finland’s second-
largest newspaper, Taloussanomat, a newspaper concentrated on economy and business, 
and, as Kymen Lehtimedia, the Group also publishes some regional papers, including 
Etelä-Saimaa, Kymen Sanomat and Kouvolan Sanomat. Sanoma Group’s net sales were 
€443.3 million in 2003, while the operating profit was €69.4 million (out of a total €2 434 
million for SanomaWSOY, and an operating profit of €205.2 million), (www.sanoma.fi , 
www.sanomawsoy.fi ).
Almamedia or Alma Media (Alma) is a media company listed on the Helsinki Exchanges, 
and its main businesses are newspaper publishing (Alpress), production and distribution 
of business information, television and radio broadcasting, new media and printing. It is 
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involved in television, through the channels MTV3 and Subtv, and commercial radio, 
through the station Radio Nova. It publishes the leading business paper Kauppalehti, the 
leading newspaper in the Tampere region the Aamulehti and the growing afternoon 
tabloid Iltalehti. Many leading provincial, local and town newspapers also belong to 
Almamedia, of which the dailies include Satakunnan Kansa, Lapin Kansa, Kainuun 
Sanomat, Pohjolan Sanomat. Net sales for Alpress were €200 million in 2003, with an 
operating profit of €30 million (out of Almamedia group’s total of €460.5 million net 
sales and operating profit of €17.7 million) (www.almamedia.fi ). 
There are actually three major players in the Finnish media, since apart from the Sanoma 
Group and Almamedia there is also the Finnish Broadcasting Company. However, the 
Finnish Broadcasting Company has no newspapers of its own and it has to take care of 
public service broadcasting, and also carries the main responsibility for launching new 
technology, including digitalization.  
Ilkka Ruostetsaari (1998) has shown in his research that the media in Finland has indeed 
depoliticized, as Habermas (1989) has argued in general terms, described above. In 1946, 
the proportion of newspapers appearing at least three times a week which could be 
considered politically neutral was one-third, and in 1990 the proportion was two-thirds. 
According to Maria-Kaisa Aula (1991) the political press has lost its position but also 
journalists consider themselves to be more neutral politically than before.  
However, Finns are still great readers. Finland has a large number of newspapers in 
proportion to its population and statistically ranks third in the world for the total 
newspaper circulation in relation to the population. More than nine out of ten Finns read a 
newspaper daily, and adults spend about 40 minutes a day reading the paper 
(www.sanomalehdet.fi/_en/tietoa). This fact underlines the importance of the public 
sphere as a domain of democracy. 
The second trend is globalization. The globalization of communications has reordered the 
nature of space and time. Telegraphs, news agencies, and technological innovations have 
made it possible to transmit large quantities of information. Cable infrastructures, use of 
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satellites, and digitalization have together promoted the expansion of the global market. 
The globalization of communication, however, has also been an uneven process. There 
are great variations and inequalities in terms of access to the global networks of 
communication, so that some parts of the world are connected, while others are not. Two 
out of every three human beings living on our globe has never made a telephone call. 
Yet an asymmetrical flow of information and communication products within the global 
system is today’s reality, a one-way-traffic in news and entertainment from the major 
exporting countries to rest of the world. This was already the case when Kaarlo 
Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis did their studies, published in 1974 in the Journal of 
Communication. Herbert Schiller (1969) has also shown that American cultural 
imperialism has become a trans-national corporate cultural domination.
However, this argument has its limitations. Liebes and Katz have, for example, studied 
the reception of Dallas among different ethnic groups. These kinds of studies have shown 
that the reception and appropriation of media products are complex social processes 
which vary between the groups. The experiences of soap operas vary and are closely 
linked to cultural background of the viewers (Thompson 1995). Within a culture, too, 
readings vary widely and the feminist approach has, for instance, underlined “feminine 
discourse” in soap operas like Dallas. Soap operas cannot be interpreted only by concepts 
of cultural imperialism. There are similarities with women’s talk or gossip, a part of 
women’s culture that exists alongside dominant culture (van Zoonem, 1996, p. 40).  
Thirdly, the use of electronically mediated communication has also shaped the role of 
communications and information in the modern world. As technology seems to guide the 
present development of communication it is worth referring to Darin Barney (2000), who 
uses the myth of the titan Prometheus, the fire-giver, as an analogy. With this comparison 
Barney wants to underline the dilemma of our modern time. Beings who recognize their 
limits can use instruments such as fire – or in modern times, computer networks and other 
forms of electronically mediated communication – in healthy and responsible ways. In the 
age of digital networks, Prometheus is unbound.  
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Barney also argues that network technology encourages the collapse of the distinction 
between information and communication. As an example he refers the World Wide Web 
(www, or the Web) and all the potential options linked to web-business. He portrays 
computer networks as merely media of transaction rather than as media of interaction 
(ibid, pp. 92-97). With this argument Barney considers that information society is 
capitalist society or in other words, a class society. Bits are the currency of universal 
capitalism. According to Barney, it is important to understand both the nature and depth 
of the changes that network technology has brought to the operation of capitalist 
economies, as well as that computer networks are much more than means of production. 
They are also the means of control, the means of labour, and the means of exchange and 
consumption. 
Barney’s argumentation is convincing. The belief that new information technology could 
solve the problems linked to quality of discourse or the quantity of participation in the 
public sphere is of course not true. Technology itself does not do anything; on the 
contrary, it is used. It is a means of production. Many interesting questions arise. One of 
them is access to the new network society, one of the key bases of equality of our modern 
society. This question even has its links to the case of Sonera (see Chapter 9) and to the 
Finnish concept of the information society. However, in spite of new knowledge and 
techniques, mankind is facing the same basic questions as always: what is right, what is 
wrong, what is good life, and also should politics try to give answers to these everlasting 
puzzles? 
The feminist approach to the development of mediated communication is based on the 
fact that women are under-represented both in newspapers and in television programmes, 
especially in the daily news, though they are over-represented in advertisements (Beasley 
& Gibbons, 1977). According to Pippa Norris, women are seen as less credible by the 
media, especially on traditionally sex-typed issues like crime or defense although, at the 
same time, they may be perceived as more credible on issues like the family, welfare and 
education. These stereotypes are seen particularly in the political arena (Norris, 1997, p. 
14).
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Barrie Gunter (1995) has studied television and gender representation. Generally the 
findings support the idea that women are under-represented in media and that certain 
gender-based stereotyping is usual. But Gunter also noticed that women tend to be 
younger than men and were picked for their physical attractiveness. In the field of politics 
and the way in which women were seen in the television news, the problem was that 
women were not very visible either as reporters or as news-makers. Women were less 
interviewed on current-affairs television programmes than men, also in Finland.  
In a recent study, made in the United States, men still dominate the news. 85% of front-
page references were about men and half of the women in the newspapers were in the 
position of the victim or perpetrator of a crime. Only 1% of front-page political stories 
were about female politicians. However, the studies also confirm that the portrayals of 
female politicians and candidates seem to be more positive than those of their male 
counterparts. At the same time this can be a risk: expectations are also higher (Whitaker, 
1999). It is quite obvious that the percentage of front-page political stories about female 
politicians is much higher in Nordic countries than in the United States, though it is also 
clear that men still dominate the news. 
Norris (1997) studied what kind of public image and response women political leaders 
have worldwide. This is an area where more studies are needed, but certain common 
elements were found anyway. Firstly, the headlines stressed how important a 
breakthrough any woman leader’s position was to all women. Secondly, the common 
journalistic framework was to see women leaders as ‘outsiders’. Their rise to power is 
often seen as unexpected, and the prior experience of women leaders is often downplayed 
or undervalued. Lastly, women leaders were widely portrayed as agents of change, 
symbolizing a break with conventional politics. This frame is very positive for women 
leaders, especially if people want a change from the past, but it might also be a potentially 
negative one, if it raises false expectations about what the new leader can achieve (ibid. 
pp. 164, 165). 
Agenda-setting is also important. Understanding the dynamics of agenda-setting is central 
to understanding the dynamics of contemporary democracy (McCombs, 1997). Agenda-
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setting has its everyday effects on the exercise of power, making and shaping the agenda 
of politics. There are two major assumptions which drive agenda-setting research. The 
first is that the news media do not mirror reality, but instead filter and shape it. Indeed, 
journalists actually choose what issues and events will be covered and how they are to be 
covered. The second major assumption is that a particular emphasis by the media leads 
the public into perceiving the issues that they select as more important than others. This 
latter assumption is the basis for the agenda-setting hypothesis. It also underlines that 
agenda-setting is a type of social learning in which media consumers take part as active 
participants in a form of reflexivity.  
Conclusions suggest that education is especially influential among the demographic 
variables affecting respondents’ attitudes towards the perceived believability of the news 
media. Level of education also affected people’s interest in politics, their level of 
interpersonal communication, their exposure to news media, and finally, their 
susceptibility to agenda-setting influences. The strongest influence was the psychological 
variable, political interest. This underlines the fact that agenda-setting is not only a 
process of social learning, but also a highly active process (Wanta, 1997, p. 55). 
Highly educated individuals understand the significance of coverage in the news media 
and, thus, are more susceptible to influences related to coverage of issues in the media. 
Less educated individuals are less efficient in understanding the significance of issue 
coverage and, thus, are less likely to show the impact of strong efforts at agenda-setting. 
Wanta argues further, in a very interesting way, that if agenda-setting is really the process 
of social learning, the most efficient learners are those individuals who are highly 
educated, and who are highly motivated to learn information about important issues 
because of a strong personal interest in politics (ibid, pp. 55-57). 
People expect reading to be more difficult, and learn less from viewing because they 
expect to expend far less effort when watching television (see Salomon, 1979). This also 
suggests that we can expect a far stronger agenda-setting impact via newspapers than via 
television. It is also worth mentioning that the average sound-bite – that is uninterrupted 
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speech by a politician in primetime television news – has dropped from the average 42.3 
seconds in 1968 to 9.8 seconds in 1988 (Pilger, 1998). 
4.2. The New Ethos of Journalism  
Hannu Nieminen (1997) translates Habermas’s analysis of communication and media into 
two movements: the evolution of editorial versus productional journalism, e.g. the 
development of the press, and the evolution of print versus electronic media, e.g. the 
development of communications technology. The first movement covers the formative 
stage of the press from the 17th to the early 19th century, following a period of editorial 
journalism with two major types of press, moral-cultural and political-critical, and 
moving finally to the over-developed stage of the press, from the mid 19th to the 20th
century, including two variations of the use of the media: the promotional, including both 
political communication and commercial opinion-management, and the productional, in 
which the media become just another product/service among other commodities with no 
specific value of their own. The second movement covers the period of oral 
communications, the pre-literary or quasi-oral mode period associated with the birth of 
the press, the genuine literary period combined with the evolution of “editorial press” (i.e. 
the editor acted as an interpreter of public opinion), the commercialised press period, 
which led to the change of the function of editors as they lost their roles as interpreters, 
and finally the advent of the electronic media period, which means the evolution of new 
forms of audio-visual communications. In this scenario, the public has no opportunity to 
answer or to disagree (pp. 59-62). 
It is very obvious, according to Nieminen, that the only mode of communication fulfilling 
Habermas’s criteria of rational-critical public debate is that of the editorial-literary media, 
and within it, the political-critical variant. As parties came to dominate politics and as 
state and society grew increasingly typically intertwined, the material conditions for the 
old sort of public sphere vanished. The new version of representative publicity responded 
to a democratic broadening of the constituency of the public – at the cost of its internal 
democratic functioning.  
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In response, the relationship between publisher and editor has changed. Editorial activity, 
once a literary activity, has become a journalistic one: “The selection of material became 
more important than the lead article; the processing and evaluation of news, its screening 
and organization more urgent than the advocacy of a ‘line’ through an effective literary 
presentation” (Habermas, 1989, pp. 185-186). However, the changes in the newspaper 
publishing industry were small compared to those of the new media (film, radio and 
television) industries of the twentieth century. No longer playing an active role, the public 
was forced to adopt a passive one as spectators rather than participants (Nieminen, 1997, 
p. 33). 
Another approach to analyzing the change in journalism is offered by Olof Petersson 
(1996). His starting point is the statement that: the degree to which one has power is 
typically the degree to which one has access to information on one’s society. It is also a 
question of power about who can impact on the way in which people form their picture of 
world and create their own myths of who they are, where they come from and were they 
are going to.  
In agrarian society it was very clear that the church dominated the creation of these 
myths. And it was the political system, according to Petersson (1996), which took this 
power from the church and continued to manipulate it in the industrial society. However, 
the political system has lost its capacity to interpret the world in a cogent fashion for its 
constituents. In this gap within today’s information society, journalism has taken over this 
power and assumed the role of mythmakers. Petersson argues that journalism is 
successful at bringing things to light or identifying the misuse of power. However, he 
feels that the media is not as successful in interpreting our histories or giving guidance 
about how to live within our societies.  
The formation of journalism as a profession and the new ethos of journalism seem to 
highlight two ideals – factuality and entertainment. Factuality or how the news media 
work to define the ideological limits of “truth” can be examined by exploring how 
journalists produce news accounts (Allan, 1999). However, it is obvious that some 
journalists and some sectors of the press have always given greater emphasis to 
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entertainment and storytelling than to the ideal of gathering facts. Politics offers stories, 
dramas and excitement in a manner similar to that of theatre or sports. This tendency 
towards entertainment appears also as tabloidization in news production. According to 
Tom Rosenstiel (1994), the reasons are twofold:  the first is that networks feel they must 
account in their broadcasts for what the public is learning from other sources; the second 
is more complex but, to put it in a nutshell, it is the surest and most efficient way to add to 
the economic value of the news division (p. 38). 
Actually the networks of politicians, electors and media form a triangle. According to 
Pekka Isotalus (1998), the most important part of this relationship is the relation between 
the people and politicians, which is built around sharing the same destiny. Politicians 
need the support of the people to exercise power, since the support of the electors 
legitimates this power. The electors need the media to get information on politicians and 
politics – information that extends far beyond the life of politicians (p. 245).  
Riitta Jallinoja (1997) characterizes this need as a need for common destiny. When a 
politician or public person, a celebrity, tells us about his or her life, it gives the ordinary 
citizen an opportunity to share their life experience in the same manner. For the politician, 
it offers the possibility to increase their popularity. As a matter of fact politicians and 
politics offer significantly rich material for the media. However, politicians also need the 
media to get information on the expectations or wishes of their electorate, and the agenda 
of politics typically reflects these expectations.  
For the media, the electors are recipients and consumers. This tendency was referred to 
above as commodification. As a result of competition between various media and media 
conglomerates, these consumers are offered the “products” they are most interested in, a 
phenomenon characterized above as tabloidization. For example, if the watchers of 
television programmes prefer short commentary or political conflict between debating 
political leaders instead of longer discussions on specific items, these are provided. 
Diversity is threatened. However, Isotalus (1998) underlines that very often the media 
assumes more about expectations than they actually know by research or experience. 
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The relationship between politicians and the media is dialectical. On one hand, politicians 
need the publicity; on the other hand, there is a need to regulate the integrity of the 
message’s publicness. This is also the dilemma between politicians and journalists: 
should they be friends or gamble on identifying with the winner. Erkki Karvonen (1997) 
characterizes this dilemma: “Whatever the politician is doing, he or she can always be 
accused of being an excellent or a poor salesman. If politicians are flattering journalists, 
they are punished; if they refuse to flatter, they are also punished” (”Tekipä poliitikko niin 
tai näin, aina häntä voidaan syyttää myymisen kyvykkyydestä tai sitten kyvykkyyden 
puutteesta. Jos liehittelet meitä, saat rangaistuksen; mutta jos et liehittele meitä, saat 
myös rangaistuksen”) (p. 278). 
According to Isotalus (1998), it is the politician’s decision what kind of treatment he or 
she will tolerate and where he or she draws the line as to how much abuse or flattery is 
acceptable. The question is how to be an expert but not too superior; how to be an 
ordinary person but still admired; how to please everybody but at the same time be a 
voice for those who are silent or otherwise under-represented. Given this contradiction, it 
is very difficult to find the balance (ibid. p. 249). However, I agree with Isotalus. It is up 
to politics and politicians to make their own rules and be taken seriously as value-based 
dialogical communicators. It is up to politics and politicians to avoid entertainment and 
show business in politics.  
In this same vein, Petersson argues in favour of continuous media critique. This is 
important because, like politicians, the media is projecting power by its role as mediator 
between politicians and electors. Yrsa Stenius, a former editor of Aftonbladet, has on 
several occasions argued in favour of media critique which should organize itself as an 
internal expression accompanying every editorial. She has used the metaphor of “devil’s 
advocate” to underline the need for somebody who has the courage to take a critical 
perspective when reporting upon political drama and its heroes and rogues. 
The importance of media watch groups as an instrument of media critique is also 
underlined in Edward Silva’s (1995) research. While reading through a longish item in 
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the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail, Silva came to the sudden realization that 
almost the entire story, including the associated quotations, was from the same source.  
He presents useful and interesting frameworks for the analysis of newspapers. These 
frameworks are the “instrumental” and the “social construction” framework. In the 
instrumentalist perspective the mass media are seen to be more or less tools or 
instruments of their owners, managers, and patrons. These owners, managers and patrons 
use the media to produce both ideology and profits. Those who reject instrumentalism 
argue instead that the news is socially constructed in such manner that the news-shaping 
influence of its owners and advertisers is virtually non-existent. The general social 
constructionist’ view of the media is that the organizational and market realities of media 
production significantly and socially constrain or inhibit the outcomes, including 
whatever ideological manipulation might have been routinely undertaken by its owners 
and advertisers (ibid. p. 16). 
In Silva’s summing up he describes how the synthesis of social construction and 
instrumentalist ideas has produced useful tools to analyze media coverage. Silva 
recommends that it is important to follow up media representations more systematically 
and with greater sophistication. It is also important that those entities monitoring the news 
should report their data on press unfairness on a regular basis both to the industry as 
whole and to other media-watch groups (Silva.1995, p. 93). 
Another angle on media critique is offered by Paul Rutherford (2000) who claims that 
even if the public sphere has retained its discursive character, propaganda now shapes and 
suppresses debate. The sphere remains an arena for the production of public opinion that 
is given concrete form by surveys and polls. The public sphere is filled with ever-
increasing doses of promotion manufactured by a relatively small circle of interests. 40 
per cent of all the news in American newspapers had its origin in press releases (p. 259). 
He also argues that the success of marketing as a philosophy and an apparatus has not yet 
driven the public sphere into a total shame. On the contrary he suggests a medical analogy 
to illustrate the position: “Civic advocacy constitutes a kind of virus which debilitates the 
body politic” (p. 274). 
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4.3 Political Scandals  
Public conflicts between politicians and the mass media are common and actually one of 
the consequences of the aspect of entertainment. Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) estimate 
that conflicts are role-bonded and therefore lasting phenomena. Very often politicians 
claim that the media has too much power in society. Indeed, conflicts, sometimes leading 
to scandals, are struggles over symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake 
(Thompson, 2000, p. 245). 
Terhi Lehtinen (1997) describes the relationship with the terms symbiosis and exchange, 
but also, like Thompson, power struggle. In Finland, President Mauno Koivisto used the 
metaphor of a swarm of lemmings to give his impression of the new journalistic ethos. 
The former leader of the Social Democratic Party, Kalevi Sorsa – at that time also Prime 
Minister of Finland – used the term “infocracy” to criticize the power of the media. Later 
he developed his argument with respect to the media to highlight certain tendencies, 
speaking of “media temptations” and putting journalists into the same category as 
students who tease each other at school (Uimonen, 1996, pp. 35-36).  
The management of visibility is an ancient political art, having its roots in what has been 
considered public and private, analyzed in the context of the Occidental tradition. For 
example, one can define “public” and “private” to mean open or not available, visible to 
the public or not observable by the public, what is or is not performable in front of 
spectators, or what is or is not open for a large audience to see, hear or hear about. In this 
scenario, what is private is what is hidden from view, what is said or done in privacy, in 
secrecy, or among a restricted circle of people. In this sense the dichotomy has to do with 
publicness versus privacy, with openness versus secrecy, with visibility versus invisibility 
(Thompson, 1995). 
Richard Sennett (1978) also analyzes the paradox of visibility and isolation in modern 
public life in his The Fall of Public Man. In particular, the erosion of public life can be 
seen in politics. According to Sennett, we are likely to describe as a “credible” or 
“charismatic” leader someone who can appeal to groups whose interests are alien to his or 
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her own beliefs: “In modern politics it would be a suicide for a leader to insist: forget 
about my private life; all you need to know about me is how good a legislator or 
executive I am and what action I intend to take in office” (p. 25). 
The development of the printed and, especially, the electronic media has changed the 
nature of publicness. Prior to the development of the mass media, political leaders were 
invisible to most of the people over whom they ruled. Today, political leaders must be 
prepared to adapt their activities to a new kind of visibility which works in completely 
new ways, and on a different scale (Thompson, 1995, p. 120). The rendering of power has 
become far more visible, the decision-making more public – though by no means are 
these broad trends anywhere near uniform or complete. Conducting governance requires a 
continuous process of decision-making regarding what is to be made public, to whom, 
when and how. In general, the exercise of power in modern societies remains in many 
ways shrouded in secrecy and hidden from the public gaze (ibid. p. 125). 
On one hand, the rise of mediated visibility may make it more difficult for those who 
exercise political power to do so secretly behind closed doors. Hence it may, under 
certain institutional conditions, render the exercise of political power more open and 
accountable to all members of an electorate. But on the other hand, as mentioned above, 
the uncontrollable character of mediated visibility also gives a rise to a new kind of 
political fragility. Governments racked by scandal, political leaders struggling to limit the 
damage caused by leaks and disclosures, and other forms of public disappointment 
nourish the suspicion and cynicism that many people feel towards politicians and their 
institutions.  
Thompson (1995) has analyzed gaffes and outbursts associated with such visibility. These 
problems stem not from incompetence or loss of control, but rather from misjudgement 
with respect to the ways in which a performance would be received and understood by the 
people who watch and listen to it. The risk of backfire is all the greater when there is a 
wide divergence of interests.  
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Leaks and outburst can be understood as breakdown in the attempt to manage the relation 
between “front region” and “back region” behaviour, in the terms used in the work of 
Goffman (1971). Scandals have become an essential feature of social and political life, 
and have been interwoven with the development of mediated communication and 
visibility. But they also have their roots in changes in the public domain and transformed 
boundaries between the public and private spheres. A scandal is a kind of narrative with 
multiple plots and subplots. Most scandals are a complex of events and therefore the 
unfolding of the scandal is often like a cat-and-mouse game. 
Gossip, rumours and scandals differ from each other, although they can be associated 
with each other. According to Thompson (2000), gossiping takes place between friends or 
acquaintances. It is an activity through which the social relationships are continuously 
reworked and it is commonly exchanged in contexts of face-to-face interaction. Gossip 
columns assume that readers have an intimate relation to the persons and that readers 
know quite a lot about these people. But this is of course a one-sided and non-reciprocal 
type of intimacy. Like gossip, rumours fuel scandal. Rumours can achieve a level at 
which it is difficult to ignore them.  
The current usage of scandal refers to actions, events or circumstances which have, 
according to Thompson, the following characteristics:  
• their occurrence or existence involves the transgression of certain values, norms or 
moral codes; there are some types of norm which are more scandal-sensitive than 
others; norms and moral codes related to sexuality, financial transactions and 
power exercising are particularly prone to scandal; 
• their occurrence or existence involves an element of secrecy or concealment, but 
they are known or strongly believed to exist by individuals other than those 
directly involved; that is why non-participant knowledge is a necessary condition 
of scandal; therefore scandals are often characterized by a drama of concealment 
and disclosure; 
• some non-participants disapprove of the actions or events and may be offended by 
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the transgression; transgression is a morally discreditable action which is 
expressed to others;
• some non-participants express their disapproval by publicly denouncing the  
actions or events; ‘opprobrious’ discourse carries the implication about shameful  
action; 
• the disclosure and condemnation of the actions or events may damage the 
reputation of the individuals responsible for them; reputation is a valuable 
resource that individuals can accumulate, cultivate and protect; it is also a fragile 
resource.
(Thompson, 2000, pp. 13-24). 
Thompson describes the phases of scandal: the pre-scandal phase, the phase of the 
scandal proper, the culmination, and the aftermath. The pre-scandal may involve inquiries 
carried out by journalists, the police or others. It may also involve the publication of 
information which turns out to be relevant to a scandal or it may be characterized by 
rumour. The scandal proper begins with the public disclosure of an event or action. The 
individuals at the centre of the scandal may believe that if they firmly and repeatedly deny 
their involvement, the scandal will gradually die out. They may, for example, accuse 
journalists of muck-raking. On the other side, journalists may think that by keeping 
pressure on and making new connections, they will succeed in forcing the individuals 
involved in the scandal to admit their culpability. The culmination can be resignation or 
confession which is very dramatic by its nature. But it can also be less dramatic, so that 
public interest just fades out. The final phase is the aftermath – the period when the high 
drama of the scandal has passed and when journalists, politicians and others engage in 
interpretation. Much of this commentary takes place in the media. Perhaps even memoirs 
are written (ibid. pp. 73-77). 
Thompson refers to Markovits and Silverstein who argue that political scandals can only 
arise in liberal democracies.  
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The critical feature of any political scandal is not the degree of personal gain 
involved nor is it the normative merit of the ends sought, but rather it is the 
presence of any activity that seeks to increase political power at the expense of 
process and procedure… That, in a nutshell, is why political scandals can only 
take place in liberal democracies. (ibid. p. 92)  
Thompson characterizes the new environment of political actors as being more intensive, 
more extensive and less controllable. The intensiveness is linked to an ever-increasing 
volume of symbolic material, the extensiveness to a worldwide spread of recipients, and 
the lessening of controllability to the fact that political leaders are more visible to more 
people and, at the same time, more vulnerable to the risk that actions or utterances that are 
supposed to be private will be disclosed in the public domain. The growing legalization of 
political life also explains the increasing prevalence of political scandal. As traditional 
class-based party politics has significantly weakened and it is also difficult for people to 
understand the complexity of our modern world, the politics of trust becomes increasingly 
important. 
Giddens (1990) clarifies the distinction between trust and confidence, following the 
argument of Luhmann, by giving an example: “ In a situation of confidence, a person 
reacts to disappointment by blaming others; in circumstances of trust, he or she must 
partly shoulder the blame – and therefore, may regret having placed trust in someone or 
something” (ibid. p. 31). Attitudes of trust are connected to the psychological security of 
individuals and groups. Trust and security, risks and dangers, intertwine. The antithesis of 
trust is not distrust, but rather, a state of mind which could be best described as existential 
angst (ibid. p. 100).  
The need for trust indicates the fact that the character of a political leader is important. 
Thompson (2000) calls this “character reputation” distinguishing it from “skill-specific 
reputation”. However, reputation can take a long time to accumulate and it is intrinsically 
contestable. Reputation is a resource which is not depleted through use. It is, though, a 
very fragile resource and, if seriously and substantially damaged, very difficult to restore. 
In the field of politics, good reputation is important and a vital source of symbolic power 
(pp. 248-250).  
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Politics needs its stars. Sennett (1978) noted that the star system makes politics vulnerable 
and therefore it has its connections with political scandals. The star system of politics 
works on three principles. First, behind-the-scenes political power is strongest when the 
power brokers concentrate on a few politicians to promote, rather than on building a 
political organization. The second attribute required in order to gain maximum power is 
to limit the public exposure of a particular politician; the fewer times they appear, the 
more they appeal. The third principle is a zero-sum game. Whatever power a politician 
gains through arousing interest in his or her personality will lessen the interest of the 
public in other politicians (ibid. p. 292). 
But visibility, as well the star system, is a double-edged sword. As Thompson (2000) has 
put it:
The more visible you are, the more vulnerable you may be, because more 
visibility will generate more interest from the media, however much you wish to 
manage your self-presentation through the media, you cannot completely control 
it. (p. 108) 
It is no wonder that image-building has become part of the art of politics. Marketing has 
become one of the key buzz-words of today’s politics. Politicians – and even political 
parties – have evolved as commodities, much as toothpaste or shampoo. According to 
Risto Uimonen (1996), politicians have become trademarks which cannot be 
distinguished from each other according to their values or ideologies, but rather according 
to their images and designed imagos. Images are produced because they are tools with 
which political power and effectiveness can be achieved, by which the attitudes and 
development of society can be influenced, by which their interests can be promoted, and 
by which one can make money (pp. 22-23). 
Bruce Brendan (1992) claims that the difference between the three key disciplines of 
personal image, marketing and news management is only dimly understood. Physical 
appearance, background and personality are combined to produce an image. In this 
scenario, there are several matters which are important: body language, the property 
which is carried (like jewellery, handbag), the look (for example, Kennedy, Nixon and 
Reagan never wore glasses on television), the way one speaks and so on. When using 
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modern marketing techniques in order to gain power, the effect of research and polls is 
important. In creating brands, a clear analysis of what the brand is for is equally vital. 
Whether the product or message is a political party or a person, the essential questions to 
answer are: who is it for, why should anyone choose one party or another?  
The need for news management has led to the emergence of news managers, and “spin-
doctoring” – the manipulation of the message with a specific intent – is vital, particularly 
in the case of media-centric hazards such as awkward leaks. Media lobbyists are needed 
in shaping news. For a politician it is difficult to get the message across and be 
remembered on television. At the same time, because of the challenges of managing high-
impact communicators, it is also difficult to achieve one particular spin without other 
unwanted spin or messages being transmitted. Brendan underlines that politicians do not 
lie because their image builders say so. Rather, it is only human to use the various 
artifices at one’s disposal – including exaggeration – to create the illusion of one’s reality, 
much as actors do (Brendan, 1992). 
Risto Uimonen, a representative of the media himself, has studied the images of several 
Finnish politicians. He estimates that the former Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, was, 
during his time, a master of both dramatizing political events and very capable of 
producing headlines. Markku Koski, who has also studied Sorsa, wrote: “His character is 
as fluid and unclear as the pictures on television and the prices at the supermarket. We 
formulate his character every night, again and again” (”Hänen hahmonsa on samaan 
tyyliin virtaava ja epävakaa kuin televisiokuva ja supermarkettien hinnat. Me 
määrittelemme hänet joka ilta yhä uudestaan”) (Uimonen, 1992, p. 290).  
The former President of Finland, Mauno Koivisto, is said to be a typical media-politician 
who was very clever in his use of television. He has a particularly strong screen presence. 
Uimonen characterizes the image of Koivisto as a “media wolf in sheep’s clothing” (ibid. 
p. 318). Former Prime Minister Esko Aho’s image was described as the “Kennedy of 
Kannus”. His media strategy, according to Uimonen, was both modern and up-to-date. 
Aho himself said that his government had to win support for its exercise of power every 
day. 
 70
The researchers referred to here are not sure if a woman can win office better by relying 
on traditional female values or if the world of politics requires women to convert to a 
more manly style. Bruce O. Solheim (2000) claims that best way to understand the 
differences and similarities between men and women is to realize that we differ more as 
individuals than as genders. Nevertheless Anne Koski’s (1994) research is interesting in 
this respect. She studied the images of presidential candidates in Finland during 1994, 
which was the first time in the history of Finland that a female candidate, Elisabeth Rehn, 
a former Minister of Defense, was very close to winning the election.  
Koski argued that Rehn’s image was very much influenced by the fact she had been 
photographed with foreign male colleagues and especially with generals. She had 
trustworthiness and she reached the status of “Man of State”. In the elections of 2000, 
when Tarja Halonen, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, won and became the 
President of Finland, the image in the photographs had been much the same: Halonen 
shaking hands with world leaders, Halonen in important conferences with male politicians 
and so on. In her campaign it was always underlined that she was the most competent 
candidate and the image of photos supported the message. Indeed, the theory of women 
and political power tends to focus on women’s lack of authority and their institutional 
powerlessness, while women’s political practice shows that they are, to an increasing 
degree, being mobilized as decision-makers (Raaum, 1999, p. 25). 
Image building and marketing have come to have so much influence on the atmosphere of 
political life that it is now said, in Marshall McLuhan’s phrase, that the “medium is the 
message” (1964). Douglas Davis challenges this claim. His counterargument is that when 
politicians focus on appearance rather than reality, it is no wonder that the medium 
becomes the message. According to him, it seems inconceivable that neither politicians 
nor their managers have yet realized that a cache of critical votes awaits them in the 
discursive forms employed by the marginal streams of voters. Discursive exchange means 
time to talk, to listen, and to reply: the essence of political dialogue. Davis urges us to 
continue to reopen our dialogue and rhetoric, and to keep prodding into temporal 
structures approaching the open quality of the printed page. This might be the last and 
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certainly the least expected destiny for electronic discourse. In the world of political life, 
rhetoric and its associated structures of argument is much more important than “style” or 
“pitch” (Davis, 1993).  
Davis also gives an example of what an alternative election campaign might look like. He 
refers to Lawton Chiles, who used very little money to advertise on television. What he 
did in his advertisements was to ask people to come to their local libraries to meet and 
have discussions with him. Davis argues that the more money that is spent on a campaign, 
the more people become bored and disgusted. This argument seems to be quite relevant. 
In the last presidential election in the United States (2000) more money was used than 
ever. Still, the campaigns of neither George Bush nor Al Gore were successful in 
motivating people to vote and they did not achieve a clear result.  
4.4. Photojournalism 
Today, photographs are an extremely important part of journalism. Photographs are visual 
forms of knowledge, and knowledge is related to centres of social and political power. A 
picture connected to a written piece of news confirms that the matter has really occurred. 
It also confirms that this particular matter is important, since the photo has been 
published. Foucault (1980) underlines that the production of meanings is also the 
production of power. That leads us to the conclusion that a theory on photographs should 
explore, reveal and explain the processes of power-exercising. 
Pictures are non-verbal messages encoding communication in much same manner as are 
the verbal messages of the poet, the novelist, the newspaper reporter or the radio news 
commentator. Since photographs have the potential to create far greater impact than 
words, the photography editor’s selections of which photographs to use is more important 
than the selections a word editor must make. This notion is linked to the new visibility of 
politics. 
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Photography does not simply reproduce reality. It recycles that reality, which is the key 
procedure of modern society (Sontag, 1977, p. 174). The documentary style of 
photography – the claim of journalistic objectivity or even social truth – made its debut in 
Soviet and German journalism of the 1920s and continued in the United States during 
1930s with the rise of photojournalism in magazines such as Life and Look. War 
photography, and photographers such as Robert Capa or Joe Rosenthal, provided a 
ground for photojournalistic reputation. However, our contemporary photojournalists are 
also influenced by Daguerre and the need to record likeness, by Fenton and Brady who 
were inspired to witness history-making events, by Stieglitz and the growth of 
pictorialism and the potentialities of photographs as an art form. The documentary 
dimension has made photojournalists think of content and interpretation. Today 
photojournalism is the synthesis of all elements of the evolution of photography (Hardt, 
1999; Griffin, 1999; Rothstein, 1979). 
In Finland the first news photographs were published in May 1894 when the statue of 
Czar Alexander II was unveiled. The process of developing the photos took seven hours 
and the pictures were published in the newspaper a few days later. However, the use of 
up-to-date photos started at the beginning of the 20th century. When comparing Canadian, 
American and Scandinavian news photographs it is quite easy to make a general 
observation that Scandinavian photojournalism is more descriptive, more eager to show 
what actually happens, while Northern American photojournalism places more emphasis 
on who is doing what. 
Barthes (1977) writes, in his book Image, Music, Text, that “the press photograph is a 
message”. This message consists of a source of emission, a channel of transmission and a 
point of reception. Barthes means that the source of the emission is the staff of the 
newspaper – those who take photos, choose them, compose and treat them, including 
those who give the photo a title, a caption and a commentary. The newspaper itself is the 
point of reception – for the public who reads the paper and at the same time it is a channel 
of transmission. 
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Roland Barthes (1981) uses concepts such as studium, punctum, and noeme as tools with 
which to analyze a photo. Studium is not merely the study: it is to participate in the 
figures, the faces, the actions and the settings. It is to “taste” someone or something. 
Punctum is the conception that something in a photograph pricks you, or piques your 
interest. Very often punctum is a detail, a telling element which attracts attention. Noeme
is about time and refers to that which “has been.” The photograph does not any longer 
necessarily say what is, but only, for certain, what has been. 
When Barthes reviewed certain photographs, especially those in which he did not find a 
punctum in the detail, he called this a “unary” photograph. A photograph is “unary” when 
it imitates “reality” without doubling it or vacillating from it: no duality, no indirection, 
no disturbance. News photographs are very often unary. As Barthes describes it: “I glance 
through them, I do not recall them: no detail (in some corner) ever interrupts my reading: 
I am interested in them (as I am interested in the world), I do not love them” (Barthes, 
1981, p. 41). 
He also tries to answer the question: what is the content of a photographic message, what 
does the photograph transmit? He accords special status to the photographic image: it is 
as message without a code. All imitative arts are compromised of two messages: a 
denoted message which is an analogue itself, and a connoted message, which is the 
manner in which society to a certain extent communicates what it thinks of it. As a 
mechanical analogue of reality, the photograph does not leave room for the development 
of a second-order message. The status of the photograph is purely denotative. But: 
on the other hand, the press photograph is an object that has been worked on, 
chosen, constructed, treated according to professional, aesthetic or ideological 
norms which are so many factors of connotation; while on the other this same 
photograph is not only perceived, received, it is read, connected more or less 
consciously by the public that consumes it to a traditional stock of signs. 
(Barthes, 1977, p. 19) 
Barthes explores the connotation, the second meaning of the photographic message. There 
are some connotation techniques such as trick effects, poses, use of objects, “photogenia”, 
aestheticism and syntax. A very good example of “posing” is a photograph taken of John 
Kennedy during the 1960 election. Kennedy is photographed in a half-length-profile, eyes 
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looking upwards, hands joined together. Barthes suggests that this posing signifies the 
connotations of youthfulness, spirituality, and purity (ibid. pp. 21-25). 
What is it about photographs that attracts people and why do we want to pose? According 
to Edom (1980), some early research (1930s) showed that pictures of babies and children 
had a high overall interest value. In the middle-range appeal there were pictures of travel, 
people, animals, nature, while pictures of sports, society, fashion and finance had low 
overall interest. In more recent research over three thousands photographs were shown in 
order to find the most read categories. They were for example fire, disaster, war, weather, 
major crime, accidents and local government. Low interest were shown towards pictures 
which were linked home and family, fine arts, sports and morals. It was also noticed that 
women were generally more picture-orientated than men. The interest in photos varied 
also according to gender. While 55% of women found home and family pictures 
interesting, only 15% men gave them the same value. Men preferred sports and also 
photographs of events, while women preferred pictures of people. It has been found that 
the effect of a photograph is closely related to the attitude or meaning a person has toward 
the content of the photograph. 
Studies have also shown that photographs are effective in creating attitudes, changing 
attitudes and generally persuading people, although the trouble is that the change is not 
necessarily in the direction wanted. However, a news photograph is more effective in 
producing attitudinal change than a news-story lead with a headline. People look for and 
find meanings in photographs with which they can identify. Readers respond positively to 
pictures related to their everyday life. It was also noticed that educated people are likely 
to have more subjects with which they can identify (Edom, 1980). 
Roland Barthes writes that the nature of photography is to pose. This also explains the 
existence of “noeme”. In the photograph something has posed but in the cinema 
something has passed (p. 78). To put it in other words: 
through being photographed, something becomes a part of system of information, 
fitted in schemes of classification, and storage which range from the crudely 
chronological order of snapshot sequences pasted in family albums to the dogged 
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accumulations and meticulous filing needed for photography’s uses…. 
(Sontag, 1978, p. 156) 
There are some elements that increase the power of the photograph. Several studies have 
shown that the size of the photograph has great importance as well as cropping (or 
masking) of prints, where the picture is improved by eliminating part of the background. 
The positioning of the picture on the page has relevance. According to some studies, it 
does not matter whether pictures are black and white or colour, though, if the photograph 
is a poor one, it is more attractive with colour. The compositional elements are not 
important for ordinary readers, but it has been noticed that lighting angle has significant 
importance, and that the most favourable lighting angle is 45 degrees from the object 
(Edom, 1980; Baynes, 1971). 
Lauri Karvonen, Göran Djupsund and Tom Carlson (1995) have examined in particular 
whether there were differences between men and women’s style of campaigning. The data 
of this study was collected between 1962 and 1991 and it consisted of newspaper 
advertisements. Research classified different styles of visual categories, which were used 
in their empirical analysis. Conclusions were that iconic signs have become more 
important than verbal signs, meaning that emotions are outweighing rationality. There 
were no significant differences between male and female candidates concerning dress, 
and both women and men used straight face pictures. In commercial advertisements 
women tended to smile and in political adverts women also smile broadly, 63% (1991), 
while men seemed to have a more severe smile or neutral expression, though smiling 
increased from 6% (1962) to 37% (1991). In this context it is worth mentioning Valentine 
& Hoar (1998), who give an explanation of why women smile more than men, since 
smiling indicates attentiveness but also submission and approval seeking. 
Annukka Oksanen (1992) who has studied photographs of Finnish politicians found that 
there are some elements which are repeated. First, politicians are photographed as in 
official portraits, where the background is normally official surroundings – the House of 
the Parliament, the Castle of the State Council, or conference rooms. Secondly, the 
politicians in press photographs project only a public life; they are normally male, 
middle-class, neat and in dark suits, and Finnish politicians are controlled and grey as 
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personalities (p. 101). Sami Noponen (1994) underlines that the typical news photo is a 
handshake. It confirms the image of important decisions, but it might also include a lot of 
irony, since the connotation is the theatrical feature of politics.  
The texts under the photos were very open in their guidance. On the level of denotation 
politicians were only male and female but on the level connotation politicians manifest 
the myth of ruling class. Therefore the myth dictates the right type for politicians and 
their appearance. Politicians try to speak through their photos with the language of power-
exercising. Oksanen underlines Kyösti Pekonen’s ideas in her concluding remarks. The 
discourse of political language is the discourse of the exercise of power which is 
legitimized also through photos. The press photographs do not question the political 
system as a structure; the political system is introduced through individual politicians (p. 
104).
Based on these studies some conclusions can be made. In mediated communication visual 
impressions are of the utmost importance both in hot and cool media, in McLuhan’s 
terms. Those who exercise power are very dependent on photos published in newspapers. 
First of all, being photographed is confirmation of importance, and politicians’ 
appearance mediates the symbols of power, which is mediated communication. Secondly, 
a photograph can be used as a tool in image-building, to strengthen the desired message 
given by a politician. Thirdly, in mediated communication, photographs as messages 
increase the fragility of the political system: they are more transparent and open, more 
fragile and unpredictable.  
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5. Globalization 
Held (1999) distinguishes three historical forms of globalization in terms of: firstly, the 
extensiveness of networks of relations and connections; secondly, the intensity of flows 
and levels of activity within these networks; and thirdly, the impact of these phenomena 
on particular bounded communities (p. 92). It is therefore clear for Held that it is the 
forms of globalization that have changed over time and the claim that there once was no 
globalization is not true. I want to emphasize this conclusion, since quite often 
globalization is considered a new phenomenon.  
Nevertheless, globalization is said to be one of the most fundamental consequences of 
modernity. Giddens (1990) underlines the tendency of globalizing to be simultaneously 
extensional and intensional. This tendency connects individuals to macro-systems as “part 
of complex dialectics change at both local and global poles” (p. 177). For Giddens 
globalization is also a major force in the “detraditionalization” of modern society. 
Detraditionalization means that traditions no longer shape our social life in a self-evident 
way. This does not mean that traditions, associated with memory, involving rituals and 
having guardians, disappear, but rather that they have to explain themselves and to 
become more open. Globalization is like “action at distance” – an extension in the spatio-
temporal reach of power (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999).  
Globalization is also said to refer to a mega-trend which embraces social, cultural, 
economic and technological aspects. Globalization is not a single process but a complex 
mixture of processes, which often act in antagonistic ways, producing conflicts and new 
forms of stratification. Even mediated communication, as analyzed in the previous 
chapter, is global and what has been said about democracy is connected to globalization, 
too. For Giddens a larger global order is needed, while, for example, Hirsch, following 
the Marxist tradition, similarly emphasizes the cultivation of a new internationalism.  
However, most commonly, globalization is defined as a process through which an 
increasing proportion of economic, social and cultural transactions take place directly or 
indirectly between parties in different countries. Globalization is therefore understood in a 
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similar way as internationalization. In everyday political debate, globalization is merely a 
myth or fetish to legitimize the absence of any political input in shaping economic and 
social processes.  
Indeed, globalization is mostly concerned with the transformation of space and time. Held 
(1999) underlines that globalization can be understood in relation to a set of processes 
which shift the spatial form of human organization and activity to transcontinental or 
interregional patterns of activity, interaction and exercise of power. On the one hand, 
according to Giddens (1990), day-to-day activities are increasingly influenced by 
happenings on the other side of our globe and, on the other hand, practices and decisions 
can have significant global reverberations. “We are offered a paradoxical universe: 
geography without distance, history without time, value without weight, transactions 
without cash,” as Ursula Huws (1999) has described it. Karl Marx put it in his times: “All 
that is solid melts into air.” 
But not only economic and political dynamics have their global dimensions. Mary Kaldor 
(2000) has identified four relevant political groupings which have different positions 
related to the global civil society. These groupings also give an excellent picture of 
today’s debate on globalization and international civil networks related to it. 
Table 1 
Parochial   Cosmopolitan  
Neoliberal  New Right e.g.  Multinational Corporations 
Thatcher, Pinochet or  International Liberals 
Haider    e.g. Fukuyama 
Redistributionist   Old Left, e.g.   Global Civic Network    
Traditional socialist  e.g. NGOs, Aid Agencies 
parties 
(Kaldor, 2000, p. 109) 
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The first category comprises neoliberal parochialists: those who emphasize national or 
religious identity and traditional values but favour neoliberal economic policies. This type 
of political thinking is typical for the New Right strongly favouring free movement of 
capital but opposing free movement of people. The New Right might take, according to 
Kaldor, the form of traditional political parties but can also be identified in transnational 
networks based on religious fundamentalism or exclusive nationalism.  
The second category is the Old Left that favours the return to a strong state and 
commitment to welfare and full employment. They believe globalization is threatening 
the welfare state and therefore they want to de-globalize. The traditional socialist parties 
along with trade unions (considered to be also NGOs) represent this kind of strategy, 
according to Kaldor.  
The third category consists of new globalizers who believe that free trade and capital 
movements will contribute to wealth. These arguments tend to be expressed by corporate 
executives, centrist politicians, and economic experts. The final category comprises the 
new grouping who argues that globalization is an uneven process. Their concern is not to 
return to the era of the nation state but to regulate the process of globalization at a global 
level and to increase the access of the powerless to global institutions (ibid. p. 110). 
According to Kaldor, it is possible to form two types of successful coalitions in global 
governance. One is between the liberal globalizers and the New Right. This would result 
in an unequal global system, in which nation states would gain a new lease of life. The 
other is between the liberal globalizers and global civic networks, which would result the 
democratization of globalization. If the Old Left has any influence, their role will depend 
on the kind of coalition they choose to make (p. 111). Kaldor has not categorized the New 
Left in a way that I find satisfactory, and I would categorize the New Left with global 
civic networks as having cosmopolitan and redistributionist dimensions. 
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5.1. Effects on Nation States and Regions 
Hirst and Thompson (1996) presuppose that the starting point was a world which was 
made up of distinct and self-sufficient national economies, in other words of independent 
nation states. Globalization leads, according to this argument, to the replacement of an 
inter-national world economy and therefore the globalization process confronts or 
undermines the nation state. However, this argumentation is problematic because 
international transactions have been essential to economic and political dynamics in many 
parts of the world for centuries (Radice, 1999). The challenge faced now is more about 
finding a balance between the global and local than opposing the global. 
Modern democratic theory assumes a symmetry and congruence between citizen-voters 
and national decision-makers. Held (1999) introduces five central points to characterize 
the changing relationship between globalization and democratic nations. First, the locus 
of effective political power is no longer in the hands of national governments. Power is 
shared, bartered, and struggled over by diverse forces at national, regional and 
international levels. Second, neither can the idea of a self-determining collectivism be 
located within the boundaries of the nation state alone: “The system of national political 
communities persists of course; but it is articulated and re-articulated today with complex 
economic, organizational, administrative, legal, and cultural processes and structures 
which limit and check its efficacy” (p. 103). These structures and processes should be 
brought into the political process. Third, there is a set of disjunctures between the formal 
domain of political authority, that is the state, and the actual practices and structures of 
the state and economic system at the regional and global levels. Fourth, there are various 
loyalties which cross the borders of states. The operations of states in complex regional 
and global systems affect both their autonomy and their sovereignty. Fifth, there are new 
types of boundary problems. Powerful states make decisions not just for their people but 
for others as well, so that it is difficult to find out who is responsible for what. 
In a way the nation state, according to Held, withers away. But there is a new possibility 
which means the recovery of participatory democracy at local levels as a complement to 
the public assemblies of the wider global order. It is a political order of democratic 
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associations, cities, and nations as well as of regions and global networks. The 
cosmopolitan model of democracy is a legal basis for a divided and global authority 
system which is delimited by democratic law. In this cosmopolitan governance, people 
enjoy multiple citizenships: “They would be citizens of their immediate political 
communities, and of the wider regional and global networks which impacted upon their 
lives” (ibid. p. 107).  
However, Leo Panitch (1994) argues that the role of transnational democracy is nebulous. 
There is no need, according to him, to replace international civil society with 
transnational democracy. Capitalism has not escaped the state but rather the state has 
always been a fundamental constitutive element in the process of the extension of 
capitalism. He writes: 
Not only is the world still very much composed by states, but insofar as there is 
any effective democracy at all in relation to the power of capitalists and 
bureaucrats, it is still embedded in political structures which are national or 
subnational in scope. (p. 87) 
Hugo Radice (1999) summarizes the globalization debate with some common features 
which I find relevant. He underlines that in the last thirty years national economies have 
become significantly more internationally integrated and as a result of this development 
national governments have lost much autonomy in their economic policy-making. Also 
the majority of the largest privately-owned companies operate through transnational 
networks of production. In spite of the differences in national legal and regulatory 
systems, a growing proportion of the labour force has entered global labour markets. 
Finally, nation states have accommodated this global integration with policy changes that 
have shifted the balance of economic and political power towards the employers and 
owners. 
These tendencies have also changed the role of the state from being a buffer between the 
demands of international markets and the social interests of citizens to being an adapter of 
these interests to the demands of global market. Also the networks built between business, 
politics and science ensure mainly competitiveness in the global sphere. Supranational 
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economic blocks are being created, such as the EU and NAFTA, to answer the challenges 
of a global economy. 
Susan Strange (1998), in her article “Who is Europe”, has compared US and EU policy 
during the late 20th century. Strange refers to Robert Reich’s article “Who is US”, which 
says that the competitiveness of American-owned corporations is not the same as 
American competitiveness. The US government should, according to Reich, promote 
human capital in the territorial USA rather than favour companies that fly under the US 
flag. Human capital will – more than financial capital – count in the globalized world. 
Strange shares this argument that the role of states today should be as good landlords. 
They occupy a territorial space but they no longer control what takes place in that space. 
According to Strange, managers of firms value, for example, security, good educational 
opportunities for their children, and an efficient and reliable local system of transportation 
and communication. Foreign investment is the key word. 
David Held (1999) sees that the UN and the EU are important in this new development as 
are the new voices of transnational civil society in order to help open up the possibility of 
a cosmopolitan democracy. I agree with him and I will state the reasons for my argument 
by comparing the EU and NAFTA. Ricardo Grinspun and Robert Kreklewich (1999) have 
studied regional integration, and have proposed a conceptual taxonomy of integration, in 
which the most salient aspects of the institutional form of integration are scope and 
coverage, a regulatory framework, and agency and power relations.
Grinspun and Kreklewich suggest that the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) can be analyzed according to this taxonomy and compared to aspects of the 
institutional framework of the European Union (EU). NAFTA has a very narrow scope 
and deep coverage in only a few limited areas. Scope and coverage concentrate on key 
corporate issues, like market access and investment, as well as areas of strategic interest 
to the United States, such as energy, financial services and intellectual property. Labour 
rights, environmental and social concerns receive marginal coverage, while there is none 
at all in areas such as the drugs trade, illegal migration or human rights. NAFTA 
promulgates a very sophisticated and powerful regulatory framework including a binding 
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enforcement mechanism for trade disputes, a strong regime of investment rights and 
intellectual property rights. The scope and coverage of the EU is broader, including 
coverage of political and democratic processes (for example the European Parliament), 
juridical processes (for example the European Court of Justice, ECJ) as well as monetary 
union (EMU) (ibid. pp. 23-26).  
These regulations, according to Grinspun and Kreklewich, protect large transnational 
capital, whereas weak regimes for labour and environmental enforcement have led, for 
example, to a downwards harmonization of social and labour standards in North America. 
The EU has instead moved in the direction of “federalism”, although there are tensions, 
with the principle of subsidiarity. Legislative and executive authority is centralized in the 
Commission and Council of Ministers, and there is also a strong role of the ECJ. The 
consultative and advisory role of the European Parliament has also been expanded, 
although the legal status of the Social Charter has remained uncertain. Recently the 
proposal of the EU Constitution has clarified the role of the Parliament. Concerning 
agency and power relations NAFTA preserves asymmetries of power relations among the 
three countries in favour of the US. There is a much more balanced institutionality in the 
EU and a need to expand harmonized areas (ibid. p. 27). 
But there are also some critical voices. Stephen Clarkson (1998) raises some questions. 
Did continental regimes form because of the failure of globalism, and will globalization – 
especially the strengthening role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – make it 
impossible to continue with a regional or continental basis, and will this tendency rescue 
national sovereignty? The WTO effectively expands its global competence from trade 
matters to include investment rules, competition law, human rights, and environmental 
and labour policy. According to Clarkson, this means that the EU will lose equivalent 
amounts of policy-making sovereignty. NAFTA’s prospects in the light of the WTO’s 
expansion are murkier, since, in the shadow of the WTO, NAFTA appears to have 
secondary importance. The continental systems outside North America are even more 
fragile.  
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Robert A. Dahl (1999) is also critical. He argues that international organizations, 
institutions, or processes cannot be democratic. This is because political leaders would 
have to create political institutions that would provide citizens with about the same level 
of opportunities for political participation, influence and controls, as there already are in 
most of the nation states. There should be also an international equivalent to national 
political competition by parties and individuals seeking office. Instead of speaking of 
international democratic order, we should rather speak about the bureaucratic bargaining 
system. However, global structures, whether they are worldwide, continental or regional, 
are faced with the need for more democratic governance. The question remains open, 
whether, in Weber’s terms, we are looking at bureaucratic (technocratic) management or 
real democratic governance. 
5.2. Economic Globalization 
For Bauman (1999) globalization of capital, finances, and information means first and 
foremost their exemption from local, and above all nation-state, control and 
administration. The proof of economic globalization is often said to lie in quantitative 
data on the development of world trade, world production, and the mobility of capital and 
the international migration of labour. The data verifies the existence of economic 
globalization. Birgit Mahnkopf (1999) emphasizes the importance of going beyond 
references to quantitative factors of global economic integration and of taking into 
account also qualitative developments.  
One of these qualitative developments is the globalization of time which is manifested 
most clearly in the financial markets. In this context it is worth referring to contours of 
modernity that underlined the emptying of time. The separation of time and space is 
essential to the dynamism of modernity. A standardized dating system, and the overall 
mapping of the globe, have together, according to Giddens (1990), provided a unified past 
which is accepted worldwide. 
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Money’s logic dominates global society. Modern I&C technology, along with computer 
programs, eliminate the time differences between the various capital markets and allow 
money and capital to circulate in real time, all the time. Time-competition is becoming a 
more critical factor in global market success.  
Today it is credit schedules which determine the rhythm of global time regimes. It 
is no longer the harvest cycle, as in agrarian societies, nor the rate of circulation, 
as in large-scale industry, but the maturing of debts which defines the horizon of 
action and the periodization of cycles within globalized finance capitalism. 
(Mahnkopf, 1999, p. 145)  
After the Great Depression and the Second World War, financial markets were generally 
weak and strictly controlled. However, starting from the 1950s, deregulation and 
liberalization of capital markets have continued. This process has led to a remarkable 
growth in capital mobility. Currencies have also become deterritorialized. Their 
circulation is not determined by law or politics but rather by the dynamics of supply and 
demand. But it also true that free capital movements will optimize welfare only in an 
idealized world of pure competition and perfect foresight. In reality, according to 
Benjamin Cohen (1999), economies are rife with distortions that prevent attainment of 
first-best equilibrium. The latest research demonstrates that financial liberalization is 
almost always associated with serious systemic crisis. This is perhaps also one of the 
reasons why the model of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is based on a strategy 
of market alliance. 
One of the political attractions of a single currency in Europe is the economic weight it 
offers to the EU in trade negotiations with the other powerful economies of the US and 
Asia. For some members of the EU, the euro symbolizes Europe’s leading position in 
commerce and culture. For others it may just be a necessary convenience protecting the 
euro area from exchange and interest rate differentials. The use of the single currency will 
reduce transactions costs and exchange rate risk, both of which will raise efficiency, 
increase investment and effect greater competition (Boles & McDonald & Healey, 2002, 
p. 119). 
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The Maastricht Treaty (1991) obligated EU countries to join the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) if they showed adequate convergence. The assessment principles were the 
following: 
• sustainable price stability, which meant that, during the 12 months prior to the 
examination, the rate of inflation could not be more than 1.5 percentage points 
above that of the three best-performing Member States; 
• sustainable government financial position. The reference values mentioned in the 
Protocols of the Treaty were: 3 percent of GDP for general government deficit and 
60 percent of GDP for government debt; 
• exchange rate stability, which meant that Finland, for instance, should join the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System for at least 
two years without devaluing on its own initiative against the currency of any other 
Member State; 
• an interest rate criterion, which was specified in the Protocols, such that the 
nominal long-term interest rates in Member States could not exceed by more than 
2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best-performing Member States. 
The question of entering the euro zone became reality when Finland joined the EU in 
1995. But already during the membership negotiations EMU was analyzed, as is explored 
more in detail in the empirical study (Chapter 7). For example Martti Hetemäki (1993) 
evaluated the benefits and disadvantages of EMU from four different angles: whether 
Finland was the Texas of Europe or not; what the destiny of Finland would be – was it 
going to remain subject to fluctuations; whether it would be possible to control inflation 
in EMU; and what the effects of EMU would be on the structure of Finnish production 
and on the growth of the economy.  
Texas was analyzed, since its position in the US currency zone is not ideal, because of its 
oil resources. Finland would be in quite a similar position in the euro zone, because of its 
forest resources. Hetemäki concluded that EMU would diminish the importance of 
fluctuations of exchange rates, which have traditionally sharpened conjunctures. 
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According to him, the disadvantages of EMU could be eliminated by Finland’s own 
actions. These actions would mean a rational economic policy and a flexible incomes 
policy. On the one hand, it would be difficult to achieve benefits outside EMU, if 
exchange rates were fixed. This would probably mean, according to Hetemäki, too severe 
a discipline in the economy and a large flexibility in incomes and wages. On the other 
hand, if the choice was a floating currency there would be less need to maintain 
competitiveness in the economy and in the structure of production. This might lead to a 
weak currency and a poorer standard of living compared with other countries in EMU 
(Hetemäki, 1993). 
However, the liberalization of financial markets and the tendency to look for market 
alliances in order to soften harmful effects has not been self-evident. The International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) original task was not to call for free capital. The charter drafted 
at Bretton Woods, on the contrary, explicitly allowed the preservation of capital controls. 
The options of controls were reserved to the individual states with such restraints that the 
controls should not restrict international commerce. The idea was to compromise between 
the imperatives of domestic interventionism and international liberalism. By the 1990s, 
the tendency was moving towards the consecration of free capital mobility as a universal 
norm. Then Asia and Latin America experienced severe crisis. Limitations on capital 
mobility have gained new legitimacy as an instrument of monetary governance. But 
governments, that is representative democracies, will hesitate. 
According to Cohen (1999), there are several reasons for hesitation which are 1) technical 
issues; 2) lack of convincing evidence; 3) ideological principle; 4) domestic politics; or 5) 
international politics. There are such questions as what kind of capital flows should be 
subject to limitation, and what kinds of controls might be most effective under the 
umbrella of technical issues. Cohen argues that if governments were seriously considering 
new limitations on capital mobility, there would be some indication by now. Cohen 
estimates that ideological principles may not explain the hesitation over capital controls. 
The fundamental reason for hesitation is politics, domestic and international. The critical 
issue is who wins and who loses. The losers from capital controls would quite obviously 
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be larger industrial and commercial enterprises, who could have the access to cheaper 
foreign sources of finance, but would also include those who invest with expectations of 
the highest returns. Potential winners would be those who might benefit from a return to 
some degree of monetary sovereignty like local banks, borrowers, and labour unions. 
According to Cohen, it is not hard to imagine that the balance of influence of these forces 
tends to favour bigger and wealthier integrationists. Therefore it is no surprise that 
countries hesitate to adopt new capital controls (Cohen.1999).  
Knut Borchardt (1991) draws a picture of cycles of free trade which are linked with 
foreign policy, pressures in domestic markets and political intrigues. In his historical 
argumentation he claims that the demand for protectionism is usually provided by 
economic interests – mainly those interests affected by the threat of foreign competition. 
The suppliers of the protection are state institutions. Both buyers and sellers of protection 
are concerned about employment and agrarian interests.  
Borchardt studied the start of two waves of general European protection in the 19th
century; both had similar features, coming at times of deep depression and deflation. At 
the turning points of these protectionist trends, the suppliers of protection had powerful 
motives either to increase or decrease the supply of protection. Foreign policy played a 
significant role; if there were interests in preserving peace or maintaining alliances or 
stimulating a neutrality of friendship by economic means, a freer access of foreign goods 
was allowed into domestic markets. In the 20th century President Roosevelt of the United 
States argued that, during the depression of the 1930s, the nation was not able to carry the 
burdens of international commitments and this led to isolation of the USA. However, 
some economists succeeded in steering the New Deal, so that the USA could achieve its 
hegemony, while Europe suffered the conflicts which later expanded in the Second World 
War (p. 14).
Borchardt’s argument supports the claim that protection accumulates obstacles to mutual 
co-operation and understanding, which are the basis of alliances and integration. There is 
a very real possibility that world trade will be characterized by three main trading blocks, 
each with its own currency: the EU and the euro, the US and the dollar, and Asia with the 
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Japanese yen or Chinese yuan. Indeed, the EU has an important role in the Triad. But 
could there be an alternative? Daniel Drache (2001) argues in favour of the return of the 
public domain after the triumph of the markets. As an economic principle the public 
domain includes public goods, such as welfare, information and a shared forum. 
According to Drache, strong public domains enable local and national communities to 
take defensive measures against powerfully anchored global forces. This may be an 
important issue for the Europeans, particularly related to their WTO policy. 
The WTO agreements recognize that regional arrangements and closer economic 
integration can benefit countries, but that also, in certain circumstances, they may hurt the 
trade interests of other countries. Normally setting up a customs union or free trade area 
would violate the principle of equal treatment for all trade partners. However, the articles 
allow regional trading arrangements, though regional integrations should complement the 
multilateral trading system. That is why the existence of NAFTA and the EU are not 
matters of speculation. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the international body dealing with rules of trade 
between nations and started its work at the beginning of 1995. However, its trading system 
is much older. When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was originally 
created (1948), it was not supposed to be an organization, and was designed to depend on 
an International Trade Organization (ITO) as a specialized agency of the United Nations. 
The ITO was never established because the US did not ratify the negotiated agreement, the 
Havana Charter.  
There are three main purposes of the WTO. Firstly, to administer the WTO trade 
agreements but also to see that the rules are followed. Present agreements cover 
industrial and agricultural goods, services, and international property rights. New areas 
are under negotiation, such as labour standards, environment, investments and rules 
concerning competition. The most important function of the WTO is to serve as a forum 
for these discussions. Secondly, dispute settlement is a tool for ensuring the observance 
of the rules. The third important role of the WTO is to promote free trade through 
negotiations between its member countries. The WTO has become a key institution of 
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global governance, like the United Nations or World Bank and other international 
financial institutions.  
However, the WTO has faced strong criticism from social movements and NGOs, and in 
its defence it has highlighted some of the benefits of its multilateral trading system: the 
system helps to promote peace; disputes are handled constructively; rules make life easier 
for all; freer trade cuts the costs of living, providing more choice of products and quality; 
trade raises incomes, stimulating economic growth; the basic principles make life more 
efficient; governments are shielded from lobbying; and the system encourages good 
government. However, there are also, according to the WTO, some misunderstandings 
about its nature: that the WTO dictates policy; that the WTO is for free trade at any cost; 
that commercial interests take priority over development, over the environment, and over 
health and safety. It is also said that the WTO destroys jobs and worsens poverty, that 
small countries are powerless in the WTO, that it is the tool of powerful lobbies, that 
weaker countries are forced to join the WTO, and that it is undemocratic. (www.wto.org )   
Social movements and non-governmental organizations have criticized the WTO especially 
because of its lack of democratic processes. They also play an important role when putting on 
pressure to reorganize the WTO. This is because, according to the critique, the inter-state 
apparatus has sold free trade to market forces. The focus of the critique is especially on the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement, since the WTO allows countries to challenge each other’s laws and 
regulations as violations of WTO rules. The decisions are made by trade bureaucrats, according 
the social movements, who pay a little attention to domestic law or responsibilities to protect 
environment, workers or human rights (www.tradewatch.org). 
However, the WTO agreements are ratified in national parliaments. National parliaments adjust 
their legislation to international agreements, but, with only partial adoption in some countries, 
many of the disputes are handled with unequal levels of adherence. Panellists are bureaucrats but 
still experts of trade legislation.  
Social movements and NGOs locate themselves in the category of direct democracy and, 
in terms of Kaldor’s matrix (see above), among the global civic networks. These networks 
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have been created with the help of the Internet and that is why they can act in a very 
organized manner at short notice. However, the social movements and NGOs have 
themselves also been criticized as “white and middle class”. The very fact that access to 
the Internet is limited in the Third World supports this claim, although it does not lessen 
the value of the NGOs. 
It is also said that the present structures of the WTO need fundamental reforms. These 
assumptions are supported by researchers like Ostry and Stiglitz who are both WTO 
insiders. Sylvia Ostry argues that in its present state the WTO cannot run the trading 
system. With 135 (now 146) member states, the WTO has no means of providing either an 
effective training system or resources for analytical research. There is an urgent need for a 
new system of governance, especially if the WTO is to assume any responsibility in areas 
such as the environment and labour rights (Ostry, 2000). 
Maude Barlow (2001) demands that the rules of global trade be rewritten. She underlines the need 
to protect common resources: food, water, social security, and culture. She argues that in the 
global economy everything is for sale.  
As never before in history, the public space, the vital commons of knowledge, has been 
hijacked by the forces of private greed, who have also captured, or are in collusion with, 
our political leaders and the dominant institutions of our society. (p. 2)
Barlow argues, quoting the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that every 
person on the planet has inherited the rights of “citizenship”, including access to health care, 
education, housing, meaningful work with fair wages, and human dignity. Democracy, social 
security and cultural diversity are the basis of human rights. That is the reason why these rights 
cannot be for sale (ibid. p. 4). 
A good number of those who criticize the WTO agree that the turning point in the 
development of the WTO was Seattle. According to Fred Halliday (2000), in Seattle there 
were two conflicts: on the one hand a conflict between poor and rich countries and, on the 
other hand, a conflict between governments and non-governmental groups. It was obvious 
that the world of international trade could no longer be the exclusive domain of sheltered 
elites, trade bureaucrats and corporate power brokers. It must become accountable to 
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legislatures and all their sectoral concerns. The WTO negotiated positions must come 
back for parliamentary scrutiny and ratification. The message from Seattle was that there 
are limitations on what things or matters are considered tradeable. 
According to Fred Halliday there are three narratives and also three Seattles: a 
revolutionist, a rationalist and a realist. He concludes that the states should “fix” the 
WTO. Halliday also argues that the inter-state mechanisms have been sold out to 
corporate interests. The WTO should concentrate on policy issues, like the relations 
between economic growth, protection of the environment, the relation of the growing 
inequalities in world wealth and the management of inter-state and inter-community 
conflict. 
According these critiques the WTO is faced by challenges. There is a need to “fix it or nix 
it”, to reform it or to do away with it. The WTO should, according to those who want to 
fix it, include environment, labour and human rights, and poverty issues into its agenda. 
To those who prefer to nix it, expectations of the WTO’s capabilities are unrealistic and 
they are sceptical that the interests of markets are adequate to handling such questions. 
There is, however, a need for global governance. The question still remains: how to 
influence the direction of globalization in the future. Noreena Hertz (2001) suggests a 
silent takeover, that the combination of consumer activism and political protest can be the 
catalyst for change. 
Globalization is indeed a mega-trend of modernity. It is not a new phenomenon but new in 
the sense that new global governance is needed. We have a deficit of global rules. The 
EU, as one of the most advanced models of international institutions, can be active in 
creating these rules. Therefore Finland also needs a clear policy line which includes the 
resources of civil society. Such policy is also important when thinking about democracy; it 
is important that people are aware who is responsible and for what. To relegate policy and 
its reach only to government at the level of nation states would only give room for private 
interests in the global forum. 
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6. Research Methods and Data 
The aim of my research is to study the nature of the exercise of power, particularly 
democracy, as it is put into effect in Finnish decision-making. I focus on the public 
sphere: how political decisions are argued and how these arguments are mediated into the 
public sphere. I am also interested in how the decisions are made, what the information 
and communication structures of the political elite are, i.e. how democratic decision-
making functions.  
Reflexive modernity emphasizes the importance of knowledge – the web of global and 
local networks of information and communication – as a medium of global and reflexive 
features of contemporary societies, including the domain of politics. How the information 
structures and flows of the political system are organized is an essential matter to give 
evidence of governance and trust. Indeed, the winners and losers of reflexivity are 
dependent on their places in the mode of information.
The public sphere is an analytic category between the state and civil society. Electors (or 
receivers of messages and codes) are located in the domain of civil society. Those who 
have been elected to exercise power, i.e. who represent the Government and Parliament 
and are, in my study, also the actors or senders of messages and codes, are located in the 
domain of the state. However, political power is no longer in the hands of national 
governments. Power is shared, bartered, and struggled over by diverse forces at regional, 
national and international levels. The argumentation of decision-makers mediated into the 
public sphere has to be analyzed therefore in the context of globalization – who is 
responsible and for what. 
The paradox of modern politics is that more transparency means more fragility. The 
decision-makers have to reflect all the time on the response of electors mediated by the 
media. The public sphere between the state and civil society is certainly more than the 
media, though the mass media are mediators of the argumentation. The public sphere is 
our common theatre, the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, 
and hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction. It is also an arena giving 
possibilities for social reflexivity.  
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Habermas claims that the state has fused the sphere and even finds similarities between 
modern publicity and feudal publicness. Nevertheless, the rational-critical debate in the 
public sphere is important for giving legitimacy to those who exercise power but also 
offering possibilities for dialogic democracy, reflexivity or autopoiesis. Indeed, it is a 
domain of democracy. 
Figure 1 
I have taken four cases to analyze. To explore the influence of globalization (1) the 
decision to join the Economy and Monetary Union (EMU), and (2) the development of 
trade policy during the early stages of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are studied. 
It is natural to focus on economic globalization, since Finland’s entry into global financial 
markets happened quite late compared with other western countries, namely during the 
1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless trade policy has always had its global dimensions. 
To analyze the role of mediazation I have selected two scandals from the end of 1990s: (1) 
the first scandal of Sonera, which led to the resignation of Minister Aura, and (2) the so-
called “Black List Scandal.”  Both represent significant examples of how the political 
system was required to manage publicity and how a small detail had effects on the results 
of the policy in question, Sonera’s privatization and the attempts to restructure labour 
policy. 
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My specific points of inquiry are: 
• who made the decisions, in order to analyze the exercise of power and to identify the 
political elite in Finland; 
• what kind of information and communication structures characterize the power-
exercising; 
• what kinds of arguments were expressed in the public debate;  
• how did globalization and mediazation influence the nature of this argumentation; 
• who has the initiative in the public debate; and finally 
• how to characterize representative democracy and its challenges in Finland. 
Qualitative methods offer various alternatives for studying the debate in the public domain. 
Creswell (1998) distinguishes five traditions which are:  the biographical study, the 
phenomenological study, the grounded theory study, the ethnography, and the case study (see 
Table 2, overleaf).  
Two of these research traditions characterize my study, case study and grounded theory. 
Use is also made of content analysis and approaches which Barthes, in particular, 
developed to analyze photographs. 
According to Creswell (1998), “a case study is an exploration of a bounded system or a 
case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information rich in context” (p. 61). Yin (1984) describes a case study 
as an empirical inquiry investigating a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context (p. 23). Furthermore Yin recommends six types of information: documentation, 
archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and physical 
artefact. The type of analysis of data can be a holistic analysis of the entire case or an 
embedded analysis of a specific aspect of the case. 
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Table 2 
Dimensions for Comparing Five Research Traditions in Qualitative Research
Dimension Biography  Phenomenology Grounded Theory Ethnography Case Study 
Focus Exploring the
life of an  
individual 
Understanding 
the essence of  
experience  
about a  
phenomenon 
Developing a  
theory grounded  
in data from  
the field 
Describing and 
interpreting a  
cultural and  
social group 
Developing an    
in-depth analysis 
of a single case or
multiple cases 
Discipline
origin 
Anthropology
Literature 
History 
Psychology 
Sociology 
Philosophy      
Sociology 
Psychology 
 Sociology Cultural 
anthropology 
Sociology 
Political Science  
Sociology 
evaluation,  
urban studies, 
other social 
sciences 
Data 
collection
Primarily  
interviews and 
documents 
Long interviews
with up to10 
people 
Interviews with 
20-30 individuals 
to “saturate”  
categories and  
detail a theory 
Primarily  
observations and  
interviews, with 
additional  
artefacts, during 
extended time  
the field  
Multiple sources –
documents,  
archival records, 
interviews,  
observations,  
physical artefacts 
Data  
analysis 
Stories 
Epiphanies 
Historical 
content             
Statements 
Meanings 
Meaning  
Themes;   
General  
description of  
the experience 
Open coding 
Axial coding 
Selective coding 
Conditional matrix
Description 
Analysis 
Interpretation 
   Description 
   Themes 
   Assertions 
Narrative
 form 
Detailed  
picture 
of an  
individual’s 
life 
        
Description 
of the “essence”
of  the  
experience            
Theory or  
theoretical  
mode 
Description of the
cultural behaviour
of a group or an 
individual 
In-depth study  
of a case or cases 
Source: Creswell, John (1998, p. 65) 
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There are several fundamental benefits, according to Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg (1991), in 
using a case study: 
• It permits the grounding of observations and concepts about the social action and 
social structures to be studied in natural settings, at close hand. 
• It provides information from a number of sources and over a period time, thus permitting a 
more holistic study of complex social networks and complexes of social action and social 
meanings. 
• It can furnish the dimensions of time and history to the study of social life, thereby 
enabling the investigator to examine continuity and change in life-world patterns. 
• It encourages and facilitates, in practice, theoretical innovation and generalization  
(pp. 6-7). 
Case study’s strength is its holistic approach, which I consider important as a concept 
here, not only in the research. It is also said that the virtue of case study research is that it 
lends itself to theoretical generation and generalization. In generalization it is not merely a 
question of how many units but rather what kind of unit has been studied (Orum and 
others, 1991, p. 15). One strategy to buttress assessing the results of one case study is to 
use several case studies in a comparative framework, an approach well articulated in 
Grounded Theory, which I shall return to. However, very often it is suggested that four 
cases form a reasonable maximum for proper research. 
To generalize conclusions on the basis of few cases is a challenging task. Hubert Blalock 
(1970) viewed the exercise with some scepticism: “Each social scientist is like a journalist 
writing his own story; there is little guarantee that several such journalists will report the 
same story” (p. 44). However, according to Jennifer Mason (1996), qualitative research 
should produce explanations which are generalizable in some way, or which have a wider 
resonance.
There are certain methods for generalizing the data, such as combining qualitative 
research with quantitative measures of populations, either purposive sampling or 
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theoretical sampling, or using an analytic model which assumes that generalizability is 
present in the existence of any case (Silverman, 1999, p. 111). However, a large number 
of cases could give evidence for generalizability.  
Some studies give guidance in generalization which may help. Risto Alapuro (1995) has 
studied the birth of the Finnish nation through a progression of local cases, in Suomen
synty paikallisena ilmiönä 1890-1933 (The Formation of Finland as a Local Phenomenon 
1890-1933). According to Alapuro, Finland as a nation first found its political identity at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Both the General Strike and the Civil War created a 
political culture essential to our democracy today. This development in miniature is 
studied through the political history of a small community, Huittinen. Alapuro used 
events, actors and community social structures to highlight the local processes which were 
also relevant at the national level.  
In the same way Theda Skocpol (1979) has analyzed social revolutions in States and 
Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Darnell M. 
Hunt (1999) studied the Simpson case in his book O.J. Simpson – Facts and Fictions. O.J. 
Simpson’s criminal trial became a society-wide ritual through which most of the basic 
values, norms, and social structures of the US society could be scrutinized, celebrated, and 
challenged. Complex interaction between the micro- and macro-level can be found. It is 
also worth mentioning Riitta Jallinoja’s research Perheen aika (2000) in which she 
analyzes romantic love, and particularly its narration, to mediate images of social 
relationships in a nuclear family in order to interpret modernity. Generalizability is 
derived in my research from single incidents and the progress of events in a comparative 
framework. 
The choice of methods had been considered in terms of how these methods provide valid, 
reliable and objective data. The validity of observations is not as problematic as reliability 
in case studies. Validity is, according to Silverman, another word for truth. He suggests 
five ways of thinking critically in order to aim at more valid findings: the refutability 
principle, the constant comparative method, comprehensive data treatment, deviant-case 
analysis and using appropriate tabulations. Reliability is most often interpreted as the 
ability to replicate the original study using the same research instrument to obtain the 
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same results. In other words, reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which 
instances are assigned to the same category by different observers (p. 188).  
It is said that the great strength of case-study research is that it permits the researcher to 
assemble complementary and overlapping assessments of the same phenomena, if there is 
a variety of data sources, as in my research. In qualitative research in general it is also 
important to maintain a balance between objectivity and sensitivity which are both 
necessary for making discoveries. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), objectivity 
“means openness, a willingness to listen and ‘give voice’ to respondents, be they 
individuals or organizations” (p. 43).  
As a researcher and an observer, I was not an outsider. Indeed, social action is understood 
by the actors and the researcher in a similar way. My research is not based on my personal 
notes or participatory observation as such but instead on various sources of documented 
and recollected memories. Because the interview material is the main source of data, there 
was an added understanding through personal familiarity with all the interviewees, as well 
the studied cases.  
As I have said above, multiple cases are scrutinized. My intention is to follow a typical 
format of case study by providing first a detailed description of each case and the themes 
within it. This is called a within-case analysis followed by a cross-case analysis, that is a 
thematic analysis across the cases. In the final interpretative phase, the “lessons learned” 
are reported. Klaus Mäkelä has illustrated the analyzing process of the data with three 
steps: the classification, the conclusion, and the interpretation (1990, p. 45). 
The cross-case analysis and the lessons learned – or interpretation – are introduced in my 
final chapter. However, some partial conclusions are drawn, based on each particular case, 
to analyze the plot, actors and argumentation.  
I have used grounded theory to process my within-case analysis i.e. I have followed the 
standard format of grounded theory. Through open coding the purpose was to form 
categories of information by segmenting information. Within each category there were 
further categories or subcategories. In axial coding the idea was to assemble the data in 
new ways after open coding. This is represented using a coding paradigm or logic diagram 
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by which the researcher should be able to identify a central phenomenon, explore causal 
conditions, specify strategies, identify both the context and intervening conditions, and 
delineate the consequences. In selective coding, based on grounded theory, the purpose is 
to identify a “story line,” then write a story that integrates the categories according to the 
axial coding model. Conditional propositions or hypotheses are also presented. Finally it is 
possible to develop a conditional matrix that elucidates the social, historical and economic 
conditions influencing the central phenomenon (Creswell, 1998, p. 57). Since the 
theoretical mapping presented in the previous chapters serves as the framing vehicle for 
interpretation of the studies, there is no theory derived directly from the data.  
The Atlas.ti computer program is a dedicated software system for qualitative analysis, 
well known in grounded theory. The computer does not literally understand the meaning 
of words or sentences, but it helps to manage all kinds of ordering, structuring, retrieving 
and visualization. The first step is to open a hermeneutic unit, the equivalent of an 
“electronic container.” It collects and organizes all data including codes, memos and 
diagrams. In open coding, relevant text passages are marked, with codes and memos 
assigned to each. Text passages indexed by patterns of codes can then be retrieved by a 
Boolean query tool, which is important for testing hypotheses. On the more conceptual 
level, the steps of both axial and selective coding support multiple functions. One is to 
create families of conditions or consequences. It also becomes possible to make graphic 
representations of text segments, codes and memos. The idea is that the testing of the 
groundedness of a study can be checked (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 278). 
I have used Atlas.ti software to organize and analyze the interview data. Open coding, 
thematizing the data and the use of different kinds of queries have all been useful in 
organizing the data. Coding consisted of open coding, thematizing the data selectively, 
and axial coding. Codes were episodes, expressions, words or arguments including 
quotations. Code-families were created, too. These families consisted, for example, of 
actors or arguments or metaphors. A query tool provided by the software was used, for 
example to find arguments similar to or conflicting with each other that helped to 
reorganize the data after open coding. The program was very supportive and an effective 
tool.
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The structure of narrative consists of episodes. Narratives including various episodes 
characterize well the power-exercise while the decisions are more or less like processes in 
a certain time-frame. Main plot and subplots can be found as well as certain turning points 
of a plot. The episodes were created, with the help of the Atlas.ti program, by organizing 
and analyzing the interview material. The two specific cases explored in the framework of 
mediazation follow the phases of a political scandal, so that the episodes were already 
clearly demarcated to a large degree.  
Episodes are completed with documents, archival records, and also with some 
characterization of the media response. The structure of a narrative is presented in the 
form of a table; episodes, time period, and public debate to give a quick and visual 
overview of the case. Public debate refers in this context both to media response and 
debate in Parliament.  
In creating episodes I also applied the ideas of Satu Apo (1986), who has studied the 
message structure contained in magical Finnish folktales. A general picture of the 
principal elements of content, plot types and structure, main themes and characters 
emerges from her analysis. I have utilized these same methods to explore plots, themes 
and characters within my political analyses, although I do not use explicit narrative-
oriented categories or the taxonomy of the various narrative structures derived from 
Finland’s mythic heritage 
Apo’s analysis of magic tales is relevant for my study in another way, too. Entertainment 
is one of the aspects of mediazation. The decision-making processes may include political 
fights or conflicts entertaining public audiences. Apo found that there seem to be clear 
rules concerning the roles of “actants,” or actors in Finnish magic tales. For example, it is 
not possible for any actor to appear in just any role, they must be cast for particular 
characteristics. Because of these parallels, I find it reasonable to use some of the elements 
of Apo’s research in my own work.  
All actors in every case have been categorized, whether as politicians, civil servants, 
representatives of social partners (mostly labour market partners), or journalists. The roles 
of key actors have been analyzed with the help of Apo’s findings. I have also used the 
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actant model of Greimas as a supplementary tool in fine-tuning my analysis. In this model 
actants or actors are categorized with the help of subject and counterpart that formulates 
the core of complex relations. There are antagonistic and conflicting interests between 
various actants, which are the basis of the tensions of a specific story. For example, a 
subject has a countersubject whose aim is to prevent the success of the subject, and who 
may be helped by an assistant. (Korhonen & Oksanen, 1997).  
The findings of Rene Girard (1977) have also been useful in my analysis concerning the 
roles of actors or actants. In Violence and the Sacred, he has studied the harmony and 
unity of a community. In every community there is hidden violence or muted hatred. This 
violence has to burst out and therefore it has to be put on the stage in a sacrificial 
ceremony. The purpose of this rite is to maintain the harmony in a community and to 
strengthen the web of social unity. The object of violence, the victim in the rite, must be 
chosen carefully. The object should be, on the one hand, an outsider but on the other 
familiar to insiders. Victims or scapegoats release the community from evil. The 
symbolism of the victim is many-sided: the evil is outside of the community, but the 
victim carries the burden of the common malice. These kinds of rituals are common in 
mediated publicness; events, plots, and actors – heroes, rogues, and victims – follow the 
logic of a drama familiar to us from fairytales. However, the roles of actors are clearer in 
political scandals – here, the Sonera case and the Black Lists. I have not tried to speculate 
about the motives of the actors but have relied on the information provided by 
interviewees. 
To analyze the media-coverage of the four individual cases, I have used content analysis. 
Arthur Asa Berger (1998) and Barrie Gunter (2000) suggest that content analysis is based 
on measuring the amount of something and is a method of studying and analyzing 
communication in a systematic, objective and quantifiable manner for the purpose of 
measuring variables. The definition that “content analysis is systematic” means that the 
content to be analyzed is selected according to explicit and consistently-applied rules. 
There must be uniformity in the coding and analysis procedures. Objectivity means that 
the researcher’s personal idiosyncrasies and biases should not enter the findings. 
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Quantifiability is linked to the goals of content analysis in order to represent a body of 
messages accurately (Gunter, 2000, pp. 56-57). 
Some critics have asked whether content analysis can ever be truly objective, and whether 
it can avoid value judgement, and this critique is relevant, in my opinion. Gunter refers to 
the argumentation of Klaus Merten who continues this debate: first, he asks if content 
analysis can serve as an instrument for inquiry into social reality; secondly, he questions 
to what extent this analysis is contaminated by reactivity, the effect of perspective 
differences among the coders. In spite of these critical remarks I would argue that content 
analysis of media response gives an instrument to understand social reality. Content 
analysis gives information on what issues are more important than others in a society, and 
the arguments presented by the media (for example, the coverage linked to the four cases 
here) give some confirmation of the values and moral codes prevailing in society. 
However, it is obviously difficult to eliminate totally the reactivity of coders or value 
judgements in findings.  
To avoid personal judgement as much as possible, it is important to follow certain rules. 
The process of content analysis can be broken into a series of clearly articulated key steps, 
which guide the practice of content analysis. The relevant content should be derived from 
the articulation of the research problem and the theoretical framework of the study. The 
practical challenge is to limit the amount of material selected for analysis, and to assure 
that the material is representative. The unit of the analysis can be the individual word, the 
sentence, the paragraph, the article, the news item, actor or source, and so on. As a 
quantitative technique, content analysis is about reporting how often different aspects of 
texts occur, and what their meaning is relative to other aspects or dimensions (Hansen, 
1998, p. 99, 104-105). 
There seem to be a number of categories which are considered to be standard in any 
content analysis. These include medium, position within medium, and size/length/duration 
of items. Genre (e.g. editorial or news report) might also be included as a classification. 
Thirdly, the analysis of actors/characters/sources is also important. The analysis of who is 
portrayed as saying and doing certain things, and with what key attributes, is essential to 
an understanding of the media’s role in both social representation and power relationships 
 104
within society. A general categorization is an attempt at classifying content in terms of 
value judgements. Evaluative categories are often dichotomies such as “favourable-
unfavourable,” “positive-negative,” “accurate-inaccurate” or “critical-uncritical” (Hansen, 
1998).
Both “piloting” and “fine-tuning” the coding schedule helps the research work. Piloting 
should, according to Hansen, include some checks on how reliable the coding process is. 
Reliability in content analysis is about consistency: consistency between different coders 
(inter-coder reliability), and the consistency of the individual coder’s coding practice over 
time (intra-coder reliability) (Hansen, 1998, pp. 120-121). 
In order to eliminate elements of subjectivity, the cases here were primarily based upon 
media response collected by competent specialists at relevant institutions. The material 
covers editorials, news, and comments, and there is diversity in the type of newspapers. I 
have categorized the newspapers as national, tabloid, provincial and partisan. However, 
the major media conglomerates play an important role in mediazation. Therefore, in 
further analysis, the categorizing covers two conglomerates, the Sanoma Group and 
Almamedia and their newspapers, both national and tabloid.  
I have classified the media coverage in the following way: medium, genre, main message, 
core arguments, and also whether the article is positive, negative or neutral. I have also 
classified actors mentioned in the articles, particularly in the cases of scandal. The coding 
formula for each specific case has been created, and the results are presented with the help 
of Excel software. In the case of the WTO, however, headline-analysis gives a more 
coherent picture of the situation, because of the number of articles. When the electronic 
archive of Finnish News Agency is used, no genre is coded, since the articles were almost 
exclusively factual news reports. 
The material also covers some photographs and cartoons. Photographs are an extremely 
important part of modern journalism, and the presence of photographs supports the 
importance of a particular news item, the larger it is, the greater the importance. 
Therefore, the same journalistic criteria applicable to writing should be applied to 
photographs, and the same editorial rules and aims apply: the photos must be authentic, 
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they should impact as many people as possible, they should be clearly associated with the 
content, and they should also be, of course, aesthetically powerful.  
Wilson Hicks, who has had a long career in the field of photojournalism, uses the verb “to 
read” to describe what photographs mean to him. When you “read” a picture, you interpret 
it in terms of your own experience of life: what you are, who you are, what is your 
experience, your knowledge, your imagination, your intuition, your instinct (Schuneman, 
1972).
However, according to Sami Noponen (1994) and Victor Burgin (1982 & 1997), it is 
problematic to compare the metaphorical language of photography with a real language and 
associated Saussurean terminology, although Hicks, by reading, does not mean literal 
semiotic analysis. Noponen suggests that a news photo can be studied conventionally with 
messages which are either connotative or denotative. A photo can be also studied with 
terms familiar to us from narratives, and can be described as a story but one in which the 
stylistic factors are such elements as the angle of the photo, its cropping etc. 
Janne Seppänen (2001) writes, in his thesis Valokuvaa ei ole (Photograph does not exist), 
about three theoretical models by which to approach the photograph, and to understand it 
as a societal phenomenon. The first model is the aesthetic-formalist approach studied by 
Beaumont Newhall. This approach is common in the literature on photography. The main 
idea is to construct one’s own identity into a photograph. According to Seppänen, this 
approach to interpreting photographs is problematic because “it is difficult to perceive the 
photograph at the crossroads of different kinds of societal practices” (p. 237).  
The discursive-functionalist perspective in based mainly on John Tagg’s work. Its aim is to 
unravel the cultural meanings of the photograph, in other words, to sociologize the 
aesthetics of the photograph. The problem with this approach is that, according to 
Seppänen, it is not capable of enabling the analyst to recognize the historical constitution of 
the observed subject. The third ideal model for analysis is the constitutional theory linked 
with work of Jonathan Crary. This approach raises the question of whether or not to study 
the photograph itself, or to study the photograph as part of the broader changes in our visual 
culture (Seppänen, 2002). 
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However, the work of Barthes is perhaps more useful in this context since I will not 
explore the photos in such a detailed manner as Seppänen suggests, though the ideas 
presented by Noponen are utilized. Similar elements can be found in concepts used by 
Barthes. Some photos which have been included here are analyzed with Barthes's concepts 
(see above, Chapter 4.4), but I have also tried to answer the questions of what the message 
in an article is and what the message of a photo is – is the photo supporting the message or 
is it conflicting? 
In Barthes’s terms most of the photographs related to the first two cases are “unary”, that 
is imitating “reality” without doubling it (1981, p. 41), and are therefore not analyzed 
here. The human theatre of mediatized politics is however reflected in the photography 
associated with it, often charged with connotative detail, and I have followed Barthes’s 
approach in examining the most widely used images related to the drama of the scandals 
in the other two cases. 
The data consists of three main sources: interviews, documents including archival records, 
and media coverage associated with each of the four cases. It is summarized at the 
beginning of each case, to give an overview of the scope. 
The purpose of the interviews was to map information flows among the political elite, this 
includes both the key actors within a given ministry and the political elite. The 
argumentation mediated to the public was also studied. In some cases the number of actors 
has been quite small, in others large. In total, 20 interviews were conducted. Some 
interviewees had a role in all four cases. The structure of the interviews followed a 
chronological order and it was specific to each interviewee. It is also very important to 
emphasize that interviewees did not use their diaries or notes but were trying to remember 
the arguments and political atmosphere afterwards.  
Originally I also considered the possibility of using focus group interviewing. The focus 
group is defined as an interview style designed for small groups. Using this approach the 
researcher strives to learn through discussion about psychological and socio-cultural 
characteristics (Berg, 1998). Focus group interviews in this context could either have been 
guided or unguided, addressing a particular topic of interest and relevance to the group 
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and the researcher. This approach could have been very interesting and have given a 
possibility also to observe the interaction. However, focus group methodology has some 
disadvantages (viz e.g. Langan, 2000) and especially in my research it would have been 
impossible to find a suitable common time for the interviewees. From an observing point 
of view, it would also mean that both videoing and taping had to be given extra weight in 
analyzing the data. Neither was possible because of limited resources; however, these 
indicate possible avenues for further study. 
However, the interview material is the main source of information. Interviews were semi-
structured, including some open-ended questions, recorded and afterwards transcribed. I 
knew personally all the interviewees, as well as the topics through my earlier 
responsibilities. In this sense, the field situation was somewhat different from the norm 
with political studies, since the setting was in every case informal, and the interview 
conducted with relative ease. The ethical question evaluated in this context was how to 
ensure confidence between the researcher and the interviewees, and at my suggestion 
everyone was able check their personal quotations used in this thesis. To maintain 
objectivity I also have tried to give a voice to interviewees by using their own words as far 
as possible in the research text.  
Documents and archival records consist of preparatory papers and protocols which were 
produced by the administrators for the Government or Parliament. Documents produced 
by social partners are used as well. In addition, I include the Parliamentary debate in the 
events of each case. The Parliamentary debate was studied with the help of the electronic 
archives of the Finnish Parliament.  
Media response is typically more a reflection of the events that occurred, as opposed to the 
interviews, which are typically more an interpretation of the past. The media response has 
been collected and catalogued in order to determine which arguments or features were 
seen as essential to a particular issue at the time. The media response concerning EMU 
was collected from the archives of the Bank of Finland. The response concerning the 
WTO is based on Finnish News Agency’s electronic archive. In the Sonera case the media 
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coverage was collected by the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the 
coverage concerning labour reform was collected by the Ministry of Labour.  
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EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
7. The EMU case – The EMU can fly! 
Finland formally applied to join the European Union in 1992 and became a member in 
1995. Membership of the EU was considered a historic opportunity, detaching Finland 
from the influence of the former Soviet Union. As a neutral country, Finland maintained 
good political and commercial contacts with the Soviet Union after World War II. 
However, its closest cultural ties have always been with the Nordic family of nations, 
while the values of its society are rooted in the wider heritage of Western Europe, which 
has also long been significant in terms of foreign trade. 
Finland’s initial negotiations with the EU, at the beginning of 1990s, concerned a separate 
trade agreement between the EU and other EFTA countries. When Sweden unexpectedly 
applied for full membership of the EU, Finland was forced to take a step forward. The 
strategy changed, so that, instead of a separate agreement, Finland became a potential 
new entrant of the EU. EU membership was a significant opportunity provided by sudden 
geopolitical changes, and the Government’s decision to apply was rushed. The leading 
opposition party at the time, the Social Democratic Party, gave its support to the 
Government, but public opinion was not prepared for full membership, and this division 
was reflected in the referendum that took place in 1994. 
EMU went hand in hand with the EU. In fact, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) obligated 
EU member countries to join Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) if convergence to 
the stipulated criteria was considered close enough (for the criteria, see Ch. 5.2).  
To understand the background of the EMU case and the context in which it was decided 
that Finland would enter the euro zone among the first countries, it is useful to highlight 
some characteristics of Finnish monetary policy. Finland’s monetary history since 1945 
has been a cycle of inflation and currency instability. During this period, Finland has 
experienced eleven devaluations, three revaluations and one period of floating the 
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currency (Boldt, 1999). In the past Finland’s industrial structure was very much based on 
pulp and paper, but it is currently much more diverse. Exports by the electronics industry 
as well as by the machinery and metal industries have become significant. Almost half of 
Finland’s exports go to the euro zone, while the United Kingdom, Sweden and Russia 
each account for ten per cent, with important further markets in Asia and the USA. The 
structure of Finnish exports was one of the arguments advanced in favour of EU 
membership when the question was actively being debated, and a single market was also 
considered to favour Finnish companies. 
Finland ran into a severe economic crisis at the beginning of 1990s, causing a deep 
recession, which resulted in a steep rise in both government debt and unemployment. 
Unemployment increased from 3.5 per cent to almost 20 per cent within a few years. 
Unemployment is still high, currently (2003) running at around 9.1 per cent 
(Tilastokeskus, valtiovarainministeriö; www.vm.fi). The main reasons for the recession 
were an external asymmetric shock – the collapse of the Soviet Union – and the 
uncontrolled deregulation of Finland’s financial markets in the late 1980s, which also led 
to a severe banking crisis. 
Until this point Finland had been a closed economy, and the pressures to liberalize the 
financial markets were both external and internal. Liberalization was accompanied by a 
monetary policy based on a strong and solid currency, planned and defended by the Bank 
of Finland. However, the liberalization of financial markets happened without proper 
thinking, and most of the decision-makers, both in the political elite and the financial 
institutions, were unaware of all the dimensions of its consequences (e.g. Hulkko and 
Pöysä). 
This policy – to liberalize and to protect a strong currency – was affected by several 
serious backlashes in global financial markets and even led to conflicts between the 
Government and the Bank. The turning point came with the decision to devaluate the 
Finnish markka in November 1991. Finland did not have enough reserves to defend the 
value of its own currency. This devaluation initiated a period of floating the currency that 
 111
helped the country to recover from recession, but it also made the Finnish economy 
vulnerable to international pressures and caused enormous problems in domestic markets.  
Since small size is associated with vulnerability, membership of the Economic and 
Monetary Union was calculated to provide shelter for a small economy in global capital 
markets. However, EMU would also mean a fixed exchange rate policy, which was 
potentially problematic for Finland. 
General recession, accompanied by banking crisis, has overshadowed Finnish society 
from that time on, though the economy has experienced a sustained period of economic 
growth since 1994. Many analyzes of the economic crisis (e.g. Kiander) have been 
published. The symbol of the crisis was the collapse of one of Finland’s major banks. It is 
said that the banking crisis was the result of “bad luck, bad policy and bad banking”. 
Although it hit all Nordic countries, the solutions for managing the banking crisis in 
Finland differed from those in other Nordic countries, and the severe recession that hit 
Finland was deeper than in any other Western country.  
7.1. Data 
Specific data used in this chapter has been collected from the following sources: 
• the protocols of the Cabinet Committee on European Affairs 21.1.1993, 
26.1.1993, and 16.6.1995; 
• the memorandum (12.6.1995) prepared by the Ministry of Finance about matters 
of the Ecofin Council 19.6.1995; 
• the Government Statement about Economic and Monetary Union 16.6.1995; 
• the EMU Convergence Programme for Finland 17.8.1995; 
• the EMU Statement by the Council of State to Parliament on Finnish Participation 
in the Euro Area 24.2.1998; 
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• the Stability Programme for Finland, September 2000 update; 
• Economic Bulletins  (www.vn.fi/vm/english);  
• the protocol of the Grand Committee 16.6.1995; 
• parliamentary protocols (www.eduskunta.fi) with search emu# 1994-1995 of 
which 213 references date from after the Elections of 1995; 
• ‘Economic and Monetary Union – EMU: What is it about?’ (’Talous- ja Rahaliitto 
— EMU, Mistä on kysymys?’) Paper prepared by SAK 7.12.1995; 
• ‘Wage-earners and EMU’ (‘Palkansaaja ja EMU’), background material prepared 
by SAK February 1997; 
• ‘EMU and the Labour Market’ by Peter J. Boldt, June 1999; 
• ‘Finnish Industry and EMU – effects on competitiveness’  (www.tt.fi/english); 
• media coverage from December 1994 to November 1995 about EMU, altogether 
217 articles, collected by the Bank of Finland from Finnish newspapers. 
• Interviews, with Martti Hetemäki (4.2.2002), Paavo Lipponen (25.2.2002), Sauli 
Niinistö (6.3.2002), Pertti Parmanne (20.12.2001), Raimo Sailas (15.11.2001), Iiro 
Viinanen (15.1.2002), and Jorma Westlund (20.12.2001). 
Sixten Korkman also answered some questions in written form and Ben Zyskowicz 
commented briefly on the matter, as did Lasse Arnio, who also helped to find the 
documents. Prime Minister Lipponen did not allow any recording of his interview; 
therefore no direct quotation from him is used and, unlike the other interviewees, he has 
not checked his statements.  
The focus of the interviews was to establish how the decision to join EMU among the 
first countries was prepared; what kind of political discussions took place and who these 
involved; what kinds of arguments were used and how these arguments were mediated 
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into the public sphere. I was also interested to know how much the EU and EMU were 
seen in a global context and if EMU was seen as an inevitable consequence of 
globalization. The purpose of the interviews was also to find out who the key-actors were, 
as well as to obtain information about the further progress of EMU at both a national and 
a European level. Some open-ended questions were also included, concerning the specific 
interests of the interviewees.  
7.2. Actors 
All the actors mentioned in the interviews were categorized according to whether they 
were politicians, civil servants, representatives of social partners or of the media. The 
‘actor-family’ consisted of 58 individuals altogether. Of those who were mentioned, 24 
were politicians and 20 civil servants. The civil servants were all economists, of whom 
six represented the Bank of Finland and the rest, the Ministry of Finance. 12 further actors 
represented social partners, that is to say labour-market partners, and 2 actors represented 
the media.  
Figure 2 
n=58
The number of key actors was small. Those mentioned by interviewees more than six 
times were: Paavo Lipponen (36), Esko Aho (12), Sixten Korkman (12), Claes Andersson 
(7), Martti Hetemäki (7), Raimo Sailas (7), Erkki Tuomioja (7), Matti Vanhala (7) and 
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Johnny Åkerholm (7). Although Ministers of Finance Viinanen (5) and Niinistö (4) were 
not mentioned in interviews as often as the others, both can be seen as key actors because 
of their positions. It is also worth mentioning that Minister Viinanen resigned from his 
post in February 1996 and that Minister Niinistö succeeded him. Interviewees mentioned 
the rest of the actors only once or twice. 
Former Prime Minister Aho was an important actor especially in lobbying for EU 
membership; however, the decision to enter EMU was made by Prime Minister 
Lipponen’s Cabinet.  
On the basis of the interview material, it is very clear that the key politician or the key 
decision-maker was Paavo Lipponen. MP Erkki Tuomioja was mentioned not as a 
decision-maker but in his capacity as chairman of the Grand Committee. He also seemed 
to act as a kind of counterbalancing power, influencing the way in which EMU was 
managed in Parliament. 
The key civil servants emerge as: the former Director General in the Economics 
Department of the Ministry of Finance, Sixten Korkman; particularly his successor, 
Martti Hetemäki; Secretary of State Raimo Sailas, who was at time serving in the Prime 
Minister’s Office, but later became Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance; and 
Johnny Åkerholm. Åkerholm became a key bureaucrat as one of the two Deputy 
Permanent Secretaries at the Ministry of Finance. However, he was not in that position 
during the year under review, 1995. Conversely, Sixten Korkman left his post in the 
summer of 1995, when he was nominated to an office in the EU. 
Director General Martti Hetemäki was secretary of a preparatory sub-committee on EU 
Affairs, which concentrated on questions relating to monetary policy and especially 
EMU. He also appears as the link-person with the social partners, because of his duties as
secretary of the Committee of Income Policy.  
It is interesting to note that the decision to join EMU was prepared and discussed by very 
few politicians and civil servants. It is also worth emphasizing that the representatives of 
the Bank of Finland did not play as essential roles as Paavo Lipponen, Iiro Viinanen, 
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Raimo Sailas, and Martti Hetemäki, who were the real key players in Finland’s entry into 
EMU. The Bank of Finland was kept informed but the policy was articulated by the 
Ministry of Finance, supported by the Prime Minister.  
I also wanted to know who the advisors or trusted persons were for key politicians. Prime 
Minister Lipponen underlined the role of Professor Jukka Pekkarinen. Iiro Viinanen 
considered his closest advisor to be Under Secretary Eino Keinänen, while emphasizing 
the role of his own Ministry as an essential factor in his decision-making: “Keinänen was 
always present, Åkerholm sometimes. I had some contacts with Liikanen and Satuli, too. I 
had a meeting with them during every journey to Brussels, particularly when Liikanen 
was our ambassador there.”  (”Keinänen oli aina mukana, Åkerholm joskus. Yhteyksiä oli 
Liikaseen ja Satuliin. Minä tapasin ne joka reissulla etenkin silloin kun hän (Liikanen)  
oli suurlähettiläs.”) (Interview with Viinanen). 
Contacts between the German Minister of Finance, Theo Waigel, and his Finnish 
colleagues were close, too. Concerning EMU, Minister Waigel, a party comrade from 
Germany, was very close to Viinanen: “Yes. I got to know Waigel very well.” (”Kyllä,
opin tuntemaan Waigelin oikein hyvin”). Minister Sauli Niinistö also mentioned the 
importance of Johnny Åkerholm as a colleague for discussion (interviews with Viinanen 
and Niinistö). 
The major governmental groups, the Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition 
Party, had their own specialist groups to analyze economic policy but according to the 
interviews, they had no specific importance. The interview material shows that 
communication on EMU was mainly between the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Finance.
7.3. The Narrative of the EMU case 
The structure of the narrative was created following the methods of grounded theory. The 
within-case analysis was investigated by coding the interview material with the help of 
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the Atlas.ti software. The narration took form in episodes and followed a clear 
chronological order. Such an order is most appropriate since the EMU case, like most 
political issues, was more or less a process. The episodes cover the EMU process as a 
whole (1995-1998), while my detailed analysis is focused on 1995 and the media 
coverage is from that same year, because the actual decision was made in 1995. However, 
the importance of this decision is easier to realize if the whole path towards Finland’s 
entry into EMU is described in broader terms.  
Indeed, the preliminary political commitment was made both when Finland joined the 
European Union and again when the Government Programme of Prime Minister 
Lipponen’s first Cabinet was negotiated. However, the actual decision was made, quite 
unexpectedly, on June 16th 1995, being formally passed by Parliament three years later. 
Episodes will be studied in detail. The titles of specific episodes try to characterize the 
decision-making process and the turning points of the plot. “Prologue” gives an overview 
of the setting – the political atmosphere and the argumentation provided by various 
actors. “The Unexpected Decision” treats the commitment or actual decision, which was 
made without any political debate within the political elite. Considered in terms of 
democracy and the public sphere, the decision was neither actively informed nor publicly 
defended: the decision was in fact very undemocratic. “The Need for Analysis”:  a need 
for debate and analysis was high and it was conducted by NGOs, particularly by SAK 
(Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö; the Central Organization of Finnish Trade 
Unions); SAK helped to turn the tide and shift a very negative public opinion in a more 
positive direction. This debate was a necessary basis for a true political commitment, in 
which all the parties represented in the Government made a decision in favour of EMU.  
However, reading the media coverage through, it becomes clear that it follows another 
logic, separate from the chronology of the decision-making process. Although, therefore, 
in this specific case, two different narrative-structures could be presented, I prefer to 
follow the narrative of the decision-makers. This is because the media’s narrative omits 
episode B, the actual decision, failing to recognize it as an essential turning point of the 
plot.
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The structure of the narrative is further supplemented by public debate, which refers in 
this context to both media response and debate in Parliament. The actual decision to enter 
EMU was neither debated in Parliament nor analyzed in the media, although EMU was 
discussed generally. However, media response is analyzed in more detail separately. 
The narrative is structured as follows: 
Episodes:      Time period:    Public Debate:
A: Prologue – EMU on top of the EU   1994   yes 
– Finland joins the EU 
B: The Unexpected Decision      1995    no 
– Finland will enter EMU among the first countries 
C: The Need for Analysis –  
Delayed Political Debate     1995–1997  yes 
– field debate organized by SAK and an agreement on buffer funds  
– research work led by Professor Jukka Pekkarinen  
– political commitment of the various parliamentary groups 
D: Formal Closure  
– Parliament votes in favour of EMU    1998    yes 
A: Prologue – EMU on top of the EU
Finland became a member state of the European Union at the beginning of 1995. The 
application for EU membership had been introduced in Parliament on March 16th 1992. 
When the negotiations started,  Minister Pertti Salolainen (the National Coalition Party) 
announced in Brussels in 1993 that, “the Government of Finland has determined to fulfil 
the conditions required for being among the first group of states to enter the EMU the 
third stage” (EMU Statement, 1998).  
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This statement was drafted by the Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs. The Committee 
authorized Minister Salolainen to fine-tune the statement, which would then be dealt with 
at the Evening School on 27.1.1993 (Protocols of Committee for EU Affairs).3
A further very important decision was made on 31st March 1993 when the Government, 
led by Prime Minister Esko Aho (Finnish Centre Party), announced its goal to put the 
public debt onto a downward path. This policy was successful and was also the main 
reason why the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty were met by Finland’s key 
economic indicators even before the Parliamentary Elections in 1995. This decision 
meant “discipline” in the economy, including large cuts in public spending, but also 
increasing unemployment.  
Former Minister of Finance, Iiro Viinanen (the National Coalition Party), said that, at a 
stage when Finland was still only an observer at Ecofin meetings (the Council of 
Ministers of Finance), it was already being used as an example of good policy, especially 
in 1994. The economic indicators of various countries were studied carefully in order to 
analyze their convergence. Most of the member states of the EU, including Germany as 
the economic powerhouse of Europe, had economic problems so that there were dark 
clouds overshadowing the third phase of EMU, which was scheduled to start at the 
beginning of 1997, according to the Treaty (interviews with Hetemäki and Viinanen).  
The focus of negotiations for membership of the EU was not on EMU but rather on 
agriculture and particularly on an agricultural subsidy package which was needed in 
domestic markets to support Finnish farmers. This should be understood in the context of 
the political framework: it was important for the Centre Party not only to ensure that the 
majority of people would vote for membership in the referendum but also to guarantee a 
majority in Parliament in favour of membership.  
As the ruling governmental party, the Finnish Centre Party had severe problems obtaining 
support in the Party for EU membership because of the threats of agriculture. The 
3
   The Evening School (iltakoulu) is an informal gathering of Cabinet members to discuss particular 
reforms, problems or challenges of political work, though its style has varied, as interviews here and in 
other sections indicate.
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political journalist, Unto Hämäläinen, wrote  an article in Helsingin Sanomat (30.12.
2001), concluding from his studies that neither discussions on EMU nor an evaluation of 
the impact of a single currency could be found in the protocols of the Cabinet Committee 
on EU Affairs during the membership negotiations. The Government’s energy had been 
put into agricultural affairs.  
EMU was analyzed mainly by economists in their own publications (e.g. Alho, 
Kotilainen, Widgren, Honkapohja, Pikkarainen, Korkman, Oksanen and Suvanto). 
Former Director General Sixten Korkman was also an active debater and urged Finns to 
find out about EMU. His role as an active civil servant, however, was criticized by some 
politicians. He said in an interview in Kaleva that membership of EMU was sensible and 
rational but also problematic for Finland (Kaleva, 14.4.1995). 
Various articles written by economists highlight the overwhelming capacity of the 
administrators – the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Finland – to control and master 
public debate. Permanent Secretary of State Raimo Sailas also emphasized the superior 
position of the administration and its ability to analyze EMU as the reason for the 
weakness of public debate during the years 1994-1995. The same tendency can be also 
seen in media response, where interviews were with economists, not politicians. 
For most of Finns EMU seemed to be a distant, unknown and speculative matter. This 
was also the case among politicians. In his interview, former Minister of Finance Iiro 
Viinanen described how the Governor of the Bank of Finland, Sirkka Hämäläinen, 
informed the Cabinet Committee on Economy Policy about monetary union in 1993. 
Terms like “EMI” or “ERM” were new to all.4 Ministers were listening with “mouths 
open” to the report given by the governor. None of them had heard about the issues or the 
specific terms, but it did not take long before they did, since Finland was already in a 
position to observe the process and the terminology soon became familiar to all. 
The Finnish Parliament debated EMU four times in greater detail. However, the usual 
political situation – of confrontation between the opposition and the Government – is not 
4 The abbreviations refer to the European Monetary Institute, the precursor of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), and the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
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to be found in the documents. All political parties were more or less divided, including 
the opposition and the Government. On the Government’s side, the National Coalition 
Party was in favour of EMU, the Finnish Centre Party was divided and the Christian 
League was against. On the side of the opposition, the Social Democratic Party was 
critical of elements, while the Left Alliance and the Greens were more against EMU than 
in favour. 
The first opportunity to debate EMU came when the Left Alliance made an interpellation 
about EU policy concentrating on the impact of EMU and of a common foreign and 
security policy in June 1994. Altogether 302 speeches or replies were given during the 
debate. Of these 56 speakers (i.e. 18% of all speeches) mentioned EMU and most of the 
speakers just referred to EMU without entering into detail.  
The Prime Minister, Esko Aho, argued that EMU was a logical step in the deepening 
integration of the EU, an argument that had already been used when the application for 
membership of the EU and the report on the negotiation process were introduced to 
Parliament. Speakers representing Aho’s Government argued that the cycle of 
devaluations and inflation had been vicious and very harmful to Finns. It was also, 
according to the speakers, very difficult to say what the future of the third phase of EMU
would actually involve. 
One of the arguments for opposing membership of EMU was the Finland’s need to 
maintain its own monetary policy. The sovereignty of the nation state was underlined. 
However, the main argument used in the debate was the unfavourable connection between 
the convergence criteria and aims to promote employment. MP Claes Andersson, the 
leader of the Left Alliance, criticized the eagerness of some politicians to join EMU 
among the first countries. He emphasized that EMU would abolish the possibility of 
running an independent national economic policy and that EMU would affect 
employment negatively: “We are worried about those people who have become victims of 
the Euro-strategy adopted by the government and the Bank of Finland.” (”Olemme 
huolestuneita niistä, jotka ovat joutuneet hallituksen ja Suomen Pankin eurostrategian 
uhreiksi”) (VK 3/1994 www.eduskunta.fi/htwfakta). 
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MP Paavo Lipponen, the leader of the Social Democrats, announced that his party would 
support the decision to join the EU (which was still at the time an open issue), but that it 
would vote against the domestic package to support agriculture. He also criticized the 
policy of the Bank of Finland concerning the strict inflation target. He argued in favour of 
employment as an essential part of the forthcoming EMU process.  
Speaker of the Greens, MP Heidi Hautala accused the government of being too eager to 
enter Economic and Monetary Union, because it was obvious that “money goes to 
money” (”Raha menee rahan luo”). The strongest criticism of the EU and EMU was 
presented by MP Esko Seppänen from the Left Alliance. He said that Minister Pertti 
Salolainen was making a great mistake by informing the EU of Finland’s readiness to join 
EMU among the first countries. He said that EMU would mean the same for the Finnish 
economy as the old monetary policy anchored in the strong value of the Finnish markka 
(ibid.).
In autumn 1994 a referendum about EU membership was held. Although Finland, unlike 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, had not made any opt-out reservations concerning 
future Economic and Monetary Union, there was hardly any public debate on the EMU 
issue. One of the explanations is that the whole matter was too difficult to handle. 
However, those who were opposed to EU membership argued strongly against EMU, and 
the Centre Party MP Paavo Väyrynen and the Left Alliance MP Esko Seppänen were 
particularly active in opposing not only membership but also EMU. 
Elsewhere Pertti Parmanne, the leading economist of the largest labour organisation, 
SAK, described the atmosphere:  
“When we in SAK debated on membership of the EU in the spring of 1994 in 
order to evaluate its impact, the assessment, by the way, had already been written 
in our memorandum and that was delivered among other papers to our council, 
‘the targets of Economic and Monetary Union are sensible as such, but the formal 
fulfilment of them, if employment or growth in the economy are not taken into
consideration, may lengthen the economic crisis. On the other hand, there might 
be an even greater need for good economic management outside of the EU than as 
a member state of the EU. It is much easier to attack a small nation and its 
currency than those who have joined EMU and who will be mutually supported by 
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the other currencies. Remaining outside of the EU, Finland would not be able to 
design the economy policy of the EU but instead would be forced to adapt to it’.”
(”Kun me SAK:ssa keväällä 1994 kävimme tätä keskustelua EU-jäsenyydestä niin 
arviomuistiossa, joka mm. jaettiin meidän valtuustolle, siinä jo todetaan, että 
sinänsä talous- ja rahaliiton tavoitteet ovat mielekkäitä mutta että niiden 
kaavamainen toteuttaminen ottamatta huomioon työllisyyttä tai kasvua voi johtaa 
laman pitkittymiseen. Toisaalta EU:n ulkopuolella tarve hyvään taloudenpitoon 
saattaa olla vieläkin suurempi kuin EU:n jäsenenä. Pientä maata ja sen valuuttaa 
vastaan on helpompi hyökätä kuin EMU:un liittyneiden ja toisiaan tukevien 
maiden valuuttoja vastaan. EU:n ulkopuolella Suomi ei pääsisi muotoilemaan 
EU:n talouspolitiikkaa mutta joutuisi siihen pitkälti sopeutumaan’. ”)
(Interview with Parmanne).  
Another explanation of why debate about EMU during the referendum was so weak 
comes from Iiro Viinanen, former Minister of Finance:  
“Among the criteria there were the interest rate, inflation, the government debt 
and the budget deficit. Everyone likes to have low interest rates and low inflation. 
These were not at issue. On the one hand, I believe that people had become used 
to me haranguing them about economic discipline and the harmful effects of the 
budget deficit during the previous couple of years. They had been taught strict 
discipline and to shun budget deficit and it became clear to all that this was as it 
had to be, however much they railed against it. It [EMU] never became such an 
important issue. On the other hand, most of the people did not even understand
that it was a binding Treaty.”  
(”Kriteereissä olivat nämä korot, inflaatio, velka ja budjettialijäämä. Jokainen 
tykkää alhaisista koroista ja alhaisesta inflaatiosta. Ne eivät ole mitään asioita. 
Toisaalta minä uskoisin, että ihmiset olivat oppineet tiukkaan talouskuriin ja 
budjetin alijäämästä paasaamiseen, jota ne olivat kuulleet pari vuotta. Niille oli 
opetettu tiukkaa kuria ja budjetin alijäämää ja se alkoi olla selvää, että näin pitää 
olla vaikka urputtivatkin vastaan. Siitä [EMU:sta] ei saatu sellaista kysymystä. 
Toisaalta useimmat ei edes ymmärtänyt, että se on luja sopimus.”) 
(Interview with Viinanen) 
The discussion continued when the positive result of the advisory referendum was 
declared. Later the Finnish Parliament agreed, after a very long debate, to join the EU. 
Altogether 1211 speeches were given, of which 139 (11%) dealt with EMU. The final 
third discussion took four days. The result of the voting was 152 for and 45 against EU 
membership. Parliament also decided that the question of joining the third phase of EMU 
would be dealt with as a separate issue in Parliament, a condition which was addressed by 
the Constitutional Committee. 
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Minister of Finance Iiro Viinanen argued strongly in favour of EMU when he introduced 
the annual budget proposal to Parliament in late autumn 1994. His main argument was 
that it was the time to get rid of the cycle of inflation-devaluation. “EMU is not a strait 
jacket for Finland meaning economic misery. The future can neither be built on 
devaluations nor on an endless burden of national debt.” (”EMU ei ole Suomelle 
taloudellista kurjistumista aiheuttava pakkopaita. Tulevaisuutta kun ei voi rakentaa 
devalvaatioiden tai valtion loputtoman velkaantumisen varaan.”) He also said that EMU 
is an uncertain project and that  
…it is irrelevant whether we are inside or outside of the EU and whether or not we 
have to follow the EMU criteria and the other economic restrictions of EMU. It 
means, for the sake of Finland’s benefit, that we have to reduce the budget deficit, 
have to maintain a low rate of inflation, have to control debt and try to diminish it 
and also to control interest rates... If it also suits the EU’s purpose, all to the 
good... We have tried desperately to follow this path already in the last three 
budgets and in this current fourth one. 
...on epäolennainen asia, olemmeko EU:ssa vai ei sen takia, etteikö meidän 
tarvitsisi noudattaa EMU-kriteerin tarkoittamia taloudellisia reunaehtoja. Sehän 
tarkoittaa sitä, että Suomen edun nimissä on pakko supistaa budjettialijäämää, on 
pakko pitää alhaisesta inflaatiosta huoli, on pakko pitää velkaantuminen kurissa 
ja alhaisemmalla tasolla ja pitää myös korot kurissa (...) Jos se sitten sopii EU:n 
pirtaan, niin hyvä on (...) Sitä taivalta tässä on yritetty kulkea epätoivoisesti nämä 
kolme ja nyt neljättä budjettia. 
(HE 152/1994 www.eduskunta.fi) 
MP Olli Rehn from the leading governmental party, the Centre Party, said:  
The aim of entering EMU can be either a suffocating strait jacket or, used well, a 
tool for achieving a solid currency and sustainable economic growth. It is not a 
question without risks from the Finnish standpoint because the economic history 
of Finland has been a history of great devaluations. Corporatism in our country 
has regularly failed. The labour market organizations have not succeeded in their 
efforts at stabilizing the economy and that is why the economy has been forced to 
re-stabilize by means of massive devaluation. And, as the cycle has become 
familiar, people have always learned to live with it. 
Pyrkimys Euroopan raha- ja talousliittoon voi olla joko kuristava pakkopaita tai 
oikein käytettynä käyttökelpoinen väline vakaaseen valuuttaan ja kestävään 
talouskasvuun. Se ei suinkaan ole riskitön Suomen kannalta, onhan Suomen 
talouspolitiikan historia ollut suurten devalvaatioiden historiaa. Meillä 
korporatismi on säännönmukaisesti epäonnistunut. Työmarkinajärjestöt eivät ole 
onnistuneet vakauttamisessaan ja sitten asia on pitänyt korjata ylisuurella 
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devalvaatiolla, ja kun sykliin on totuttu, sen mukaan on aina eletty. 
(ibid.)
MP Erkki Tuomioja (Social Democratic Party) emphasized that the decision to join EMU 
had to be taken in Parliament and “before the commitment is made, the position of 
employment in the European agenda has to be known and then also what kind of 
balancing systems have been put in place for the EMU area” (”Mutta ennen kuin 
sitoutuminen tehdään, on tiedettävä missä asemassa työllisyys on eurooppalaisella 
tasolla sen tavoitteissa ja minkälaisia tasausjärjestelmiä sen ollessa olemassa on silloin 
eurooppalaisella tasolla”) (ibid.).  
In February 1995, just before the Parliamentary Elections, the Government of Finland 
introduced its EU policy to Parliament (VNS 3/1994). This report provided the fourth 
opportunity to debate EMU. The Government did not focus on the EMU question. Once 
again the question of agriculture and especially the national subsidies to Finnish farmers 
were the main topics. Nine speakers (13%) out of 68 mentioned EMU. Ministers who 
spoke in order to introduce the Government’s EU policy did not mention the question of 
EMU at all. However, Minister Pertti Salolainen participated in the debate later and 
argued then in favour of EMU. 
The leader of the main opposition party, Paavo Lipponen (the Social Democratic Party), 
also argued in favour of EMU. Lipponen underlined the need for stability in the Finnish 
economy and he considered that the convergence criteria fitted well into this complex 
matter. However, his main argument was to find tools to control external shocks in order 
to promote employment and the stability of the European currency. He said: 
Implementing the third stage of EMU should still be the target for Finland as well. 
Economic and Monetary Union puts tough demands on the economy and its 
management. However, it is good to remember that market forces will appraise 
the Finnish economy according to the EMU criteria regardless of whether we are 
in or out of it.
EMU:n kolmannen vaiheen toteuttamisen on kuitenkin oltava tavoitteena myös 
Suomelle. Talous- ja rahaliitto asettaa taloudenpidolle tiukat rajat. On kuitenkin 
muistettava, että markkinoilla Suomenkin taloutta arvioidaan EMU:ssa 
noudatettavien kriteerien mukaan, olimmepa mukana tai emme.
(VNS 3/1994, www.eduskunta.fi). 
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Minister of Finance Iiro Viinanen described his feelings in Aho’s Government: 
“…It was a big relief, at least to me, to fall back on the Maastricht Treaty.
Without an external force we couldn’t get our economy onto the right track. There 
has to be external pressure just as equally there had to be external pressure on 
agriculture, too. I used to say: the decision to join the EU is the main issue, all 
other things are minor compared to membership, because only with the help of the 
membership can Finland’s economy and agriculture be restructured.”
(”... Minulle ainakin se oli iso helpotus. Tukeutua Maastrichtin sopimukseen. Että 
ilman ulkopuolista pakotetta me emme saa taloutta oikealle uralle. Pitää olla 
ulkopuolinen paine niin kuin toisaalta maatalouteenkin piti tulla ulkopuolinen 
paine. Käytin sanontaa (...) kaikki muu on pikkuasioita verrattuna EU:hun 
liittymiseen koska vain jäsenyyden kautta Suomen talous ja maatalous saadaan 
kuntoon.”)
(Interview with Viinanen) 
The main argument in favour of EMU was ‘TINA’, i.e. there is no alternative. Finland 
would in any case be evaluated in the light of the EMU criteria. Those who opposed EMU 
stressed the importance of Finland keeping control of its own currency policy and the fact 
that the Finnish markka symbolized the sovereignty of the state. The leader of Christian 
League, Toimi Kankaannieni, representing internal opposition within the Government, 
urged the other political groups to announce their position towards EMU during the up-
coming election campaign. He said that the League was against the decision to enter 
EMU because “it means submitting to mass unemployment, giving up our own currency 
and monetary policy, which includes giving up sovereign control of our own economic 
policy, and it would mean unfair changes in social policy and other areas of public 
welfare.” (”Itse Emuun liittyminen olisi massatyöttömyyteen alistumista, omasta rahasta 
ja rahapolitiikasta luopumista sekä luopumista taloudellisesta itsenäisyydestä ja 
merkitsisi siirtymistä kohtuuttomaan sosiaali ja muuhun yhteiskuntapolitiikkaan.”) (VNS 
3/1994, www.eduskunta.fi). 
It is also worth mentioning that during the Presidential Election in early 1995 all of the 
candidates, including the incumbent President Martti Ahtisaari, announced in a television 
debate that none of them would accept the decision to abandon the Finnish markka.  
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B: The Unexpected Decision 
After the elections in 1995, the Rainbow Coalition was established. The Social 
Democratic Party was the winner of the elections, while the Finnish Centre Party lost its 
ruling position and was left out of the government. The Government consisted of the 
Social Democratic Party, the Left Alliance, the Green League, the National Coalition 
Party and the Swedish People’s Party. This was called a Rainbow Coalition since parties 
from the Left and the Right were sitting around the same table.  
Prime Minister Lipponen introduced the Government Programme to the Finnish 
Parliament in spring 1995. The Government’s objective was to ensure that “Finland will 
meet the convergence criteria for the Economic and Monetary Union, giving the country 
the choice to join the third stage of EMU. The final decision is to be made in Parliament 
on the basis of a separate proposal” (Government Programme 1995). 
From the interview material it appears quite clear that there were no serious discussions 
between various political groups about the issue of EMU, nor about this specific 
formulation cited above. The text accepted was written by the Ministry of Finance. The 
practice was that texts concerning economic policy were normally prepared by the 
Ministry of Finance and its Economics Department. If the matter had something to do 
with monetary policy, the Bank of Finland was also consulted. But in this particular case 
no consultations were needed because the formulation was considered a neutral and 
logical consequence of EU membership.  
Because of the EU, the administration of the state also had to be reorganized in a new 
way to prepare Finland’s EU policy. The preparation work was done in the so-called 
‘seventh section’, which was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of 
Finance, Eino Keinänen. Other members of this particular section were: Sixten Korkman, 
Raimo Sailas, Lasse Aarnio, and Seppo Moisio, representing the Ministry of Finance; 
Matti Vanhala, Pentti Pikkarainen and Johnny Åkerholm, representing the Bank of 
Finland; Leif Fagernäs, representing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; and Eikka 
Kosonen, representing the Secretariat of the EU-affairs, which was located at that time in 
 127
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Martti Hetemäki assisted on behalf of the Ministry and 
Kjell-Peter Söderlund on behalf of the Bank (Protocol of the Ministerial Committee on 
EU Affairs).  
Some other sections working on the preparation of Finnish EU policy had representatives 
of social partners but not this one. This fact gives a reason for the impression that the 
preparatory work linked to EMU was seen more as a technical matter or one of 
implementation than a broad political issue with impact on society. One of the tasks of 
this section was to look after and make sure that all the necessary preparations and 
decisions concerning EMU were actually made. The second phase of EMU already 
obligated the member states to enact changes in their national legislation. It is very 
possible that the text formulated in the Government Programme had been discussed and 
prepared in this section. (Interviews with Hetemäki, Sailas and Viinanen). 
None of those who were interviewed had any clear memory if any discussions concerning 
EMU took place in spring 1995. On the one hand EMU was not a problematic issue for 
either the National Coalition Party or the Swedish People’s Party. According to the leader 
of the National Coalition Party, Sauli Niinistö, EMU was seen more as a westward-
looking project that would unite Finland at a fundamental level to the European 
Community than a question of the economy; the single currency would unite. On the 
other hand, EMU was criticized especially by the Left Alliance and the Green League. 
Even among the Social Democrats critical voices could be heard right up until the final 
decision was made in Parliament three years later. This is documented in the protocols of 
Parliament. Nevertheless, it seems that none of the political groups wanted to argue about 
the issue or put it on the table in the early days of the new Government.  
Jorma Westlund, Advisor to the Prime Minister, said in his interview: 
JW: I have no information on separate negotiations concerning EMU. I would 
imagine that if there had been such, I would have been present. Yet, I am 
convinced, in the light of how punctually and precisely this particular piece of text 
(as a matter of fact quite short compared to other parts of the whole mass of text) 
was handled, that the leaders of various governmental groups were certainly aware 
of the substance – I mean Andersson and Viialainen (the Left Alliance) and 
Norrback, who was the leader of the Swedish People’s Party, and Niinistö, too. 
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Also Soininvaara, who I think participated with Haavisto (the Greens) in the 
discussions concentrating on economy… it was very clear to these key negotiators 
that the will of Lipponen was to interpret the formulation in such a way that 
Finland would indeed be among the countries to establish EMU and among the 
first to enter it. Logically, in various contexts it meant adopting a line of economic 
policy with the aim of fulfilling the EMU criteria. To my mind, it was very clear. 
AA: So, when the Government programme was already being negotiated? 
JW: Yes, indeed, when the programme was being negotiated at Smolna [the 
Government Banquet Hall]. 
(JW: Erillistä EMU-neuvottelua en tiedä olleen. Kuvittelen niin, että jos sellainen 
olisi neuvotteluna ollut, olisin ollut paikalla. Mutta pelkästään siitä tarkkuudesta 
ja selkeydestä päätellen millä tämä verraten lyhyt tekstiosa koko massaan nähden 
käytiin läpi niin olen kyllä vakuuttunut, että hallitusryhmien vetäjät –  ja tässä 
tarkoitan Anderssonia ja Viialaista ja Norrback, joka oli rkp:n vetäjä ja Niinistö 
omalla tahollaan aivan varmasti (...) Arvelen myös näinkin, että Soininvaara taisi 
Haaviston ohella olla käsittelemässä näitä taloustekstejä. Kyllä näille 
ydinneuvottelijoille tuli selväksi, että se oli Lipposen tahto ymmärtää se asia niin, 
että Suomi on mukana kun EMU:a perustetaan ja on ensimmäisten joukossa ja 
että se tarkoittaa talouspolitiikan linjassa sitä, että se eri yhteyksissä 
johdonmukaisesti sanotaan, että tavoitteena on täyttää EMU-kriteerit. Minusta se 
tuli selvästi esille.  
AA: Siis jo hallitusohjelmaneuvotteluissa?  
JW: Kyllä tuolla Smolnassa hallitusohjelmaneuvotteluissa.) 
(Interview with Westlund)
Iiro Viinanen is also sure that everyone knew what the text formulated in the Programme 
was about. But he does not recall any concerns put forward by any of the partners during 
the negotiations, nor any reservations. 
AA: Do you think that it was unclear to anyone that this formulation meant that 
Finland would join EMU in any case, despite the condition of its being put before 
Parliament? 
IV: I think it was clear to everybody in Lipponen’s Government that this was the 
way it would be done. For me there was nothing unclear.
(AA: Luuletko, että jollekin olisi jäänyt epäselväksi, että tämä tarkoittaa myös 
sitä, että EMU:un sitten liitytään, vaikka siinä olikin eduskuntaehto. 
IV: Kyllä Lipposen hallituksen aikana minusta kaikille oli selvää, että näin 
tehdään. Minulla ei ole mitään epäselvää.)
(Interview with Viinanen) 
Deputy Prime Minister Sauli Niinistö confirms Viinanen’s impressions: 
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AA: Do you remember any discussions about this specific formulation between 
the leaders of the governmental groups? 
SN: No, I don’t. It was not challenged by anyone. Of course, I cannot remember 
precisely. 
AA: Everyone seems to say the same, that the focus was on the spending cuts. 
SN: That was, of course, a different issue. I mean, it was in principle a very hard 
decision that the Government took to enter EMU, but still I cannot remember any 
specific discussions concerning the matter. I cannot remember at the moment any 
argument from the small groups either... I have no memories... there may be 
something in my notes, but I cannot remember any areas of doubt.
(AA: Muistatko, että tästä muotoilusta olisi käyty hallitusryhmien vetäjien kesken 
millaisia neuvotteluja? 
SN: En. Ei sitä kukaan kyseenalaistanut. En tietenkään ihan tarkkaan muista. 
AA: Kaikki tuntuvat sanovan samaa, että fokus oli säästöohjelmassa. 
SN: Se oli tietenkin eri asia. Minä tarkoitan, että periaatteessa tuo oli kova 
hallituksen ratkaisu, että EMU:un pyritään mutta en muista, että sen ympäriltä 
olisi syntynyt mitään erityisempää keskustelua. Minä en pienryhmistäkään muista 
varmaan tältä istumalta.. minulle ei ole jäänyt mielikuvaa (...) voi olla, että 
muistiinpanoissani on jotain mutta en minä duubioista mitään muista.)
(Interview with Niinistö)
Paavo Lipponen said, in his interview, that the Maastricht Treaty was not reason enough 
to join EMU. According to him, research into the matter was certainly needed before any 
commitment. Neither did he have any memories of any discussions or concerns about the 
formulation. Prime Minister Lipponen was, however, very clear when he introduced the 
Programme and his Cabinet for voting in April 1995. Altogether 362 speeches or replies 
were given, but only fourteen speakers (4%) referred to the issue of EMU. The purpose of 
this vote was to test whether the new Government enjoyed the confidence of Parliament.  
On 16th June 1995 the Cabinet quite suddenly took a decision that was more precise than 
the Government Programme’s formulation. The statement was accepted in a meeting of 
the Ministerial Committee on European Affairs, following a short negotiation between the 
leaders of the governmental groups. The substance of the decision was that Finland would 
enter EMU among the first countries. The decision was presented without any conditions, 
qualifications or riders, followed by an appraisal of the current economic situation. The 
economic policy implemented would, according to this statement, guarantee the 
possibility of fulfilling the convergence criteria, as long as they were followed strictly.  
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In this particular case the text was written by Lasse Aarnio, who coordinated EU affairs in 
the Ministry of Finance. Prime Minister Lipponen and Minister of Finance Viinanen 
informed the Grand Committee of Parliament of the decision that same day and the 
statement was made public (Government Statement, 16.6.1995). I will come back later to 
the meeting of the Grand Committee with some remarks. 
None of those interviewed can recall any serious doubts concerning this particular 
decision in spite of its crucial nature – this was when the political commitment to join 
EMU was actually made. Neither the benefits nor the disadvantages of EMU were 
analyzed in the background papers prepared for the Cabinet Committee. The nature of the 
documents was more technical and the focus was on the detailed preparatory work which 
was needed in order to harmonize the legislation with the demands of the second phase of 
EMU. In one of the background papers for an Ecofin meeting, dated 2.6.1995, the 
position of a country in the event of its remaining outside of EMU was briefly analyzed:  
Finland has to be prepared for the fact that a number of countries will enter the 
third phase of EMU in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty. If Finland were to 
decide to stay outside, it would readily be categorized as a ‘second class’ country, 
both economically and politically. 
(Suomen täytyy varautua siihen, että joukko EU-maita siirtyy EMU:n kolmanteen 
vaiheeseen Maastrichtin sopimuksen mukaisesti. Ulkopuolelle jäädessään Suomi 
joutuisi helposti sekä taloudellisesti että poliittisesti ‘toiseen luokkaan’.)
(Protocol of Cabinet Committee on European Affairs, 12.6.1995) 
In June it was not clear what the final schedule would be for those EU countries which 
would enter the third stage of EMU. The Treaty left the timing flexible, with an earliest 
start date of 1997 and a latest of 1999; however, many European politicians and bank 
directors argued that the year 1997 would be premature. Iiro Viinanen made a proposal in 
summer 1995, at an Ecofin meeting which took place after the Finnish Committee’s 
meeting on EU Affairs, to postpone the start of EMU until 1999. This was mainly his own 
idea and it had not been discussed in the Cabinet Committee.  
No official decision about the timing of EMU was taken at the Ecofin meeting, perhaps 
for fear of giving a confusing message to the public. For example, the Chairman of the 
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Commission, Jacques Santer, had argued earlier in spring that, if the debate about the 
timing was the main issue, it would negatively affect the credibility of EMU. Because of 
the turbulence of currencies at the time, he considered EMU a necessity (KL 10.3.1995). 
Furthermore, the ‘Reflection Group’, consisting of members representing various organs 
the EU, considered postponing EMU to be harmful. Indeed, in a Finnish context, it is 
essential to underline that the formulation “among the first countries in the first wave” 
could have meant the year 1997.  
For Finland it would have been politically very difficult to enter EMU as early as 1997, 
not because of the convergence criteria but because of high unemployment. As a matter of 
fact it was already clear in spring 1995 that Finland would fulfil the criteria, but if the 
Government had faced a vote of confidence in 1995, the result could well have been 
negative. 
There were no special reasons why the decision was made just before Midsummer 1995. 
However, Midsummer in Finnish culture is the start of holidays. There is also something 
in journalism called a ‘slow news day’, which usually falls on Sunday or during a holiday 
period, when the sources of official information are taking a break. This is exactly what 
happened with the statement issued by the Cabinet, even though the Cabinet itself was not 
resting. It seems that it was the media that was resting. 
Nor was there any technical reason which forced the decision to be rushed. The 
Maastricht Treaty and the second phase of EMU already obligated some changes in 
domestic legislation, and the work could be started without any other special 
commitments. Interviewees underlined, however, the importance of having a clear 
position. Prime Minister Lipponen argued that it was important for the Government to 
express its will clearly, and that it is better than sailing side-on. (Minusta on tärkeätä, että 
hallitus ilmaisee tahtonsa selvästi. On se parempi kuin että mennään laita edellä) (My 
notes; interview with Lipponen). 
Secretary of State Raimo Sailas said: “This demonstrates the appropriateness of when we 
put things in motion. It was very well timed. There never came a point when it would 
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have been possible to stop the process, once it had already been put in motion.” (”Tämä
osoittaa liikkeellelähdön tarkoituksenmukaisuuden. Se oli oikein ajoitettu. Siinä ei oikein 
tullut sellaista paikkaa, että olisi voitu pysäyttää prosessi, joka oli pantu jo liikkeelle.”)
Later, during his interview, he filled in his impressions: 
“My impression was – going back now to June 1995 – that those who were still 
sleeping were surprised, since at that stage people knew very little about the 
matter (…) The matter was still some way off, so that Lipponen judged that 
circumstances were favourable and he did not perhaps see any need to discuss the 
matter more widely. I’d think that he would have contacted the Bank in first 
place.”
(”Minulle jäi sellainen mielikuva, vielä palaan loppukevääseen 1995, että sillä 
yllätettiin nukkuvat ja kun tuossa vaiheessa vielä tunnettiin asiat harvinaisen 
huonosti (...) melko pitkälti asia oli niin, että Lipponen arvioi tilanteen otolliseksi 
ja ehkä ei nähnyt tarvetta alkaa keskustelemaan laajemmin. Luulisin, että 
yhteydenpito oli lähinnä pankkiin.”)
(Interview with Sailas) 
Jorma Westlund, the Prime Minister’s Advisor, explained the timing of the decision in the 
following way:  
“I see the decision made in June as a result of the operational logic of the 
Government Programme. In addition this was the stage when it is customary for 
the Ministry of Finance to publish the latest economic statistics or forecasts to be 
used as the basis for preparing the next budget… Perhaps the purpose of the 
decision was also to look for some kind of shelter in order to survive the painful 
budget process.”
(”Minä näen kesäkuun päätöksen ikään kuin hallitusohjelman 
operationalisoimislogiikkana plus niin, että siinä tavanomaisesti on se vaihe, 
jolloinka on taloudellisesta kehityksestä valtiovarainministeriöllä esittää tuore 
tilasto tai tieto sen pohjaksi, mitä sitten budjettivalmisteluissa käytetään (...) Sitten 
kenties jonkinlaisen suojan etsimistä sitä silmällä pitäen, että budjettituska olisi 
helpommin vietävissä lävitse.”) 
(Interview with Westlund) 
EMU was also one of the arguments which made it easier to cut public spending, 
although Minister Niinistö denies very strongly any connection. However, Minister 
Viinanen said in his interview:  
“I think the spirit of these background discussions was always that we had to get 
ourselves firmly anchored and quickly. Since we were making progress in a 
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positive direction, therefore we couldn’t allow any indiscipline in public spending 
to run out of control again, inflation to take off, interest rates to rise, or any 
consequent uncertainty about this union. Indeed, we wanted to tie ourselves down, 
so that we would have the collar on which would lead to a disciplined economy.” 
(”Minusta se henki oli aina niissä taustakeskusteluissa, että meidän pitää saada 
ankkuri maahan ja nopeasti. Kun kehitys on menossa hyvään suuntaan, ettei 
pääse uudelleen ryöstäytymään tällainen menokurittomuus, inflaatio 
irtaantumaan, korot nousemaan ja sitten tulee epävarmuutta tähän liittymiseen. 
Kyllä se haluttiin lopullisesti fiksata kiinni, että meillä on länget kaulassa ja että 
se johtaa kurinalaiseen talouteen.”) 
(Interview with Viinanen) 
This argument, of the connection between EMU membership and decisions to make 
savings in public spending, was used in Parliament just before Midsummer when some 
proposals to cut financial allowances were dealt with. Westlund, the Prime Minister’s 
Advisor, emphasized: 
“I think the strength of EMU lay in the way in which its fundamental premises 
fitted very well with and supported the economic policy which the Government 
was practising in any case. EMU gave this policy a kind of ‘back rest’ to carry 
budget cuts through successfully and to favour those matters which supported 
convergence towards the EMU criteria. It was like a new international reference
which step by step gave the Government credibility.”  
(”Minusta vahvuus (EMU:n) oli siinä, että EMU:n perimmäiset perusteet sopivat 
kovin hyvin ja tukivat sitä talouspoliittista linjaa, jota hallitus oli joka tapauksessa 
toteuttamassa. Se antoi sille sellaista selkänojaa viedä säästöpäätöksiä lävitse ja 
pitää hyvänä sellaisia asioita, jotka tukivat EMU- kriteereiden täyttymistä. Oli 
semmoista ikään kuin uutta kansainvälistä referenssiä joka vähitellen antoi 
hallitukselle vakuuttavuutta.”) 
(Interview with Westlund) 
It is possible that, by the time that Minister Niinistö was responsible for budget affairs 
and when convergence was already in view, there was no longer any such argument. But 
earlier the rhetoric about EMU was certainly used as an excuse to follow a policy which 
had been adopted, in spite of the fact that the demands of EMU were not as ambitious as 
the domestic aims. It was also clear quite early on that the criteria stipulated by EMU 
were modest compared to the fiscal policy needed in Finland. Yet, such an analysis was 
not shared by all politicians in their public statements. It was a surprise at least to the 
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public that Finland was able to fulfil the criteria as early as 1995 (IL 17.3.1995 and TS 
11.5.1995).
Minister Viinanen described his feelings with satisfaction: “This government is amazing” 
(”Tämä on ihmehallitus”). However, governmental groups had no opportunity to discuss 
the matter before the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on European Affairs. The work 
of the party groups in government is structured so that the formation of opinions occurs 
within various groups, in order to guarantee unity and to control the debate in Cabinet. 
Small governmental groups did not have the possibility of working as a collective but the 
Social Democrats and the National Coalition Party did have this possibility in principle. 
In reality the decision-making process was very simple, as one of the interviewees said: 
“We did as I wanted.”  
According to the interviewees, it was important to make the decision before the end of 
June while there was still an atmosphere of good will and before the “honeymoon period” 
passed. Even Andersson and Haavisto, who might have been critical because of their 
political groups, were very “cooperative”, “responsible” and “intellectual”. “They were 
not just people filling their chairs,” according to one interviewee. The decision was 
discussed with Sirkka Hämäläinen, the Governor of the Bank of Finland, but the driving 
forces were Prime Minister Lipponen and Minister Iiro Viinanen. 
However, the Grand Committee of Parliament debated, at least to some extent, the 
statement given by the Cabinet about entering EMU among the first countries and in the 
first phase. The paper was delivered to committee members just before the meeting. The 
Prime Minister informed the committee about the forthcoming EU Summit in Cannes. It 
was not possible for any of the members of the Grand Committee to discuss the matter 
within their own political groups. Yet, the statement was adopted. Minister Viinanen was 
present as well as Permanent Secretary Keinänen.  
The protocol of the Grand Committee covers only the decisions, so that any impression of 
critical comment is based on interview material. It is also important to underline that in 
the Finnish system the Prime Minister always informs the Committee, before and after the 
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Summit. It was in that sense quite natural that the Prime Minister should pay a visit and 
inform the Committee of the Government’s positions. 
Some critical comments were expressed by the Chairman of the Committee, Erkki 
Tuomioja, MP Mikko Elo (both Social Democrats), and MP Johannes Leppänen (Centre 
Party). The picture given shows a clear logic. MPs representing the Centre Party, and 
therefore in this case the opposition, were mainly in favour because of their loyalty to 
former Prime Minister Esko Aho, whose Cabinet had made the commitment to both the 
EU and EMU. However, MP Johannes Leppänen had voted against the EU and therefore 
it was logical that he should be critical of EMU. The critical comments made by some 
Social Democrats were not surprising either. The Chairman of the Grand Committee, 
Erkki Tuomioja, had publicly expressed his concerns about EMU. Yet, the criticism 
caused no real problems for the policy adopted by the Cabinet. According to the 
interviews, it was characteristic of Erkki Tuomioja that he would be critical at first but 
that with time he would come into line; in this case, however, Tuomioja participated 
actively in public debate and his critical comments affected the final decision-making 
process of Parliament.  
Media response to the statement adopted in June 1995 was actually very weak. Only 
Helsingin Sanomat reported it, with Renny Jokelin writing about the Government 
Statement on entering EMU among the first countries and an interview with Prime 
Minister Lipponen. Lipponen’s argument was that this specific decision added to the 
stability of the economy, and he also said that the beginning of the third stage was merely 
a political question. He further underlined that the criteria would be the same as those 
adopted at Maastricht, and that while he considered employment to be an important issue, 
Finland would not in any circumstances try to change the criteria (HS 17.6.1995). 
It is worth highlighting that Prime Minister Lipponen was very clear concerning 
employment: Finland should not, according to him, raise the issue of employment as a 
core element of the EMU preparations. However, many politicians, including the Minister 
of Labour, Liisa Jaakonsaari, demanded that employment should be a criterion of 
convergence, regardless of whether the criteria adopted at Maastricht remained intact. As 
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far as the interviews show, employment was never a serious element in Finnish policy on 
its path towards EMU. 
My interpretation of the weak public interest is that not only was this the holiday season 
but also that the political elite were unwilling to debate the matter – the media was not fed 
any response to the matter. The formulation of the Government Programme was not 
argued; the actual decision made in June was not discussed either. There were at the time 
many unresolved questions concerning EMU, such as how large the euro zone should be, 
what the final positions of Germany and France would be and if they would be able to 
satisfy the convergence criteria, whether it would be possible to devaluate the euro (at that 
time, the ecu) in case of monetary crisis, and so on. EMU was a subject of speculation 
and it was much easier not to take it seriously.  
However, the decision in June was a serious one. Finnish Participation in the Euro Area 
(24.2.1998) was introduced to Parliament based on this particular decision. Before it took 
place, Finland had to enter the ERM and to adopt a currency policy of fixed exchange 
rates. It is no wonder that these decisions were painful, since no analysis had yet been 
made about the effects on the Finnish economy. 
The Finnish EU doctrine was still in development, and EMU was considered to be a side-
effect of the EU, a derivative of integration policy. The EU policy adopted demanded that 
Finland should strive to be at the centre of the EU and therefore no presumption could be 
allowed to challenge either the single currency or the convergence criteria. 
C: The Need for Analysis – Delayed Political Argumentation
Public opinion was negative towards EMU. In 1994, just before the EU referendum, the 
Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies (EVA) published a study of Finnish 
opinions on the EU. Supporters and opponents of Finland’s membership were running 
neck and neck.  
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Some results of the survey are worth mentioning in this context. Nearly 80% of Finns 
thought that the negotiations with the EU could be characterized as a political game, in 
which the main issue was in danger of being forgotten. This was because of the 
agricultural subsidy. Indeed the political debate concentrated on agricultural issues, as 
already discussed in the Prologue. The value-added-tax system (VAT) was also highly 
criticized by the citizens. (Finnish EU Opinion, Autumn 1994) 
The survey included questions on opinions concerning the aims of the Maastricht Treaty; 
common foreign, security and defence policy, Economic and Monetary Union, as well as 
a common EU citizenship. There was increasing support for a common defence policy but 
decreasing support for a common currency, where 36% of respondents were in favour and 
54% against. But as has been said before, during the Referendum the focus of the political 
elite was more on agricultural issues and not on a single currency. In fact the question 
which was debated most in public was whether the President of Finland should represent 
the country at the EU Summits or the Prime Minister or perhaps both (ibid.). 
A survey by EVA a year later (1995) on the attitudes of Finns also included questions 
concerning the EU. Most Finns could not answer definitely on questions about the future 
development of the EU, but it is significant that only 18% of respondents supported a 
single currency. Most Finns (93%) hoped for more transparency in the EU; there was, 
however, no question about transparency in Finnish society in the survey. (Epävarmuuden 
aika – matkalla uuteen, EVA-raportti 1995) 
Public opinion was critical towards membership of EMU during the time period 1995-
1998. In December 1996 36% of the respondents were in favour, whereas 45% were 
against, with 19% of respondents undecided. A year later (1997) the figures were 38%, 
41% and 21%. Attitudes changed in a more positive direction (1998) after SAK made its 
decision to support the issue followed by some political parties: the Social Democratic 
Party, the Left Alliance and the Green League. Those who considered the decision to 
enter the euro zone positively were in the majority but, at the same time, over half of the 
respondents considered it to be a big risk. Half of the respondents were sure there would 
be confusion over the new currency and two-thirds announced they would follow taxes 
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and prices of other countries carefully and compare them to Finnish ones (polls by 
Taloustutkimus). 
According to a survey made by EVA, citizens considered the media’s analysis of EMU to 
be reliable, and that reports by specialists were more difficult to understand than the 
analysis by the media. Finns also trusted the Prime Minister and his capacity to deal with 
the matter but in general the political elite seems to have had difficulties convincing the 
people on the benefits of EMU (Suomi ja Euroopan tulevaisuus – suomalaisten EU-
kannanotot, syksy 1997). 
The conclusions of the research are no surprise. The Government had decided not to make 
any special analysis of the impact of EMU in its statement in June 1995, yet it had 
announced its will to promote public debate. Jorma Westlund took a leading role in 
lobbying for a bill for an appropriation for various political parties, social partners and 
NGOs, in order to promote the debate. The bill was originally rejected by the Ministry of 
Finance but finally accepted by the Government in its Budget Proposal for the year 1996. 
It was SAK in particular who took the initiative in public debate, and I shall return to this 
matter later in my study.  
On 3rd March 1997 Aamulehti made a summary of how the various political groups had 
made their decisions. The majority of the parties in government had not made any 
decisions, though the Government itself had over a year earlier. The council of the Social 
Democratic Party (17.11.1996) underlined the importance of studying the benefits and 
disadvantages of EMU, and employment was considered to be an important factor, but no 
specific decision had been taken. The council of the Left Alliance (1.12.1996) underlined 
the issue of timing. There was no reason to hurry, according to the Left Alliance, and it 
was also important to know Sweden’s position before Finland made its resolution. 
Employment was also considered to have some influence on the matter. The council of 
the Greens (1.12.1996) assessed that it was premature for Finland to enter EMU, since it 
would be difficult for Finland to react to any external shocks except through 
unemployment.  
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Political parties representing the opposition had not made their final decisions either. The 
Board of Christian League accused the Government of being naïve and demanded proper 
research on the question. The council of Finnish Centre Party (24.11.1996) considered 
that EMU would not be good for Finland, that it was important to see in the first place 
which countries were going to form the area, and that, if the Government was in favour of 
EMU, it should organize a referendum. 
The party congress of the Swedish People’s Party in June 1996 made a positive official 
decision, although their approach had been positive since the beginning of EU 
membership. The Young Finns (an opposition party) also argued in favour of EMU at 
their Party Congress in June 1996. The National Coalition Party made a decision in its 
council (13.2.1997) that Finland’s objective should be to join EMU in the first phase. In 
reality the approach of conservatives had been positive since the issue of EU membership 
had first been raised. 
It is also very interesting that, according to a poll published in Helsingin Sanomat 
(15.02.1997), there were members of the Finnish Parliament did not want to answer 
whether they were in favour of or against EMU. In response to the question: “Do you 
support participation of EMU’s third phase among the first countries,” 116 MPs out of 
200 answered the question, but 21 refused to say anything, while most of the MPs refused 
permission for their answers to be published. According to the article, only one MP from 
the Social Democratic Group was publicly in favour of entering EMU; no one from the 
Conservatives was against and no one from the Centre Party was in favour. Ministers, 
most of them also MPs, were excluded. 
Helsingin Sanomat continued that the leadership of the Government – that is to say, Prime 
Minister Lipponen and Minister of Finance Sauli Niinistö – had announced that Finland 
should endeavour to move towards membership. However, it did not refer to the fact that 
the whole Government had already made this commitment in June 1995.  
It is obvious that EMU was a hot potato for the political elite. This was not the case with 
the corporate world. Johannes Koroma, Managing Director of the Confederation of 
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Finnish Industry and Employers (Teollisuus ja Työnantajat, TT), gave an interview before 
the formation of Paavo Lipponen’s Government, in which he said that only one form of 
words would satisfy the employers in the up-coming Government Programme and that 
was:  Finland will join EMU among the first countries (Savon Sanomat 6.4.1995). 
It is apparent that TT had already made its decision in favour of EMU during the 
Referendum of 1994. The board of TT is very large and, according to one interviewee, 
“they never ask anything from their members because the members don’t understand the 
matters.” Obviously EMU would impact quite differently in various fields of industry. In 
1995 the role of the paper and pulp industry was still significant and the question of 
asymmetric shocks was debated. However, TT’s main argument in support of Finland’s 
participation in the euro zone was motivated by monetary policy.  
The liberalisation of monetary markets has made it very difficult to conduct 
autonomous monetary and exchange rate policy. Because of credibility problems 
and speculation, fixed exchange rate policy is problematic. In addition, the freely 
floating exchange rates are an unsatisfactory alternative. In a small country 
exchange rate volatility is often high which creates uncertainty and cost for the 
companies. (Finnish Industry and EMU – effects on competitiveness, www.tt.fi) 
TT also argued that a single currency could provide “great possibilities for a slumping 
Europe to respond to the competition from North America and the East Asia.” TT 
underlined, however, the risks: “If economy policy including incomes policy is poorly 
managed and if the companies are inefficient, risks will grow” (www.tt.fi). TT’s 
commitment to EMU was unanimous although there may have been some hidden 
disagreements.  
In SAK (the Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions) feelings were mixed. It was 
strange that the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers should so readily 
support membership of EMU, particularly the paper industry. Fixed exchange rate policy 
was also seen problematic among members of the Central Union of Agricultural 
Producers and Forest Owners (MTK), and the option of devaluation had been important 
to the paper and pulp industry as well as to forest owners. 
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If and when Finland joined EMU, the main consequence would be a fixed exchange rate. 
This would mean that employment and nominal wages would have to fluctuate in 
response to external shocks, and that employers would have to retain the right to lower 
agreed wages unilaterally. The labour movement argued that this would destroy the 
bargaining system, and this factor forced SAK specifically to consider whether EMU was 
a good option for Europe as a whole as well as for Finland in particular. 
The debate stimulated by the trade unions started in October 1995 at SAK’s general 
assembly. At SAK’s Congress, held in June 1996, it was stated that SAK would oppose 
joining EMU if it were linked to “demands for the dismantling of the bargaining 
structures or nominal wage fluctuations. SAK also demanded the development of buffer 
funds and the development of agreed rules for dealing with economic disturbances.” 
(Boldt, SAK reports 1999, p. 5).  
According to Pertti Parmanne, it was obvious that the Confederation of Finnish Industry 
and Employers (TT) and even the Prime Minister had imagined that SAK would 
automatically support membership of EMU.  
“They began to build the kind of provisions and started putting in the kind of 
content that membership of EMU would call for, and that we could not in any 
circumstances accept. And so we would have been obliged supposedly to start 
giving or even paying them in exchange for Finnish membership of EMU. That 
was the clear impression they gave.”  
(”Silloin ryhdyttiin rakentamaan sellaisia ehtoja ja alettiin antaa sellaisia 
sisältöjä, että mitä EMU:n jäsenyys merkitsee, joita me emme voineet missään 
tapauksessa hyväksyä. Ja että meidän olisi pitänyt muka ryhtyä antamaan tai 
maksamaan jotakin vastineeksi, että päästään EMU:n jäseneksi. Tämmöinen 
vaikutelma tuli erittäin selvästi esille.”)
(…)
“We started, according to the Swedish model, with broad district and union-based 
discussion, the aim of which was to analyze the issue honestly in the same way 
that we had done with EU membership... In March 1997 SAK organized a seminar 
on Wage-earners and EMU in the Labour Movement’s House in Helsinki, and 
Koroma, so to speak, came to us across the Long Bridge [the bridge that, for 
decades, separated the bourgeois parts of Helsinki from the workers’ district] with 
a positive attitude towards resolving the issues ... For the first time the employers 
abandoned their systematic opposition to buffer funds and admitted that these 
matters needed to be explored... We had long been demanding the establishment 
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of an expert working party. Indeed it had been a central demand in our 
memorandum of 7.12.1995. We considered this kind of high-level and impartial 
expert analysis was needed to analyze the impacts of EMU to generate public 
debate. In Sweden they had already made this kind of analysis.” 
(”Me käynnistimme ruotsalaisen mallin mukaisesti laajan aluekohtaisen 
kenttäkeskustelun, jossa aidosti käytiin läpi asiaa ihan niin kuin EU:n jäsenyyden 
yhteydessä, että mitä tämä merkitsee (...) Maaliskuussa 1997 SAK järjesti 
Helsingin Työväentalolla EMU ja palkansaajat seminaarin, jossa Koroma tuli 
niin sanotusti pitkän sillan yli meitä vastaan ja suhtautui yhteistyöhaluisesti (...) 
Ensimmäistä kertaa työnantaja luopui systemaattisesta puskurirahastojen 
vastustamisesta ja tunnusti, että näitä asioita voidaan selvittää (...) Vaatimus, että 
pitää panna asiantuntijatyöryhmä pystyyn niin se oli meillä ollut jo pitkään. Itse 
asiassa se on ollut jo 7.12.1995 muistiossa keskeisenä vaatimuksena. Katsottiin, 
että tarvitaan tällainen korkeatasoinen, ns. puolueettomien asiantuntijoiden 
analyysi tätä keskustelua varten. Ruotsissa oli sellainen ollut jo aikaisemmin.”)
(Interview with Parmanne) 
The purpose of the buffer funds was to smooth the impact of EMU in the case of an 
asymmetric shock. The response of the government was quite negative. Minister Viinanen 
contended that the most important buffer was a stable government budget and that all 
other kinds of funds were peanuts, an approach that was also shared by his successor, 
Minister Niinistö.
Prime Minister Lipponen followed the arguments expressed by his conservative 
colleagues. When asked about his hesitation concerning buffer funds, he recalled that the 
Ministry of Finance was exceedingly critical. However, it was Sixten Korkman, a former 
economist at the Ministry of Finance, who stated publicly for the first time that buffers 
would not cause any harm. Furthermore, Martti Hetemäki, Korkman’s successor, had 
argued in favour of buffer funds in the Income Policy Commission. According to his 
argument, a rise in employers’ social insurance contributions during a low part of the 
economic cycle could deepen the recession. In that sense buffers could have a role to play 
in balancing the fluctuations. The Buffer Fund Agreement was accepted in November 
1997. (Interviews with Lipponen, Parmanne, Korkman, and Hetemäki). 
In May 1997 the Group of Professors, chaired by Professor Jukka Pekkarinen, concluded 
its work. The group had been appointed by Prime Minister Lipponen and was only 
announced at the SAK General Assembly in November 1996 (over a year after the 
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decision) in reaction to SAK’s criticism of EMU. Parliament had been promised a study 
of EMU, yet neither Professor Pekkarinen’s chairing of the group nor the nature of the 
research itself had been specified in Government discussion: Prime Minister Lipponen 
took the decision alone. The Group of Professors did not in fact make any 
recommendations, producing instead several well-researched reports, for example on the 
impact of EMU on regional development and the welfare state.  
The Ministry of Finance had also set up an EMU project, with the remit of ensuring a 
smooth transition to a single currency involving relevant agents in all sectors of society, 
and Parliament was also able to discuss the preparatory work in summer 1997. But, with 
the exception of the National Coalition Party and the Swedish People’s Party, the 
majority of the parties in the Government had still not made any final decision, and it 
seems that a strategy based on “playing into extra time” was generally accepted.  
As a matter of fact, it was SAK that appeared to take a leading role in the assessment of 
EMU in the public sphere and to give the public some tools for understanding the issue; it 
was also successful in lobbying for its political aims when the proper opportunity arose. 
The Left was able to follow the paths opened up by SAK and never had to take any actual 
responsibility for the decision made in June 1995.  
In the end thousands of articles were published before the formal decision to enter EMU. 
An organization called “Eurooppalainen Suomi” (European Finland) collected press 
releases covering all newspapers published in Finland from the beginning of the year 
1997; although these therefore fall after the year in question, 1995, and outside my 
research, some of the articles have been used here to illustrate the plot. 
D:  Formal Closure
The National Coalition Party and the Swedish People’s Party had decided in favour of 
EMU. The Council of the Social Democratic Party took its decision, with hardly any 
discussion, in autumn 1997 after SAK had made its own recommendation to join EMU. 
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The Left Alliance organized an internal party-referendum during late autumn 1997, in 
which the question of supporting the decision to enter EMU and the aim of continued 
governmental responsibility were linked together. Despite a narrow margin, the majority 
of members came out in favour of EMU. It is obvious that the trade unions played an 
important role in the decision-making process of both the Left Alliance and the Social 
Democratic Party. 
The Greens took a vote on the question in their 1997 council, where the Chairman of the 
Green League, Satu Hassi, was against and what the result would be was far from clear. A 
telling detail is that Hassi had to telephone Arja Alho to check whether it was true that the 
Government had already made a decision to join EMU among the first countries, which of 
course it had a year earlier. Minister Pekka Haavisto (the Greens) interrupted a visit to 
Central America in order to participate in the debate, and Prime Minister Lipponen paid a 
visit to the meeting of the Greens. The result of the vote was in favour of EMU. 
When all governmental parties had made their decisions, public opinion also became 
more favourable towards EMU. The Finnish Centre Party still preferred to follow the 
policy adopted in other Nordic countries, where neither Denmark nor Sweden was ready 
to join EMU among the first countries, a stance which Prime Minister Lipponen criticized 
bitterly in a debate in Parliament. 
The Statement to Parliament on Finnish Participation in the Euro Area was given in 
February 1998 and Parliament voted on the question in April 1998. In March 1998 the 
Commission of the European Union and the European Monetary Institute (EMI) provided 
the EU Council with reports on convergence and countries’ progress towards fulfilling 
their obligations. At the start of 1999, the exchange rates of 11 national currencies were 
irrevocably fixed. Greece, the 12th member, joined the club in January 2001. On 1st
January 2002 the euro area’s three hundred citizens, including Finns, could withdraw euro 
notes and coins and start spending their new money. The biggest step towards European 
political and economic integration had been taken. 
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7.4. Media Response 
From December 1994 to November 1995 the Bank of Finland collected a review of the 
press consisting of 222 articles about EMU. I have selected this specific time period 
because it covers the actual EMU decision, including the period before and after the 
decision. Although the review may not be exhaustive with respect to articles concerning 
EMU, since the Bank’s coverage naturally concentrates on the economic pages more than 
the political, the coverage across a variety of newspapers is wide. 
The newspapers have been classified according to whether they are national, provincial, 
partisan or tabloids. National and tabloids are classified according to their ownership such 
as the Sanoma Group and Almamedia. The category ‘Other’ consists of newspapers 
published by the trade unions. 
Figure 3 
n=222
Concerning EMU, there is no significant difference between the interests of the major 
media conglomerates. As long as political parties were not particularly eager to 
participate in public debate on EMU, neither were partisan newspapers. From Alma’s 
newspapers Kauppalehti in particular had a central role, lobbying purposefully on behalf 
of EMU, while at this period the Sanoma Group did not yet have its own financial 
newspaper. 
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TYPE OF ARTICLES (EMU)
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The types of articles have been classified into five categories: editorials, news, comments, 
cartoons or others. The category of ‘others’ comprises mainly of interviews. In this 
instance, the Bank’s collection of press cuttings does not include cartoons, although some 
drawings and graphics were used to illustrate EMU or the current economic situation in 
Finland. Only a few photographs were generally used to illustrate articles, and the 
pictures and photos that were published, were mainly portraits of the interviewees. In 
Barthes’s terminology these portraits were ‘unary’, with male faces looking seriously 
from the page in their dark suits with a background symbolizing power.  
Figure 4 
n=222
The news and interviews (categorized as ‘others’) account for 75 per cent of the coverage, 
which underlines the impression that public debate about EMU was weak and largely 
unformed, and that since the political system did not generate any material there could be 
little impact in the editorials. The media coverage merely reflected the events, or lack of 
them, surrounding EMU. 
Half of those who were interviewed before summer 1995 were foreigners, mainly 
representatives of various EU organisations. This coincides with the period referred to 
here as the “Prologue”, the first stage of the process. The other half consisted of Finnish 
economists representing mainly the interests of industry, but also included Governor 
Sirkka Hämäläinen, Commissioner Erkki Liikanen and the Minister of Finance, Iiro 
Viinanen.
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After summer 1995 (that is, the second episode, “The Unexpected Decision”), the 
majority of interviewed experts were Finns (80%). All those who were interviewed were 
men except Sirkka Hämäläinen. Interest in Sweden’s position was also reflected in the 
coverage of both interviews and reports. When the people interviewed are compared with 
key actors in the case of EMU, the linking person emerges as Minister Viinanen, who 
argued publicly in favour of EMU, while being also a key actor in the decision-making 
process.
The following categories were selected in response to the total coverage. The main 
content of the articles, particularly their headlines, were divided into seven sections in 
order to characterize the media response. A few of the articles fall into more than one, 
yielding the following percentages:  
• the timing of EMU      14% 
• the convergence criteria    31% 
• reports on preparatory work    20% 
• evaluation of the impact of EMU   25% 
• the need for analysis       4% 
• currency as an identity factor        4%  
• how the decision should be taken     4% 
The first group concentrates on the time schedule of EMU. The substance of the articles 
focused on such concerns as whether the third phase would start during 1997 or not until 
1999, whether EMU would become a reality at all and how the process was being 
negotiated within the EU countries. The second group consisted of reports concentrating 
on the criteria in general and especially on speculation about whether Finland would fulfil 
the criteria or not, whether employment should be included among the criteria, and 
whether Finland was truly ready to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) or not.  
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The third group consists of reports giving information on the preparatory work, such as 
meetings within the EU, the design of notes and coins, and includes some interviews with 
politicians or economists, which were more of the nature of reportage than opinion. The 
fourth category consists of articles in which EMU was evaluated or analyzed, the pros and 
cons, and where the interviewees expressed an opinion of EMU. The fifth category 
consists of calls for more public debate on the issue or for more information on it. The 
sixth category concentrates on articles or reports which stressed the importance of the 
national currency to national identity. The seventh and last category contains articles or 
reports which concentrated on the issue of how the decision to enter EMU should be 
taken in Parliament and whether a referendum should be organized.  
The first conclusion to be drawn about the media response is that themes which can be 
considered as technical or structural, descriptive rather than evaluative – including the 
question of timing, the various criteria, reports on the preparatory work, and what form a 
proper decision-making process should take – account for two thirds of the material. 
However, the influence of the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) was analyzed very 
carefully and even debated, and generally regarded as problematic for the Finnish 
economy, but it was still not problematized as a criterion. More fundamental questions, 
such as whether EMU would be good or bad for Finland and even for Europe, what it 
would mean, what kind of research was needed and how important having its own 
currency was to a nation, in other words semantic or evaluative factors, account for only 
one third of the material.  
According to headlines, the main messages of the editorials from 16.12.1994 to summer 
1995 (before the actual decision to enter EMU) are: 
• EMU leads to chains; 
• EMU is difficult for Finland; 
• EMU will punish Finland in the right way; 
• joining EMU is a dream, the timing is too tight and our own currency is important; 
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• Germany and France will create the euro zone, Finland is not yet ready; 
• Finland should analyze the impact of EMU immediately; 
• the aims of EMU are good for Finland; 
• employment should be remembered; 
• Finland should join EMU, the Treaty should not be opened up.  
With respect to the editorials what emerges is that provincial newspapers were critical or 
very critical in their emphasis, while, of the media conglomerates, Alma and especially 
Kauppalehti were more positive towards EMU than the Sanoma Group. For example, the 
editorial of Helsingin Sanomat (HS 16.12.1994) entitled “EMU leads to chains” is 
actually very critical. The main argument against EMU was that within the world of EMU 
there would be no possibility of devaluing. It would mean, according to the paper, a very 
rough adaptation process and it was hard to believe that wages or the prices of wood 
would be flexible enough. The editorial of Etelä-Suomen Sanomat (19.12.1994) supported 
scepticism, predicting with irony that Minister Iiro Viinanen would be remembered, in 
spite of the cuts, as a benevolent Santa Claus in the EMU environment, since even larger 
cuts would be needed in future public spending. Minister Viinanen was generally strongly 
criticized because of his strict financial policy.  
The tone of editorials of Helsingin Sanomat changed during the spring towards more a 
neutral stance than earlier, but can still be characterized as hesitant. In a piece published 
in the middle of the election campaign, Helsingin Sanomat (8.3.1995) demanded that the 
benefits and dangers of EMU should be analyzed. 
The main messages of editorials after June 1995 (when the decision had already been 
made) are: 
• there is a need for debate in Finland; 
• a strict fiscal policy would also be needed outside EMU; 
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• the EMU debate shows signs of intolerance; 
• a healthy economy is needed in any case; 
• moving from a floating currency to a single currency would be a welcome change; 
• there is some schizophrenia in the EMU debate; 
• the question of EMU might cause conflict; 
• belief in EMU is weak; 
• the government is promoting EMU against reason (“kuin käärmettä pyssyyn”);
• what actually is the future of EMU? 
Judging from the media response, there appears to have been no recognition of the 
decision made in June, except for the article in Helsingin Sanomat 17.6.1995, referred 
earlier. None of the editorials evaluated the Government’s decision. No comments were 
published.
Kauppalehti (16.6.1995), reporting the agenda of the Cannes Summit, also predicted that 
Finland’s position should be clear quite soon. Kauppalehti did not know how right it was: 
on that very day the Government’s position did become clear but, ironically, received no 
comment in Kauppalehti.
The low level of publicity concerning the decision made in June is also one of the 
probable reasons why the commitment was not debated in Parliament, for example during 
Question Hour. The decision was scarcely commented on by economists either. For 
example Johnny Åkerholm, who started his career at the Ministry of Finance in autumn 
1995, gave an interview in Etelä-Suomen Sanomat (13.11.1995), where he made no 
reference to this decision, although he demanded that Finland should join EMU among 
the first countries. Prime Minister Lipponen, in a comment published in Turun Sanomat 
(11.10.1995) stressed that the Government had already made a decision but this elicited 
no further response. 
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The criteria of EMU were, however, analyzed in the autumn. Most of the articles that 
focused on criteria concentrated on exchange rates and the timing of entry into the ERM.
The Finnish markka was floating and past experience of fixed exchange rates had been 
traumatic. There was a lot of speculation about when it would suit the Finnish economy to 
enter the ERM. It is also very clear that some tension existed between the Government 
and the Bank of Finland, which was reflected in media comment as well as in interviews. 
Kauppalehti’s editorial (11.1.1995) opened the debate on the ERM just as membership of 
the EU was beginning, arguing in favour of the ERM, in the light of Austria’s entry into 
the mechanism: “Austria seems to have considered the matter carefully and it is 
convinced of the benefits for a small country”. A day earlier, when Helsingin Sanomat
reported the same decision, it added that there was still no information about the timing of 
Finland’s joining the mechanism.  
The Governor of the Bank of Finland, Sirkka Hämäläinen, was interviewed for 
Kauppalehti on 16.1.1995, and her main message was that the question of EMU was 
premature; there were neither enough instructions from the EMI (European Monetary 
Institute) nor information to fix the currency’s exchange. It was important, in 
Hämäläinen’s eyes, to find out more about the currency’s natural level and long-term 
economic balance, while she emphasized that Finland had to strive towards the ERM. 
Finally, she regretted that not all of the Nordic countries were members of the EU. 
Hämäläinen refused to comment on Prime Minister Lipponen’s ideas about entering the 
ERM to Helsingin Sanomat (1.7.1995). She said that the system had been created in quite 
different circumstances and there was no official interpretation concerning the criteria. 
The Parliamentary Supervisory Board of the Bank further underlined its right to make 
decisions on monetary policy and to control the activities of the Bank. MP Ilkka Kanerva 
asserted, in Kauppalehti, that the Board should play an active role, especially if the 
Finnish currency were to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism. He stressed that the 
decision had to be legal, that it had to benefit the Finnish economy, and that it should be 
evaluated in the context of neighbouring countries, especially Sweden (KL 14.9.1995).
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The Bank and Ministry of Finance came into sharp confrontation when the currency 
legislation was modified to make it accord with the EMU environment.5 Speculation 
surrounding the Finnish markka became heated, and MP Esko Seppänen made a 
statement in Pohjalainen that the ERM was even worse than EMU (27.9.1995). Minister 
Viinanen convinced the Government to continue its policy of a floating currency (HS
2.10.1995). However, speculation continued about whether Finland would enter the 
mechanism as soon as the legislation, which allowed for a fixed rate, was introduced to 
Parliament or whether the timing would perhaps be later. 
Economist Neil MacKinnon from Citibank, interviewed by Niklas Herlin in Kauppalehti 
(KL 25.10.1995), underlined the problems of the ERM and said it was a great mistake. 
Demari also carried a report saying that there was no reason to hurry into the ERM. 
(9.11.1995). Atte Jääskeläinen, writing in Helsingin Sanomat, maintained that it was not 
possible to enter the ERM without a report from the EMI and that the commotion was 
therefore premature. Both Prime Minister Lipponen and Minister Viinanen assured the 
public that the question of the ERM was not an immediate concern. It is no wonder that a 
year later scandal hit the Government when entry to the ERM became a reality.6
A shift in the tone of articles concerning the timing of EMU began to take place, towards 
a more favourable attitude. The turbulence in exchange rates and in financial markets 
during early spring 1995, in which many currencies encountered difficulties, strengthened 
demands to institute EMU. Finnish economists, for example Kari Alho (AL 7.3.1995), 
judged that devaluations would not ruin the EMU process and that the single currency 
was needed to stabilize financial markets.  
Satakunnan Kansa, in a comment on 23.2.1995 about the demands of EMU and the role 
of Minister Viinanen, noted that Viinanen described the performance of the Finnish 
economy as catastrophic when he was in Finland but, when he was abroad, as healthy and 
strong. Optimism about achieving the convergence criteria was therefore confused, 
5
  This is from direct personal knowledge, since I was responsible for the preparatory work. 
6
  Since it falls outside the scope of this study, and since I had a personal interest in the matter, it is not dealt 
with further here. 
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according to the paper. According to Iltalehti (17.3.1995), the civil servants at the 
Ministry of Finance were shocked to find that Finland would be able to fulfil the criteria.
A Green Paper published by the EU Commission (31.05.1995) reported on preparation 
for EMU and it was widely discussed in the Finnish media. Jyrki Raivio (HS 1.10.1995) 
reported from Brussels that Ministers of Finance would set a target for EMU to start in 
1999. The European Parliament supported the EMU process, and the MEP Mikko 
Rönnholm wrote in Ilkka (29.10.1995) that EMU had to be created now or otherwise 
Germany would retreat. The demands to add employment as a convergence criterion were 
rejected with the argument that the Treaty should not be opened to negotiation, because it 
would just postpone the process. Yet, the Government’s decision to enter EMU among 
the first countries, regardless of all unresolved factors and doubts, was not reported.  
7.5. Conclusions 
The Plot 
The main plot of the EMU case is certainly Finland’s membership of the EU. EMU was a 
derivative of the EU, considered a reasonable objective for Finland but not without risks. 
The project appeared uncertain while most countries in Europe were experiencing 
economic difficulties to a greater or lesser degree. I would argue that the public debate 
(1995) in Finland underestimated the political commitment of member states of the EU to 
deepen integration and to establish the euro zone.  
It would be natural to assume that the experiences of the past economic crisis – an 
asymmetric shock including the failure of a strong currency and fixed exchange rate – 
would make politicians wary. However, the strategy adopted was an unusual one: first the 
decision, then secondly the analysis, and the latter only in order to obtain a majority in 
Parliament, since the decision to join EMU would formally have to be Parliament’s.  
The smaller governmental partners, the Left Alliance and the Greens, were more or less 
against EMU, but in reality they did not have very much choice. The decision was made 
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in the early days of the new Government, when there was a strong will to avoid any major 
conflicts, which interviewees termed the “honeymoon period”. The economic situation 
was vulnerable, too. In the past, politicians had learned how complicated monetary policy 
and the financial markets were and how excitedly “market forces” reacted to political 
disagreements. In practice, governmental groups were attacked by surprise in June 1995. 
Prime Minister Lipponen saw the question more as a political one than an economic one. 
EMU was an essential part in shaping the outlines of the Finnish EU doctrine which was 
then in development. My interview notes record that he said that it was true that economic 
integration went on its own track although it was a kind of derivative. Savings in public 
finances were uppermost …and since energy was limited, the time went into solving these 
questions. (Tietyssä mielessä on totta, että taloudellinen integraatio meni omaa rataa, 
vaikka olikin johdannainen. Valtiontalouden säästöt olivat päällimmäisenä (...) kun 
energia on rajallinen, aika meni näitten kysymysten ratkaisemiseen) (Interview of 
Lipponen).
The media seemed to follow EMU as an evolutionary process and their point of view was 
more economic. First EMU was viewed as an uncertain and even harmful process to 
Finland, later much more probable than had been expected. If convergence was achieved, 
EMU could offer an opportunity for Finland and its economy, while potentially including 
both positive and negative impacts.  
Nevertheless, EMU was opposed in public debate particularly because of its global 
dimensions. The sovereignty of the nation state was threatened as well as independent 
monetary policy. On the political Left, however, criticism of EMU centred not so much 
on sovereignty as on the danger of increasing unemployment. It was judged that an active 
labour market policy would be sacrificed because of EMU. While corporatism in Finland 
was heavily criticized, it is possible that some participants in the debate calculated that 
EMU would diminish the importance of the corporations. These were speculations that 
the trade union corporations could not accept. 
The main concern emerged as the fixed exchange rate for the currency, which was also a 
source of disagreement between the Government and the Bank of Finland. Media 
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attention was also focused more or less on the ERM – what would be a suitable timing 
and an acceptable level for the currency to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Since the 
ERM itself did not come into effect until the following year, it falls outside this study. 
Public opinion was very negative: the sovereignty of the nation state was threatened by 
EMU. The turning point in the plot came with SAK’s positive decision, which was then 
followed by the political parties; and it was their success in achieving agreement on the 
setting up buffer funds that made it possible for SAK to support entering EMU. Whether 
the agreement was a symbolic breakthrough or a real one, it also made it easier for the 
Left to support EMU. In a crucial way, SAK turned the tide. 
The Actors and Information Flows 
Prime Minister Lipponen controlled the planning of the guidelines on EU policy to a 
greater extent than any other key player in EU affairs, including the President of Finland, 
Martti Ahtisaari, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tarja Halonen, or the Minister for 
Foreign Trade, Ole Norrback. The interviews show that Lipponen had a high profile and a 
very clear agenda. However, it was Minister Viinanen who entered most actively into the 
debate in favour of EMU in 1995. 
Particularly in the EMU process, the Minister of Finance, first Viinanen and then 
Niinistö, was a key actor, along with the Ministry’s civil servants. In the EU, EMU was 
mainly managed and discussed in the Ecofin meetings; economic policy was very rarely 
debated by the participants of EU Summits, because it “might cause confusion among the 
delegates”, according to one interviewee. The Finnish delegation (consisting of President 
Ahtisaari, Minister of Foreign Affairs Halonen, Prime Minister Lipponen and Minister of 
Finance Viinanen, and later Niinistö) therefore took part in no special discussion about 
EMU: “...the matter was neither discussed nor evaluated by our delegation.” (”Mutta ei 
siitä meidän delegaattien sisällä keskusteltu tai arvioitu.”)
Nevertheless, Ministers of Finance representing the European Social Democrats had 
regular meetings where the risks of EMU were discussed as well as the substance of the 
Growth and Stability Pact and focusing particularly on the issues of how to promote 
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growth and to reduce unemployment, forums which were, in my experience as a 
participant, a genuine attempt to create a supranational dialogue. This was not a custom 
among the conservatives. Prime Minister Lipponen had occasional meetings with the 
Leader of the opposition, Esko Aho, but Minister of Finance Sauli Niinistö did not meet 
Aho.
However, the timing of the Government’s decision about EMU was discussed in a small 
circle. Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen, Minister of Finance Iiro Viinanen and Governor 
of the Bank of Finland Sirkka Hämäläinen had some talks in June 1995. The Bank 
evidently had reservations about joining the euro zone among the first countries because 
of the ERM, as is seen both in the interview material here and also in Hämäläinen’s 
statements to the press from the spring of 1995. In these statements Hämälainen 
emphasized the importance of a national monetary policy and the need for a proper 
analysis. This “disagreement”, to my mind, underlines that the decision made in June 
1995 was a political statement, although it was not defended politically. However, the 
media did not choose to present this disagreement as a drama. 
It is interesting that neither political parties nor parliamentary groups were mentioned as 
important in the EMU case, an absence which is also seen in the actor-family drawn from 
the interviews. My argument is that the political system was not involved, and was, in 
fact, excluded from the decision-making process about EMU, despite the decision’s 
importance and very political nature. The political system’s information flows were 
blocked and shared by only a few actors. Although, Ministers of course had their 
positions in their political parties, the question of EMU was seen as an issue for insiders 
of the administration rather than a common political issue.  
Of those who represented the political system, only the Party Secretary of the Left 
Alliance, Matti Viialainen, and his successor, Ralf Sund, were mentioned: Viialainen in 
the context of the negotiations to form the Government and Sund in the context of the 
referendum organized by the party in 1997. But the major governmental groups did not 
pay any specific attention to their political reference groups. There was no reflexivity 
among the political elite nor between electors and elected during 1995.  
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When the National Coalition Party organized a seminar about EMU in 1995, the 
Chairman of the party’s parliamentary group said that no further discussions were needed 
since the Party was in favour of EMU. In general, “the time was limited” to have 
conversations in political groups. This was particularly problematic within the Social 
Democratic Ministerial group, where the time was just enough to handle the immediate 
weekly affairs. Neither the Board of the Social Democratic Party nor the Parliamentary 
Group became an intimate forum (”fundeerauksen pesä” was the phrase used), and the 
flow of information between the leader and his party colleagues was not optimal. A 
similar situation seemed to pertain among the conservatives. 
The Parliamentary Groups were not active on their own account either: none of the 
interviewees remembered being asked to come to a particular parliamentary group to give 
information on the EMU issue. State Secretary Raimo Sailas did, however, pay a visit to 
the Parliamentary Group of the Centre Party on other occasions: “Last time I visited the 
Group of the Centre Party, it was in the middle of watching the skiing competition” 
(”Viimeksi olen käynyt kepun eduskuntaryhmässä kesken hiihtokilpailun katsomisen”)
(interview with Sailas). 
The most popular metaphors used by interviewees to describe the EMU process were 
those of a train and a wagon. The general attitude appears to have been one of 
disengagement or lack of concern, since matters were out of the hands of a nation-state. A 
converse interpretation of the same attitude could be that there was too much to do on the 
domestic front. The global financial architecture and the future prospects of EMU were 
not at the top of the political agenda. Indeed, the EU and Finnish membership of the EU 
came first and foremost, EMU was an additional matter. However, in the case of EMU, 
the politics of trust is a central factor. According to polls, people trusted Prime Minister 
Lipponen, and this trust replaced debate in 1995, and was not, therefore, a consequence of 
more opening up at an institutional level, as suggested by Giddens. 
In honour of Finnish Presidency of the European Union, the Central Chamber of 
Commerce of Finland and the World Trade Center in Helsinki published a selection of 
cartoons called March of the Times – Finland’s Road into the European Union (1999).
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One of these aptly characterizes Finland’s road to EMU: Prime Minister Lipponen is 
driving a car at speed, and the Finnish maiden, afraid of the speed, asks: “May I be scared 
silly?” 
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8. The WTO case – Fix it or nix it! 
I will start by introducing briefly the Finnish decision-making process relating to trade 
policy. My purpose is to give an idea about the complexity of governance. Various 
ministries are involved both at the level of the nation-state and the EU. But before doing 
that, the role of the EU must be acknowledged.  
Finland joined the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 1995 as an old GATT country 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). At the same time Finland became a member 
state of the EU. Although trade is one of the core areas of the EU, the new organization of 
world trade remained to a large extent in the shadow of EU membership and the role of 
the WTO was hardly recognized in Finland. According to Commissioner Lamy (2002), 
the performance of the EU in terms of global governance has been strongest when Europe 
has been united and has managed to speak with one voice. In trade policy this has been 
the case since the early days of European integration.  
The EU, based on the Treaties, represents its member states as a collective organization in 
the area of trade. However, this competence is shared between the EU and its member 
states. The EU Court of Justice has clarified the responsibilities of various actors through 
its judgements. Under Secretary of State Leif Fagernäs characterized the competence of 
the EU in the following way: 
“As a matter of fact the competence of the EU in the field of trade policy had been 
solved in early 1994 by the EU Court of Justice. It was of course legally binding 
because it was a decision made by the Court. (…) The decision judged the EU’s 
competence to cover all that was considered trade in the Treaty of Rome. It was 
restricted to cover the trade of goods and some elements of services which are 
traded across borders. That was all. All other issues were considered to be under 
shared competence.”  
(”Se oli itse asiassa jo ratkaistu vuoden 1994 alussa EU:n tuomioistuimessa mikä 
on EU:n kauppapoliittinen kompetenssi. Se oli tietenkin jäsenmaita sitova koska 
se oli tuomioistuimen tekemä ratkaisu (...) Se rajattiin ihan tarkasti koskemaan 
sitä mikä Rooman sopimuksessa koski kauppapolitiikkaa. Rajattiin koskemaan 
tavarakauppaa ja sitten palvelukaupan osia jotka menevät suoraan rajan ylitse. Ei 
muuta. Kaikki muu katsottiin olevan jaetussa kompetenssissa.”)
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
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However, the matter is not fully resolved, since the balance remains mixed: 
“Legally the matter is clear. But that is not enough in practice, because the WTO 
has already, in the course of the Uruguay Round, exceeded the EU’s competence 
as it has started to cover new areas of trade. Let’s take a theoretical example. If 
one of the member states of the EU is charged under the procedures of WTO 
Dispute Settlement, perhaps because of some service item, and if there is a 
common EU position, that member state is not allowed to represent itself. This 
gives rise to a problem. It is possible that a member state does not consent in the 
matter and wants to maintain its own position and therefore it will be sanctioned. 
It is possible that a member state could be sanctioned in an area which is under the 
competence of the EU. However, this has never happened. The question is 
theoretical but the logic of the case led us to the conclusion that something has to 
be done.
(”Juridisesti asia on selvä. Mutta sehän ei riitä mihinkään käytännössä koska 
WTO jo Uruguayn kierroksella ylitti EU:n kompetenssin ja lähti seilaamaan 
uusille alueille. Sitten otettiin tällainen teoreettinen esimerkki että joku jäsenmaa 
haastetaan WTO:n riitojen ratkaisuprosessiin jossain palveluasiassa. Tuolloin on 
kuitenkin kysymys siitä, että jos on olemassa EU:n yhteinen positio niin jäsenmaa 
ei voi edustautua omissa nimissään. Tässäpä ongelma syntyy. Ja sitten voi käydä 
niin, että jäsenmaa ei tässä asiassa taivu ja pitää päänsä ja silloin se joutuu 
rangaistuksen kohteeksi. Silloin saatetaan rangaista maata alueella, joka kuuluu 
EU:n kompetenssiin. Tämä on teoreettinen esimerkki, näin ei ole koskaan 
tapahtunut mutta se logiikka johti että okei jotakin täytyy tehdä.”)
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
The policy adopted by Finland is therefore to strengthen the competence of the EU and 
widen the area of free trade (though this policy is at present being challenged by the 
Finnish Parliament due to proposals by the EU Convention concerning public services). 
Leif Fagernäs said in his interview:  
AA: The position of Finland is that the competence of the EU should be 
strengthened? 
LF: Yes. That is the position accepted by the Government.  
AA: Had the Government already arrived at this position at the intergovernmental 
conference in 1996? 
LF: Yes, it was our position at an early stage. Then we began to consider when we 
should start to promote it. The first such forum was Nice, where some general 
agreements began to be revised. It [the competence] was included on the agenda 
but implementation is still a question of interpretation.
(AA: Suomen kanta on nyt sitten se, että EU:n kompetenssia pitäisi vahvistaa 
LF: Kyllä. Se oli hallituksen kanta. 
AA: Tuliko tämä kannaksi jo silloin 1996 hallitusten välisessä konferenssissa? 
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LF: Kyllä se tuli aika pian. Sitten alettiin pohtia missä sitä alettaisiin viemään. 
Nizza oli sitten ensimmäinen sellainen foorumi missä ryhdyttiin perussopimuksia 
muuttamaan ja sinne tämä sitten saatiin mutta sen soveltaminen on vielä 
tulkintakysymys.)
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
Finnish trade policy is mainly the responsibility of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 
Department for External Economic Relations is responsible for the guidelines and the 
substance of trade. The Ministry of Trade and Industry and its Trade Department is 
responsible for the implementation of trade rules, as is the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry. As the coverage of the WTO agreements has expanded, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Environment are also more involved.
In order to cover the heterogeneous area of trade, several administrative subcommittees 
have been established specializing in various elements. These subcommittees are often 
formed by civil servants, social partners, and representatives of industry. Nevertheless, a 
special coordinative committee is chaired by the Under Secretary of External Trade 
Relations. This arrangement, therefore, means that trade policy is led by the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and confirmed in the Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs.  
At the level of the EU both the Council of General Affairs and the Council of Agriculture 
are competent to address the aims adopted by the EU concerning the WTO. 
Minister Sasi said in his interview: 
KS:  Relations [with respect to the division of responsibilities] have not been 
problem-free but cooperation in these WTO issues has worked well. Of course it 
always depends to some extent on the people too. 
AA: What about trade-policy issues generally at EU level? 
KS:  There are certainly a good number of subcommittees, in several of which the 
Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry is represented. However, the coordination 
is done in the Article 133 Committee, and it is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
which is represented there. But, to my mind, the system works. I have not noticed 
any significant problems or conflicts. 
AA: Has the fact that EU affairs are passed up to the Prime Minister’s office had 
any effect, in your view? 
KS: I do not think it makes any difference in WTO matters.
(KS: Se ei ole ihan ongelmaton se suhde mutta näissä WTO-asioissa yhteistyö on 
sujunut hyvin ja tietysti se aina vähän riippuu henkilöistäkin. 
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AA: Mutta miten yleisesti EU:n tasolla kauppapoliittisissa asioissa? 
KS: Siellä on todella kovasti työryhmiä ja useissa on ktm:n edustus ja sitten taas 
koordinointi tapahtuu 133 komiteassa, jossa on um:n edustus. Mutta kyllä se 
minusta toimii. Minä en ole havainnut mitään merkittävämpiä ongelmia tai 
ristiriitatilanteita. 
AA: Onko sillä ollut vaikutusta, että EU-asiat ovat siirtyneet valtioneuvoston 
kansliaan sinun näkökulmastasi? 
KS: Minun mielestäni sillä WTO-asioissa ei ole ollut merkitystä)
(Interview with Sasi) 
However, recently (summer 2003) a new arrangement has been made and, as a policy 
area, trade has been centralized into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The trade 
department of the Ministry of Industry and Trade is now located in the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs.  
As can be seen, there are still several administrative players in the field. Owing to 
conflicting interests, major disagreements on substance appeared from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, since it favours protectionism, while the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs favours more competition and liberalization. Agriculture has always been a 
difficult issue in foreign trade, as Borchardt (1991) has shown. In Finnish debate 
agriculture has certainly played a major role, especially during the EU negotiations. 
Minister Sasi put it in the following way: 
“While we in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs took a stance for liberalizing the 
trade of agricultural goods, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry tried to 
protect trade as much as possible. The solution was that Finland, to a large extent, 
followed the guidelines adopted by the Commission. What was decided in the 
Council of Agriculture and what Commissioner Lamy was ready to approve, did 
very well for us too. Effectively, the starting point was that trade on agricultural 
products should be opened but that the extent would be considered during 
negotiations. Let’s say that cooperation in the preparatory work went tolerably 
well, but there was a conflict of interests. So when we explored the formulations 
of various documents with Minister Hemilä, there was seldom any wrangling over 
the formulations or the form of words to use.  
(”Kun um:ssa me olimme (maatalouskaupan) vapauttamisen kannalla niin sitten 
taas mmm:ssa ne pyrkivät suojelemaan niin paljon kuin mahdollista. Ratkaisu oli 
sitten aika paljon se, että Suomi tukee komission linjauksia. Mitä sitten 
maatalousneuvostossa päätettiin ja minkä Lamy oli valmis hyväksymään niin kyllä 
se sitten meille kelpasi. Ja voi sanoa, että lähtökohta oli, että avata pitää mutta 
sitten että kuinka paljon, se sitten katsotaan neuvotteluissa. Sanotaan, että 
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valmisteluyhteistyö sujui kohtalaisen hyvin mutta intressit oli selvästi vastakkaiset. 
Formulaatioita kun sitten katsottiin näihin papereihin Hemilän kanssa niin kyllä 
siinä harvoin oli kädenvääntöä formulaatioissa, että millaista sanamuotoa 
käytetään.”) 
(Interview with Sasi) 
At the level of the Finnish Government, WTO issues are handled in the Cabinet 
Committee on European Union Affairs. Thus far, trade has not been an area of particular 
interest.  
AA: What about the Cabinet Committee on the EU Affairs? Would you, as a civil 
servant, like to have more debate? 
LF: I would say – this is very much a personal point of view – but I would like to 
have more debate. That some questions were raised and that we could explain... 
But in practice, the matter is brought up briefly among other issues and that’s it.
(AA: Mitenkä sitten EU-ministerivaliokunta? Olisiko virkamiesnäkökulmasta 
toivonut, että siellä olisi keskusteltu? 
LF: Minä sanoisin – tämä on tietysti henkilöstä riippuvaista – mutta minä olisin 
suonut, että siellä olisi keskusteltu. Että olisi tullut kysymyksiä ja olisi voitu kertoa 
(...) Siellä on lyhyesti asia esitelty muitten joukossa ja sillä siisti.)
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
According to Kimmo Sasi, interest has increased – but only since Seattle. 
AA: What is the role of the EU Cabinet Committee? The agendas are always long 
– do you have enough time and are these matters discussed? 
KS: Nowadays we talk about them. Our meetings may take an hour and a half, 
even two hours. However, there is no other forum for the Government to debate 
except the Evening Schools, which are very seldom organized. Therefore, a few 
issues other than purely EU affairs can be brought into the EU Committee. 
AA: And people are interested in trade policy? 
KS: Yes. Trade is considered interesting but the most interesting topic at the time 
of the Nice Treaty negotiations was the issue of the Commission’s competence. 
The situation was like this: Finland had actively sought to enlarge the 
Commission’s competence but the response of the Government was unfocused. 
While the line had long been to enhance the Commission’s competence, with trade 
as a core area of community policy, Erkki [Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs] and Satu [Hassi, Minister of Environment and Development Aid] 
hesitated. Their aim was to set limits to it, and in fact it was a bit like the situation 
we had when the Doha conference was being prepared. But it was quite easy to 
reject these demands since the conclusions had already been reached two years 
earlier and Finland’s positions settled, so no changes were accepted, which is why 
there were no major problems.
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(AA: Mikä on EU-ministerivaliokunnan rooli? Listat ovat aina pitkät, riittääkö 
aika ja keskustellaanko siellä? 
KS: Nykyään siellä puhutaan. Kokoukset saattavat kestää puolitoista kaksikin 
tuntia. Hallituksella ei ole oikein paikkaa missä keskustella kun iltakouluakaan ei 
juuri enää ole. EU-valiokuntaan on voitu tuoda vähän muitakin asioita kuin 
EU-asioita.
AA: Ja kauppapolitiikka kiinnostaa? 
KS: Kyllä. Kauppapolitiikka kiinnostaa mutta suurin kiinnostuksen aihe oli silloin 
kun Nizzan sopimusta käsiteltiin ja komission kompetenssia. Siinähän oli sellainen 
tilanne, että Suomi ajoi aktiivisesti komission kompetenssin laajentamista mutta 
hallitus oli siinä suhteessa hajanainen, että kun pitkä linja on ollut, että komission 
kompetenssia pitäisi lisätä ja kauppapolitiikka on keskeistä yhteisöpolitiikan 
aluetta niin Erkki ja Satu olivat epäileviä. He pyrkivä asettamaan rajoja sille ja 
oikeastaan pikkuisen saman tyyppinen tilanne oli kun Dohan kokousta 
valmisteltiin. Mutta se oli sikäli helppoa kun kaksi vuotta sitten oli lyöty lukkoon 
päätelmät ja Suomen kannat, niin niissä sitten pitäydyttiin ja siitä syystä ei ollut 
suurempia ongelmia.) 
(Interview with Sasi) 
There was not enough political interest in trade issues on the part of Parliament either. 
However, Minister Norrback said in his interview: “The Grand Committee was always 
informed. But the interest was very weak. After the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, the interest was increasing. It was some kind of turning point. In the Foreign 
Committee there was hardly any debate on trade issues” (Interview in English with 
Norrback).  
8.1. Data 
The data used in this chapter has been collected from the following sources:  
• the Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee about the Ratification of the WTO 
Agreement (UaVM 11/1994, www.eduskunta.fi); 
• the plenary protocols from the period  25.11.-20.12.1994, which include the 
debate before and after the Committee report (HE 296/1994 www.eduskunta.fi); 
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• the Statement of the Foreign Affairs Committee (Lausunto 23/1996, 
www.eduskunta.fi) about the position of Finland for the Intergovernmental 
Conference; 
• the Statement of the Foreign Affairs Committee (Lausunto 26/1996, 
www.eduskunta.fi) about the Information Technology Agreement; 
• Agreed Minutes of the Grand Committee which handled the WTO in 1999 
(www.eduskunta.fi); 
• a proposal for topical discussion (keskustelualoite 8/1999, www.eduskunta.fi); 
• search (with the term ‘WTO#’) in parliamentary documents (speeches, bills, 
written questions, union affairs, reports and statements of committees during the 
time 1994-1999, www.eduskunta.fi); 
• the Statement of the Foreign Affairs Committee 7/2001 (www.eduskunta.fi); 
• preparatory documents for the Third WTO Round  HELD571-41, HELD571-47, 
HELD571-56 and 58, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
• preparation for the Third WTO Ministerial Conference 12092/99, Council of the 
European Union;
• Interviews with Leif Fagernäs (15.8.2002), Ole Norrback (24.4.2001), Pertti 
Salolainen (27.4.2001), and Kimmo Sasi (27.2.2002); and 
• media response published by Finnish News Agency (STT) 1994-1999 (search 
with ‘WTO#’, altogether 317 political articles, 367 economic articles: www.stt.fi ) 
All Ministers for Foreign Trade were interviewed: Minister Salolainen, who introduced 
the Bill; Minister Norrback, Minister from 1995 to 1999; and Minister Sasi, who 
participated in the Seattle Summit. Ministers Salolainen and Norrback were interviewed 
in English (as part of studies on the WTO issue at York University, Ontario).  
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FAMILY OF ACTORS (WTO)
39 %
25 %
22 %
6 %
8 %
Politicians
Civil Servants
WTO/EU officials
Journalists
Social Partners
The key administrative figure was the Under Secretary of State in External Economic 
Relations, Leif Fagernäs, who was responsible for the trade department in the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs during the years 1995-2001, first as General Director and later as Under 
Secretary of State. Director General Eikka Kosonen and Vesa Himanen also answered 
some questions in written form. Background information was given by Jari Gustafsson in 
order to organize the data.  
In this specific case I was not personally involved; however, I did participate in the 
meetings of the Committee on European Union Affairs and the Evening School during 
1995-1997 as a Minister and later as an MP in the meetings of the Grand Committee of 
the Parliament of Finland. 
8.2. Actors 
Altogether 36 actors were mentioned in the interview material. Of these: a total of 
seventeen represented administration, including Finnish, EU and WTO civil servants. 
Fourteen politicians were mentioned, two journalists and three actors representing social 
partners.
Figure 5  
 n=36 
If national and international officials are put together, civil servants form the major group 
of actors, which is quite natural since trade issues have not been regarded as particularly 
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interesting. Although they are categorized as politicians, the relevant ministers, as heads 
of their ministries, could plausibly be considered as officials, in which case hardly any 
politicians as such would have had a significant role in shaping the Finnish doctrine of 
trade policy.  
If the number of references in the interviews is considered, however, civil servants, both 
national and international, were mentioned once or twice. Of the few who were 
mentioned more often, most are politicians. (The reason for the relatively low numbers in 
this case is a result of the small number of interviewees, as well as the total number of 
actors mentioned.)  These actors were: Minister Ole Norrback (4); the Minister of 
Agriculture and Forestry, Kalevi Hemilä (3); MP Kimmo Kiljunen (3); Minister Sasi (3); 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Erkki Tuomioja (3); and Peter J. Boldt (3), representing 
SAK.  
The political elite governing trade policy is a very small one. Ministers who are 
responsible for external economic relations and trade issues are important in the decision-
making processes. It appears that recently the only MP who has consistently participated 
in the political debate on the part of Parliament is Kimmo Kiljunen. At the same time, 
therefore, it is very easy to have a high profile in trade issues because of the low general 
level of interest.  
It is fair to say that Finnish strategies on WTO policy are designed and discussed among 
the administrators with the EU officials. Key civil servants are better qualified to 
formulate Finnish trade policy. 
Social partners seem to be active to some extent, as well as certain NGOs, in fostering 
interest in free trade and its rules. Peter J. Boldt, representing SAK, has had some role in 
influencing trade policy by participating in the debate and lobbying actively on behalf of 
labour rights. TT, representing the interests of industry, appears not to have paid 
particular attention to the general policy line adopted in Finland, perhaps because 
traditionally there has been more focus on trade to the east.  
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It also appears, from the interview material, that the journalist who has followed trade 
issues most systematically is Heikki Karkkolainen from the Finnish News Agency (STT). 
Otherwise journalists’ interest can be described as weak. For example, the major Finnish 
newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, seldom sent its own reporter to the Ministerial 
Conferences of the WTO. 
8.3. The Narrative of the WTO case 
The structure of the narrative here was decided, based on the interview material, the 
debate in Parliament, and the media response. The episodes chosen to depict the WTO 
policy adopted in Finland are ordered according to the Ministerial Conferences of the 
WTO. The preparations for the Ministerial Conferences appear to have stimulated some 
discussion among the political elite both in the Government and later also in Parliament. 
The media response reflects the same cyclical order, where summits generate a peak in 
public interest. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) seems to form a clear 
turning point in public debate. 
Finnish NGOs have played a role in drawing attention to some special elements of trade, 
following the critical arguments of the anti-global NGOs referred earlier (e.g. Barlow, 
Halliday). However, these issues had already been put in front of the decision makers, as 
opposed to being placed in the public sphere, in the EU and therefore also in the Finnish 
administration. Public debate refers to media response and also debate in Parliament. 
Episodes:      Time period:  Public Debate:
A: Prologue  
– Finland Ratifies the Agreement   1994   yes 
B: The Silence  
– the WTO in the Shadow of the EU   1995-1998  no or slightly 
– Singapore Ministerial Conference 
– Labour Standards and IT and telecommunication 
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C: The MAI       
– political interest takes fire    1998   yes 
D: Seattle  
– the WTO becomes interesting   1999   yes 
– the subcommittee of the Grand Committee is established 
A: Prologue – Finland Ratifies the Agreement
The Minister of Foreign Trade, Pertti Salolainen, introduced the Bill proposing joining 
the WTO to Parliament on 25th November 1994. Salolainen underlined, among other 
things, that the new rules of free trade would increase the predictability of trade and that 
the new dispute settlement procedures would unify the system.  
The WTO also offers a forum to its member states to promote free trade through 
negotiations and gives the possibility of raising any question which a member 
state sees as being essential from a trade point of view... I might say that, 
personally, I would place especially great weight on, and at the same time hope in, 
this theme of trade and environment gaining in real centrality as the subject of 
discussion and debate about world trade through the establishment of the WTO. 
Finland’s official policy aims for us to be pushing this matter forwards and to the 
centre within the framework of the WTO. How many of these, so-called new areas 
of trade politics, of the kind that are mentioned – among others: competition 
policy, investments, international labour standards, transmission of technology, 
etc. – will get onto the WTO’s agenda, will naturally depend upon whether the 
partners agree these are matters for them to deal with... a consensus already being 
practised in GATT. For further work, continued negotiations related to the service 
sector will be important, too. There are four negotiation areas that remain open: 
telecommunications, maritime commerce or shipping, financial services and the 
free movement of labour, which need to be brought to a successful and agreed 
conclusion within a timetabled framework. Perhaps the handling process of these 
issues presages the new possibilities of the WTO compared to the Uruguay 
Round, so that items can be negotiated separately, without tying them into 
unwieldy, large packages... To put it briefly: big countries can always take care of 
their interests; for small countries, like Finland, it is always better if world trade is 
disciplined and conducted according to a clear set of rules. The law generally 
protects the small, so is more important for the small than for the big. Therefore it 
is to Finland’s own advantage to agree the negotiated result of the Uruguay 
Round.
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(WTO tarjoaa foorumin sen jäsenmaille kaupan edelleen vapauttamista koskeville 
neuvotteluille kuin myös mahdollisuuden esittää käsiteltäväksi mikä tahansa asia, 
jonka jäsenmaa katsoo olevan kaupan kannalta oleellinen (...) Voin sanoa, että 
henkilökohtaisesti panen erittäin paljon painoa ja samalla myös toivoa siihen, että 
tämä kauppa- ja ympäristöteema saataisiin todella keskeiseksi maailmankaupan 
keskustelu- ja debattikohteeksi WTO:n perustamisen yhteydessä. Suomen 
virallinen politiikkakin tähtää siihen, että me olisimme viemässä tätä asiaa 
keskeisesti eteenpäin WTO:n puitteissa. Kuinka muut nk. uudet kauppapoliittiset 
aiheet, tällaisenahan mainitaan mm. kilpailupolitiikka, investoinnit, työelämään 
standardit, teknologian siirto, jne. pääsevät WTO:n asialistalle, riippuu 
luonnollisesti siitä, hyväksyvätkö jäsenet niiden käsittelyn (...) sen vaatiessa Gattin 
käytännön mukaan konsensusta. Jatkotyöskentelyn kannalta ovat myös merkittäviä 
palvelusektorilla käytävät jatkoneuvottelut. Neljään avoimeksi jääneen 
neuvottelualueen, jotka ovat telekommunikaatio, merenkulku, rahoituspalvelut ja 
henkilöiden liikkuvuus, vieminen tulokselliseen päätökseen sovittujen aikataulujen 
puitteissa ennakoinee myös niitä mahdollisuuksia, mitä WTO:n puitteissa on 
neuvotella yksittäisistä kysymyksistä ilman niiden nivomista hankaliksi suuriksi 
paketeiksi, kuten Uruguayn kierroksen osalta tehtiin (...) Asia on pelkistäen 
seuraavasti: Suuret valtiot (valtiot?) pystyvät aina valvomaan etunsa. Pienelle 
valtiolle, kuten Suomelle, on aina edullista, että maailmankauppa on kurinalaista 
ja toimii selkeiden pelisääntöjen mukaisesti. Pientä laki suojaa yleensä, ja se on 
pienelle tärkeämpi kuin suurelle. Siksi Uruguayn kierroksen tulosten 
hyväksyminen on Suomen erityisten etujen mukaista.) 
(HE 296/1994 www.eduskunta.fi/htwfakta )
During the preliminary handling MP Paavo Nikula (the Greens), who was the only 
speaker, hoped that the Foreign Affairs Committee would handle the Bill properly. He 
said: 
It is quite possible to think that the dream of the 1960s will at last come true; the 
exploitation of developing countries will end and these countries can boost their 
economies through trade. But does it mean for Europe a new kind of 
“Finlandizing”, that is that unemployment is high and social security goes to ruin?  
(Hyvin paljon voidaan ajatella, toteutuuko tässä vihdoinkin 1960-luvun unelma 
siitä, että kehitysmaiden riisto loppuu, kehitysmaat saavat kaupankäyntiinsä uutta 
vauhtia. Mutta merkitseekö se Euroopalle, että Eurooppa uudella tavalla 
suomettuu, työttömyys on korkeaa ja sosiaaliturvaa joudutaan purkamaan?)
(ibid.)
During the first reading MP Pekka Haavisto (the Greens) was the only speaker. He was 
surprised that there was no special interest in spite of the fact that ratification of the WTO 
agreement was as significant as the EU treaty. He also referred to the report of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, underlining such issues as the position of developing 
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countries, environment and labour standards. He also criticized fears about accepting the 
principle of recycling waste paper.  
It is stated in the Committee’s report that this question is difficult for the Finnish 
wood-processing industry and its competitiveness, and that in a way it (recycling) 
is interpreted to be a protectionist measure favouring Central European countries. 
I think creating this kind of opposition, in which the Finnish wood-processing 
industry or Finnish wood companies want to promote their own export interests by 
any means and attack what are, to my mind, pretty good environmental standards 
in preparation in Central Europe, including recycling standards, accusing them of 
protectionism, is not very good policy from Finland’s point of view. 
(Valiokunnan mietinnössä todetaan, että se (kierrätysmassa) on Suomen 
metsäteollisuuden kilpailukyvyn kannalta hankala ja tavallaan protektionistinen 
asia joidenkin Keski-Euroopan maiden kannalta. Mielestäni tällaisen 
vastakkainasettelun luominen, jossa suomalainen metsäteollisuus tai suomalaiset 
metsäyhtiöt haluavat kaikin keinoin edistää omia vientimarkkinoitaan ja 
hyökkäävät Keski-Euroopassa valmisteilla olevien mielestäni aika hyvin 
ympäristönormien kimppuun, esimerkiksi kierrätysnormien kimppuun, ei ole 
oikein hyvää politiikkaa Suomen kannalta.)
(ibid.)
During the second reading a number of MPs, Heidi Hautala (the Greens), Erkki Pulliainen 
(the Greens), Ensio Laine (the Left League), Pekka Haavisto (the Greens), Jarmo 
Wahlström (the Left League), Pekka Räty (the Greens), Lea Mäkipää and Sulo Aittoniemi 
(the Finnish Rural Party), as well as Minister Salolainen, participated the debate. The 
majority of speakers referred to the Committee Report or replied briefly to arguments 
raised by other speakers, but also some severe criticism was also expressed. 
Hautala considered that the agreement should not be ratified, arguing against it on several 
counts: the issue of the environment, which was not included as a protected principle of 
the WTO; the dispute settlement process, which was closed and undemocratic; the use of 
hormones to improve agricultural efficiency; and, finally, the position of developing 
countries, which would be exploited by multinational companies.  
I want to make some critical contributions, about the possibility of this 
organization [the WTO] establishing some kind of new international order, where 
neither citizens, nor parliaments, nor NGOs have any chance whatever of 
influence. The principle that free trade is paramount will be consolidated at a 
global level, and subordinate to this will be all other aspects, which are important 
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for us as representatives of citizens, like the protection of environment and the 
protection of social, labour and human rights.
(Haluan tuoda esiin joitakin kriittisiä näkökohtia, jotka liittyvät tämän järjestön 
(WTO) mahdollisuuteen muodostaa eräänlainen uusi maailmanjärjestys ilman, 
että kansalaisilla, parlamenteilla tai kansalaisjärjestöillä on juuri minkäänlaista 
mahdollisuutta vaikuttaa siihen. Täällä sementoidaan koko maailman tasolla 
periaate, että kaupan vapaus on ylimmäinen periaate ja sille tulee alista kaikki 
muut näkökohdat, jotka meille kansalaisten edustajille ovat tärkeitä kuten 
ympäristönsuojelu, sosiaalinen suojelu, työvoiman suojelu, ihmisoikeudet.)
(ibid.)
During the debate Hautala’s proposal was not supported, though the same arguments were 
used elsewhere, focusing on developing countries and environmental issues. Haavisto, a 
party colleague of Hautala’s, said in his speech that it was not a secret that he was in 
favour the WTO agreement, unlike Hautala, and that he could not consider the strategy of 
rejection as sensible. During the final reading no proposals and no speeches were made. 
The Parliament of Finland accepted the agreement on 20th December 1994. 
The media response followed the “news line”, reporting more the actual decisions than 
the debate in Parliament, and the split inside the Greens was not recognized. The Finnish 
News Agency wrote a background article on 8th December 1994 about the WTO as the 
successor of GATT. Instead of reporting current debate, it gave a short history of the 
various rounds, along with a rough estimation of the economic results of Uruguay, as well 
as reporting the stiff competition for leadership of the WTO. The fact that China and 
Russia would not be members of the WTO, when it was established, was also underlined 
(STT 8.12.1994). 
On the following day the Agency reported that Finland would ratify the Agreement. The 
Minister for Foreign Trade, Salolainen, gave a short statement, in which he judged the 
future prospects related to the liberalization of free trade to be positive. He also said that, 
“Finland with other Nordic countries have put efforts to promote the environmental 
debate in the WTO” (STT 9.12.1994). He also highlighted estimates made by the 
secretariat of the GATT, that as a result of the negotiated agreement about 2 400 billion 
Finnish markkas would be added to the prosperity of world economy.  
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The new arrangement in Finnish trade policy was reported by the Agency on 12.12.1994. 
Finland as well as Sweden and Austria resigned from EFTA because of membership of 
the EU. Minister Salolainen regretted that Finnish debate about world trade and the 
establishment of the WTO had remained in the shadow of the EU debate.  
He pointed out that both of these organizations were related to extremely 
important elements of trade policy and that world trade would be developed 
through these organizations in future. According to the Minister, Finland is 
planning to concentrate especially on linking the items of trade and environment 
with each other. The purpose is, for example with energy issues, to push forward 
resolutions, by which energy usage is made more expensive and polluting 
emissions are limited with various measures.
(Hän muistutti, että näihin molempiin liittyy äärimmäisen tärkeitä 
kauppapoliittisia elementtejä ja maailmankaupan edelleen kehittäminen tapahtuu 
pitkälti niiden kautta. Ministerin mukaan Suomi suunnittelee keskittyvänsä 
erityisesti kauppa- ja ympäristöteeman yhdistämiseen. Tarkoitus on, että 
esimerkiksi energia-asioissa saataisiin läpi sellaisia ratkaisuja, joilla 
energiankäyttö tehtäisiin kalliiksi ja saastepäästöjä rajoitettaisiin erilaisin 
keinoin.) 
(STT 12.12.1994) 
The message of Minister Salolainen – the importance of the environmental issues – was 
what received the publicity. It is very possible that trade was considered an area of 
expertise by the media, so that the Minister’s arguments received attention and made the 
news, unlike the concerns of MPs.  
B:  The Silence – the WTO in the shadow of the EU
The WTO was not an issue in Parliament during 1995. In his interview for this study, 
Minister Salolainen regretted that there was no interest in trade when he was Minister. 
However, he urged everybody to be concerned:  
“Everybody should understand that we cannot continue like this. The global 
laissez-faire capitalism is destroying the environment of our planet! If nothing 
major is done on the highest political level, eco-terrorism will become dangerous.” 
(Interview with Salolainen)   
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Minister Norrback confirmed the lack of interest in his interview: “I expressed my wish to 
give some information to the political groups of Parliament several times. During my four 
years as a Minister, I was never asked. It is a pity.” (Interview with Norrback). 
According the plenary protocols of Parliament, the WTO, as an organization, was referred 
to only three times and very briefly. No questions or initiatives were made. The WTO was 
dealt with in the Annual Governments Report for the year 1994 in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. The media response was as weak, with short pieces of news published about 
the start of the WTO and the organization’s nominations. At governmental level, Finland 
supported the membership of Russia – first Minister Salolainen and later Prime Minister 
Lipponen.
During 1996 the committees of Parliament handled some issues which were related to the 
WTO. The Grand Committee handled six related ‘Union Matters’ (U Matters), that is EU 
directives or proposals on subjects that fall within the competence of Parliament. Seven 
other committees referred to the WTO as an organization. 
The Government Report on Future Prospects and the Governmental Report on Security 
Policy were occasions when some parliamentarians could also participate in the debate 
and refer to the WTO. But the role of the WTO was not analyzed, rather its importance 
was acknowledged. 
How much or, as a matter of fact, how little the WTO was focused on in Parliament can 
be seen with from the search with the term “WTO”: 
• during the period 1995-1999 altogether 17 EU matters were handled in the Grand 
Committee as so-called U Matters; 
• 36 reports of various committees referred briefly to the WTO; 
• 10 written questions were submitted (of which 3 concentrated on the MAI 
agreement) out of 4558 questions (0.2%). 
Excluding the MAI agreement, these written questions were: 
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• a question from MP Toimi Kankaanniemi  (the Christian League) about 
restrictions on importing wood (June 1996); 
• a question from MP Sulo Aittoniemi (Finnish Rural Party) about the competition 
rules concerning public acquisition in the European Union (August 1996); 
• a question from MP Eila Rimmi (the Left Alliance) about Finnish policy guiding 
public acquisitions to promote employment (April 1997); 
• a question from MP Reijo Laitinen (the Social Democratic Party) about the same 
issue (May 1997); 
• a question from MP Erkki Pulliainen (the Greens) about  transatlantic market 
areas in the EU (May 1998); 
• a question from MP Irja Tulonen (the National Coalition Party) about the future of 
the Finnish textile industry (January 1999); and 
• a question from MP Eila Rimmi (the Left Union) about guaranteeing jobs in the 
food industry (February 1999) (www.eduskunta.fi). 
While the WTO summoned little interest in Parliament, there was no more in the 
Government.  
“The only issue that was debated more thoroughly was labour standards and that 
was before the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996. I think this was because 
SAK had got a slightly misleading picture of the government’s position. And it 
[the agenda and position of Finland] was discussed in the government’s Evening 
School. That was the only occasion on which there has ever been some kind of 
debate. But not in the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs.” 
(”Ainoa josta on enemmän ja syvällisemmin keskusteltu oli ennen Singaporea ja 
se oli työelämän normeista. Sekin johtui minusta siitä, että SAK:lle oli välittynyt 
hiukan väärä kuva mikä on hallituksen kanta. Ja se oli hallituksen iltakoulussa. Se 
on ainoa kerta, jolloin on ollut mitään keskustelua. Mutta ei 
EU-ministerivaliokunnassa.”)
(Interview with Fagernäs)  
Peter J. Boldt representing SAK was lobbying strongly on labour standards.  
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“He was as a member of our delegation in Singapore in 1996 and was extremely 
active in influencing what the Finnish position was and how it was formulated. 
But at Seattle [1999] matters then went more in line with SAK’s thinking.”  
(”Hän oli Singaporen kokouksessa 1996 valtuuskunnan jäsen ja vaikutti erittäin 
aktiivisesti siihen mikä oli Suomen positio ja miten se muokauttui. Mutta 
Seattlessa asiat menivät sitten enemmän SAK:n ajattelun mukaan.”) 
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
However, the Ministerial Conference in Singapore (1996) was also in another sense an 
important one for Finland. The major goal on Finland’s part was to include the IT sector
as an area of free trade.  
“Inside the EU it was Finland and Sweden which were pushing the IT sector 
strongly into the EU’s agenda. France was opposing it. But we succeeded and the 
IT sector was considered being one of the major negotiating goals of the EU. We 
were also successful in Singapore. The result was that 90 per cent of the global 
markets were opened to free trade. This was very important for Nokia, Sonera and 
Ericsson which are leading companies in the world”  
(Interview with Norrback) 
The role of Nokia was important in Finnish strategy: 
AA: More about Singapore and the IT sector. Presumably there was a common 
Nordic interest in this (the IT sector)? 
LF: I would say that it was a result of a hard struggle inside the EU as well. The 
United States lobbied for the IT sector for their own reasons, as did the EU 
Commission and Finland. Nordic Countries came along, as well as Great 
Britain… The starting point was difficult because the United States introduced a 
completely new item to the ministerial conference, wanting an immediate 
decision. So it was difficult for France and other countries like it, sharing the same 
kind of views. It was seen as a concession. It was really challenging for us to 
explain that this was in no way a concession or a compromise but would benefit 
all sectors of industry. They would all eventually use IT technology. Therefore all 
would benefit from it. But they saw it in this traditional context of give and take. 
But yes, the Nordic Countries were supporting us, but we were the ones who were 
the chief engine.  
AA: It was an important issue for Nokia? 
LF: Yes. For Nokia it was of the utmost importance. Of course this fact put more 
energy into our efforts. 
AA: The Grand Committee has stated that it supports this goal because it advances 
a well-functioning information society. 
LF: Yes, that was our philosophy. And we really had to bang it into French heads, 
that all areas of your industry will use IT. If they cannot get this technology
cheaply, then competitiveness will deteriorate.
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(AA: Vielä Singaporesta kun IT-sektori tuli mukaan. Siinä oli ilmeisesti 
pohjoismainen yhteinen intressi?    
LF: Minä sanoisin, että siinä oli kova kamppailu EU:n sisälläkin. Sitä ajoivat 
Yhdysvallat omista syistään ja EU:n komissio ja Suomi. Pohjoismaat myötäilivät 
ja Iso-Britannia (...) Perusasetelma oli vaikea koska Yhdysvallat toi 
ministerikokoukseen aivan uuden aiheen, jonka se halusi siellä heti päätettäväksi. 
Ja se oli silloin ranskalaisille ja heidän tyyppisille samalla tavalla ajatteleville 
maille vaikea. Se katsottiin myönnytykseksi. Meillä oli kova työ selostaa, ettei 
tämä ole mikään myönnytys, että se tulee hyödyttämään jokaikistä teollisuuden 
sektoria. Niissä kaikissa tullaan IT-teknologiaa käyttämään. Kaikki siitä tulevat 
hyötymään. Mutta ne näkivät sen tässä perinteisessä ota- ja anna-asetelmassa. 
Mutta kyllä Pohjoismaat tukivat mutta me olimme siinä ihan priimusmoottori.
AA: Nokialle asia oli tärkeä.  
LF: Nokialle asia oli erinomaisen tärkeä. Tokkakai se pani meihin sitten vauhtia.  
AA: Suuri valiokunta on lausunut asiasta, että he tukevat tätä tavoitetta ja se 
edesauttaa toimivaa informaatioyhteiskuntaa.  
LF: Se oli meidän filosofia. Ja ranskalaisten päähän oli oikein lyötävä, että kaikki 
teidän teollisuuden alat tulevat tätä käyttämään. Jos ne ei saa halvalla näitä 
laitteita niin kilpailukyky huononee.) 
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
The Finnish News Agency reported in their political news (12 articles) only the visits paid 
by the President of Finland to China  (18.4.1996), or visits by the Minister for Foreign 
Trade, Ole Norrback. In Johannesburg, South Africa, on 30th April 1996, Minister 
Norrback emphasized the position of poor countries in the WTO and the importance of 
supporting developing countries. The Chairman of SAK, Lauri Ihalainen, in his statement 
to the Singapore Conference (24.10.1996), argued strongly in favour of labour standards 
and against child labour. He demanded clear rules for world trade, also mentioning 
agricultural issues. In the economic news (30 articles) the hormone treatment of beef 
cattle was the major item during the spring.  
The press reported the preparations for the Singapore Conference, along with the 
intention to free the IT sector (viz e.g. 19.4. or 30.4.1996), which was seen as an 
important matter for Nokia, but the question was not analyzed in the context of the 
information society, as was being argued in the Finnish Parliament. Other reports 
considered the importance of labour standards for Finland in EU guidelines (29.10.1996), 
as were the results of the Ministerial Conference. The Finnish New Agency offered 
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statistical background information on trade and some prognoses of the importance of 
trade in the world economy (1.4. and 7.5.1996). 
The reportage in 1997 followed the same lines as in 1996, with trade low on the list of 
priorities. In one particular area, however, a successful lobby group, the producers of 
agricultural products, conveyed their message effectively: the WTO might be a threat to 
food safety.  
C: The MAI – Multilateral Agreement on Investment
The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, negotiated by the OECD countries seemed to 
raise the level of interest in trade policy. The MAI,7 as proposed by the OECD Ministerial 
Council in 1995, would “provide a broad multilateral framework for international 
investment with high standards for the liberalisation of investment regimes and 
investment protection and with effective dispute settlement procedures” (www.oecd.org ). 
The purpose of the agreement was to protect both investors and investments. The first 
aim, to liberalize investments was not exactly problematic because the idea was to replace 
bilateral agreements with multilateral arrangements.  
However, the MAI collapsed, not perhaps because of the resistance of NGOs but rather 
because of opposition from France and, especially, the United States. Both countries 
referred to the arguments of various NGOs which reflected the worries of developing 
countries. The element of dispute settlement was also problematic to those who criticized 
the MAI – because it included the right of an individual citizen to bring a suit against a 
state – so that one reason why the MAI provoked interest was a fear that the agreement 
would negatively affect the sovereignty of nation states.  
7
   In Finnish this becomes “MAI-sopimus”, which translates into English as “MAI agreement”.  Though in 
English this may seem tautologous, it has been kept in some translations for the sake of accuracy. 
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The interview material confirms that the MAI was a turning point. It was a sign for 
international NGOs that it was possible to influence global rules. Minister Norrback 
described the watershed: 
“After the MAI agreement, the interest was increasing. Indeed, it was some kind 
of turning point. In the Foreign Committee there was hardly any debate on trade 
issues… As I said before it was quite frustrating that there was so little interest. 
Personally I find globalization very important process and the need for the 
political control is obvious. But the political control is not possible if there is 
neither interest nor support.”
(Interview with Norrback)  
Minister Sasi expressed similar thoughts: 
AA: So, at what point do you think that interest in WTO matters increased? Was it 
after the MAI agreement or after Seattle? 
KS:  Considering the matter from the position of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
which I was a member of at that time, it was definitely the MAI agreement. If we 
take the discussions about the WTO agreement, the general feeling was that it was 
certainly quite sensible. There was nothing particularly interesting about it.
(AA: Niin, missä vaiheessa sinun mielestäsi kiinnostus WTO-asioihin heräsi? 
MAI-sopimuksen vai Seattlen kokouksen jälkeen?
KS: Nyt ajattelen asiaa uav:n kannalta, jonka jäsen olin. Kyllä se oli MAI-
sopimus. Jos ajatellaan keskusteluja WTO-sopimuksesta niin ajateltiin kyllä 
kaiketi tämä on järkevää. Ei siinä ollut mitään merkittävämpää kiinnostusta.)
(Interview with Sasi) 
Although Minister Sasi agreed that the turning point was the MAI, this did not by any 
means indicate a wider interest in either the WTO or free trade. 
“Later there was some interest in the Grand Committee but I must say that my 
interpretation is that it was limited to just a few members. You can say that there 
was already some criticism in connection with the MAI agreement and then, when 
it collapsed because of France’s opposition, the globalization debate also began. 
Certainly there were Kiljunen and Brax, and yes also Vanhanen, who followed the 
matter closely… and there were certainly quite a lot of questions in the 
Committee. In that sense there was interest. On the part of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, it has to be said that there was little interest. Perhaps they got the 
feeling that the Grand Committee was hijacking the whole issue, which belonged 
to their competence and therefore the activity of the Committee also increased 
related to these WTO matters.”
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(”Suuressa valiokunnassahan oli kiinnostusta mutta täytyy sanoa, että minun 
tulkintani on, että kiinnostus rajoittuu vain muutamaan ihmiseen. Voi sanoa, että 
MAI- sopimukseen liittyi jo kritiikkiä ja kun se kaatui Ranskan vastustukseen, 
sitten on syntynyt globalisaatiokeskustelua. Kyllähän se on Kiljunen ja Brax ja 
okei myös Vanhanen, jotka ovat seuranneet tiiviisti (...) valiokunnassa kyllä on 
aika paljon kysymyksiä esitetty. Siinä mielessä kiinnostusta on ollut. 
Ulkoasianvaliokunnan osalta voi sanoa, että kiinnostus on ollut vähäinen. Siellä 
taisi vähän syntyä sellainen fiilis, että suuri valiokunta on kaappaamassa asian, 
joka heille kuuluu ja sitten siellä syntyi myös aktiivisuus näissä WTO-asioissa.”)
(Interview with Sasi) 
The turning point can also be seen in written questions made to the Government. These 
were:
? a question from MP Mikko Elo (the Social Democratic Party) about the 
Government report concerning the MAI agreement (March 1998); 
? a question from MP Eva Biaudet (Swedish People’s Party) about the goals 
adopted by Finnish Government concerning the MAI negotiations (March 1998); 
and
? a question from MP Pentti Tiusanen (the Left Alliance) about the possibilities for 
Parliament to control and guide the preparatory work on investments rules like the 
MAI agreement (January 1999) (www.eduskunta.fi).  
Searching further for references to the MAI agreement, the following questions were also 
identified:
? a question from MP Tuija-Maaret Pykäläinen (the Greens) about the goals and 
restrictions concerning the MAI agreement (March 1998) and a question about the 
standards in the MAI agreement (May 1998); and 
? a question from MP Annika Lapintie (the Left Alliance) about the Multilateral 
Investment Agreement [MAI] (January 1999) (www.eduskunta.fi). 
MP Eva Biaudet also suggested organizing a topical discussion (5.5.1998) on the matter 
in Parliament; the suggestion was rejected by the Speaker’s Council. 
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However, the MAI was not treated in the political articles published by the Finnish News 
Agency and it never became an important political issue in the Government’s policy. 
Economic journalists did report the negotiations on the Agreement in the OECD. For 
example, during the spring of 1998 it was reported that there were some difficulties in the 
way of a decision on the Agreement and that the OECD would postpone the process 
(27.4.1998), and two days later, that Minister Norrback demanded that the Agreement 
was accepted (29.4.1998).
In terms of the media, Finnish NGOs published their critique of the MAI on 19th October 
1998, and on the same day Finnish industrialists expressed their desire to keep the 
negotiations alive. On 20th October 1998 it was announced that the negotiations on the 
Agreement could not be continued on their former basis. 
The MAI stimulated political interest but the amount of press coverage also increased 
significantly during 1998, on both the economic and the political pages. The visit of 
Renato Ruggiero, Director General of the WTO, was reported on 24th February 1998. The 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs set out to stimulate debate by organizing public seminars on 
WTO issues and tried to establish dialogue with the NGOs. The Under Secretary of State, 
Leif Fagernäs, commented in his interview: 
LF: I cannot remember precisely when the first seminar was organized but the 
participation was quite active. One time we had as a guest Ruggiero, the WTO’s 
Director General at the time, and Commissioner Leon Brittan also visited Finland. 
AA: I remember that Mr Ruggiero also visited Parliament.  
LF: I think these seminars were quite good occasions because they both ready to 
speak openly and to express their own opinions. They also argued strongly against 
the views expressed by the NGOs. I would say these occasions were very 
welcome. KEPA [the Service Centre for Development Cooperation] was, by the 
way, part of the delegation at Seattle – the Finnish NGOs had chosen KEPA to 
represent them, which was fine. They were present at internal preparatory 
meetings and everything was making progress, but then there was no final 
progress in Seattle.
(LF: Meillä oli seminaareja, en muista milloin oli ensimmäinen kun järjestettiin ja 
niissä oli aika aktiivinen osanotto. Meillä oli WTO:n silloinen pääjohtaja 
Ruggiero kerran ja komissaari Leon Brittan oli täällä.  
AA: Ruggieron muistan kun kävi myös eduskunnassa. 
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LF: Ne olivat aika hyviä tilaisuuksia koska he olivat valmiita avoimesti puhumaan 
ja antamaan henkilökohtaisia näkemyksiä ja debatoivat voimakkaasti myös 
kansalaisjärjestöjen mielipiteitä vastaan. Minusta ne olivat tervetulleita 
tilaisuuksia. Kepahan oli muuten valtuuskunnassa Seattlessa – järjestöt valitsivat 
kepan ja siinä ei ollut mitään huomauttamista. Ne olivat mukana sisäisissä 
kokouksissa ja kaikki eteni paitsi sitten mikään ei lopulta edennyt Seattlessa.)
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
D: Seattle – The Third Ministerial Conference in 1999
When the EU’s approach to the WTO Millennium Round was formulated, it was chaired 
by the Finnish Presidency in the EU Council. This factor increased the media’s interest in 
trade policy, so the Seattle Conference and the EU Ministerial meetings in Finland were 
reported frequently. The WTO therefore became better known, at least in that sense that 
more articles were published. 
During the spring of 1999 most of the press articles covered the disputes between the EU 
and the USA concerning agricultural products like hormone-treated beef and bananas.
During the summer and especially during the autumn articles dealt with Finland’s 
presidency and its role in chairing the EU negotiations. The difficulties in electing a 
leadership for the WTO were reported as well as the negotiation process involving new 
member states such as China and Russia.  
In October and November, in the run-up to the Ministerial Conference at Seattle, reports 
emerged of disagreements in the preparatory work between the EU and the USA, and it 
was generally thought that no consensus would be found. The conference and anti-global 
demonstrations were widely reported. Coverage of attempts to find a solution entailed 
repeated updates on the final day (3.12.1999). The failure was analyzed in Heikki 
Karkkolainen’s article for STT, the Finnish News Agency, on 13.12.1999: 
The failure of the WTO’s Seattle meeting is down to the United States and its 
unwillingness to start a new round of trade negotiations… The Seattle meeting 
also drew attention to the European Union’s problems in decision-making. 
Although Minister Sasi succeeded in gathering the EU member states behind 
Commissioner Lamy during the negotiations, the atmosphere in Seattle among the 
assembled EU Council was highly charged. 
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(WTO:n Seattlen kokouksen epäonnistuminen johtui Yhdysvaltojen 
haluttomuudesta uuden kauppaneuvottelukierroksen aloittamiseen (...) Seattlen 
kokous osoitti myös Euroopan Unionin päätöksenteon ongelmat. Vaikka Sasi 
saikin EU:n jäsenmaat pysymään neuvotteluissa Lamyn takana, kuohui Seattlessa 
kokoontunut EU:n neuvosto melkoisesti.)
But the plot is more complicated. After the collapse of the MAI there was a noticeable 
increase in interest at a political level, too. MP Ulla Anttila (the Greens) proposed a 
topical discussion in Parliament about the goals for the third Ministerial Conference in 
Seattle (30.9.1999), with the purpose of ensuring that sustainable growth was a key 
element in the further development of the WTO. Altogether 26 parliamentarians signed 
the proposal but the Speaker’s Council rejected the suggestion. 
MP Ulla Anttila had moved for her proposal in the following way:  
The WTO’s forthcoming negotiation round in Seattle is one of the most important 
matters influencing sustainable growth. It will have crucial effects on the trade 
policy of Finland as well as of the whole world. If the WTO’s agreement package 
widens to new areas without remedying any current problems, it might jeopardize 
the statutes and practices prepared for the protection of people, animals and the 
environment... It is also essential that Parliament should actively follow the 
development of the negotiations during the next three years. The compromises 
which take shape may be very far from the original aims. 
(Maailman kauppajärjestön WTO:n Seattlen neuvottelukierros on yksi 
tärkeimmistä kestävään kehitykseen vaikuttavista asioista. Se vaikuttaa 
ratkaisevasti sekä Suomen että koko maailman kauppapolitiikkaan. Jos WTO:n 
sopimuspaketti laajenee uusille alueille ilman nykyisten ongelmien korjausta, se 
voi vaarantaa ihmisten, ympäristön ja eläinten suojelemiseksi laadittuja olemassa 
olevia säädöksiä ja käytäntöjä (...) On myös välttämätöntä, että eduskunta seuraa 
aktiivisesti neuvottelujen edistymistä seuraavien kolmen vuoden aikana. 
Muotoutuvat kompromissit voivat olla hyvinkin kaukana alkuperäisistä 
tavoitteista.)
(Keskustelualoite 8/1999) 
Prior to this initiative Minister Sasi had addressed (7.5.1999) the Grand Committee about 
the third ministerial conference. The committee discussed labour standards and especially 
child labour. Minister Sasi considered it important that Finland should be receptive to the 
views of NGOs. Later in May (28.5.1999) both Minister Hemilä and Minister Sasi were 
present at the meeting of the Grand Committee, at a time when the issue of GM food and 
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hormone beef were very much current and there were some passions in the air. This was 
mediated in the press release of the meeting by the Committee.  
The Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs had accepted goals for the Millennium Round and 
its position as the country in the presidency of the EU. The main message was that the EU 
aimed to commence a new, broad round of negotiations. The position was reported to the 
Grand Committee, which accepted national goals for the Millennium Round, while 
underlining its constitutional right to influence Finnish trade policy. Trade liberalization 
was considered important for Finland; however, no doubt with an eye on the debate 
concerning hormone-treated beef, the Committee emphasized that liberalization in the 
context of agricultural goods should not affect the quality of food adversely. The 
Committee raised the question of supporting the poorest countries by establishing a legal 
aid service in the WTO (the Legal Affairs Centre). Indeed, the decisions were made in 
democratic order, following procedure, but not defended. (Press release of Grand 
Committee, www.eduskunta.fi)  
The Grand Committee (24.9.1999) discussed the agricultural negotiations introduced by 
Minister Hemilä. Minister Sasi informed the Committee at the same meeting about the 
unofficial gathering of the foreign trade ministers. On the agenda were, among other 
things, labour standards, protection of the environment, agricultural subsidies, the quality 
of food and some special items concerning services. The Committee underlined the 
importance of strengthening cooperation between the ILO (International Labour 
Organization) and the WTO, the importance of public services and development aid. The 
Committee considered that the most important task was, however, to create new 
economic global rules. (Press release of the Grand Committee, www.eduskunta.fi)  
The position of the EU was written personally by Under Secretary Leif Fagernäs with his 
European colleague, Jacques Brodin of the Council Secretariat (and characteristically the 
text was finished in a Finnish sauna). Finland as the Chair had real influence, although the 
issues and decisions in the position had, of course, been discussed and negotiated among 
the member countries several times. Furthermore none the issues was new. Concerning 
the role of the Presidency, Under Secretary Leif Fagernäs answered interestingly:  
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AA: You have experiences on the Commission and also the presidency of the 
Council. What is the role of the presidency? 
LF: Surprisingly significant. Particularly when thinking about Seattle as well as 
Doha. It was the responsibility of Finnish Presidency to write the EU position. I 
wrote it together with the Secretary of Council, Jacques Brodin. We two wrote the 
position of the EU. The Commission did not do anything. Then it was plonked in 
front of the Article 133 Committee and we said: you have two sessions in which to 
settle the matter. Only two questions were left open and these simply went up to 
Prime Ministerial level for a decision. One was anti-dumping and the other labour 
standards. 
AA: What about the Commission? I suppose the Commissioner is the key person. 
LF: The Commissioner is a negotiator, but the interesting thing is that the country 
in the Presidency formulates the position. It is not even the Commission’s 
proposal, but that of the country holding the Presidency. The Presidency also 
conducts the meetings. The Commission at this point is more a bystander. It can 
express an advisory expert opinion. It is like this because the bulk of the matters 
there belong to shared competence. Of course the Commission in reality then does 
a great deal, but it does not formulate the position and it does not defend the 
position in front of the member states. Looking back on it, it was a hard exercise 
but also a pleasant experience. Finland was not criticized for promoting the one-
sided interests of any specific member state. I think that the British had some sour 
feelings, as they had hoped for a position only five lines long, in other words, 
welcome to Seattle. On the other hand the Latin countries wanted a lot more, but 
we already knew that. In Seattle the Commission came to the negotiations with the 
others. They told us how things were going and then the EU had to respond. The 
Commission is not of course ordering rather it is commentating. The country 
holding the Presidency has to evaluate the situation and to make either decisions 
or proposals. Those two long nights of plenary sessions, when we were 
reformulating the EU position, were very hard. The Commission said, only 
remember that you’ve just got to be ‘tough’… Everyone has to have their say, so 
that afterwards they can go home and say, ‘we made our case but nothing came of 
it because the majority was against’. At this stage you have to weigh these things 
very carefully and this is easier for the Presidency than the Commission, because 
the Commission is always criticized. If you criticize the Presidency country a 
couple of times, the whole system collapses... As long as the issues are under 
shared competence every member state has an opportunity to block the process. 
Of course if we know in advance that such and such an issue is of particular 
interest to a particular member, and know their domestic policy situation, and 
therefore whether something is absolutely on or off… we have to refer the matter 
to ministerial, or sometimes even Prime Ministerial, level. In France the decisions 
went as far as the President’s and Prime Minister’s Offices – I contacted them 
personally. 
(AA: Kun sinulla on kokemusta puheenjohtajamaan näkökulmasta ja suhteessa 
komissioon, mikä sinusta voi olla puheenjohtajamaan merkitys? 
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LF: Yllättävän merkittävä. Tämä koskee erityisesti Seattlea ja Dohaakin. 
Puheenjohtajamaa oli se, joka kirjoitti position. Sen tein minä ja neuvoston 
sihteeri Jacques Brodin. Me kaksi kirjoitimme EU:n position. Komissio ei tehnyt 
mitään. Sitten se lyötiin komission 133 eteen ja me sanoimme, että teillä on kaksi 
istuntoa aikaa sopia asiasta. Siitä jäi vain kaksi asiaa auki ja ne menivätkin sitten 
ihan pääministeritasolle ratkaistavaksi. Toinen oli polkumyynti ja toinen 
työelämän normit. 
AA: Miten sitten on komissiossa? Onko se komissaari, joka on keskeinen.? 
LF: Komissaari neuvottelee mutta mielenkiintoista on, että puheenjohtajamaa 
tekee position. Se ei ole edes komission esitys vaan sen tekee puheenjohtajamaa. 
Puheenjohtajamaa vetää myös kokouksen. Komissio on siinä vaiheessa statisti. 
Komissio voi antaa asiantuntijalausunnon. Se johtuu juuri siitä, että siinä 
suurimmalta osaltaan on aiheita, jotka on jaetussa toimivallassa. Totta kai 
komissio sitten faktisesti tekee paljon mutta ei tee positiota eikä puolusta sitä 
jäsenmaitten edessä (...) Jälkikäteen arvioiden, se oli kova harjoitus mutta myös 
miellyttävä kokemus. Suomi ei saanut arvostelua siitä, että se olisi ajanut 
yksipuolisesti jonkun maan etua. Minä luulen, että happamampia olivat 
englantilaiset, jotka olisivat toivoneet viisi riviä pitkän position, että tervetuloa 
Seattleen. Mutta latinalaiset maat halusivat paljon enemmän mutta senhän me 
tiesimme. Kun oltiin Seattlessa, komissio käy keskusteluja muitten kanssa. Kertoo 
missä mennään ja sen jälkeen EU:n pitää vastata. Komissio ei sitä tietenkään 
määrää, esittää vain kommentteja. Puheenjohtajamaa esittää arvion tuleeko tästä 
mitään ja sitten hän tekee joko päätöksen tai tekee esityksen. Ne kaksi pitkää yötä 
tai istuntoa kun me muokattiin EU:n positiota olivat kovia. Komissio sanoi vaan 
että muistakaa että pitää olla vain tough (...) Kaikkien pitää saada esittää jotakin 
ja viedä kotiinpäin, että me esitettiin mutta ei siitä mitään tullut kun enemmistö oli 
vastaan. Se pitää hirveän tarkkaan mitata siinä vaiheessa ja tämä on 
puheenjohtajalle helpompaa kuin komissiolle koska komissiota kritisoidaan aina. 
Puheenjohtajan kritisoiminen merkitsee sitä, että kun sen tekee pari kertaa niin 
kaatuu koko systeemi (...) Niin kauan kuin asiat on jaetussa toimivallassa, 
jokaisella jäsenmaalla on mahdollisuus pysäyttää asiat. Tietenkin jos etukäteen 
tiedetään, että joku asia on jollekin erityisen tärkeä, tiedetään sisäpoliittista 
tilannetta että onko se ehdottomasti näin vai ei.. ministeritasolta sitä on kysyttävä, 
aina välillä pääministeritasolta. Ranskassa asiat meni presidentin ja
pääministerin kansliaa myöten – minä olin sinne itse yhteydessä.)  
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
Minister Kimmo Sasi, however, underlined the importance of Commission: 
AA: How far does the Commission act independently in formulating the WTO 
policy and what is the role of the Council? 
KS: Well, the Commission is quite independent. But of course it depends to some 
extent on the Commissioners. Lamy, as a person is very strong. He is extremely 
competent. That is one reason. And when someone has to negotiate with separate 
parties, for example with the United States or developing countries, then yes, the 
Commission has the responsibility of doing so in a coordinated manner. That is 
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another reason why the Commission’s position is strong. But if we’re considering 
position-forming, then country holding the Presidency may have a relatively large 
role. The guidelines of the EU policy for Seattle were made in October 1999 
during the Finnish Presidency but remained in force until the end of the process. I 
would like to say that, because we have a good civil service, we made a huge 
contribution to reaching conclusions, as well as finding compromises. If you 
consider the whole process, Finland has possibly been the Commission’s best 
supporter. Of course it was easy, since the conclusions were made during our 
Presidency and the Commission adopted them. 
(AA: Miten pitkälle komissio toimii itsellisesti WTO-politiikan hahmottamisessa ja 
missä määrin käytetään hyväksi neuvostoja?
KS: No kyllä komissio on hyvin itsenäinen. Mutta se tietenkin vähän riippuu 
komissaareista. Lamy on varsin vahva. Hän osaa asian erittäin hyvin. Se on yksi 
syy. Ja kun jonkun pitää neuvotella eri osapuolten kanssa, Yhdysvaltojen tai 
kehitysmaiden kanssa, niin kyllä se on komissio joka käy ne koordinoidusti. 
Siitäkin syystä komission asema on vahva. Ja jos ajatellaan kannanmuodostusta 
niin puheenjohtajamaalla saattaa olla suhteellisen suuri rooli. Tässähän 
linjaukset tehtiin Suomen puheenjohtajakaudella 1999 lokakuussa Seattlea varten 
mutta ne säilyivät voimassa loppuun asti. Kyllä minä sanoisin, että koska meillä 
on hyvä virkamieskunta, meidän panos päätelmien tekemisessä oli suuri plus 
sitten kompromissien hakemisessa. Kun katsoo tätä koko prosessia Suomi on ollut 
komission ehkä paras tukija. Sehän on tietenkin ollut helppoa, koska päätelmät 
tehtiin meidän puheenjohtajakaudella ja komissio on omaksunut ne.)
(Interview with Sasi)  
On the basis of these statements, the preparatory work done by the Finnish administrators 
produced good results. However, Seattle was a disappointment. So what went wrong in 
Seattle? The analysis of interviewees is as follows:  
AA: What was the reason for the failure of Seattle, in your opinion? The United 
States must have played a fairly big part in it? 
LF: Yes, they take a large part of the blame. At no point were they willing to be 
flexible on anything. That’s how it was. Another reason was that the agenda was 
rather large, and it is definite that even at the preparatory stage it was not moving 
forward, so that no-one could foresee any significant results coming out of it. 
However, nobody could imagine that the conference would collapse so totally and 
so spectacularly. It was inconceivable. The preparatory work was poor and, all in 
all, it is now easy to say, that too many items were put in front of the developing 
countries and they all got furious. Perhaps something partial could have been 
brought about at Seattle if the developing countries hadn’t been kept completely in 
the dark… I was there myself when the topics for the specific topic-based forums 
were distributed. So when labour standards came up, all the developing countries 
said that this item does not belong to this forum, or to this declaration, but if you 
left the room and talked off the record then they were willing to negotiate... They 
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were ready to seek solutions in order to save the conference. I found it positive. 
But the Americans were shooting with real bullets. 
AA: Did the big demonstrations and anti-globalization movements have any 
influence at all? 
LF: They had no effect on final results. 
AA: But I suppose there is an impression at least to the general public that they 
were successful in paralyzing the meeting? 
LF: Well, perhaps in the sense that no opening ceremonies were held, but 
otherwise everything else went ahead. They could make all the noise they wanted. 
The reality is that the substance of the conference was completely deadlocked.
(AA: Minkä takia sinun mielestäsi Seattle meni pieleen? Yhdysvalloilla taisi olla 
aika suuri osuus siihen? 
LF: Kyllä heillä oli suuri osuus. He eivät olisi missään vaiheessa joustaneet 
mistään. Kyllä se näin oli. Toinen asia oli se, että agenda oli aika iso ja 
ratkaisevaa oli, että valmisteluvaiheessa ei edetty niin ettei kukaan kuvitellutkaan, 
että sieltä tulisi mitään merkittävää tulosta. Mutta ei kukaan kuvitellut, että 
kokous romahtaisi niin täydellisesti ja niin näyttävästi. Ei sitä osattu ajatella. 
Valmisteluprosessi oli huono ja kaiken kaikkiaan nyt on helppo sanoa, että tuotiin 
liian paljon asiaa kehitysmaiden eteen ja heidät kaikki suututettiin. Ehkäpä 
Seattlessa olisi osittain jotain saatu aikaan jos heitä ei olisi pidetty täysin 
pimennossa (...) Minä olin itse paikalla kun jaettiin teemat aihepohjaisiin 
foorumeihin. Sitten kun tuli työelämän normit niin kaikki kehitysmaat vastasivat 
ettei tämä asia kuulu tähän saliin eikä tähän julkilausumaan mutta jos mennään 
tästä huoneesta ulos ja keskustellaan epävirallisesti niin he ovat valmiita 
keskustelemaan (...) He olivat valmiita löytämään jonkun muodon, jotta kokous ei 
kaatuisi. Minusta se oli myönteistä. Mutta amerikkalaisilla oli kovemmat piipussa. 
AA: Entäs sitten nämä isot mielenosoitukset ja antiglobalisaatioliikkeiden 
vaikutus ylipäätään? 
LF: Ei niillä ollut vaikutusta lopputulokseen. 
AA: Mutta julkisuudessa ainakin kuva on sellainen, että ne halvaannuttivat 
kokouksen.
LF: No sillä tavalla, että avajaisia ei saatu pidetyksi mutta kaikki muuhan eteni. 
Ne olisi voinut mellastaa miten vaan. Asiat vaan olivat jumissa ihan täydellisesti.) 
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
Minister Kimmo Sasi described his feelings:  
“The goal was to start a new negotiation round and that was postponed for two 
years! The attitude of the United States was problematic but above all the 
preparation was disastrous. A document of 36-pages was prepared and there was 
disagreement on every single point. It was quite impossible to polish that up in a 
four or five-day conference. Mike Moore was also new in his position as a chief 
director.”
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(”Tavoitteena oli käynnistää uusi neuvottelukierros ja sitä jouduttiin lykkäämään 
kaksi vuotta! Yhdysvaltojen asenne oli vaikea mutta ensinnäkin valmistelu oli 
onnetonta. Oli tehty 36-sivuinen paperi, jossa kaikista kohdista oli erimielisyys. 
Neljän viiden päivän kokouksessa hiominen on ihan mahdotonta ja Mike Moore 
oli uusi pääjohtaja.”)
(Interview with Sasi) 
The Finnish Parliament was following the Ministerial Conference in Seattle. MP Kalevi 
Olin placed a question during Question Hour (2.12.1999) about the meeting and 
demonstrations to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tarja Halonen. She replied that 
Minister Sasi and Minister Hemilä were both present in Seattle and that the 
demonstrations reflected the debate on globalization. She also underlined the role of the 
NGOs in democratic dialogue.  
The Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle raised the level of Finnish public interest in 
trade policy, although the reason was not only the conference itself but also the Finnish 
Presidency of the EU Council. However, the Grand Committee did not formulate any 
clear guidelines, though it did address some of the questions which were considered 
problematic by NGOs or lobbying groups. 
In reality, Finland was in a position to influence preparations and the positions adopted by 
the EU, a task in which it succeeded. Evidence of this success is the fact that the EU’s 
position remained the same, in practice, into the Doha Conference in 2001. Both the 
Commission and the Finnish Presidency played an important role, which is noteworthy 
when analyzing the concepts of regional integration and democratic governance. 
Nevertheless, the policy lines were articulated mainly by the civil servants, both at a 
national and an international level.  
The WTO had, however, failed in Seattle, while the debate on globalization stimulated by 
the international anti-global movements also began in Finland. As mentioned earlier, 
according to Fred Halliday (2000), there were three Seattles: a revolutionist, a rationalist 
and a realist version. He suggested, emphasizing perhaps more the rationalist and realistic 
approaches, that states should fix the WTO and that it should concentrate on policy 
issues, such as the relations between economic growth and protection of the environment, 
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or the relation of the growing inequalities in world wealth to management of inter-state 
and inter-community conflict. Indeed, the WTO became a hot issue.  
8.4. Media response 
Articles mediated by STT, the Finnish News Agency, are not analyzed according to their 
type as in other cases, since they all fall into the category of news or informative pieces; 
however, their publication was divided between the newspapers’ political and economic 
pages, reflecting varying emphasis. How much the services provided by the STT were 
relied upon by various papers is unclear, but as commented earlier major newspapers did 
not necessarily send their staff-reporters to Ministerial conferences.  
With a search on the term “WTO”, a total of 317 political news articles and 367 economic 
news articles were published during the time period in question, 1995-1999. There is 
some duplication of the same article, as well as variations of the same press release during 
the course of a day, which accounts for the significant difference between the total 
number of articles and the number analyzed, particularly with respect to political news. 
For example during the Seattle Summit tens of press releases were put out every day. 
Therefore it is worth emphasizing that, of the reports on the WTO, more appeared on the 
economic pages than on the political ones. Furthermore, about two thirds of the articles 
were published during 1999, which highlights the growth in public interest in the WTO 
after the collapse of the MAI, but particularly because of Seattle.  
After analysis of the articles, the items were classified into six sections. The group 
labelled “WTO” consists of articles which dealt with either the meetings of the WTO, 
nominations, new tradable items or new member states of the WTO. In this last 
subsection, the membership applications of China and Russia were reported particularly 
frequently. The second group, “Trade Disputes”, consists of disagreements between the 
WTO partners concerning, for example, subsidies to the shipbuilding industry or the 
question of bananas, which was a contentious issue between the EU and the USA. 
“Agricultural matters” concentrates on food safety and the position of agricultural trade 
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ITEMS OF ARTICLES (POLITICAL)
25 %
5 %
37 %
14 %
12 %
7 %
the WTO
Trade Disputes
Agriculture
Development
Visits
Other
ITEMS OF ARTICLES (ECONOMIC)
53 %
17 %
13 %
6 %
3 %
8 %
the WTO
Trade Disputes
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Other
during the forthcoming Millennium Round. “Development Issues” includes human and 
labour rights, as well as poverty and the position of developing countries. The section 
“Visits” consists of news items reporting visits paid by Finnish Ministers or the visits of 
the WTO officials to Finland. The section “Others” covers mainly statistics about free 
trade.
 The following tables give the relative frequency for each group in terms of political and 
economic coverage. 
Figure 6 
 n=117 
Figure 7 
 n=302 
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Questions of agriculture and development receive greater attention on the political pages 
than on the economic pages, whereas questions of trade disputes are reported more often 
on the economic pages. The position of developing countries and the role of the WTO in 
the global economic order were stressed by Minister Norrback. Minister Haavisto also 
contributed to this question during his visit in Vietnam in early 1997, as well as Minister 
Hassi in connection with the Lomé negotiations in 1999. 
Ministers, as members of the establishment, could get their messages across. In a way, 
they also opened up an opportunity for political argument but, to judge from the media 
response, it was not used by Parliament. Issues related to developing countries, 
environment and labour standards were important during the period under review (1995-
1999) but no clear policy line was expressed. Minister Sasi has an explanation:  
“The issue debated most in Parliament is the position of developing countries. But 
if you look at the report of the Grand Committee… it is really quite unclear. On 
the one hand agriculture should be liberalized and on the other hand it should not. 
Then what there has been disagreement about is whether new items should be 
discussed during the negotiation rounds: the protection of investments – reflecting 
the MAI agreement – and then the rules of competition. Then labour rights and 
what should be done in this context. Earlier it was demanded that the WTO should 
be more active in these questions, but then fears started to arise about what, if 
these labour questions were specified as part of the WTO’s competence, this 
might this lead to. So attention started to turn towards the ILO… Environmental 
matters were stressed and considered important too, but there the trouble is what 
the substance of the matter really is. Okay. The Commission did have an opinion 
what the substance was but in the domestic debate the matter was indistinct. It was 
also interesting that during the last week before the Doha Ministerial Conference 
two opposite messages came from the environmental NGOs. On the one hand they 
demanded that environmental matters should be taken up vigorously, and on the 
other hand not, that it wasn’t right for Ministers for Foreign Trade to negotiate on 
environmental matters.”    
(”Se mistä eniten on käyty keskustelua on kehitysmaiden asema. Jos katsoo suuren 
valiokunnan lausuntoa (...) se on kyllä aika epäselvä se lausunto. Maatalous 
pitäisi vapauttaa mutta sitten taas ei pitäisi. Sitten mistä on ollut kinaa on se, että 
pitääkö olla uusia aiheita neuvottelukierroksilla. Investointisuoja – kun tämä 
MAI-sopimus heijastuu vielä – sitten kilpailusäännöt. Sitten työelämän oikeudet ja 
mitä siinä suhteessa pitäisi tehdä. Kun aikaisemmin edellytettiin, että WTO:n 
pitäisi olla aktiivisempi näissä kysymyksissä niin sitten alkoi syntyä pelkoa, että 
jos WTO:ssa oltaisiin määritelty näitä työelämän kysymyksiä niin mihin se 
johtaisi. Ja siinä alettiin kääntyä ILO:n suuntaan (...) Ympäristökysymykset nekin 
painottuivat ja niitä pidettiin tärkeinä mutta siinäkin oli vähän, että mikä on 
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substanssi. Okei. Komissiolla oli kyllä käsitys mikä substanssi on mutta 
kotimaisessa keskustelussa se oli hahmottumaton. Siinäkin oli mielenkiintoista, 
että viimeisen viikon aikana ennen Dohan kokousta ympäristöjärjestöiltä tuli 
kahdenlaisia kirjeitä. Toisissa vaadittiin, että ympäristöasiat pitää ottaa vahvasti 
esille ja toisessa ettei pidä ottaa. Ettei ole oikein, että kauppaministerit 
käsittelevät ympäristökysymyksiä.”) 
(Interview with Sasi) 
Articles focusing on the WTO as an organization form the major part of the economic 
coverage. In these articles the STT concentrated on reporting the negotiations before the 
Ministerial Conferences, the results of these conferences, and expectations of various 
interest groups (for example, the IT sector) concerning the WTO. As already mentioned, 
the STT reported trade disputes in the context of the economy rather than politics.  
Those actors who were interviewed by the STT or whose statements were referred to in 
articles had formal positions in the field of trade policy. Ministers Salolainen, Norrback 
and Sasi conveyed their messages, as did the Ministers for Developing Aid, Haavisto and 
Hassi. Similarly, the statements of the Director General of the WTO were reported as well 
as Commissioner Brittan’s and Fischler’s.  
The most important domestic theme was food safety. It was not only an important 
question for farmers but for consumers, too. Nevertheless, social partners could lobby 
their own interests: MTK on the importance of protecting agriculture and SAK in the area 
of labour standards, as well as child labour.  
8.5. Conclusions 
The Plot 
In the beginning, the WTO was not an interesting issue politically though its importance 
as a new global actor was recognized. In Finland, the establishment of the WTO remained 
in the shadow of the country’s entry into the EU and remained there for quite a long time. 
Hormone-treated beef and bananas did not excite any emotion among the political elite. 
However, based on media response, public interest focused on agricultural issues. This 
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interest was not raised because of the importance of free trade, but rather because of 
protectionist interests.  
The turning point of the plot was the MAI, under negotiation in the OECD. It made the 
Finnish Parliament and the political system in general more interested in trade policy. 
This was very much due to the input of both global and national NGOs. The MAI also 
stimulated the dialogue between social movements and the administrators. However, 
public interest reflected the fears expressed by the NGOs and did not generate any further 
discussions on the WTO or the rules of free trade, in spite of Minister Norrback’s 
message that free trade is not free from rules. Generally the concerns shared by the 
political elite were more or less to protect or support Finnish industry and its 
competitiveness, not to influence the policy of the WTO. 
The Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle – with its riots and demonstrations but also 
the failure of the Millennium Round – was another, even more important turning point in 
the Finnish globalization debate. The MAI had already given some hints, but after Seattle 
the WTO as an organization and as a global actor became well-known. These two turning 
points made trade issues more transparent and publicly interesting. The interest of the 
political elite was awakened by the media, which reported mainly on the concerns and 
demands of anti-globalization NGOs. The reflexivity may even have functioned too well 
in this case, since the message of the supporters of free trade did not receive much 
publicity. 
As a consequence of this interest, the Grand Committee established a subcommittee to 
follow WTO policy, evidence that the role of the WTO was acknowledged in a new 
global architecture. Perhaps after Doha in 2001 the conclusion was even clearer than after 
Seattle: that trade policy is after all politics. The role of the EU could be that of a good 
partner to developing countries in creating fair rules for world trade and Finland could be 
active in this process, as well as in lobbying for other issues of importance to both Finland 
and the EU. 
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The Actors and Information Flows 
The key actors in the WTO policy adopted in Finland were civil servants of the 
Department of External Economic Relations, along with the Ministers for Foreign Trade 
as spokesmen. The position of the Department of External Economic Relations has been 
traditionally very strong. Minister Norrback, in his interview, analyzed the reason for this 
as historical: trade has not been a political issue, so that if some difficult questions have 
arisen concerning trade policy, it has been very easy to separate the principles of foreign 
policy from the principles of trade – and the problems have been solved. Norrback 
emphasized his personal efforts to politicize trade policy. 
Because of new areas of free trade, the weight of other ministries, particularly the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, has also become more significant. However, the 
role of Finland can be summarized as that of a good supporter of the EU Commission, 
which means that domestic disagreements have been solved in the context of the EU.  
Only a few politicians, apart from the ministers concerned, have been interested in trade 
policy. Formally all proposals have passed through the Cabinet Committee without any 
particular interest. Those who have expressed their views have been Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs or Development Aid, in other words those whose political responsibilities are 
closely related to trade issues.  
This lack of general involvement raises a question about fragmentation in the exercise of 
power: ministers are taking care of their own affairs rather than interfering in others’ 
business regardless of the political dimensions of the trade issues. If there is no interest, 
there is no debate either. If there is no debate, there is no possibility for citizens to 
evaluate the policy line adopted. However, the public sphere was dominated by the NGOs 
and their viewpoints. 
Information, flowing from the administration – including the EU and the WTO – and 
from anti-global NGOs, is confusing. Therefore it seems to be difficult for the political 
elite to locate themselves between the views of the administrators and the NGOs. Under 
Secretary Fagernäs described his feelings: 
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AA: How then would you describe the importance of these anti-globalization 
movements? To what extent do you, as a civil servant, follow their activities? 
LF: I would certainly see their role as important. They often have the kind of 
viewpoint and knowledge that we do not necessarily have. Their input is to bring a 
new angle, but they do not take part as decision-makers. There are various kinds 
of organizations and elements. With some dialogue is possible, with others not. It 
may be that in past there have been people who have been rude towards NGOs 
but, during my time, there has been no difficulty listening to their views.  
AA: Would you even say that it is nice to have a debating partner? 
LF: Yes, indeed. For example concerning the environmental issues there were 
many aspects – as was also admitted later in the EU – we had not taken into 
consideration as potential sources of conflict…. We now have environmental 
agreements in which a trade dimension is included. Whenever these agreements 
have come up against the WTO rules, there has never been conflict, rather the 
WTO has applied the rules in favour of the environment. The Americans are 
always saying, what are you getting so worked up about. But that is their Anglo-
Saxon case-law mentality, while we aspire to the rule of law and statutes. 
(AA: Miten luonnehtisit sitten näitä antiglobalisaatioliikkeitä, missä määrin 
virkamiehet seuraavat niitten toimintaa?
LF: Kyllä minä näkisin heidän roolinsa tärkeänä. Heillä on usein sellaisia 
näkökohtia ja tietoa, jota meillä ei välttämättä ole. He tuovat uuden aspektin 
mutta eivät he ole päätöksentekijöinä mukana. Siellä on monenlaista ainesta. 
Joittenkin kanssa voi keskustella joittenkin kanssa ei voi. Voi olla, että historiassa 
on ollut henkilöitä, jotka ovat olleet töykeitä kansalaisjärjestöjä kohtaan mutta 
sinä aikana kun minä olen ollut mukana, että heitä ei olisi haluttu kuunnella.
AA: Voisiko jopa ajatella niin, että on mukavaa kun on keskustelukumppani?   
LF: Kyllä, kyllä. Sanoisin, että esimerkiksi ympäristöasioissa sieltä tuli paljon (...) 
ja se myönnettiin sitten EU:ssakin myöhemmin.. näkökohtia, joita ei oltu otettu 
huomioon mahdollisina törmäyskohteina (...) Nyt on jo ympäristösopimuksia, 
joissa on kaupallisia näkökohtia. Aina kun nämä ovat törmänneet WTO-
sääntöihin, ei ole koskaan nähty ristiriitaa vaan WTO on aina soveltanut niitä 
ympäristön hyväksi. Amerikkalaiset aina sanovat, että mitä te vaahtoatte. Mutta se 
on se anglosaksinen oikeustapakohtainen ajattelu kun taas meillä pyritään 
lainsäädäntöön ja normeihin.)
(Interview with Fagernäs) 
Information was also given to committees of Parliament, and the Grand Committee had a 
more active role than the Committee for Foreign Affairs. However, none of the 
parliamentary groups wanted to come to grips with information on the WTO or trade 
policy. Yet it also became very clear that the administrators really wanted to find partners 
for a dialogue. The reflexivity is in flux.  
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9. The Sonera Case – Put your money where your mouth is, but not too much
The Sonera case is analyzed here in the framework of mediazation, although it is also 
related to globalization due to the significant role that Sonera had in the strategy of 
shaping the information society, through which Finland would succeed in global 
competition. However, Sonera was hit by a scandal, which was a turning point for the 
company. The dismissal of the President of Sonera, Pekka Vennamo, and the resignation 
of Minister Aura form a typical example of a political scandal with enormous media 
response. The media also directed the drama and its plot. This particular scandal was the 
first of many. 
Finland is considered one of the world’s leading countries in the telecommunications 
sector, as well as in use of the Internet. Nokia is the global market leader in the 
manufacture of mobile telephones. Northern EU countries, including Finland, were 
pioneers in liberalizing the telecommunications sector. The opening up of telecom 
markets, in effect across the European Union since 1998 when there was also a worldwide 
WTO agreement, required new thinking. Telecom companies could not concentrate only 
on national markets, but also had to think on a European and global scale. It was 
especially in the interest of Finland (and Nokia) to open telecommunication markets 
worldwide. The breakthrough happened in Singapore, at the WTO’s Ministerial 
Conference in 1996, mentioned in the previous chapter.
Finnish high-technology and telecommunication companies had learned to operate in 
deregulated and highly competitive domestic markets and were ready to enter global 
markets. This was also the case with Sonera – previously Suomen PT – although it was a 
state-owned company. It is important to emphasize the difference in the history of 
telecom operations in Finland compared with other EU countries. The Finnish telecom 
sector had a long tradition of a multi-operator environment; however, in the mid-1990’s 
Suomen PT (Finnish Post and Telecommunications) was Finland’s leading provider of 
mobile, data and media telecommunications services. 
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Telecommunication was considered more a business than a basic service provided by the 
state, but it had an essential role in the concept of the information society launched by the 
Government. Communication and the flow of information have played an important part 
in social skills, and the available technology has always determined how efficiently 
information can be transmitted. Therefore the idea was to create, with the help of wireless 
networks alongside traditional fixed-line networks, an information society that would 
sustain future welfare. Nokia, as a leading company, was of course included in the 
Government strategy, as well as Sonera. The key issue was to guarantee free and equal 
access to the Internet.  
However, investment in broad-band connections, as a step towards the information 
society, was not seen as an obligation of the state, but as a matter of supply and demand 
in private markets. In the political debate – without any response on the side of the 
Government – the infrastructure and fast Internet connections were seen as tools to 
promote balanced regional development. But this aspect was excluded from the strategies 
of developing the telecommunications sector. Indeed, the whole concept of the 
information society seemed to remain merely a slogan rather than a strategy, since it 
would have guided the policy of a state-owned company, such as Sonera. Such a strategy 
is certainly difficult to find in the documents and an eagerness to privatize may explain 
the chosen policy line better. 
The privatization of Post and Telecommunications has its roots in the early 1990s, when 
the Post and Telecommunications Office was restructured as a state-owned enterprise. 
The restructuring process continued and from 1994 the state-owned company Suomen PT 
(Finnish PT) was established. Privatization of Finnish PT started in autumn 1997. 
Parliament authorised the demerger of Finnish PT into separate post and telecom groups, 
and also approved the partial privatization of the telecommunications company, creating 
the Sonera Group.
Throughout the 1990s Finnish Telecom had expanded its operations into the country’s 
neighbouring market areas, which were seen as a natural extension of the domestic 
market. It had also made significant capital investments in companies offering mobile 
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communication services in rapidly expanding markets, such as Turkey and Hungary. 
When Sonera started as a company, it was a modern corporation with vision and 
expertise, and it was mature enough to enter international markets. 
9.1. The Data 
The data consists of:
? Offering Memorandum, 9th November 1998; 
? documents prepared by the Ministry of Transport and Communication for the 
Parliamentary Committees in January 1999 (Liikenneministeriö 12.1.1999, 
Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriö 23.10.2001);  
? press releases from the Ministry 13.8,  6.10, 12.11.1998 and 4.1.1999; 
? Report on Ownership Policy of State Owned Companies 10/1999 published by 
Ministry of Finance; 
? Reports of Commerce Committee 33/1998, Traffic Committee 37/1998 and 
Finance Committee 67/1998 (www.eduskunta.fi) 
? Protocols of Parliament debate HE 226/1997, 241/1998, SKT 12.11. and 
19.11.1998, PI 3/1998 (www.eduskunta.fi); 
? Sonera Corporation Publication Series 1/1998 and 3/1999; 
? media coverage from 14.10.1998 to 15.01.1999  collected  by the Ministry of 
Traffic and Communication; 
? Pekka, Posti ja Sonera, a book by Pekka Vennamo, former President of Sonera; 
? Interviews with: Kalevi Alestalo (24.10.2001), Minister Matti Aura (27.12.2001), 
Markku Talonen (16.1.2002), Pekka Vennamo (21.1.2002), Jorma Westlund 
(20.12.2001), and Ben Zyskowicz (19.10.2001). 
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The interviews did not follow a fixed pattern, although the same processes and turning 
points were dealt with. These were: who the key actors were; what kind of arguments 
there were in favour of or against privatization; what episodes were central during 
preparation for privatizing; the pricing of the Sonera shares; the allocation of shares, and 
the role of incentives offered to Sonera’s management; what reasons led to Minister 
Aura’s resignation and why Pekka Vennamo was dismissed; the importance of the 
forthcoming elections in spring 1999 and what kinds of efforts were made to handle a 
political scandal. In open-ended questions the interviewees could summarize the most 
crucial turning points and lessons. The Chairman of the National Coalition Party, Sauli 
Niinistö, also clarified his role in this case by answering some questions. He underlined, 
however, that he was an outsider and had nothing to do with the case. 
I was personally involved with the case as an MP, and also as a member of Sonera’s 
advisory board. However, the role of the advisory board was consultative and to review 
and to approve the auditor’s report; it was kept informed but had no role in operative 
decisions. The ownership policy was in the hands of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications.
9.2. Actors 
In the interview material, altogether 39 actors were mentioned. A ‘family’ of actors was 
created and categorized, and is presented in Figure 8. In this case, neither social partners 
nor particular journalists were mentioned by respondents; the media played an important 
role as the process turned into a political scandal, and was mentioned several times, but as 
a collective.
It is quite clear that Matti Aura and Pekka Vennamo were the main actors in this specific 
case, the privatization of Sonera. They were also key actors in the media’s account. Those 
mentioned more than six times are: Pekka Vennamo (143), Matti Aura (107), Sauli 
Niinistö (27), Samuli Haapasalo (21), Ben Zyskowicz (15), Kalevi Alestalo (14), Juhani 
Korpela (14), and Markku Talonen (8). The category of politicians consists of three main 
actors: Aura, Niinistö and Zyskowicz, all belonging to the National Coalition Party.
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The proportion of business actors is also exceptionally high although they are seldom 
mentioned as key actors. This is because the role of advisors was essential during the 
privatization. Sonera’s key people, including the category of businessmen, were its 
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Pekka Vennamo, and Markku Talonen who 
was at that time Chairman of the Board (COB) at Sonera.  
Figure 8 
 n=39 
The category of administration consists of civil servants in the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications who were responsible for governing matters related to Sonera: the 
Director of the Unit for Corporate and Ownership Policy, Kalevi Alestalo, and Samuli 
Haapasalo. Alestalo was also a member of Sonera’s board, and both he and Haapasalo 
had direct links to Minister Aura. The Ministry of Transport and Communications is 
organized according the same rules as all ministries, so that the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry is normally responsible for all matters, and acts as the main link to the 
Minister. But in this specific case, the system was different. Matters relating to Sonera 
were often business secrets, so that it was not possible to handle the questions openly in 
the Ministry. The Ministry was also the regulatory authority and that was another reason 
for the unusual communication links. Kalevi Alestalo examined the paradox in his 
interview:
“This is an exceptional thing, that, because the information is confidential, we 
were not able to handle these [Sonera affairs] in the general meetings of the 
Ministry. In a way, we were dealing directly with the Minister. I suppose the 
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practice is the same in other ministries, too... However, there was also a formal 
reason for this. Since our Ministry takes care of the regulation, the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry, and of course the Minister himself too, is the head of 
both the regulation department and the ownership section.… Somebody else might 
have taken offence at our direct contact with the Minister, but Korpela understood 
it and he always behaved very loyally to us.
(”Tämä on nyt sillä tavalla erikoinen juttu, että kun on näitä salassa pidettäviä 
asioita niin näitä ei ole voitu meidän talon yleisiin johtoryhmiin viedä. Tavallaan 
on toimittu suoraan ministerin kanssa. Luulisin, että näin toimitaan myös muissa 
ministeriöissä (...) Mutta sitten on ihan asiallinen syy. Kun ministeriössä 
hoidetaan myös regulaatiota niin kansliapäällikkö on sekä regulaatiopuolen että 
omistajapuolen päällikkö kuten tietysti ministerikin (...) Joku toinen olisi voinut 
ottaa nokkiinsa suorat kontaktit ministeriin mutta Korpela antoi sen olla ja 
käyttäytyi meitä kohtaan aina hyvin lojaalisti.”) 
(Interview with Alestalo) 
It is also worth mentioning that Pekka Vennamo and Matti Aura had known each other 
since they were teenagers, and were both were members of political families, Vennamo’s 
father having been an MP, Minister and Leader of the Finnish Rural Party, and Aura’s 
father, Prime Minister and Mayor of the City of Helsinki. Although they were not close 
friends, they were close enough to communicate without any formalities. 
Pekka Vennamo, with his political background, had also managed extremely well as a 
businessman and enjoyed a good image. Pekka Vennamo said that he was motivated to 
run the company: 
“Originally, when I made the decision to lead the Post and Telecommunications 
Office, which was in the process of changing as a state-owned enterprise, I had a 
strong intention to become a business manager. My job was to make that 
enterprise into a company rated on the stock markets.  
(”Alunperinkin kun minä lähdin posti- ja  telelaitoksen johtoon, joka oli 
muuttumassa liikelaitokseksi, koin lähteväni yritysjohtajaksi ja tekeväni siitä 
liikelaitoksesta markkinoilla toimivan yrityksen.”) 
(Interview with Vennamo)
Vennamo’s nomination as President and CEO is characterized by Markku Talonen in the 
following way: 
AA: Vennamo became the Chief Executive Officer of the telecommunications 
section. Did he make this choice himself? 
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MT: Yes he did. I was not present at a meeting where the matter was discussed but 
it was quite clear from the beginning that Pekka would be appointed. 
AA: Obviously his reputation was excellent? 
MT: Yes, it was, and with a reason. 
(AA: Vennamosta tuli telepuolen pääjohtaja. Tekikö hän itse tämän valinnan?
MT: Kyllä se näin tapahtui. Minä en ollut sellaisessa keskustelussa mukana, vaan 
se oli lähtökohtaisesti selvää, että Pekka tulee.
AA: Ilmeisesti hänen maineensa oli erinomainen?
MT: Kyllä vaan eikä syyttä.”) 
(Interview with Talonen) 
Zyskowicz confirmed this analysis in his interview: 
“Our opinion was that he had done a good job there [at Finnish PT]. We had 
positive feelings about him, having taken good care of the job as director general 
at the Post and Telecommunications Office and it was a good idea to have him 
take charge of a stock company.
(”Meillä oli sellainen käsitys, että Vennamo oli tehnyt siellä hyvää työtä. Meillä 
oli peruspositiivinen ajatus, että hän on hoitanut homman hyvin alkaen postin 
pääjohtajuudesta ja sopii oikein hyvin vaikka mennäänkin tänne osakeyhtiön 
puolelle.”) 
(Interview with Zyskowicz) 
9.3. The Narrative of the Sonera Case 
The structure of narrative emerged from the coding process provided by grounded theory, 
yet seems to follow closely the logic of a typical political scandal as described by 
Thompson (2000). The pre-scandal phase consists of both the prologue (when Parliament 
accepted the division of Finnish PT into two groups and gave permission for a partial 
privatization of the telecommunications part) and particularly the privatization, which was 
an economic success. The phase of the scandal proper started when the secret was 
exposed and success turned into scandal. The culmination of the scandal led to the 
dismissal and resignation of both the key actors. In the aftermath, Vennamo’s memoirs 
were published. Public debate refers to media response but also to parliamentary debate. 
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Episodes:      Time period:  Public Debate:
A: Prologue
– Minister Aura Takes a Leading Role 1997     no 
B: Privatization 
– A Success Story    1998 autumn   yes 
C: The Success Turns into a Political Scandal 
– A Secret is Exposed    1998 Christmas   yes 
D: It is a Question of Morality 
– We Did Not Know    1998 Christmas            yes 
E: Waterloo   
– Scapegoats     1999 New Year   yes 
A: Prologue – Minister Aura Takes a Leading Role
MP Matti Aura was appointed Minister of Transport and Communications in April 1997, 
coming from a background in business. He had formerly been Managing Director of the 
Chamber of Commerce, and had a very strong commitment to privatizing Finnish PT 
(Suomen PT). He concentrated on this issue with a lot of energy and was considered a 
very competent person to manage privatization, which was one of the major goals of his 
political reference group, the National Coalition Party. 
The privatization actually began in summer 1997, when the main political issue was 
whether Finnish PT should be privatized as a single concern or divided into two groups. 
Division would allow postal services to continue as a fully state-owned company, while 
telecommunications would be privatized. Two key people were against the demerger, 
namely the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
Juhani Korpela, and the Chief Director of PT, Pekka Vennamo.  
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The interviews showed that Korpela’s opposition was not a real problem, because the 
Permanent Secretary is supposed to follow the will of the Minister. Vennamo’s argument 
for rejecting the division was based on the idea that both postal services and 
telecommunications served the same purpose, to transmit information, albeit in different 
forms. He also predicted future developments would bring these activities closer to each 
other. If they were separated, he said:
“…it would lead to a development where the Post Office is going to build a 
telecommunications operation parallel to the one that has already started, services 
and everything else, and the operator will be looking for some synergy with the 
carriers. That was the basis of my argument for keeping post and 
telecommunications together. To my mind, they should have been privatized 
together through the stock exchange.
(”…muuten se johtaa siihen, että posti ryhtyy rakentamaan rinnakkaista 
teletoimintaa niin kuin on jo alkanutkin, palvelua ja muita, ja teleoperaattori taas 
hakee yhteistyökuvioita kuljettajista. Siihen perustui se, että minä halusin pitää 
postin ja telen yhdessä ja olin sitä mieltä, että ne olisi pitänyt viedä yhdessä 
pörssiin.”) 
(Interview with Vennamo) 
However, Minister Aura took a leading role and made up his mind. He considered it 
impossible, politically, to privatize the postal services, since these were considered to be 
“crown jewels” as one of the interviewees put it. The authorization to privatize the 
telecommunications portion was given on 28th October 1997 by the Cabinet Committee 
on Economic Policy. The interviewees did not remember any particular debate 
concerning the matter in the Cabinet Committee. Nor was the restructuring of Finnish PT 
on the table, in spite of the fact that public opinion was very concerned about postal 
services, which had been brought to the fore by the recent restructuring of the post office 
network.
The decision to privatize telecommunications was introduced into Parliament by Minister 
Niinistö as a detail of the supplementary budget proposal. Parliament’s permission was 
needed because Finnish PT was a state-owned company and the purpose was to sell part 
of the shares.
206
During the parliamentary debate, altogether 43 speeches or replies were given on the 
matter (24.11.and 3.12.1997), with the MPs representing the opposition parties more 
active than the rest. Indeed, since the role of the opposition parties is to be critical, that 
often means that MPs representing the opposition are more active in debate than MPs 
representing the Government. However, most of the speakers concentrated on postal 
services.
Minister Aura described his feelings: 
AA: I suppose you were astonished at how easy it was [to handle the 
privatization] in Parliament? 
MA: A little bit. It caused hardly any discussion.
(AA: Sinä taisit olla yllättynyt eduskuntakäsittelyn helppoudesta? 
MA: Jonkin verran. Se ei aiheuttanut juuri mitään keskustelua.)
(Interview with Aura) 
However, MP Raimo Vistbacka representing the True Finns proposed a vote, the 
substance of which was to change the post and telecommunications company back into a 
state-owned enterprise, as it had been earlier, underlining its service function and the 
importance of an adequate post-office network for the country. The proposition was 
rejected: 113 MPs were against, 38 in favour and 48 were absent (HE 226/1997 
www.eduskunta.fi ). 
Speakers generally supported the privatization of telecommunications. Most of the 
arguments highlighted the importance of global competition and liberalization of the 
telecommunications sector. Globalization was not always viewed positively, and was 
often rather a threat. The need to offer full domestic telecommunication services in all 
parts of Finland was stressed by some MPs. 
MP Esko-Juhani Tennilä (who had formed his own group after his resignation from the 
Left Alliance) was against privatizing. His main argument was that the Left has always 
valued the importance of state-owned enterprises, but that this was not the case for the 
Rainbow Coalition. He also underlined the importance of balanced regional development
and saw privatization as connected to EMU convergence, as a means of diminishing 
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governmental debt. He also accused the Government of seeking to develop only “the EU 
triangle in Finland”, according to him, the southern triangle of Helsinki-Tampere-Turku.  
MP Aapo Saari (the Centre Party) supported privatization but criticized the single-minded 
intention of getting cash for the treasury. He underlined the importance of building a 
proper IT network, in order to guarantee balanced regional development in Finland. MP 
Kimmo Sasi (the National Coalition Party) criticized his party colleague Minister Aura 
for being too slow in his privatizing and urged the Minister to sell all the shares.
Minister Matti Aura responded, arguing that the consequences of liberalization of 
telecommunications had been positive so far. Privatization, in his view, offered 
possibilities for bringing foreign investment into the development work of the company. 
He also highlighted that privatizing was a common European tendency, and reminded 
Parliament about the global rules of economy and business. Minister Aura also replied to 
MP Kimmo Sasi’s criticism by saying that it was better first to get a market value for the 
company, and then to evaluate both the experience and knowledge about privatization 
over time. He also announced that it was very possible further steps would be taken in the 
future (HE 226/1997 www.eduskunta.fi ). 
B: Privatization – A Success Story
The preparatory work began and the first task was to select advisors. Some controversial 
ideas were expressed. The proprietor (in this case the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications) wanted to guarantee the independence of the advice given and therefore 
the Ministry wanted to have an open competition in order to choose the advisors. The 
company wanted instead to use advisors who were already familiar to it. So a conflict 
emerged between the company and the civil servants.  
“It is essential to underline that during the preparations for privatization there was 
throughout a struggle over who would take the leading role in privatization, PT or 
the Ministry.”  
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(”Sehän on olennaista tässä yksityistämisvalmistelussa, että oli koko ajan 
kädenvääntö, että kumpi tätä yksityistämistä johtaa. PT vai ministeriö.”) 
(Interview with Pekka Vennamo.)  
The administrators were concerned that, “There was a risk of not getting advice that was 
truly in the interests of the owner” (”Oli vaara, ettei saada aitoja omistajaneuvoja”)
(Interview with Alestalo). However, the Ministry made up their mind. 
The Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy handled the matter on 24th February 1998, 
so that the new structure of Sonera Group could be listed in the Register of Trading 
Firms. The Committee also decided the programme order of privatization policy: the 
original intention had been that the state-owned energy company, Fortum, would be 
privatized first, followed by Sonera. However, stock market turbulence was having a 
harmful effect on preparations for privatizing and, after some delay, it was Sonera that 
was ready for its public offering first. According to the interview material, the need for 
revenue to balance the expenditure introduced in the supplementary budget was one of the 
reasons for the timing that was decided upon, but it was very suitable for Sonera. 
The Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy decided on 13th August 1998 a provisional 
timing to launch the share sale, to start in October, with the intention of selling 
approximately 15-20 per cent of the shares. It was also announced that Sonera’s shares 
would be offered both to Finnish and foreign institutional investors in an international 
offering, with a concurrent offering to retail investors in Finland and to Sonera 
employees. The purpose was to list the shares on the HEX, the Helsinki Exchanges (Press 
Release by the Ministry of Traffic and Communications 13.8.1998). 
Merrill Lynch was responsible for the global offering, while Merita Corporate Finance 
Ltd. was appointed as co-global coordinator and was also responsible for the domestic 
offering. The Cabinet Committee considered the affairs of Sonera four times. On 6th
October 1998 the Committee allowed the share sale to start. Revenue was projected to be 
around 5-6 billion Finnish markkas. A week later the whole government was informed 
about the pricing and, at the end of October, Parliament had the opportunity to guide 
privatization and the pricing of the shares. 
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The response of Parliament was weak: out of 62 speeches or replies only nine (14%) 
touched on the issue. MP Mauri Pekkarinen (the Centre Party) supported the privatization 
and the sale of shares but he was critical of the use of the proceeds. He was also sceptical 
about the timing, although his concerns were related more to Fortum than Sonera. MP 
Leena Luhtanen (the Social Democratic Party) also criticized the use of the proceeds. It 
had been announced that the majority of the potential revenue would be used to diminish 
the national debt, whereas, in Luhtanen’s view, research, for example, should receive a 
larger budget than had been allowed for. MP Hannu Kemppainen (the Centre Party) also 
underlined the importance of research, and demanded a strategy to achieve balanced 
regional development. His main argument was that it was necessary to build a broad-band 
network covering the whole country. In effect, therefore, the message from Parliament 
was that the sale itself was accepted, but the use of the revenue criticized (HE 241/1998 
www.eduskunta.fi).
As an operative decision Minister Aura decided the target price, which was set between 
36 and 45 Finnish markkas. At the time of this decision the prospects of economy were 
very uncertain, not only in Finland but also worldwide, but during the coming weeks 
stock markets recovered. The recovery led to an extremely high level of interest in 
Sonera, both in the domestic and global markets, which was already in evidence during 
the “road show”. 
During the road show – when representatives of Sonera introduced the company and its 
prospects, as well as promoting the sale – foreign investors and bankers in particular 
frequently asked whether members of the executive board were going to invest in their 
own company. President Pekka Vennamo said that he was going to invest his inheritance 
in the company, so sure was he of success.  
“American investors always asked at the beginning of the presentation how much 
the leadership of the company themselves had invested. There is an urban legend 
how  Pekka said that he himself had invested his inheritance, or was it an 
apartment he had inherited, well it always struck home.”  
(”Amerikkalaiset sijoittavat kysyivät aina ensimmäiseksi paljonko johto itse on 
sijoittanut. Tämmöinen kaupunkilegenda on se kun Pekka aina itse kertoi, että hän 
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sijoitti perinnön vai oliko saadun huoneiston tähän, niin se meni aina kotiin.”) 
(Interview with Aura)
Markku Talonen underlined the same point:  
“During the road show the pressure increased; potential investors asked how much 
money you were going invest. If you replied that you couldn’t or wouldn’t buy, 
then how could you convince others to invest? It is one of the basic facts of the 
market economy.  
(”Road Shown aikana tuli paineita, nämä potentiaaliset sijoittajat kysyivät, että 
kuinka paljon sinä ostat ja jos siinä vastasi, etten saa ostaa enkä aio, niin milläs 
perustelet, että muitten pitäisi ostaa. Se on markkinatalouden perusasioita.”) 
(Interview with Talonen)
The key civil servants had to evaluate what would be best for the company but also best 
for the shareholder value.
“We evaluated the question with Samppa [Haapasalo] from the point of view of 
the state and the value of its ownership. If we could tell investors that the directors 
of Sonera would invest significantly, it was a good signal to other investors.”
(”Me täällä Sampan kanssa katsottiin asiaa valtion omistuksen arvon kannalta. 
Jos me voidaan kertoa, että johto tähän merkittävästi sijoittaa niin se tarkoittaa 
että se on hyvä signaali muille sijoittajille.”)  
(Interview with Alestalo)
Pekka Vennamo told, in his interview, how: 
“We [key directors of Sonera] subscribed for shares on the very first day of the 
sale. So, although we did not know in detail how big the subscription would be, 
we already had a feeling from the road show that it would go well. So we made a 
decision that even before we had any information on demand, we would make our 
subscriptions. If the management did not take part, why should others bother, that 
was the feeling.”
(”Mehän [johtajat] teimme merkinnät heti ensimmäisenä päivänä kun anti alkoi 
ja senkin takia, että vaikka meillä ei yksityiskohtaista informaatiota ollutkaan siitä 
kuinka paljon merkintöjä oli tullut sisään niin kyllähän road shown aikana oli 
aistittavissa että kyllä se menee. Niin me päätettiin, että ennen kuin meillä on 
tietoa, niin tehdään ne merkinnät. Ellei johto osallistu miksi muittenkaan, oli 
fiilis.”) 
(Interview with Vennamo) 
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The response to the offering was greater than expected, and was oversubscribed by 16 
times. The sale was the largest ever carried out in Finland. It was clearly desirable to 
guarantee a good result by permitting the directors of Sonera to invest in their company 
by buying shares. However, this was not announced in the prospectus, because it had 
never happened before in Finnish state-owned companies, that the management of a 
company would put their own money into shares and take a financial risk, nor had anyone 
imagined such a good market response. After the sale closed (10.11.1998) Sonera’s share 
value was already 60 markkas.  
The price was, however, remained fixed at 45 markkas, since it was considered, according 
to interview material, that raising the price would be an overly complicated process. Stock 
markets were in an uncertain condition and changing the price would mean delay, so it 
was decided to keep the price at the announced level, although Merrill Lynch 
recommended higher price. An editorial in Helsingin Sanomat (11.11.1998) considered 
that the oversubscription was evidence of too low a price. Kauppalehti congratulated the 
Government on the success of the offering and rebutted criticism of the pricing as 
premature. Iltalehti considered that too many of the critics of the price were being wise 
after the event. 
Some commentators strongly criticized Minister Aura, and one, writing under the pen 
name “Diileri”, in Ilta-Sanomat (22.12.1998), wrote that Matti Aura’s dreams of success 
might crash to the ground if there was dumping of Sonera stock. According to the 
comment, Minister Aura was also responsible for Merrill Lynch’s gigantic profits, 
helping the firm at a time when it was undergoing some economic troubles, by fooling the 
Finns. I will come back later to this argument. 
Despite the oversubscription, no new orders or instructions were given, and the Finnish 
retail offering followed the terms and conditions previously announced. The subscription 
period ended on 10th November 1998 and because of the oversubscription, the allocation 
of the shares became significant.  
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The purpose of the allocation, according to interviewees, was to guarantee good ratings in 
the future. That is why about half of the available shares were allocated for foreign 
investors and the other half for domestic investors including private shareholders.  
“It was our conscious aim, and this was stated in Parliament, to achieve a good 
rating for shares and good demand – to achieve a good reputation. But shares were 
also expressly allocated to foreign investors, because we knew they would trade 
the shares, making them a commodity. Our aim was to get the market price to go 
up.”
(” Tietoisesti pyrittiin siihen, ja tämä on kerrottu eduskunnalle, että osakkeille 
tulee hyvä kurssikehitys ja niihin tulee imua. Että tulee hyvä maine. Mutta 
nimenomaan allokoitiin myös ulkomaisille koska tiedettiin, että ne myyvät ja 
silloin se on tavaraa. Siis pyrittiin saamaan nouseva kurssikehitys.”) 
(Interview with Aura)  
The allocation and pricing of the shares was described by Markku Talonen in the 
following way:  
“There was some thought of creating a share suitable for ordinary citizens. The 
general rule of thumb, taken into consideration in the pricing, was that the share 
price should increase during the course of several weeks and months by about 20-
30 per cent. Once it achieves positive momentum everybody is satisfied, as you 
would expect. What happens afterwards has a life of its own. Public subscription 
and share-issue for personnel are also linked to a reasonable pricing that makes the 
shares interesting. ”
(”Vähän tällaista kansanosaketyyppistä ajattelua, että hinnoittelussa otettiin 
huomioon yleispätevä nyrkkisääntö, että kurssi nousee muutaman viikon ja 
kuukauden kuluessa tommosen 20–30 prosenttia. Silloin tulee imua, kaikki ovat 
tyytyväisiä niin kuin pitääkin olla ja mitä sitten tapahtuu on jo omaa elämää. 
Yleisömerkintä ja henkilöstöanti ja siihen myös kytketään hinnoittelu, että se on 
kiinnostavaa.”) 
(Interview with Talonen) 
Preliminary principles for the acceptance of subscriptions in the Finnish retail offering 
and the employee offering for Sonera were given on 12th November 1998. The status of 
final requests was confirmed with checks that the purchase commitments and 
subscriptions were correct and that they followed the terms and conditions of the offering. 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications and Sonera decided on the final 
allocations as follows:  
• in the bonus offering, purchase commitments would be fully accepted up to 800 
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shares. It was not possible to increase the number of shares accepted in the bonus 
offering, because the number of investors was so high that they could not have 
been allocated a number of shares that was divisible by ten, as required by the 
terms and conditions of the bonus offering; 
• in the employee offering, subscriptions would be accepted in full up to 600 shares. 
Beyond this limit, approximately 13 percent would be accepted. (Press Release, 
12.11.1998).
In November 1998, the state of Finland sold approximately 22 percent of Sonera’s shares 
to Finnish and foreign investors. The target set for the sale was achieved well: the state 
sold 158,000,000 shares, the revenue from which came to approximately 7 billion Finnish 
markkas. In other words, the privatization had been very successful, so successful in fact 
that certain limitations on the distribution of the shares had to be put in place, as seen 
above.
Though the value of the shares increased, there was some criticism of the privatization in 
the media. A headline in Ilta-Sanomat read: “Finnish national property sold to foreigners 
at a bargain price.” (”Kansallisomaisuutta sopuhintaan ulkomaille”, IS 10.11.1998), and 
an editorial in Helsingin Sanomat was quite critical: “The state could have got more 
money for Sonera” (”Valtio olisi saanut Sonerasta enemmänkin”, HS 11.11.1998) — 
both newspapers belong to the Sanoma Group.  
During the Question Hour (12.11.1998) in Parliament the allocation of the shares was 
debated. MP Markku Pohjola (the Social Democratic Party) asked why private investors 
got only one third of the whole amount and whether this was an equal and fair allocation. 
MP Olavi Ala-Nissilä (the Centre Party) asked about the so-called ‘green shoe 
arrangement’ made with Merrill Lynch, which had been responsible for the international 
operations during the privatization process.  
Minister Aura replied, arguing that an appropriate balance between different types of 
investors would form the right prerequisites for suitable liquidity and share performance. 
According to him, international investors were more likely to be active in managing their 
portfolios compared to domestic small scale investors. Because of the great success of the 
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first wave of privatization, the ‘green shoe arrangement’ meant a reward for Merrill 
Lynch, which Minister Aura considered an acceptable practice in the kind of operation 
that entailed some risk for an organizer (SKT 12.11.1998; www.eduskunta.fi). The 
arrangement was later inspected by the Financial Supervision Authority and found to be 
according to the rules.  
The debate continued a week later (SKT 19.11.1998; www.eduskunta.fi), but the focus 
shifted to the way in which the privatization had been accomplished: Merrill Lynch’s 
compensation was heavily criticized and the newspapers also reported who had bought 
shares in Sonera. In the Iltalehti (Almamedia) the headline for 18th November 1998 read: 
“Pekka Vennamo has a portfolio worth 1.3 million marks. Ministers also bought Sonera” 
(”Pekka Vennamolla 1,3 miljoonan osakesalkku. Myös ministerit ostivat Soneraa”) (IL
18.11.1998). Yet according to interviewees, public debate about the possibility of setting 
a higher target price for the shares than had originally been decided was seen more as 
compulsory criticism, a matter of being seen to be vigilant, than real concern about 
failure, and benefited from the wisdom of hindsight, which was said to be typical for 
politicians. 
As mentioned earlier, Minister Aura was considered a very competent person, especially 
with regard to privatization, because of his background, and his expertise was not 
challenged. From Sonera’s point of view, Aura was a Minister who understood the wishes 
of the company’s management, so that, according to Vennamo, Aura was a person who 
shared the idea that the company management knows best how to organize its affairs. The 
leader of the parliamentary group of conservatives, Ben Zyskowicz said: 
“Aura was a central actor in this [privatizing]. He was in no way just a formal 
operator, but central because of his background and expertise...when the arguing 
about the right level of the pricing started, the ordinary members of our 
Parliamentary Group – who were not experts at all – were relieved it was just 
Aura who was in charge of these matters, who knew and understood these 
things...”  
(”Aura oli tässä keskeinen tekijä. Hän ei ollut mikään muodollinen toimija vaan 
oman taustansa ja ekspertiisinsä vuoksi keskeinen (...) kun tuli tätä 
hintakeskustelua, eikä ryhmän tavalliset kansanedustajat hirveän eksperttejä 
ollutkaan, silloin jengi oli helpottunut, että siellä oli Aura, joka osaa näitä ja 
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ymmärtää...”) 
(Interview with Zyskowicz) 
C:  The Success Turns into a Political Scandal – A Secret Is Exposed
Just before Christmas Taloussanomat (Sanoma Group) found out that Pekka Vennamo 
had bought Sonera shares not only as a private person but also as an institution, having 
bought shares for the Vennamo family’s investment company that he owned. The 
headline was: “The Vennamo family has a Sonera portfolio worth almost five million” 
(”Vennamoilla on jo lähes viiden miljoonan arvoinen Sonera-salkku”). Ari Kapanen had 
interviewed Kalevi Alestalo who had admitted that the Ministry had decided to allocate 
the number of shares requested in full to the directors of Sonera, while denying 
completely that the directors could have influenced the final price that was agreed upon 
(Taloussanomat, 23.12.1998). The information had been properly registered in the 
Register of Insiders but it had not been noticed earlier, nor had it been actively announced 
by either Sonera or the Ministry.  
The headline of the following day’s Helsingin Sanomat was: “Vennamo’s company got 
special treatment in the sale of Sonera shares. The Ministry of Transport gave permission 
to subscribe twice” (Vennamon yhtiö sai erityiskohtelun Soneran myynnissä. 
Liikenneministeriö antoi luvan kaksinkertaiseen merkintää) (HS 24.12.1998). Because of 
the Christmas lull this was the only piece of news for several days and was referred to 
widely both on television and radio.  
Sauli Niinistö, the leader of the National Coalition Party and the Minister of Finance, 
gave a statement to Ilta-Sanomat immediately after Christmas, which was headlined as: 
“Niinistö is astonished at Director Vennamo’s haul of Sonera shares” (”Niinistö 
kummastelee pääjohtaja Vennamon Sonera-rahastusta”) (IS 29.12.1998). He said that it 
was incomprehensible that the Ministry had given permission to Vennamo to invest 
through his investment firm as well as personally. In response, Minister Aura was quoted 
as saying that, “The final result is very good. Minister of Transport and Communications 
Matti Aura considers that there were no mistakes in the marketing of Sonera. ‘It is right 
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and fair that the operative executives should be able to buy as many shares as they want’, 
considers Aura.” (”Slutresultat mycket bra. Trafikminister Matti Aura anser inte att 
några fel begicks vid utförsäljningen av Sonera. Det är rätt och riktigt att den operativa 
ledningen får köpa så mycket aktier den vill, anser Aura.”) (Hufvudstadbladet,
29.12.1998).
In an editorial, Demari (30.12.1998) accused Minister Aura of not listening to the critics 
and suggested that Minister Niinistö was scenting some trouble in the forthcoming 
elections, so was trying to distance himself from Aura. 
Niinistö’s statement led to an avalanche of criticism in the media, making it legitimate to 
be critical. And so it happened – there was something wrong in the case. The most 
frequently used words were “greedy”, “arrogant”, “scandal”, “shameless”. Hannu 
Savola’s comment in Ilta-Sanomat (28.12.1998) was titled “The height of indecency” 
(”Siivottomuuden huippu”); Stig Kankkonen’s in Hufvudstadsbladet (29.12.1998) was 
“Vennamo was his own Santa Claus” (”Vennamo var sin egen julgubbe”); Suomenmaa,
the party newspaper of the Centre Party, underlined the responsibility of the whole 
Cabinet and urged Minister Aura to resign: “Aura’s countdown has started.” (”Auran
lähtölaskenta on alkanut”) (Suomenmaa, 30.12.1998). Also MP Erkki Tuomioja gave a 
statement in Demari, in which he said, “I would not be surprised if somebody had 
demanded his [Aura’s] resignation” (”En ihmettelisi jos joku vaatisi eroamaan”) (Demari
30.12.1998).
Indeed, the scandal proper started with Taloussanomat’s revelation that not only had the 
state lost money, because of the price of the shares being set too low, but that also 
Vennamo might profit personally. This matter was judged in the context of moral code, 
with the verdict that Vennamo had been greedy and that this was not acceptable. 
D: It is a Question of Morality- We Did Not Know
Suddenly, therefore, the case became a matter of morality, as is typical of scandals, which 
are very often linked to standards and moral codes, while they also often involve an 
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element of secrecy. The exposure was a result of the distinction between the concept of a 
private investor and an institution, which becomes subtle in the case of a family trust. It 
was not only a question of the form of an investor but the amount invested, since beyond 
a certain level of investment an individual is automatically treated as an institution, 
though this was irrelevant. More important was that a non-participant, in this case 
Minister Niinistö, had expressed his disapproval. 
Minister Aura explained the reasons for disapproval: 
“We had a situation where the sale of shares was already going on. Then the 
question of the role of the management was raised. The world of stock markets is 
strange because it depends upon whether you are an institution or a private 
investor how many shares you get. So when it started – and it was obvious quite 
early on that the offering would be success – this gave rise to a phenomenon they 
call inflationary. This is when the institutions see that this is a hot property and so, 
if I want to get one million shares, I’m going to have to ask for two million in 
order to get them. Well, the management cannot do things like that.”) 
(”Tässähän tuli sellainen tilanne, jossa osakemyynti oli jo käynnissä ja silloin tuli 
sellainen kysymys, että miten johto. Tämähän on omituinen maailma koska oletko 
instituutio vai yksityinen riippuu kuinka paljon osakkeita hankit – silloin kun alkoi 
ja sehän alkoi näkyä jo aika pian, että anti menee hyvin, tulee sellainen ilmiö, jota 
ne kutsuvat inflatoriseksi. Kun instituutiot näkevät, että aha tämä on kuuma tavara 
ja jos minä haluan miljoona kappaletta niin pyydän kaksi saadakseni sen. No 
johtohan ei voi näin tehdä.”) 
(Interview with Aura)  
Minister Aura tried to argue in favour of the whole process. He emphasized the advantage 
for the owners of Sonera stock that the directors had invested their own money in the 
company. However, he admitted that there had been mistakes in communication and 
information, which Ilta-Sanomat reported (30.12.1998) as, “Aura became humble in one 
night: We acted wrongly” (”Aura nöyrtyi yhdessä yössä: Menettelimme väärin”).
Aura specified that he felt ashamed of the way in which information had not been given 
out.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications did not publish the Director’s 
share allocations explicitly. In this we acted wrongly and it was contrary to the 
proper practice of securities dealing, even though all the information as such has 
been publicly available, and the subscriptions have been registered properly, in 
accordance with the securities market law, in the register of insiders. 
 218
(Liikenneministeriö ei erikseen julkistanut johdolle allokoituja osakemääriä. 
Tässä asiassa meneteltiin väärin ja hyvän arvopaperitavan vastaisesti, vaikka 
sinänsä kaikki johdon osakeomistukset ovat olleet julkisesti saatavilla ja niistä on 
tehty asianmukaiset arvopaperimarkkinalain sisäpiiri-ilmoitukset.)
(IS 30.12.1998) 
Minister Aura unofficially informed Cabinet Members about the holdings of Vennamo 
and other Sonera directors during the Christmas holidays (30.12.1998). The Government 
decided that Parliament must be informed about the case and the Financial Supervision 
Authority (FSA) also announced that they would study the case. A high-level group of 
Permanent Secretaries was appointed by the Cabinet to make recommendations about 
how to proceed with privatization and what kind of incentive systems should be created 
and were acceptable in state-owned companies. 
Aamulehti (31.12.1998) interviewed Pekka Vennamo, who expressed “surprise at the 
fuss. I was treated in the same way as other investors” (”Vennamo ihmettelee kohua. 
Minua kohdeltiin samalla tavalla kuin muitakin sijoittajia”). He assured the interviewer 
that he had not got any privileges and had no intention of selling the shares for quick 
profit. Vennamo also disputed the accusation of special treatment in Turun Sanomat
(30.12.1998) (”Vennamo kiistää saaneensa erityisetuja Soneran myynnissä”).
The columnist Maija Siikala, in Aamulehti, analyzed the scandal: 
Vennamo’s transformation into an institution was kept secret. That is why the 
process changed into a form of special treatment – in other words favouritism... 
Aura should blow the whistle for the end of this game. And that means he should 
order Pekka Vennamo to sell his investment firm’s 25,000 shares. And without 
any profit.
(Vennamon muuttuminen instituutioksi salattiin. Siksi menettely muuttui 
erityiskohteluksi  – suosimiseksi (...) Auran on vihellettävä peli poikki. Ja se 
tarkoittaa, että hän määrää Pekka Vennamon myymään sijoitusyhtiönsä 25 000 
osaketta. Ja ilman voittoa.)
(AL 31.12.1998) 
Vennamo counter-attacked in Iltalehti: “Vennamo blames envy and spite: my stout person 
has been harnessed to pull the opposition’s election wagon” (”Vennamo syyttää kateutta 
ja pahansuopaisuutta. Pullea persoonani on pitänyt valjastaa opposition 
vaalivankkureiden vetäjäksi”) (IL 2.1.1999). 
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Sauli Niinistö, Ben Zyskowicz and Minister Aura had a couple of meetings to discuss the 
problem. It was suggested that Vennamo should sell the shares which had been 
subscribed by his investment firm, but he refused to do so. Ben Zyskowicz said in his 
interview: 
“The pressure increased not only on him but also on Minister Aura, who had 
protected Vennamo. The people felt that Vennamo had been greedy and that the 
Minister, representing the National Coalition Party, had given his full support, and 
there were only three months to the elections. We had couple of meetings about 
what was to be done. To be greedy… actually it was allowed by the rules, but 
Vennamo had actively invested in shares as a business proposition and that wasn’t 
acceptable. We thought it would be a good idea if he confessed that he had been 
too eager and that would surrender his investment company’s shares at the same 
price he had bought them; he would not make a profit and instead would give up 
any profit to some good cause. Yes, that was actually our line of thinking.  
(”Paineet kasvoivat Vennamoa ja Auraa kohtaan, joka antoi tuulensuojaa. Siis 
kansa kokee, että Vennamo on ahnehtinut ja että kokoomuslainen ministeri antaa 
täyden tukensa. Vaaleihin on kolme kuukautta. Eräässä keskustelussa pohdittiin, 
että mitä olisi tehtävissä. Ahnehtiminen.. tai olihan se pelisääntöjen puitteissa 
mutta Vennamo oli aktiivisesti hankkinut osakkeita bisnesmielessä, johon ei oltu 
varauduttu. Syntyi ajatus, että hän tunnustaisi, että innostui liikaa ja luopuisi 
osakkeistaan sijoitusyhtiössä hankintahintaa. Hänelle ei tulisi voittoa vaan se 
voitto luovutettaisiin johonkin hyvään tarkoitukseen. Niin totta, meillä oli 
tällainen ajatus.”) 
(Interview with Zyskowicz)  
Matti Aura answered the questions in his interview: 
MA: It was not originally my idea but I had offered it to him, not forced him. In 
this scheme he would have sold the shares for example to Sonera’s pension fund. 
He would neither have got any profits nor incurred any losses. The solution would 
have been a neutral one. He would have come out of it a hero but he did not want 
to have it. 
AA: This conversation happened around Christmas with you, Niinistö and 
Zyskowicz – as Vennamo puts it in his book, a plan cooked up by a bourgeois 
cabal [who would be supposed to consider profits natural], and Niinistö made a 
telephone call? 
MA: Yes, Niinistö called, and so did I. The owner did not want to force him. He 
was not sacked because he had invested but because he had misled the markets.  
(MA: Se ei ollut alunperin minun ideani mutta olen sitä hänelle tarjonnut mutta en 
pakottanut. Sehän olisi ollut malli, että myy takaisin Soneran eläkesäätiölle ne 
osakkeet. Hän ei olisi voittanut eikä hävinnyt. Ratkaisu olisi ollut neutraali. Hän 
olisi saanut sankarikehän mutta sitä hän ei halunnut.
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AA: Tämä tapahtui joulun välipäivinä. Niinistön, Zyskowiczin ja sinun – 
porvarillisten juristien keksimä juttu kuten Vennamo sanoo kirjassaan ja Niinistö 
soitti. 
MA: Niinistö soitti ja minäkin olen soittanut. Mutta omistaja ei halunnut pakottaa 
siihen, ei hän saanut lemppuja siksi, että oli sijoittanut vaan siksi että oli 
harhauttanut markkinoita.
(Interview with Aura)  
There was pressure on Minister Aura from two fronts. On the one hand, there was 
criticism of privatization, especially the pricing, as well as the allocation of the shares,
which had left small scale investors disappointed. Such criticism could be considered as 
benefiting from hindsight. On the other hand, there was growing concern among leading 
politicians of the Coalition Party because of the forthcoming elections. Vennamo had 
been greedy and Minister Aura had accepted it. What had been hailed as a great success 
was in danger of turning into a failure, with knock-on political consequences, which 
would affect the party’s support negatively, with the elections just round the corner.  
However, the politicians’ reaction was to claim ignorance. The Prime Minister denied, in 
a statement, that either he or other Cabinet members had known about Vennamo’s 
holdings (HS 29.12.1998), and Niinistö and Aura also denied they had any information on 
Vennamo’s investments. It is quite possible that Minister Aura did not know the exact 
number of shares bought by Vennamo or that he did not pay particular attention to this 
aspect, since, before the scandal blew up, this information was relatively unimportant and 
Vennamo had had permission to subscribe as it was good for the sale. 
In fact, the Government announced they did not know anything about the allocation of 
shares to the directors of Sonera (HS 31.12.1998), which can perhaps be interpreted as a 
defence mechanism used by politicians, but also true to some extent. The Cabinet was not 
informed in detail about the sales. They knew about the principles which had been 
adopted, including the offering to personnel, and it was publicly known that Vennamo 
had bought shares, but his total investment was not public knowledge.  
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E:  Waterloo – The Scapegoats
The President of Sonera, Pekka Vennamo, started his own offensive. He gave a press 
release to emphasize what the main message should be: the success of privatizing Sonera. 
“It is incredible that Finnish envy and malevolence are trying to stain this achievement.” 
(”On uskomatonta, että suomalainen kateus ja pahansuopaisuus yrittävät tämän 
saavutuksen tahria. ”) (KS 3.1.1999). Vennamo did admit, however, that the storm could 
have been avoided if the information had been not just public, but clearly and separately 
detailed, especially to Parliament. 
Aura and Vennamo had a meeting on 2nd January 1999 to evaluate the situation. During 
their conversation, Vennamo informed Aura that he had made an arrangement to deal 
with the shares within his family. Aura did not know about these arrangements and was 
very surprised, while for his part Vennamo thought that Aura would have known, because 
he had informed the Register of Insiders that he had sold some of the shares to members 
of his family. It later came out that Merita Bank had made a mistake in looking after the 
Register, so that the information was not in fact available. 
Vennamo had confirmed in a press release (28.12.1998) that the shares in Sonera were 
still under his control, but he did not mention the arrangements within his family. 
Originally Aura had interpreted the statement to mean that all the shares were still in 
Vennamo’s personal portfolio. He considered it very important that Vennamo should not 
make any profit from his shares, and stressed, in his interview, that he had repeatedly told 
Vennamo that he could not sell the shares. He was therefore astounded to learn about 
Vennamo’s manoeuvres. 
No such advice had been given in advance; indeed, another of the top directors had sold 
his shares and it was not considered to be against the rules. However, Aura was losing 
confidence in Vennamo and demanded that the Board of Sonera should have an urgent 
meeting.
Aura stated in his interview: 
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“I have said the same thing many times – to no avail and your thesis will not credit 
it either: Vennamo was dismissed by the Board of Sonera, not me. I did not say 
you have to dismiss him. I just said that the major shareholder no longer trusted 
Vennamo. Judicially the process was correct. My view is that he lost my 
confidence because of his statement, in which he wrote about his shareholdings in 
a misleading manner, formulating it in such way that he could not be caught in a 
lie.”
(”Minä olen monta kertaa sanonut sen eikä se koskaan mene läpi. Eikä mene 
sinunkaan kirjassasi läpi. Vennamonhan erotti Soneran hallitus, en minä. Minä en 
sanonut, että pitää erottaa. Minä sanoin, ettei pääomistaja enää tunne 
luottamusta Vennamoa kohtaan. Juridisesti mentiin oikein. Vennamon 
luottamuksen – minun silmissäni – katkaisi hänen oma tiedotteensa, jossa hän 
kirjoitti harhaanjohtavasti omasta osakeomistuksestaan valiten sellaisen 
sanamuodon, joka oli sanamuodoltaan niin, ettei se ollut vale.”) 
(Interview with Aura) 
Minister Aura also faced personal pressures. His father was dying and he was not used to 
being at the centre of media attention. His party leader, Minister Niinistö, had also 
publicly disapproved of his actions. His back was against the wall and there was no room 
for manoeuvre; he either had to bear the burden of continuing scandal or to clip its wings. 
Vennamo described the drama of the dénouement in the following way: 
“At the point when Markku Talonen called me in Turku, early on Sunday evening, 
having been asked to call a Board meeting, he told me about the process that was 
going on. He said they were not able to change Aura’s mind and that I was the 
only one who could. So I called Putte [Aura] but there was no talking to 
him…The reason was political pressures, coming at him from the publicity and 
from within his party. That is the reason for his reaction and why he lost his 
nerve.”
(”Siinä vaiheessa kun Talosen Markku soitti minulle Turkuun alkuillasta 
sunnuntaina ja oli kutsuttu hallituksen kokoukseen ja kertoi, että tällainen prosessi 
on menossa. He eivät pysty kääntämään Auran päätä, että sinä olet ainoa, joka 
tässä voi. Minä soitin sitten Putelle mutta ei hänen kanssaan voinut ollenkaan 
keskustella (...) Kyse oli siitä poliittisesta paineesta, joka häneen kohdistui 
julkisuuden kautta ja kokoomuksen sisältä. Se oli syy siihen, miten hän reagoi ja 
miksi häneltä petti hermot.”  
(Interview with Vennamo)  
Minister Aura was indeed in a difficult position, as Talonen confirmed.  
AA: What do you think about the claim made in Vennamo’s book that Aura 
suffered a break-down? Did you already know on that Sunday that Aura would 
resign? 
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MT: No, I did not know. But when he announced his resignation later, I was not 
surprised. I do not know anything about burn-outs but I think Pekka is right on 
that. Yes.
(AA: Mitäs mieltä olet Vennamon kirjassa esiintyneestä väitteestä, että Aura oli 
tilassa, jota on totuttu kutsumaan burn outiksi. Tiesitkö jo silloin sunnuntaina, että 
hänkin aikoo erota? 
MT: En tiennyt. Mutta kun hän sen asian sitten julkisti, niin en minä sitä kyllä 
ihmetellyt. Minä en burn outeista tiedä mutta kyllä Pekka siinä ihan oikeassa on. 
Kyllä.)
(Interview with Talonen). 
The Board of Sonera decided to dismiss Vennamo, as Markku Talonen described:  
“I do not remember exactly, but before Christmas we said to Vennamo that he 
should declare everything publicly. Pekka replied that these were private matters 
how things were organized with the family. Was it on St Stephen’s Day [Boxing 
Day] or when was it, but anyhow Pekka gave an interview to commercial 
television from Ruka [a skiing centre in Northern Finland], blaming persecution. 
Hell, I thought, no good will come of this and I shut off my mobile telephone 
immediately. Pekka attacked the media...There were many kinds of considerations 
for the Board: should we think about whether the President of Sonera enjoys the 
trust of the major shareholder or not, and is it a crucial factor or not? or is it 
because of this public fuss? Everybody knew quite well, based on the information 
that was available, that nothing illegal had happened, nothing against the rules of 
acceptable behaviour had happened – the problem was that public criticism had 
got its teeth into the President of Sonera, partly through his own fault, and partly 
for other reasons. We had a wide-ranging discussion about the approach of the 
elections and all things influencing the situation.... OK, if the company’s major 
shareholder did not trust the President, the Board had to listen to its opinion very 
carefully. If the major shareholder had been not the government but another kind 
of institution, would it have made a difference or not? We also bore in mind that if 
we as the board considered him to be the best in the world for this job, we should 
support him and put our foot down to the shareholder. It came down to this, that 
the shareholder would first have to change the Board and we were mentally 
prepared for this, too. OK. Is this the right man for this job or not?  I suppose it 
was me who guided the discussion at this point, so, we were coming in for public 
drubbing, whether with or without cause did not matter, and, was the person who 
was the object of this criticism really helping or damaging the company and could 
he carry out his duties properly, regardless of what the shareholders’ opinion was? 
We tried to weigh the options and evaluate different viewpoints. We came to 
conclusion that the public criticism was so intense and harmful for company that 
we could not justify it… Vennamo was sacked.”  
(”En tosiaan muista tarkkaan mutta ennen joulua puhuttiin, että nyt kerrot 
julkisuuteen kaiken. Mutta Pekka sanoi, että nämä on yksityisasioita miten 
perheen kesken asioita järjestellään. Oliko se sitten Tapaninpäivänä vai milloin 
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kun Pekka antoi Maikkarille Rukalla haastattelun ja syytti vainoamisesta. Silloin 
ajattelin, että perhana, tästä ei hyvää seuraa ja pistin omasta puhelimestani 
sähköt pois samantien. Pekka hyökkäsi julkisuutta vastaan (...) Hallituksessa oli 
monenlaista pohdintaa, että pitäisikö meidän miettiä, että nauttiiko pääjohtaja 
suurimman osakkeenomistajan luottamusta vai ei ja onko se ratkaiseva tekijä vai 
ei, ja onko tämä julkinen häly – kaikki ymmärsivät ihan hyvin niitten tietojen 
varassa, jotka oli käytettävissä, että mitään lainvastaista ei ole tapahtunut, mitään 
menettelytapojen vastaista ei ole tapahtunut – kysymys on vain siitä, että 
pääjohtaja on julkisuuden hampaissa osittain omasta syystään, osittain vain 
jostain muusta syystä. Käytiin laaja keskustelu vaalien lähestymisestä ja siihen 
peliin liittyvistä asioista (...) Okei. Jos yhtiön suurin osakkeenomistaja ei luota 
toimitusjohtajaan, niin kyllä hallituksen täytyy kuunnella suurimman omistajan 
mielipidettä varsin painokkaasti. Jos se ei olisi valtio vaan joku muu 
institutionaalinen, tulisiko siitä jotain eroa vai ei. Ja mietittiin, että jos me ollaan 
hallituksena Vennamon kannalla, että hän on maailman paras tähän hommaan, 
meidän tehtävä on tukea Vennamon ja pistää omistajalle hanttiin. Ja jättää asia 
niin, että omistaja vaihtaa ensin hallituksen ja tähänkin oltiin henkisesti valmiita. 
Okei. Onko tämä mies oikea tähän hommaan vai ei. Ja oikeastaan minä 
johdattelin sitä keskustelua siinä vaiheessa, että jouduttuaan syystä tai syyttä ei 
mitään väliä, jouduttuaan julkisen myllytyksen kohteeksi, onko tällainen julkisen 
myllytyksen kohteena oleva henkilö ylipäätänsä eduksi vai haitaksi yhtiölle ja 
voiko hän hoitaa asianmukaisesti tehtäviään riippumatta mitä mieltä omistaja on. 
Tätä koetettiin punnita ja arvioida eri näkökohtia. Sitten tultiin siihen 
lopputulokseen, että julkimyllytys on niin raskas ja vahingollinen yhtiölle ettei 
sillä perusteella voida... annettiin potkut.”) 
(Interview with Talonen) 
Minister Aura made his personal decision, too and announced his own resignation. But 
why did he resign? Ben Zyskowicz said in his interview:  
“I was there when the decision was made to offer Vennamo this deal [to solve the 
problem] but I was not at the meeting where the decision was taken to dismiss 
Vennamo. It was either at a meeting or on the telephone, some situation, where I 
heard Aura saying that he had made up his mind. He did not trust Vennamo any 
more and as he saw it, in these circumstances, Vennamo should be dismissed, and 
he could not make this decision without himself resigning. The latter was more 
interesting to us. Of course the former part, too, but it was after all the minister’s 
own decision. We were interested in the latter part. To be honest, we did not try to 
change his mind, and certainly, if Vennamo was sacked and Aura continued as 
Minister, it would have been seen miles off that the President of Sonera had been 
sacrificed and made a scapegoat for everyone else while the Minister stayed put. 
We judged that, especially in the impassioned political atmosphere just before 
elections, that would have been an untenable position for Aura. Aura had 
supported Vennamo in every respect, decided the rules of the game, which 
Vennamo had followed… and now he was being made the scapegoat and he 
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would himself continue in his position… it would mean trouble. Aura must have 
thought it through along these lines, and we agreed. ”
(”Siis minä olen ollut tekemässä päätöstä, että Vennamolle tehdään tällainen 
tarjous mutta minä en ole ollut sellaisessa palaverissa tekemässä päätöstä, että 
nyt erotetaan Vennamo. Minä olen ollut palaverissa tai puhelimessa, tilanteessa, 
jossa Aura on sanonut, että hän on päätynyt tähän. Hän ei luota enää Vennamoon 
ja tässä tilanteessa hän katsoo, että Vennamo on erotettava ja että hän ei voi 
tehdä sitä päätöstä ilman, että hän myös itse eroaa. Ja tämä jälkimmäinen asia oli 
tietysti se, joka meitä kiinnosti. Miksei tietysti ensimainittu, mutta se oli kuitenkin 
ministerin oma ratkaisu. Jälkimmäinen meitä kiinnosti. On kai rehellistä sanoa, 
että me emme ryhtyneet kääntämään hänen päätään ja olisi varmasti käynyt niin 
että jos Vennamo olisi erotettu ja Aura olisi jatkanut, se olisi näyttänyt kilometrien 
päähän, että uhrataan Soneran pääjohtaja ja tehdään siitä syntipukki kaikkeen ja 
ministeri jatkaa. Me arvioimme, että siinä kiihkeässä poliittisessa tunnelmassa, 
vähän ennen vaaleja, se olisi kestämätön ratkaisu Auran kannalta. Että hän joka 
oli tukenut Vennamoa, päättänyt pelisäännöt, joitten mukaan Vennamo oli 
toiminut (...) niin, että tuo on se syntipukki mutta että minä jatkan – siitä ei hyvää 
seuraa. Siitä, että Aura oli ratkaisun näin ajatellut, oltiin samaa mieltä.”) 
(Interview with Zyskowicz)  
Ben Zyskowicz is very clear in his analysis: it was a question of morality. The success 
story had turned into a political scandal, and the logic of the scandal demanded a solution 
of scapegoats and heroes. 
AA: So, it’s your opinion that this was definitely Aura’s own choice? 
BZ: I would say so: dismissing Vennamo and his own resignation were Aura’s 
own decisions… To be cruel, in spite of the fact that Aura was considered a very 
good Minister, very competent and skilful, in these circumstances we judged that 
both Aura himself and his party would be faced with an impossible situation of a 
witches’ brew of media and politics, if Vennamo had been the only scapegoat. 
Vennamo himself considers that Aura’s resignation was unnecessary. But they 
were connected, in fact. 
(AA: Olet siis sitä mieltä, että tämä oli ehdottomasti Auran oma ratkaisu?
BZ: Minä sanoisin niin, että Vennamon erottaminen ja oma ero oli Auran oma 
ratkaisu (...) Raadollisesti, vaikka pidettiin Auraa erittäin hyvänä ministerinä, 
todella asiantuntevana ja osaavana, niin siinä tilanteessa arvioitiin, että Aura itse 
joutuisi ja hänen puolueensa mahdottomaan tilanteeseen median ja politiikan 
noidankattilassa jos se vain olisi tehnyt Vennamosta syntipukin. Vennamohan itse 
katsoo että Auran ero oli tarpeeton. Mutta ne kulki kyllä tässä mielessä yhdessä.”) 
(. . . .) 
AA: Aura became a man of honour. Is this your description? 
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BZ: Yes it is. Of course my starting point is that, generally and especially before 
the elections, the whole business has to be to try to show the party [Coalition 
Party] in a good light. When Aura made this decision, the positive aspects of the 
decision were of course vital. As a matter of fact, it was a wretched decision. All 
the same, the positive side in a general sense was that the minister had made such 
a decision. 
(AA: Aurasta tuli sitten kunnian mies. Onko tämä sinun ilmaisu?
BZ: Kyllä. Tottakai minä lähden yleensäkin ja varsinkin vaalien alla, että asiat 
pitää yrittää selittää kokoomuksen kannalta parhain päin. Kun Aura tämmöisen 
ratkaisun oli tehnyt oli ilman muuta tärkeätä se ratkaisun positiiviset puolet. 
Sehän oli kurja ratkaisu. Positiivinen puoli yleisessä merkityksessä kuitenkin oli, 
että ministeri teki tällaisen ratkaisun.)
(Interview with Zyskowicz) 
Minister Aura described his conclusions with similar arguments.  
“Yes, the political logic was – and I think it is the same logic in the private sector, 
too – that Vennamo could not be the sole scapegoat. Certainly in other 
circumstances it would have been possible to shelter Vennamo too. He was not the 
sole scapegoat. Indeed, my estimation of public reaction was proved right, that if 
we had sacked only Vennamo and I had continued, I would be certainly have been 
politically dead. There was a short period, about an hour, when the news about 
Vennamo’s dismissal was out and my press meeting had not yet taken place, 
during which I got several e-mails, which took the opportunity of labelling me yet 
another crook.”  
(”Mutta kyllä se poliittinen logiikka ja kyllä se on yksityiselläkin puolella – 
minusta – Vennamosta ei voitu tehdä yksin syntipukkia. Toki varmasti toisin 
menetellen olisi voitu Vennamokin suojata. Ei hän on ollut yksin syntipukki. Kyllä 
se minun ajatus julkisuuden reaktioista on edelleen oikea että jos me olisimme 
potkineet vain Vennamo ulos ja minä olisin jatkanut, minä olisin ollut poliittisesti 
kuollut ilman muuta. Siinä oli sellainen lyhyt aikajakso, noin tunti, jolloin ulkona 
oli Vennamon ero ja minun tiedotustilaisuutta ei vielä ollut, minulle ehti tulla 
muutama sähköposti, jossa ehdittiin sanoa, että minä olen uusi konna.”) 
(Interview with Aura)
The culmination of the scandal was, therefore, Aura’s loss of trust in Vennamo, 
Vennamo’s dismissal and Aura’s announcement of his own resignation on 4th January 
1999. Minister Aura publicly explained the reason for his resignation, as owing to Pekka 
Vennamo’s repeated misinformation about his shareholdings both to him and to the stock 
markets, and he stated that Vennamo had not informed him either about his selling of 
shares to members of his family. Minister Aura therefore considered that he had 
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misjudged Vennamo, so that he no longer felt able to take charge of the office of Minister 
of Transport and Communications successfully (Press Release 4.1.1999). 
The political scandal, therefore, began with exposure of a hidden detail. The Cabinet did 
not exactly give its support to Minister Aura, having given a rather neutral statement that 
it would report to Parliament about the case and put it to the vote. Nor did Aura get 
support from his own party; on the contrary, Minister Niinistö had criticized him.  
Aura could discuss the matter only with his party colleagues, who were not concerned 
with Sonera as a company. The Ministry officials were more observers and unable to help 
Aura. Information did not flow freely, but neither were any real “secrets” exposed by the 
media; however, the media took charge of the drama, assigning roles and leaving it only 
as a matter time as to who would be cast in the role of scapegoat and who as hero. The 
National Coalition Party was angling to be the hero.  
What was the lesson of this specific scandal? Pekka Vennamo’s own conclusion is: 
“The main reason for this whole controversy was that, although he [Aura] was a 
third-generation minister from a political family, his own political experience was 
extremely slight. And, in the time he had been involved in politics, he had enjoyed 
a form of honeymoon. First, he was elected a Member of Parliament with a great 
number of votes, then he challenged for chairmanship of the Coalition Party and 
then he was appointed a minister. In addition, it is important to remember that the 
work he had done before he came into politics, in the Chamber of Commerce, had 
never exposed him to public criticism. Then there is another factor of course – 
which is how it always works in politics – first you are put on a pedestal, then the 
criticism begins. He…could not stand the criticism and seemed to imagine, right 
until the end, that it was because of his own doing that he was getting criticism, 
that he had made some mistake and that he should try to change something or fix 
it, to make the criticism stop. A more experienced politician is aware that this is 
not generally the case. Rather, those who are criticizing intend to make the person 
nervous, to change his mind, to panic him into doing something else.”  
(”Pääsyy koko tähän jupakkaan oli se, että vaikka hän kuinka oli kolmannen 
polven ministeri ja poliittisen suvun jäsen niin hänen oma poliittinen 
kokemuksensa oli erittäin vähäistä. Ja sen ajan, jonka hän oli ollut mukana 
politiikassa, hän oli elänyt sellaista kuherruskuukautta. Ensin kansanedustajaksi 
suurella äänimäärällä, kandidaatiksi kokoomuksen johtoon ja sitten ministeriksi. 
Lisäksi pitää muistaa, että se työ ennen poliitikoksi tulemista siellä 
Kauppakamarissa oli sellainen, ettei siellä joutunut julkisen kritiikin kohteeksi 
koskaan. Sitten siihen varmasti vaikutti – niinhän politiikassa aina käy, ensin 
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nostetaan jalustalle ja sitten alkaa kritiikki. Hän koki sen (...) hän ei kestänyt 
kritiikkiä ja kuvitteli nähtävästi loppuun saakka, että se johtuu hänen omista 
tekemisistään, että sitä kritiikkiä alkoi tulla ja että hän on tehnyt jotakin väärin ja 
että hänen pitäisi jotenkin muuttaa tai korjata, jotta se kritiikki loppuisi. 
Kokeneempi poliitikko tietää kyllä sen, ettei se yleensä ole näin. Kritiikin 
esittäjällä on pikemminkin tarkoitus saada toinen hermostumaan ja muuttamaan, 
tekemään hätäpäissään jotain muuta.”) 
(Interview with Vennamo) 
9.4. Media response 
The analysis of the media coverage here has been based on press reviews collected by the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications during the period mid-October 1998 to mid- 
January 1999, when Kimmo Sasi was appointed as the new Minister. This does not mean 
that all newspapers or articles published about the matter are covered; however, as a 
representative sample the data consist of 214 articles. Two thirds of the articles were 
published during the political scandal and its culmination.  
Figure 9 
 n=214 
It is obvious, looking at the percentages of published articles, that the Sanoma Group 
followed the privatization of Sonera more intensely than Almamedia and, when the nature 
of the content is taken into account, its general attitude was far more critical than that of 
Almamedia. Sanoma Group never showed the same level of enthusiasm for the 
privatization at any stage of the narrative, including the “success story”. Sanoma Group’s 
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scoop was to expose Vennamo’s portfolio and to accuse him of greed. However, after 
Aura’s resignation and Vennamo’s dismissal, for example, Helsingin Sanomat’s editorials
were slower to analyze the changes in the direction of the plot than Almamedia’s papers, 
nor did Helsingin Sanomat analyze the role of the media, directing criticism instead at the 
incompetence of politicians in governing state-owned companies. 
Almamedia’s papers gave Pekka Vennamo an opportunity to speak, while Sanoma Group 
did not, and Almamedia stressed Aura’s arguments for his decision, as well as the heroic 
decision to take personal responsibility for the case by resigning. Almamedia (Iltalehti)
even expressed anxiety about whether the scandal would make politicians more grey and 
bureaucratic. 
The types of articles published during the specific time period mentioned are shown in 
Figure 10. However, during 1998 the relevant content was more orientated towards news 
than comment or editorial, whereas in January 1999 as many editorials and comments 
were published as news articles. This can be partly interpreted as the media taking control 
of the plot of the case, which it had turned into a political scandal.  
Figure 10 
 n=214 
At first, Sonera was reported as a success story, but it turned into a failure because of 
Vennamo’s greed. A few articles, however, had differed from the general approach of 
taking Sonera as a success story, scrutinizing Sonera’s foreign investments. At the 
beginning of the offering Jyrki Raivio of Helsingin Sanomat (18.10.1998) wrote about the 
risks Sonera was running by investing in an American firm: “Aerial is a billion markka 
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risk or, in flowery language, a long-term strategic investment” (”Aerial onkin miljardin 
markan riski, tai kukkaiskielellä pitkän aikavälin strateginen sijoitus”). Niklas Herlin of 
Ilta-Sanomat (20.10.1998) also analysed Sonera as an investment target and highlighted 
the risks Sonera had taken in its foreign investment, especially with Aerial in the USA. 
These articles can be seen as reflecting mistrust of Sonera’s strategy and management to 
conquer world markets. 
However, the media’s general approach was just to report on the offering process. 
Criticisms began to emerge after the price was set: it was too low, the advisors’ bonus 
was too generous (the so-called ‘green shoe’), and the small share holders were not going 
to be treated equally. Politicians’ criticisms in Parliament appeared to be similar. 
Taloussanomat (10.11.1998) interviewed Professor Jarmo Leppiniemi who argued in 
favour of small shareholders, who would be long-term investors and largely uninterested 
in quick profits. He also stressed that it would not be possible to recover shares sold 
abroad to Finnish ownership if this was wanted, because of the country’s limited financial 
resources.
The privatization did not turn into a scandal until 23rd December, when Taloussanomat
reported the total investment made by Pekka Vennamo and his family firm.  
The main messages or arguments during the media storm, taking all the articles (52) into 
account, were: 
• allowing directors to buy shares is not acceptable   44% 
• special treatment of Vennamo is not acceptable   29% 
• the share price was set too low     25% 
• Minister Aura is responsible and made a mistake   41% 
As the percentages indicate, in most of the articles more than one argument was included. 
Helsingin Sanomat’s editorial of 30th December 1998 asked “Is Pekka Vennamo worth 
his weight in gold?” (”Onko Pekka Vennamo painonsa arvoinen kultaa”), and it 
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questioned whether it was morally right to offer incentives for management to be loyal to 
their companies and how much greed should be tolerated. Since the offering was 
oversubscribed, it was clear that all who wanted shares would not get them, or would only 
get part of the total requested, but this had not been the case for Sonera’s directors. 
Apparently, such a principle had been accepted by Minister Aura and by the Government, 
according to the newspaper.  
Staffan Bruun and Birgitta Jernvall Ingman wrote an article in Hufvudstadsbladet
(30.12.1998) which differed from the general interpretation, which was entitled: 
‘Conflicts of interest and hindsight’ (”Intressekonflikt och efterklokhet”). Magnus von 
Knorring, director of Fondita, who was interviewed for the article, could not understand 
why Vennamo was being pursued: 
…what would the media response be if the share-value, instead of rocketing, had 
sunk from 45 to 40 markkas?… It is also important to remember that Pekka 
Vennamo took enormous risks by investing his own money in buying the shares. 
It is definitely not fair to compare this business with options where the leadership 
takes no risks at all. This is a totally different thing.
(... Hur mycket skulle tidningarna skriva i dag ifall kursen inte gått upp brant utan 
sjunkit från 45 mark till 40 mark (...) Och det är viktigt att minnas att Pekka 
Vennamo har hostat upp egna pengar att för att köpa aktierna. Man skall absolut 
inte förväxla den här affären med optioner som innebär att ledningen inte tar 
någon egen risk. Det är någonting helt annat.)
(Hbl 30.12.1998) 
After Aura’s resignation the media responded with surprise but also enthusiasm. 
Editorials published in the newspapers owned by the Alma Group underlined Aura’s 
strong sense of responsibility and conscience. The moral aspect of the case was 
scrutinized, highlighting the difference between this specific case and the so-called Alho-
Sundqvist case. The editorial of the Iltalehti (5.1.1999) declared the resignation to be the 
dawn of a new political culture, and that the decision to dismiss Vennamo and to resign 
was something previously unheard of in Finnish political life.  
The first demand for Aura’s resignation was published on 30th December 1998 and the 
resignation happened 4th January 1999, so that there was a lapse of six days, although 
heavy criticism had started before Christmas. The media’s comparison-case was Arja 
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Alho’s resignation as a Minister in the Ministry of Finance in 1997; this had been 
criticized as too slow in coming, but had also taken six days’ consideration prior to the 
actual resignation, while the press criticism had lasted about the same time as well, two 
weeks. Because of the roles in which they were casting the actors, the press chose in 
effect to create a difference. 
Almamedia’s newspapers all commented on the resignation. Iltalehti’s editorial 
(5.1.1999) considered that it was a natural consequence of capitalism that directors would 
have to leave their posts because of the owner’s lack of trust, an argument that was later 
repeated in Parliament when it had the chance to debate the matter. However, Iltalehti
was also worried whether this indicated a change to a new political culture, which would 
lead to Ministers’ posts being filled by ordinary “grey” politicians, over-cautious about 
making any mistakes and dependent on the hints of civil servants. Aamulehti (5.1.1999)
wrote that Aura had resigned with style, and deserved the appreciation expressed by 
Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen and the Chairman of the National Coalition Party, Sauli 
Niinistö. Kauppalehti analysed that both Vennamo’s offensive and Aura’s attempts to 
reject the charges of privilege had begun too late. According to the paper, Vennamo’s 
mistake was not to have been open about his business dealings within the family (KL
5.1.1999).
The only editorial comment on the matter from the Sanoma Group appeared in 
Taloussanomat on 5th January. It reminded readers that the resignation was a consequence 
of the information published by the newspaper concerning the Vennamo’s shareholdings. 
“The consequences of misjudgement often have a significant effect on society. Even more 
often the consequences are significant for those who made the decisions.” (”Virhearvion 
seuraukset ovat usein yhteiskunnallisesti merkittäviä. Yhä useammin seuraukset ovat 
merkittäviä myös päätöksentekijöille.”) (Taloussanomat 5.1.1999). 
Helsingin Sanomat did, however, publish a comment from its respected journalist, Risto 
Uimonen (HS 5.1.1999): 
The political risks became simply too high because of Vennamo. The Coalition 
Party blew the whistle for game over in a cold-blooded manner. Aura first, in his 
capacity as minister, withdrew the government’s support from Vennamo as 
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President of Sonera, and then handed in his resignation. This is politically such an 
extreme measure that it cannot simply have come from Aura himself.... The 
political message is clear: morality is not a relative matter for the Coalition Party, 
as it may seem to be for other parties.... The election’s proximity has affected the 
Coalition Party’s choice of strategy. This fact does not diminish the value of 
Aura’s act any the less. Political morality will always be evaluated in the light of 
actions. Aura’s resignation creates a new political culture, and will be used as a 
yardstick in other contexts yet to come. 
(Poliittiset riskit kävivät yksinkertaisesti liian suuriksi Vennamon takia. Kokoomus 
vihelsi pelin kylmästi poikki. Aura veti ensin ministerin valtuuksilla valtion tuen 
pois Vennamolta Soneran johtajana ja pyysi sitten itse eroa. Tämä on poliittisesti 
niin raju ratkaisu, ettei se ole voinut syntyä pelkästään Auran omassa päässä (...) 
Poliittinen viesti on selkeä: moraali ei ole kokoomukselle suhteellinen käsite, 
kuten muille puolueille (...) Vaalien läheisyys on vaikuttanut kokoomuksen 
valitsemaan strategiaan. Tämä ei siitä huolimatta vähennä Auran teon arvoa. 
Poliittista moraalia arvioidaan aina tekojen valossa. Auran ero luo uutta 
poliittista kulttuuria, jota käytetään mittatikkuna muissa myöhemmissä 
yhteyksissä.)
The columnist Hannu Savola (IS 7.1.1999) urged “hold your horses over the Sonera 
spectacle [in Parliament because of the report given by the Cabinet]. . . After the Alho-
Sundqvist controversy there is a new bone to gnaw on: who have they managed to make 
into the villains of the Sonera share offering? who are the heroes? It is certain that 
Parliament will be full of investment experts” (”Jäitä hattuun Sonera-riekkujaisiin- 
…Alho-Sundqvist-väittelyn jälkeen on saatu uutta kaluttavaa: Ketkä onnistutaan 
leipomaan Soneran osakeannin konniksi? Ketkä sankareiksi?  Se on varmaa, että 
eduskunta on täynnä pörssisijoittamisen ammattilaisia”). Savola concluded by saying 
that there were great possibilities but also great risks in Sonera. “And one thing is sure: 
every day brings us closer to the moment when Sonera’s price comes down with a crash. 
It would be good to remember this in the midst of all the wisdom after the event.” (”Ja 
yksi asia on varma: joka päivä lähestyy myös se hetki, jolloin Soneran hinta tulee 
rymisten alas. Se olisi hyvä muistaa kaiken jälkiviisastelun keskellä”) (IS 7.1.1999). 
Helsingin Sanomat’s editorial on 13th January 1999 analysed the Sonera debate in 
Parliament. It did not refer to its earlier criticisms but instead directed its attention to the 
political system. Entitled “Yields of Sonera debate remain small” (”Sonera-väittelyn anti 
jäi vähäiseki”), the editorial thought that the opposition could not give evidence that it 
had an essentially better idea of the value of Sonera shares than the Cabinet Committee 
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for Economic Policy when the target price of the offering was decided. It also said that 
the political debate concerning Sonera and its national ownership would continue until the 
elections, although the first round in Parliament had shown how difficult an area business 
was for politicians: “They have plenty of critical comments but few concrete proposals”. 
The conclusion of the Sanoma Group was published in another editorial (HS 15.1.1999), 
that politically appointed advisory boards were good for nothing. 
The main arguments in the media response (113 articles) following the resignation were: 
• the share price was too low       7% 
• Vennamo was greedy and was punished         17% 
• public pressure forced Aura to resign                          18% 
• Aura is a honourable man                                          14% 
• Aura’s resignation is a sign of new culture and new moral  12% 
• Alho should have resigned this quickly       12% 
• Privatization is difficult     22% 
More than one argument was included in a few of the published articles. It is significant 
that the original reason for criticism – the share price – played a minor role after Aura’s 
resignation. The commentary seems to emphasize the importance of public pressure to 
react and the politicians’ learning process in dealing privatization, and at the same time 
creating a new political culture. 
Political journalists analyzed the matter more often than economic journalists. According 
to Pekka Vennamo, he was not worried about negative publicity as long as it came from 
the field of politics instead of the business world. Analysis of media response also 
confirms that Minister Aura was acting on his own during the crisis, including when he 
was defending privatization, the support that he needed from the Cabinet was only given 
after his resignation. 
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Photographs
Photograph 1. 
The photographs published of Minister Aura are typical portraits. In this particular photo, 
taken by Hannes Heikura for Helsingin Sanomat, Minister Aura chairs a press conference. 
He is sitting behind a table and is the main actor, while the Ministry civil servants are in 
background, observing the situation rather than controlling it. Aura is wearing dark suit, 
his hair cut short and his forehead can be seen clearly. It is shining. He looks very 
business-like with his glasses and also seems to be relaxed. The background is an official 
meeting room of Ministry; no details can be seen, only the warm colour of the wall, 
however, the architecture symbolizes the tradition and authority of the Ministry. The 
caption reads: “Minister Aura resigns from the Ministry of Traffic and Communications” 
(HS 5.1.1999). 
This photo is ‘unary’, a typical press photo. There is nothing special in this photo in spite 
of the fact that the situation is exceptional. The punctum in this photo is the forehead of 
Minister Aura and his look. The light on the forehead gives Aura a kind of halo, while his 
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look is solemn and he appears unafraid to face the future. The photo supports the image of 
decisive character with high morals, which was, indeed, the general message in the 
journalists’ comment, with a connotative message of heroism and purity. 
Photograph 2. 
The photograph, taken by Jaakko Avikainen from Lehtikuva, a press photo agency owned 
by Sanoma Group, has another kind of message. Pekka Vennamo is standing alone in a 
banquet hall after his press conference. There are no glasses on the table. The party is 
over. He is talking into his mobile phone (maybe calling his wife?). His black suitcase is 
on the table and Vennamo is not hiding his paunch. Accused of being greedy, it is also 
obvious that he enjoys good food. His general appearance is, however, modest, and he 
looks like an ordinary man who has faced an unexpected situation, left tired and alone. It 
is very hard to believe that just the day before he was the President of Sonera and one of 
the key architects of privatization and Sonera’s success story. However, he really is our 
man.  
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The caption reads: “Pekka Vennamo, the former President and Chief Executive Officer of 
the Finnish telecommunications company, Sonera, speaks on his mobile phone after the 
press conference in Helsinki on Monday, 4th January. Vennamo was replaced early 
Monday morning due to the share scandal involving his role in Sonera, in which the 
government has a majority stake. Vennamo had bought and resold the shares in 
November without informing the government. Earlier on Monday the Finnish Transport 
and Communications Minister Matti Aura resigned due to the scandal” (IS 5.1.1999). 
In this photo the punctum is the suitcase, located on the table like a rejected object, 
symbolizing the power which Vennamo has just lost. But it is also a portfolio, not that it 
looks like a thick portfolio worth 5 million Finnish markkas. The suitcase symbolizes the 
whole political scandal, with a connotation that is much clearer than a text that appears 
more neutral. The message is clear: the party is over and Vennamo has lost the game. 
Photograph 3.  
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A very interesting photograph was published later in January, taken by Peter Jansson of 
Lehtikuva. Parliament had had a debate on Sonera informed by Minister Aura. This was 
also the day he formally left his position as a Minister, and actually also the day he left 
politics. In this photo Minister Aura is walking downstairs in the back part of the 
Parliament building. His face is hidden and he is only seen in profile. The caption is: 
“Minister Matti Aura leaves the House” (”Ministeri Matti Aura poistuu”) (IS 13.1.1999). 
The punctum in this photo is Aura’s head. He is watching his step but, at the same time, 
he seems to be depressed, perhaps even beaten. He is going down the circle of the stairs. 
The photo symbolizes in an excellent way the decision made by Aura, to leave Parliament 
literally. The pressures of his personal situation have become too heavy. The connotative 
message of this photo supports the textual message, Aura is leaving politics. 
9.5. Conclusions 
The Plot
The Sonera case is a typical political scandal. It followed precisely Thompson’s (2000) 
narrative of a scandal. The dimensions of morals and morality became an essential part of 
the plot. During the pre-scandal phase the pricing of Sonera’s shares was criticized as 
well the share allocation. The success of the sale started to turn into failure, and profits 
should have been maximized. The company management was able to get rich quick, 
while ordinary investors had not got all the shares that they wanted.  
The phase of scandal proper was reached with an exposure: Vennamo had received 
special treatment. The individuals at the centre of the scandal denied the claim and 
Vennamo himself accused the media of muck-raking. The culmination of the scandal 
came when Minister Niinistö made his choice and left his party colleague, Aura, on his 
own because of the forthcoming elections, leading to Aura’s resignation and the dismissal 
of Vennamo. The aftermath of the scandal can be seen in the media response when 
journalists tried to interpret the case, and Vennamo later published a memoir concerning 
his career in the Post and Telecommunication Office and the later Sonera. 
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It is important to note that one of the factors that emerged was that, when Vennamo was 
offered the management of telecommunications, without postal services, and was forced 
to accept that Finnish PT would not be privatized as a whole, one of the incentives was 
the possibility of obtaining some share options. Self-interest, greed, was seen as a positive 
thing. The possibility of getting options was a common practice in the private sector to 
reinforce executives’ commitment to their companies. Business values and public values 
were in conflict. In this particular case the options did not become a reason for scandal, 
and it was instead the shares bought at the offering by Sonera’s directors.  
“...how to get Vennamo to come along with this – Markku said with money, of 
course. We offered him the opportunity of getting rich. We painted a rosy future 
for Pekka, since in a stock company there would be the opportunity for options. In 
a normal state-owned company it is not possible to get rich but when the company 
is quoted on the stock markets you can make money.”  
(”...miten Vennamo saadaan tähän mukaan – niin Markku sanoi, että rahallahan 
saadaan. Hänelle avataan rikastumisen mahdollisuus. Pekalle maalattiin 
tulevaisuus, että pörssiyhtiössä on mahdollisuus optioihin. Normaalissa 
valtionyhtiössä ei rikastu mutta kun yhtiö menee pörssiin niin voi rikastua.”) 
(Interview with Aura)  
The Actors and Information Flows 
The roles played by the various actors were predictable. Vennamo was a suitable 
scapegoat because of his controversial role. He was an outsider in the business elite 
because of his political background and he was not defended by that elite. Nor was he 
defended by the political elite, except by Minister Aura.  
Vennamo was a former politician (a former MP and Minister of Traffic and 
Communications). His public image, a representative of poor and oppressed people, was 
seriously at odds with the image of a wealthy businessman getting even wealthier. He was 
not oppressed and he was not an ordinary man, on the contrary. Vennamo could not take 
the role of a hero in terms of Apo (1986) – a modest man, who with the help of Sonera’s 
“magic” became a “prince” admired by all – because of a muted hatred or silent envy in 
society (see Girard, 1977). Vennamo was sacrificed in the domain of politics to calm the 
scandal.
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There was a Minister who was competent in business but not so familiar with the games 
and pressures of political life. He was cast as a man of honour, a hero. However, he was 
forced into this role. There was the danger that, if Aura was made a scapegoat, this could 
also have dangerous effects on the success of his political party. In the “backstage” of 
politics there was a lot of activity managing the publicity or “spin” in order to guarantee 
the success of the National Coalition Party.  
The media strategy created in the Coalition Party (Niinistö and Zyskowicz) was to follow 
public feeling. Aura’s position changed dramatically when Minister Niinistö, who was 
outside the scandal’s ambit, criticized him publicly, making Aura’s position even more 
difficult. He wanted on the one hand to protect Vennamo and the success of the 
privatization but, on the other hand, this put him into conflict with his own party. 
Furthermore because of a failure of communication, he felt that Vennamo had betrayed 
him, which was an even heavier burden because of pressures in his personal life. The 
discussions between Aura and his civil servants were very dramatic, as well as those 
between Aura and Vennamo. 
It was natural for Niinistö, as chairman of the party, to try to take on the role of a hero and 
to respond to the public’s wishes. He and the party had created an image of high morality, 
which was vulnerable and fragile and needed to be protected. Logically Aura would be a 
scapegoat, but it was important to change the presentation of the case, so that through his 
resignation, Aura became a hero. However, he also left the stage of politics, retired on 
grounds of ill health and, in that sense, lost the game, so that he ended up a wounded 
hero.
However, it seems that there are further ramifications in the relationship between Aura 
and Niinistö. Aura had started his career in politics as a candidate for the chairmanship of 
the National Coalition Party, to which Niinistö was elected. Aura was inexperienced 
when he was appointed as a minister and it is possible that he was not really prepared for 
negative publicity and criticism, since his career in politics had until then been full of 
success.  
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It is obvious that the upcoming elections made the Coalition Party very nervous and that 
the risks involved led to the resignation of Minister Aura and Vennamo’s dismissal. 
Minister Niinistö made a comment that the atmosphere was already calming down before 
Aura’s resignation but Ben Zyskowicz remembers matters differently: 
“We had about four months to the elections, with victory on the horizon, and it is 
fair to say that the approach of Niinistö and the rest of the Coalition leadership 
was that we had to clear the matter up and take care of it so that nothing would put 
our victory in jeopardy. Of course we became more and more nervous as the 
scandal continued and grew, while Aura was loyally pledging his support for 
Vennamo’s actions. Certainly we were worried that, as the nation would not 
accept this one bit and the citizens saw it as unfair and unequal, then we were 
worried that here was a Coalition Party Minister giving full shelter to Vennamo 
and Sonera’s management. Vennamo, as a former politician, was of course a 
delicious target.” 
(”Me oltiin noin neljä kuukautta ennen vaaleja, vaalivoitto häämöttämässä ja on 
oikein sanoa, että Niinistö ja muu kokoomuksen johto lähti siitä, että nyt pitää 
klaarata ja hoitaa asiat niin, ettei meidän vaalivoitto sula minkään syyn takia. Ja 
totta kai me ruvettiin huolestumaan kun se jatkui ja paisui ja kun Aura sitoutui 
tukemaan Vennamon toimintaa lojaalisti. Kyllä meillä huolestuttiin että kun kansa 
ei tätä alkuunkaan hyväksy ja kansalaiset kokee että tämä on 
epäoikeudenmukaista ja epäyhdenvertaista, niin huolestuttiin siitä, että nyt 
kokoomuslainen ministeri antaa täydellä tuulensuojaa ja tukea Vennamolle ja 
Soneran johdolle. Vennamo tietysti entisenä poliitikkona oli herkullinen kohde.”) 
(Interview with Zyskowicz)  
However, the privatization of Sonera had been decided with proper democratic procedure: 
all the political decisions related to it had been handled in the Cabinet Committee on 
Economic Policy, an all-party committee, and Parliament had been kept informed on the 
matters, including the target share price, when the supplementary budget proposal was 
introduced to Parliament. The formalities of the democratic decision-making process were 
fulfilled.  
Criticism that there was insufficient information was one of the arguments during the 
scandal and this led to a more complicated arrangement concerning the policy of state 
ownership and how to organize information. Even so these arrangements could not help 
Sonera avoid further scandals: 
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The cartoon by Jouko, published in Länsi-Savo on 6th January 1999, gave an idea of the 
previous year and its scandals. Pekka Vennamo and Matti Aura are together, with some 
papers and documents in a waste-basket. The waste-basket is labelled “1999’s 
controversies (Vuoden 1999 jupakat)”. The cleaner’s overalls read “Keep Finland Clean”, 
and he heaves a deep sigh: “Hopefully the rest of the year will run more peacefully”. The 
message is clear: the scandal is over and the cleaning up of politics has been successful – 
so far. 
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10. The Black List – How the flap of a butterfly’s wing became a typhoon 
In the recession of the early 1990s the demand for labour abruptly dropped, resulting in a 
sharp growth in unemployment. Recovery from the recession and support for employment 
were important issues in the 1995 parliamentary elections, won by the Social Democratic 
Party. Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen formed the “Rainbow Coalition” that called itself 
“a government of employment and solidarity.” The main political promise was to halve 
unemployment during the following four-year period. 
Unemployment has been the most serious societal problem since the recession. Paavo 
Lipponen’s Government did not succeed in halving unemployment, though employment 
did increase. On the contrary, a structural hard core of unemployment developed and 
remained practically unaffected by the recovery of the economy which began in the mid-
1990s. Matti Sihto (1994) did research on Active Manpower Policy which showed that, 
with this policy, the labour market functioned better and the employment situation 
improved. Therefore it was natural that some active measures would be needed. 
Throughout history the harmful nature of high unemployment has been connected to 
damaging societal and ethical implications, especially crime and instability. Politically 
implications have been considered to be twofold. On the one hand, unemployed people 
are seen as potentially revolutionary forces threatening the establishment and society at 
large. On the other hand, they are seen as a politically passive and marginalized group, 
yet potentially giving support to those political parties capable of mobilizing them. As a 
social problem, unemployment is linked to poverty and marginalization; economically, it 
is seen first and foremost as inefficiency. Indeed, unemployed people are treated as 
objects of help, control, charity, or expense (Skog & Räisänen, 1997). 
How can the problem of long-term unemployment be solved? The expectations of the 
public but also the political elite have been confusing; there has been a desperate wish to 
find a new trick or a magic tool with which to solve the problem, though the importance 
of sustainable growth has been acknowledged. The expectations of reforms, generally, are 
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more or less to find new solutions. However, to use all policy tools to aim at the same 
goal has been difficult. 
The reform of labour market policy is analyzed here in order to find out how seriously the 
Government acted to realize its target of halving unemployment. The reform is also 
analyzed in the context of mediazation, since a political scandal became more public than 
the labour reform itself. However, the story begins when the Minister of Labour, Liisa 
Jaakonsaari, appointed Government Counsellor Harri Skog and Senior Researcher Heikki 
Räisänen to prepare the reform of the labour market policy system.  
10.1. Data 
Data used in this chapter has been collected from the following sources: 
• Senior Government Advisors’ report for the reform of the labour market policy 
system, “Towards a better functioning labour market” by Heikki Räisänen and  
Harri Skog , 1998;  
• “Tanskan työvoimapolitiikan malli” (“The Danish model of labour market 
policy”) by Harri Skog and Heikki Räisänen , unofficial paper; 
• PCA-analyses of employment reform by Grey Eminence; 
• press releases of the Ministry of Labour 1.4.1998, 2.4.1998, and 9.4.1998; 
• parliamentary documents about the case;  Question Hour SKT 54/1998 
(www.eduskunta.fi); 
• the media coverage of the scandal 25.3.-16.4.1998, altogether 67 articles, 
collected by the Ministry of Labour; 
• Interviews with Ulpu Iivari (10.2.2002), Liisa Jaakonsaari (17.2.2002), Harri Skog 
(13.2.2002), and Jorma Westlund (20.12.2001). 
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In this specific case I was not personally involved, but the matter was familiar to me, 
since I was present at the Evening School when the advisors’ proposals were introduced 
to the Government (June 1997), and was also involved in the budget negotiations between 
the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Finance (July 1997).  
The focus of the interviews was to clarify the objectives of the reform, its position in the 
strategy of the Government, the reasons why the work of a consulting firm, Grey 
Eminence, was used, how the media storm began, what kind of effects it had and what 
kind of information flows existed concerning the reform especially during the scandal 
among the political elite. There were also open-ended questions for the interviewees to 
elaborate areas of their own interest. 
10.2. Actors 
The actor-family consisted of 33 people, categorized as politicians, civil servants 
including researchers, representatives of social partners (employers and employees), 
journalists, and business actors as in other cases. Ulpu Iivari could be categorized as a 
politician, but has been included among the business actors, since at that time she was 
working as a consultant. Twelve politicians were mentioned, fifteen civil servants 
including researchers, one actor representing social partners, one journalist and four 
people from the business sector.  
The labour reform was a project of the Ministry of Labour. From the Ministry’s point of 
view, social partners played an important role in helping to obtain public support for the 
new initiatives. However, during the scandal social partners had no role. Compared to the 
other political scandal, the Sonera case, the media cannot be considered to have acted as a 
collective. Only one journalist was mentioned by name but several newspapers were 
identified during the interviews. 
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FAMILY OF ACTORS
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Figure 11 
 n=33 
Those who were mentioned more than six times were: Liisa Jaakonsaari (19), Heikki 
Räisänen (16), Pertti Sorsa (12), Ulpu Iivari (9), and Sauli Niinistö (7). From the 
interview material, the key political actors in this case were Liisa Jaakonsaari and Sauli 
Niinistö. Harri Skog (5) and Heikki Räisänen were the key civil servants (Räisänen as a 
researcher), while Permanent Secretary Pertti Sorsa stood aside from the work of the 
advisors and particularly from the scandal. The key business actor is Ulpu Iivari. 
On the basis of the media response, a total of 67 articles, the key actors of the scandal 
were naturally Liisa Jaakonsaari (22) and Ulpu Iivari (24), but so was MP Anneli 
Jäätteenmäki (11). Minister Pekka Haavisto (10), Minister Antti Kalliomäki (4), Minister 
Sauli Niinistö (4) received frequent mentions, as did MP Arja Alho (7) and Ulf Sundqvist 
(7). Ministers Haavisto, Kalliomäki and Niinistö participated actively in the Question 
Hour debate, which is evidence that Parliament really is the most important domain to 
participate public debate. Both Alho and Sundqvist were mentioned in reference to a 
previous scandal, not examined in this study, which was used to bolster the credibility of 
arguments about favouritism. The Sonera case was already under way, but would not 
erupt for another year. The work of the advisors was not referred in the media response 
during the scandal.  
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10.3. The Structure of Narrative 
The structure of narrative emerged from the coding process provided by grounded theory, 
yet, again, closely follows the logic of a typical political scandal as described by 
Thompson (2000). The pre-scandal phase (prologue and launching efforts) turned into the 
phase of scandal proper because of an exposure. A non-participant actor, MP 
Jäätteenmäki, utilized the reactions of media. However, in this specific case the 
culmination of this specific scandal did not lead to any dramatic closure, and instead the 
scandal just died away. The aftermath of the scandal did not lead to any particular critical 
evaluation of the case among the political elite or the media. However, it affected the 
lives of the participants greatly.  
In the table below, public debate refers to either discussion in Parliament or public debate 
in the media.  
Episodes:     Time period:             Public Debate:
A: Prologue 
– the Reform of the Reforms    1996     no 
B: Launching the Initiatives    1997 (spring)   yes 
– Grey Eminence consulted 
C: A Secret is exposed
– A Typhoon      1998    yes 
– Black Lists are revealed 
– Professor Wiio gives an interview; 
– the culmination of the scandal in 2.4.1998 
D: After the Typhoon    1998    yes 
– The media is never wrong 
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A: Prologue – the Reform of the Reforms 
In order to solve the problems of long-term unemployment, to improve employment in 
general, and to achieve the goal adopted by the Government, new initiatives were needed. 
The purpose of labour reform was to motivate and support the unemployed in their efforts 
to find work, to provide special training and education for re-entering the labour markets, 
and to add to the resources of the labour civil service to give a more individual service.  
For the Left a strong commitment to improve the unemployment situation was crucial, 
otherwise large cuts in public spending would not be accepted. Cuts in public spending 
were an essential part of promoting stability and also sustainable growth in the economy. 
This argument was emphasized by the Right. Both the Left and the Right considered 
economic growth to be a major factor in reducing unemployment. However, active 
measures were also needed, particularly because of long-term unemployment, but the 
nature of these measures was politically and ideologically controversial.  
The capacity of the labour civil service to absorb change had been sorely tested in the 
recent past. Harri Skog illustrated the fact by giving figures: during the previous five 
years over one hundred reforms and variations of them were introduced, which meant that 
every month the labour administration had to deal with an average of one-and-a-half 
reforms. This fact was the main reason for starting a process to make the system more 
transparent but also simpler. The idea was to speak straight to unemployed but also to 
find a new angle for policy in the labour market. 
Indeed, the system of labour market policy was complicated. Minister Jaakonsaari 
outlined the advisory work: 
“Actually it was my own idea, that the work should be done like this. It came from 
my own experience, as when I began my work as Minister of Labour, I found out 
how complicated and strange the system was. It was difficult even for me to get 
light on the matter. There had to be some sense. The system should be transparent 
and clear to decision-makers but above all to employment officials and to the 
unemployed. There needed to be some order in the matter. And then, it was my 
own decision that advisors should clarify the system… Not a committee because 
there was first of all no time for it, speed was important, and then, clarifying the 
system was not in that sense a large social reform, covering different social groups 
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widely, but was clearly the employment administration’s and the Ministry of 
Labour’s own project. And why nominate just Skog and Räisänen? My experience 
was that they were innovative and skilful civil servants. I could rely on them.”  
(”Se oli itse asiassa minun oma ajatus koko työ, että tehdään näin päin. Ihan siitä 
omasta kokemuksesta, että kun tulin työministeriksi niin huomasin kuinka 
monimutkainen ja omituinen on tämä järjestelmä, josta ei tahtonut itsekään oikein 
saada selvää. Tähän täytyy saada joku tolkku. Sen täytyy olla läpinäkyvä ja selvä 
ja nämä asiat täytyy olla päättäjille selviä mutta ennen kaikkea niitten täytyy olla 
selviä työvoimaviranomaisille ja työttömille. Jotain selkeyttä täytyy saada. Ja 
sitten se oli ihan minun oma päätös, että selvitysmiehet pistetään tekemään (...) 
Komiteaa ei sen takia koska tässä ei ollut ensinnäkään aikaa, nopeus on tärkeätä 
ja sitten tämä ei ollut sillä tavalla iso yhteiskunnallinen reformi, joka kattaisi 
laajasti eri alueita vaan tämä oli selvästi työvoimahallinnon, työministeriön oma 
projekti. Ja miksi sitten Skog ja Räisänen, ihan sen kokemuksen pohjalta mikä 
minulla oli, minusta he olivat innovatiivisia ja päteviä virkamiehiä. Minä pystyin 
luottamaan heihin.”) 
(Interview with Jaakonsaari)  
Harri Skog explained the basis of the advisory work: 
“It was the Government Programme, promoting employment and decreasing 
unemployment, or as it was said during the first Government led by Lipponen, 
halving unemployment. Actually, the larger framework of our work was 
contributed by the recession. The analysis of the functions of labour markets, 
unemployment and the employment services showed – we used it as a slogan – the 
labour market policy had not changed from the times of deep recession. On the 
one hand the activity of unemployed people and on the other hand the services of 
employment offices had disintegrated. We had stayed as we had been in the early 
years of the 1990s when the task of employment offices was mainly to register the 
unemployed and to try to get them somewhere else rather than keep them on the 
registers of employment offices. At the back of this project was ridding ourselves
of the positions and attitudes of the recession, and that was also the project’s 
starting point.” 
(”Hallitusohjelma, työllisyystavoite ja tavoite vähentää olennaisesti työttömyyttä 
tai niin kuin Lipposen 1. hallituksen aikaan puhuttiin puolittamisesta. Mutta se 
muu kuvio tuli itse asiassa laman seurauksena. Kun arvioitiin työmarkkinoiden 
toimintaa, työttömyyttä ja työvoimapalveluja niin todettiin, meillä oli se ikään 
kuin sloganina, että oli jääty lama-ajan asentoon työmarkkinoilla. Työttömien 
aktiivisuus ja toisaalta työvoimatoimistojen palvelut olivat rapautuneet. Oli jääty 
siihen aikaan kun 90-luvun alussa, jossa pitkälti työvoimatoimistot rekisteröivät 
työttömiä, yrittivät saada osan jonnekin muualla kuin pitää työttöminä 
työvoimatoimistossa. Tämän hankkeen taustalla oli ikään kuin irrottautua 
lama-ajan asennosta, tämä oli semmoinen lähtökohta.”) 
(Interview with Skog) 
 250
The work was organized with two separate sub-groups. Permanent Secretary Pertti Sorsa 
was the chairman of the academic group, which consisted of researchers. The advisors 
devised their own tasks.  
“We had a line open on the Internet where we could discuss and test the waters; 
not only the response of our own administrators but also from outside. We 
introduced the premises of our work to the OECD and also to organizations 
concerned with the labour market. Doing things together was considered to be 
important; that it was not only the Ministry who was doing this but also our whole 
service branch was involved... it made our job easier... the idea was to see the 
labour market policy as a way back for the unemployed to the labour markets, not
simply part of the social security system; as a part of the welfare society but not 
simply as a part.”
(”Meillä oli internetissä auki myös kanava, testattiin ja keskusteltiin paitsi omassa 
hallinnossa myös ulkopuolella. Sitten jopa OECD:ssa me esiteltiin uudistuksen 
peruslähtökohtia miten me tehdään mutta myös sitten työmarkkinajärjestöille. 
Erityisen tärkeänä pidettiin että tähän tullaan mukaan, ettei vaan ministeriö joka 
tekee, vaan että koko meidän palveluorganisaatio (...) se auttoi kyllä (...) 
työvoimapolitiikka nähtäisiin paluuväylänä työelämään eikä pelkästään 
sosiaaliturvajärjestelmänä. Osana hyvinvointiyhteiskuntaa mutta ei pelkästään 
osana.”) 
(Interview with Skog)  
The work started in November 1996 and it was completed in May 1997. The advisors’ 
brief was:  
…to describe and reform the aggregate system formed by unemployment security, 
labour market support, employment services, and other measures which directly 
promote employment. It also included the task defining the rights and obligations 
of unemployed job-seekers. The aim was to improve the functionality of the 
labour market and increase its efficacy in promoting employment.
(Räisänen and Skog, 1998, p. 1)  
The conclusions of the report include summaries of descriptions and analyses, as well as 
the proposals which were put forward on its basis. This summary gives a good picture of 
the challenges faced with respect to labour market policy at that period: 
• The public employment service is a very important tool in labour market policy 
and because of the strong dynamics of labour markets new requirements for 
effectiveness and expertise of the services are needed.  
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• Long-term unemployment can be curbed in two ways: by reducing the inflow or 
by increasing the outflow from long-term unemployment. New methods to 
increase the outflow have to be found. 
• Labour market policy must ensure a large supply of skilled people for the labour 
force. 
• Labour market policy must change course towards the promotion of professional 
skills and know-how. 
• The analysis of dead weight effects in labour markets underlines that particularly 
in labour market training there is a need to re-allocate measures favouring those 
who have been unemployed for some time. 
• Practical training programmes and their expansion may have resulted in 
disturbances to the normal course of labour market policy programmes instead 
supporting job-seekers’ search for suitable training. 
• The role of labour market policy has led to greater emphasis of distribution policy 
to secure the level of welfare while labour market policy should rather encourage 
increasing the level of welfare. 
• The structural description showed that the present labour market policy is not 
always structured logically though the reforms of subsidized work and 
unemployment security have brought various systems closer together. 
• Working-time policy has remained detached from the rest of labour market policy. 
It should be integrated. 
• The transparency of the labour market policy must be improved.  
(Räisänen & Skog, 1998, pp. 94-96)  
Based on the analyses and description of the system, some new guidelines and proposals 
to improve labour market policy were suggested by the advisors. Advisors Skog and 
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Räisänen emphasized that, “the most important principle in the proposed reforms is the 
overall intensification of effective full-time job-seeking” (ibid. p. 160). Proposals for 
improving the employment service process were also important. The key to the re-
organization of the service process lay in fixed-term interviews, accompanied by a job-
seeking booklet, a job-seeking plan, and skill mapping. Therefore the purpose was to 
increase the service capacity of employment offices in major cities, where unemployment 
was especially high.  
Reform of labour market support was needed as well as the reform of active programmes 
and promotion of recruitment. The advisors outlined their proposals to renew labour 
market support by preventing marginalization. One of the proposals was the payment of 
incentive fees to long-term unemployed people who found a job independently in the 
open labour market. The inflow of the unemployed to active programmes should be 
increased from the level of 238 000 to about 364 000 people. The advisors suggested also 
that the rights and duties of unemployed job-seekers should be announced, including 
some sticks and carrots.  
The right of the unemployed job-seeker was income benefit and basic services. The 
obligations arising from income benefits were, for example, an obligation to be available 
to the labour market and to improve one’s labour market skills, while the obligations 
arising from basic services were, for example, to provide information. Some of the 
proposals also required supplementary financial resources in the budget of the Ministry of 
Labour.
The advisors emphasized that the proposed measures would increase the dynamics of the 
labour market and unemployment.  
The unemployed would have unambiguous and uniform access to the support of 
the entire range of labour market policy measures for job-seeking in the open 
labour market. More effective promotion of employment would shorten the 
average duration of unemployment. (ibid. p. 165) 
The reform would also increase the service capacity and make the internal operation of 
the labour civil service more systematic. As a result of these measures it would be 
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possible, according to the advisors, to strengthen the operation of the market mechanism 
within the labour market policy system, to prevent marginalization, and to increase the 
importance of the labour market policy system as the point of interface for the supply and 
demand for labour (ibid. p. 166). 
It is a common opinion that there is plenty of work in Finland but that the unemployed are 
unwilling to take it, preferring just to stay at home. Harri Skog saw the matter differently. 
“At that time claims about the reluctance of the unemployed to accept work were 
often expressed. In a way we wanted to focus the issue in the other direction, 
trying to look for reforms that could give more regular possibilities to the 
unemployed and by offering services to test their readiness to work – but through 
a more natural way than before… We introduced the reform in various places 
from this starting point, so that when new elements were brought into the service 
process, like fixed-term interviews, individual job-seeking plans, training in job-
seeking, they were offered to a very large number of people, so that the issues 
were addressed without any dreadful need to discuss how many of them were 
motivated to work.”  
(”Silloinhan voimistuivat väitteet siitä, että työhaluttomuutta on aika paljon 
työttömien joukossa. Tavallaan haluttiin nostaa esille asia sitä kautta että 
yritetään etsiä sellaisia uudistuksia jotka tihentäisivät mahdollisuuksia ja 
palveluita jota kautta tulisi ikään kuin testatuksi työhalukkuutta mutta että se 
tapahtuisi luonnollisempaa tietä (...) Me esiteltiin tätä eri paikoissa juuri sillä 
tavalla että kun tuodaan tähän palveluprosessiin näitä eri toimia haastattelut, 
työnhakusuunnitelmat, työnhakukurssit, joita tarjotaan erittäin suurelle määrälle 
niin se tavallaan selvittää näitä kysymyksiä ilman että tarvitsee käydä hirveästi 
keskustelua siitä, että kuinka monta työtöntä siellä on työhalutonta.”) 
(Interview with Skog)  
The response of Minister Jaakonsaari was excited. 
“The advisors’ report contained a lot of new thinking and, something I was 
particularly excited about, a new formulation of unemployment benefit. It had 
never before been formulated in such an understandable manner, that an 
unemployment allowance was a compensation for that period of time when a 
person was looking for a job or was improving his/her skills to re-enter to the 
labour market… We’d been used to thinking that unemployment was a stable 
position and an unemployed person could stay a long time without work. It was an 
attempt to make it clear that unemployment was a temporary phase, during which 
a person was all the time looking for work or improving skills – was actually a full 
time job-seeker. In one interview I said that the whole term ‘an unemployed 
person’ should be rejected, that there are only people with know-how available.
This expression caused disapproving reactions… Somebody said that I was 
mocking the unemployed. On the contrary! The idea was that employers should 
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realize there were plenty of capable people who were ready to enter labour 
market. The word ‘an unemployed person’ became like a stigma during the 
recession.”
(”Siinä selvitysmiesten raportissa oli erittäin paljon uutta ajattelua ja josta 
erityisesti innostuin, että siinä työttömyysturva määriteltiin uudella tavalla. Sitä ei 
tiettävästi oltu koskaan ymmärrettävästi määritelty, että työttömyysturva on 
korvausta siltä ajalta kun ihminen etsii työtä tai parantaa omia 
työmarkkinavalmiuksiaan (...) meillä oli jo totuttu aika paljon siihen, että se on 
pysyvä olotila ja ihminen voi olla työtön vaikka kuinka kauan. Siinä yritettiin 
määritellä, että se on väliaikainen tila, jonka aikana ihminen koko ajan hakee 
työtä tai parantaa valmiuksia (...) on päätoiminen työnhakija. Jossain 
haastattelussa sanoin, että koko työtön sana pitäisi hylätä että on vain vapaita 
osaajia. Sehän herätti närkästystä (...) joku jopa sanoi, että minä pilkkaan 
työttömiä. Sehän oli just toisin päin! Ajatus oli, että työnantajatkin näkevät, että 
on paljon osaavia ihmisiä, jotka ovat valmiita työmarkkinoille. Se työtön sana 
siitä alkoi tulla lama-aikana niin kuin stigma ihmisille.”)
(Interview with Jaakonsaari)  
Harri Skog also remembers Minister Jaakonsaari’s enthusiasm. 
“One time Jaakonsaari came out of her office and said: ‘Hi guys, I have read the 
report through now’. Then she said she was ready to push the proposals forwards,
she had not understood everything – some technical jargon – but she took the 
attitude that she would now make efforts to promote these particular themes. It 
played an important role when the Government handled the matter. The 
Permanent Secretary, who was chairing the academic group or the group of 
specialists, also supported the work. He had a wide and, to my mind, an excellent 
view as an economist. ‘If we do not doing something like this, we will not succeed 
in Finland.’ So we had support inside the Ministry.”  
(”Jaakonsaari tuli kerran työhuoneestaan innostuneena. Hän sanoi, että pojat, 
minä olen lukenut nyt tämän kokonaan. Sitten hän sanoi, että nyt tätä ruvetaan 
viemään eteenpäin, että kaikkea en ymmärtänyt – tutkijakieltä – mutta hän otti 
sellaisen asenteen, että nyt hän ryhtyy viemään näitä tiettyjä teemoja läpi. Se 
vaikutti hallituksen käsittelyssä. Kansliapäällikkö, joka veti akateemikkoryhmää 
tai tätä asiantuntijaryhmää katsoi, että tätä on ryhdyttävä toteuttamaan. Hänellä 
oli laaja ja minusta hyvä ekonomistinäkemys siitä, että ellei me jotain tällaista 
tehdä niin me ei (Suomessa) pärjätä. Siinä oli ministeriön sisällä tuki.”) 
(Interview with Skog)  
The report was brought to an Evening School of the Government; it was introduced to key 
civil servants in the Ministry of Finance, as well as to key Parliamentary Committees and 
Groups. The information flows were open. However, the reception at the Evening School 
was a disappointment. In spite of the positive approach of the civil servants at the 
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Ministry of Finance, Minister Niinistö strongly criticized the report, particularly on two 
proposals. The most controversial matter seemed to be the right to an incentive fee 
(kannustusraha). The incentive fee would be payable to an unemployed person who had 
been unemployed for more than 500 days and had received labour market support. The 
idea was to give a complementary motive for job-seeking. The proposal to increase active 
efforts, which meant additional employment officers, was also rejected by Minister 
Niinistö, at first in the Evening School and finally in the budget negotiations. 
The Prime Minister’s Advisor, Jorma Westlund, said in his interview: 
“The concept of an active labour market policy was – although the matter was not 
verbally expressed, it was certainly an influence – obviously emotionally loaded.
The attitudes of the Ministry of Finance were sceptical, whereas the Ministry of 
Labour shared various, more positive expectations about what could be achieved 
with the help of active labour market policy. But, to my mind, another latent 
pressure had significance and that was the reform of administration of the 
Ministry which was going on at the same time. What would happen if reform of 
the Ministry’s internal management systems was settling into place at the same 
time as the Ministry itself was bringing matters of substance into operation.”  
(”Siinä oli niin, ilman että sitä tuotiin sanallisesti esille, mutta että vaikutti siltä, 
että käsitteeseen aktiivinen työvoimapolitiikka liittyi latausta. 
Valtiovarainministeriössä siihen suhtauduttiin kovin skeptisesti ja 
työministeriössä oli eriasteisia hyvin positiivisia latauksia siitä mitä kaikkea 
aktiivitoimilla voidaankaan aikaansaada. Sitten minusta vaikutti myös toinen 
latentti paine, joka oli työvoimaministeriön hallintouudistus, joka oli menossa 
samaan aikaan. Miten sitten työvoimaministeriön sisäiset johtamisjärjestelyt 
asettautuivat samaan aikaan kun itse substanssia kehitettiin.”) 
(Interview with Westlund) 
But a new ideology or approach was not interesting enough.  
“This seems to be the problem of labour market policy, so we tried to make 
proposals, but since they were not simply about action or money, our point – what 
was most essential – was not interesting; but perhaps we didn’t manage to present
the report adequately.”
(”Tämä on jotenkin sellainen alue (työvoimapolitiikka), että koetaan, että kun 
ehdotukset eivät olleet pelkästään toimenpiteitä tai rahaa, niin se ei kiinnostanut 
mikä siinä meidän mielestä oli olennaista mutta me ei varmaan osattu riittävästi 
kuvata.”) 
(Interview with Skog) 
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However, the presentation of the advisory report was appropriate, in spite of the fact that 
the terminology of labour market policy is complicated. Prime Minister Lipponen used to 
say to his colleagues, who started to ask questions and argue with each other, that 
Evening School was not a seminar. Indeed, the nature of the Evening School had changed 
from being an informal and free discussion to a formal gathering.  
LJ: But that is the style of the Evening School, nowadays. However, we did some 
preparatory work, Skog, Räisänen and I paid a visit together to Sailas beforehand 
and to the various parliamentary groups. We wanted to ensure political support in 
advance. I also noted, or in any case I got an impression, that the people in the 
Ministry of Finance, especially Hetemäki, did understand the idea of the reform.  
AA: Yes, they did and I know that.  
LJ: And that helped a lot. I was also in the habit of informing Zyskowicz 
separately every now and then. I did this because he enjoyed my confidence, he 
was ready to listen and make an effort to understand. But Niinistö neither cared 
nor did he want to listen. And he had enormous antipathy towards the Ministry, 
the administration of employment and, as a side effect, also towards the 
unemployed.
(LJ: Mutta sellainenhan iltakoulun tyyli on nyt ollut. Mutta me tehtiin niin, että me 
käytiin sitä ennen kolmestaan Skog, Räisänen ja minä, Sailaksen luona ja 
eduskuntaryhmissä. Haluttiin poliittinen hyväksyntä varmistaa etukäteen ja sen 
minä huomasin – että erityisesti Hetemäki – joka tapauksessa minä sain sen 
kuvan, että vm:n ihmiset ymmärsivät sen idean.  
AA: Niin ymmärsivätkin, minä tiedän sen. 
LJ: Ja se auttoi paljon. Ja sitten minulla oli tapana aina Zyskowiczille silloin 
tällöin erikseen informoida koska minä olin alkanut luottaa, että hänkin ymmärtää 
ja jaksaa paneutua kun taas Niinistö oli sellainen, joka ei jaksanut eikä välittänyt 
kuunnella. Ja hänellä oli äärettömän suuret antipatiat koko ministeriötä, 
työhallintoa ja siinä sivussa työttömiä kohtaan.) 
(Interview with Jaakonsaari)  
The Government did not pay any particular attention to the report. But what was the 
response of the Parliament? 
AA: How would you describe the reception of these various proposals in the 
parliamentary groups? 
LJ: Well, it was after all quite passive. Somehow I got the impression that labour 
market policy is generally quite unclear to people. I suppose the ghost of some 
‘trick employment policy’ fluttered, at least to some extent, behind this attitude. 
AA: So, there should have been something mould-breaking. 
 LJ: Yes, something mould-breaking! One said that the working time should be 
shortened; another that early retirement should be allowed. A third suggested that 
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entrepreneurship should be promoted. The real world of unemployment was not 
after all clear to people, not the scale of the problem and how to approach it.
(AA: Mikä sinusta oli eduskuntaryhmien vastaanotto näille eri ehdotuksille?  
LJ: No. Aika passiivinen loppujen lopuksi. Jotenkin minulle jäi semmoinen kuva, 
että yleensä tämä työvoimapolitiikka on sittenkin hahmottumaton ihmisille ja oli 
vielä vähän niin kuin tempputyöllistämisen haamua takana.  
AA: Olisi siis pitänyt keksiä jokin mullistava juttu?  
LJ: Mullistava juttu. Joku sanoi, että työaikaa pitää lyhentää ja toinen sanoi, että 
eläkkeelle pitäisi päästä. Kolmas, että yritteliäisyyttä pitää edistää. Sittenkään ei 
ollut se reaalimaailma sillä tavalla selvä, että mikä on ongelman suuruus ja millä 
tavalla voidaan sitä lähestyä.)
(Interview with Jaakonsaari) 
Indeed, the support of the Ministry was given by Permanent Secretary Pertti Sorsa, but 
not without surprises:
“These matters are highly sensitive. The responses of various departments of the 
Ministry, requested by Permanent Secretary, were quite reluctant although some 
of the civil servants had been members of the group chaired by Sorsa. But when it 
was possible to put things on paper, we could see that we were too close to their 
territories. Some of the departments had extremely strong positions in the 
Ministry.” 
(”Ne ovat arkoja tunteita herättäviä asioita. Lausunnot, kun kansliapäällikkö 
pyysi eri osastoilta, olivat aika nihkeitä kaikki vaikka osa ihmisistä oli ryhmässä 
mukana, jota Sorsa veti. Mutta sitten kun ne sai panna paperille niin sitten näkyi 
se, että me liikuttiin liikaa reviireillä. Ministeriön sisällä oli voimakkaita 
osastoja.”) 
(Interview with Skog) 
Finnish labour market policy was like a jigsaw. New orders were given frequently – it 
was too complicated and there was a need to clarify policy. The work done by Skog and 
Räisänen offered a new approach to labour market policy which could be characterized as 
active and tailor-made. New policy would also imply changes in the attitudes and 
working methods of the administrators, as well as more resources to labour 
administration. Minister Jaakonsaari, one of the key actors of the case, was excited and 
ready for action. However, there was more or less resistance; reform was emotionally and 
politically loaded both inside the Ministry – because of restructuring of the administration 
– and among the governmental parties, too.
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B: Launching the Initiatives
In spite of some doubts and rejections, Minister of Labour Liisa Jaakonsaari wanted to 
promote the reform, at least to canvass public support. She decided to order some 
consultant work to clarify the core messages of the reform. The brief was also to analyze 
the media response to the advisory report, in order to develop the proposals in a manner 
more suitable for public debate. The purpose was also to find out what kind material was 
needed to promote labour reform – the pattern of thinking of the particular reform. It was 
also necessary to study the expectations of the social partners. For this specific mission 
outside capacity was needed. 
In spring 1997 Minister Jaakonsaari made the decision to use a special consultant firm 
called Grey Eminence. The firm Grey Eminence was apparently familiar to her since the 
Ministry had used its services earlier. It also employed her former colleague as an MP and 
in the party, Ulpu Iivari, who was working there after losing her seat in Parliament. No 
competitive tendering was carried out, a fact that was used later as an argument that there 
had been favouritism. The study made by Grey Eminence was not public, since it was 
more or less reconnoitring and mapping the field of action. 
“It was my own idea [to use the services of consultants]... To tell the truth, it 
[putting the bid out to tender] never crossed my mind because I didn’t even know 
there were plenty of other consultant firms concentrating on social matters… Of 
course it would have been right to ask even just as a formality. But no one, either 
civil servants or others, said that I should organize it like that. 
(”Ajatus oli minun (käyttää konsulttipalveluja) (...) Minulle ei suoraan sanoen 
edes tullut mieleen koska mä en edes tiennyt, että tällaisia firmoja olisi kauhean 
paljon, jotka tekevät yhteiskunnallista konsultaatiotyötä (...) Sellainen olisi 
tietenkin ollut hyvä järjestää ihan vaan muotosyistäkin. Minulle ei kukaan 
virkamiehistä eikä muistakaan sanonut, että olisi pitänyt järjestää.”) 
(Interview with Jaakonsaari) 
It was customary practice for the Ministry of Labour to use some consulting help in 
various projects. According to the interviews, the practice of using outside resources also 
caused criticism within the Ministry. For the Chief of Communications, Karri Varmo, 
however, it was natural to utilize exterior know-how because of the Ministry’s limited 
resources, nor were lobbying or campaigning exactly familiar territory for the Ministry, 
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and Varmo was present when the guidelines for the consulting work were dealt with. But 
it is also obvious that the Ministry’s Permanent Secretary Pertti Sorsa was not informed 
or at least that he was surprised at the use of the outside expertise. 
Harri Skog said in his interview: 
“I think that in the background [of using a consulting firm] was the idea that this 
was a different kind of work. Perhaps the Minister predicted that this would be 
difficult to push through and to get messages across and so she probably thought 
that some extra efforts were needed. Perhaps, because of her own background [as 
a former journalist], the Minister was starting from the position that the reform 
should be given a launch. I do not know how she decided on Grey Eminence.”  
(”Minä luulen, että taustalla oli ajatus kun tämä oli erityyppinen työ. Ministeri 
varmaan näki, että tämä on vaikea viedä läpi ja saada viestitettyä, niin hänellä 
varmaan oli tällainen ajatus, että tähän pitää saada jokin voima ja ministeri sitten 
omasta taustastaan lähti siitä, että uudistus pitäisi lanseerata. Sitä en sitten tiedä, 
miten hän päätyi Grey Eminenceen.”) 
(Interview with Skog) 
Consultant Ulpu Iivari described the starting point of the consulting work. 
“Our job was actually not only to study how the messages went through in the 
media but also trying to be involved with the process, to help in crystallizing them 
from quite a large and complicated entirety. I still believe the employment 
administration should try to clarify its messages… I was personally excited about 
the idea of dealing with every single long-term unemployed person individually 
and making the system simpler. When we began our consultation, it came out that 
new instructions were delivered to offices approximately once a month. I 
understood that the mission of the reform was to make things clearer, simpler, 
more encouraging and more individual. In that sense I started my work 
wholeheartedly but at the same time I was very careful not to be involved in 
contractual issues in any way.” 
(”Mehän ei itse asiassa tutkittu vain viestien läpimenoa vaan me yritimme olla 
mukana siinä, että aika monimutkaista isosta kokonaisuudesta saataisiin ne viestit 
kirkastetuksi ja minä olen edelleen sitä mieltä, että työvoimahallinnon pitäisi 
kirkastaa viestejänsä (...) Minua innostutti kauheasti semmoinen ajatus, että 
jokaista pitkäaikaistyötöntä voitaisiin henkilökohtaisesti palvella ja että 
yksinkertaistettaisiin näitä asioita. Silloin kun me aloitettiin tämä työ tuli ilmi, että 
työvoimatoimistoihin oli tullut suunnilleen kerran kuukaudessa uudet ohjeet. Minä 
ymmärsin niin, että nyt oli tarkoitus tehdä sellainen uudistus, joka selkiyttäisi 
tilannetta, joka tekisi sen yksinkertaisemmaksi, kannustavammaksi ja tekisi sen 
yksilöllisemmäksi. Siinä mielessä minä lähdin siihen aivan täydellä sydämellä 
mukaan samalla kun pidin huolen kyllä siitä, että mikä liittyi kontrahtin tekoon, en 
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ollut siinä millään tavalla mukana.”) 
(Interview with Iivari) 
Ulpu Iivari’s duty at Grey Eminence was to serve customers by giving information about 
the terrain of decision-making processes. Customers, generally, wanted to know what 
issues were important for the receivers of the messages. The co-operation between 
advisors and Grey Eminence functioned well, and the only problem was limited time. 
Minister Jaakonsaari was not involved in this work. 
The contribution of Grey Eminence helped to modify messages towards a more 
understandable form. The research was composed of two separate parts. The first part 
consisted of the summary of several interviews. Those, who were interviewed, were key-
persons of the labour movement, the employers’ organization and the political parties. 
This specific part was conducted by Ulpu Iivari. The second part of the work was a study 
of the media response, which Grey Eminence also carried out. Articles written about the 
labour reform were evaluated, along with the journalists. The evaluation was based on the 
examination of whether the article was considered neutral, negative or positive. The 
general finding was that the media response was slightly negative (The PCA-analysis of 
the Labour Reform, 1997).  
The Public Content Analysis (PCA) involved studying a total of 97 articles, published in 
51 newspapers during June 1997. A statement in an article could be either interpretative, 
objective or value loaded; either semantic, structural (strukturaalinen) or pragmatic. 
Altogether 273 statements were registered and evaluated, indicating that the reform was 
largely reported. The focus of articles was generally on the substance of the reform, that is 
structural (53% of all statements), and on evaluation of the reform, that is semantic (45% 
of statements). Pragmatic statements accounted for only 2%, which means that little of the 
grass-roots experience of unemployed people was reported. As a part of this content 
analysis a value index was made, both according to newspapers and to journalists. This 
index caused later the scandal of black lists (The PCA-analysis of the Labour Reform, 
1997).
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The response to the labour reform in media showed little enthusiasm, being more 
informative than evaluative. However, the incentive fee generated most of the headlines, 
although it was reported as a small detail in a large whole. The comment was that the fee 
meant offering bribes, that lazy people would be paid for work. Societal consequences 
were also evaluated: the state is getting rid of unpleasant duties just by paying people off 
(ibid. p. 6). This response reflected the tendency to see unemployed people as objects of 
control, help or expense, and confirms Skog and Räisänen’s analysis. However, the new 
approach was also welcomed and quite a number of commentators evaluated the reform 
to be beneficial in terms of the state economy. 
The response of the social partners was dual. Trade unions were afraid of differentiation 
of labour markets. Low-paid jobs might be a threat to the bargaining system. Subsidized 
work might damage competitiveness in the private sector, too. Representatives of the 
entrepreneurs considered tailor-made services to be a dream in a country with mass 
unemployment (ibid. p. 7). 
The goal of halving unemployment was one of the central ambitions of the Government, 
and Labour Reform was considered to be a tool to reach this objective. Certainly more 
financial resources would have been needed, too. Unfortunately that was not the logic of 
the Government. “There is a lot of talk but very little action; it is a custom of Finnish 
politics not to put additional resources into anything to solve problems”, according to one 
interviewee.  
The fences of various ministries were simply too high. If a colleague of Jaakonsaari 
supported her in her efforts to obtain more financial resources, he or she could be 
“punished” by the Ministry of Finance in his/her own sector. The punishment would then 
mean losing resources valuable to the Ministry that he or she represented and, therefore, 
failure. The Ministry of Labour’s solution was to scrape together the needed resources 
from their own budget by reducing other activities of the Ministry. However, Harri Skog 
said in his interview: 
“All major proposals were carried out. We call it the employment service process 
– the job-seeking interviews and job-seeking booklets – it was adopted, and the 
 262
needed legislation was prepared... Also payments of labour market subsidies to the 
employers and the combinations with employment subsidies were carried out, 
including the reform of adult labour market training, as well as the transformation 
from the life-management training to the occupational training. All these major 
proposals, essential to the service process, were adopted. We managed to get half 
of the proposed officers. We had in our report a map of what we wanted and 
where we wanted it. In the second, later wave of the reform it became clear that 
the resources at major offices were not enough to serve the people because of the 
great volume of customers. Although the burden is not heavier than in small 
offices, if there are 17 000 customers and 100 officers it is a different thing from 
ten officers and around a hundred customers in the same ratio. 
(”Kaikki pääehdotukset toteutettiin. Me kutsutaan tätä palveluprosessiksi, 
työnhakuhaastattelut työnhakukirja otettiin käyttöön ja tehtiin lainsäädäntö (...) Ja 
sitten yhdistelmätuet toteutettiin, työvoimakoulutus toteutettiin, siirtyminen 
elämänhallintakoulutuksesta ammatilliseen koulutukseen. Kaikki nämä isommat, 
jotka liittyvät palveluprosessiin. Viroista saatiin puolet. Meillä oli siellä oikein 
kartta mitä me olisi haluttu ja mille paikkakunnille. Toisessa aallossa sitten 
paljastui se asia, että resurssit eivät olleet riittäneet toteuttamaan asioita suurten 
toimistojen alueella asiakasvolyymin takia. Vaikka kuormitus ei olisikaan isompi 
kuin pienissä mutta jos on 17 000 asiakasta ja 100 neuvojaa niin se on eri asia 
kuin samassa suhteessa kymmenen neuvojaa ja joku sata asiakasta.”) 
(Interview with Skog)  
Later the reform was evaluated as having produced a positive impact, despite only having 
been in effect for a short time (Valtakari, 2000). The whole range of effects from the 
changes could not been scrutinized, but the overall benefits, resulting from the 
systematization of the service process and the introduction of new tools, had improved the 
operation of the public employment service. 
C: A Secret is Exposed – a Typhoon
The launching of these initiatives turned into a political scandal – nearly a year later. The 
typhoon began when somebody from the Ministry of Labour dropped a hint to a journalist 
at Iltalehti that some quite expensive research work had been ordered from a consultant 
firm. The source said that the work was very poor and that Ulpu Iivari was involved. 
Iltalehti (Almamedia) found out that the Ministry had used the services of Grey 
Eminence. At the same time, Ulpu Iivari was under the lens because of her 
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responsibilities as a consultant and it was publicly debated whether or not it was 
appropriate for a former politician to work as a consultant.  
The first headlines appeared: “Liisa Jaakonsaari: Our own resources were not enough. 
Ulpu Iivari has consulted for the Ministry of Labour, for 170 000 markkas” (”Liisa 
Jaakonsaari: Omat resurssimme eivät riittäneet. Ulpu Iivari konsultoi työministeriötä 
170 000 markalla”). Iltalehti published a large article about the consultancy work, along 
with three pictures, namely photographs of Ulpu Iivari, Minister Jaakonsaari and Ulf 
Sundqvist, all members of the Social Democratic Party. Ulf Sundqvist had done some 
projects for Grey Eminence, but before 1996, and it is obvious that his picture was 
included because of his former capacity as chairman of the Social Democratic Party and 
to bring in association with a political scandal in banking, in which he had been involved 
(IL 25.3.1998).
On 27th March 1998 Iltalehti reported that the research work was secret, which in a sense 
it was, but only insofar as it was classified as preparatory material and therefore not 
public. A former Minister of Justice, MP Anneli Jäätteenmäki (the Centre Party), reacted 
immediately, demanding to see the report.  
Kim Nyberg, who was the chairman of the association of consultants, criticized the price 
of the work and the fact that no other offers had been sought for the job (KL 30.3.1998). 
The title of the article was: “Using old contacts is not lobbying” (”Vanhojen suhteiden 
käyttö ei ole lobbausta”), and his statement confirmed the impression of favouritism. 
Ulpu Iivari tried to explain her position, her need to work for income, and said it was 
unfair to focus on the firm negatively because of her. Minister Jaakonsaari could not 
remember all the details in her public statements and she was inexact in her comments. 
Yet the scandal was about the use of a firm of consultants, so far. 
The peak of the scandal was reached, however, on 1st April 1998 when Iltalehti got hold 
of a copy of the report. It brought into the daylight a list, in which various newspapers and 
individual journalists had been evaluated according to PCA-technique. Since the value 
index could be negative, neutral or positive, it was seen as evidence of a black list, a list 
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of discrimination. The reason for secrecy was now announced to be that the work was in 
fact “a black list of journalists”. The plot changed suddenly. The news was no longer 
about the expensive consultants: now the issue was freedom of the press; if journalist 
were classified, the free press must be under threat.  
Minister Jaakonsaari was not prepared for this change of the plot either. She denied the 
existence of a list. Journalists already had a copy of it, so evidently Minister Jaakonsaari 
was a liar. The assertion was verified with a photograph – that will be analyzed later – but 
also in front of television cameras. For example, Ilkka referred to a broadcast in its 
editorial published two days later:  
Liisa’s turn to leave? It might be the first time in our history that a Finnish 
Minister has been caught lying as fast as Minister of Labour Liisa Jaakonsaari. 
She kept on repeating in a television interview: no black lists exist – while, at the 
same time, the lists could be seen on the screen.
(Liisan vuoro lähteä? Liekö suomalainen ministeri ennen jäänyt kiinni niin 
nopeasti valehtelusta kuin työministeri Liisa Jaakonsaari hokiessaan TV – 
haastattelussa, ettei mitään ‘mustia listoja’ ole olemassakaan – samaan aikaan 
kun listat pyörivät ruudussa.)
(Ilkka 3.4.1998)
The Chairman of the Finnish League of Journalists, Pekka Laine, was interviewed too. He 
said in Iltalehti (1.4.1998) that such kinds of lists were dangerous and there could be no 
other purpose than to influence the work of journalists in an improper way. The Ministry 
had let the cat out of the bag and the situation was now loaded with passion. Liisa 
Jaakonsaari said in her interview:   
“I am still angry at the term black list. In my ideology black lists, in the full sense 
of the word, denote discrimination against people because of their convictions. 
The whole debate became so Orwellian.”  
(”Minua vieläkin korpeaa musta lista. Minun maailmankuvassani se merkitsee 
sitä, että ihmisiä aletaan vakaumuksen perusteella syrjimään. Tämähän meni niin 
orwellilaiseksi koko keskustelu.”) 
(Interview with Jaakonsaari) 
The Ministry of Labour was in panic. A news conference was organised for the following 
day, 2.4.1998, but even the date was wrong in the press release. Minister Jaakonsaari was, 
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however, prepared and published all the material, urging journalists to call the list “Liisa’s 
list”. She tried to become a self-made spin doctor. 
Some kind of uncertainty still existed: what was the nature of the list, was it an official 
register regulated by the law?  The value index was legal but still many question remarks 
remained. One of the journalists asked Minister Jaakonsaari round-eyed if she would still 
be getting information from the Ministry, despite having written negatively about the 
reform. Jaakonsaari said she felt completely helpless in that situation. The idea was to 
give more information to those who did not have full comprehension of the reform. On 
the contrary, the information would be doubled, she said.  
The culmination of the scandal happened on the same day. MTV3 (Almamedia’s 
television channel) interviewed Osmo Wiio, Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at 
Tampere University. He assured them that the content analysis made by the firm of 
consultants was a very common method in media studies. When he was asked whether it 
was wrong to call the list a black list, he answered: “I think it is wrong to call the list a 
black list” (transcript of interview with Wiio, 2.4.1998) 
In Parliament, during the Question Hour (2.4.1998) organized that afternoon, the lists and 
consultants’ work were heavily criticized. MP Anneli Jäätteenmäki put a question to 
Minister Niinistö, also Deputy Prime Minister, and acting in Prime Minister Lipponen’s 
absence. Jäätteenmäki wanted to know if the use of a consulting firm was in accordance 
with the principles of good administration, and if there was any advantage for taxpayers. 
Minister Niinistö referred to Minister Jaakonsaari’s statement, repeating that no black 
lists existed. However, he continued: 
I have wondered myself if Ministries really do need to research what the opinion 
of the media is about their activities. Personally I can say that it is easy to examine 
just by reading the newspapers in the mornings. 
(Olen itsekin vähän ihmetellyt, olisiko jollain ministeriöllä tarvetta tutkituttaa, 
mitä mieltä media on ministeriön toiminnasta. Omakohtaisesti voin todeta, että 
sen kyllä yleensä huomaa viimeistään aamuisin lehtiä lukiessa.) 
(SKT 203/1998 www.eduskunta.fi) 
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Minister Jaakonsaari counter-attacked by asserting the whole matter to be a 
misunderstanding.  
The reason why this kind of content analysis and information plan have been 
made was our desire to improve the efficiency of our marketing efforts so that 
employers, the unemployed and NGOs would be informed about the core 
messages of the labour market policy. The idea is originally from Denmark, where 
reform of labour market policy was successful, because it was promoted and 
marketed with efficiency. I am actually glad; perhaps because of the lists MP 
Jäätteenmäki is now interested in the reform of labour market policy.
(Syy miksi tämmöinen sisältäanalyysi ja viestintäsuunnitelma on tehty, on se, että 
halusimme työvoimapoliittisen uudistuksen markkinointia tehostaa niin, että 
työnantajat, työttömät ja kansalaisjärjestöt saavat ydinviestin uudistuksen 
sisällöstä tietoonsa. Idea tähän tuli Tanskasta, jossa juuri työvoimapolitiikan 
uudistus onnistui sen takia, että se tehokkaasti tuotteistettiin ja markkinoitiin. 
Olen iloinen siitä, että ehkä tämän takia myös edustaja Jäätteenmäki on nyt 
kiinnostunut tästä työvoimapoliittisesta uudistuksesta.) (ibid.) 
Both the Minister of Environment, Pekka Haavisto, and the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Antti Kalliomäki, participated in the debate stating that they had also used the 
services of the same consulting firm. Minister Haavisto (the Green Party) regretted the 
matter, saying that it had not made any difference. Minister Kalliomäki (the Social 
Democratic Party) was more positive in his comments. Nevertheless Minister of Finance 
Sauli Niinistö repeated once more that the use of consultants was not desirable. The 
statements of Haavisto and Niinistö irritated Social Democrats. Expressions used in 
interview include: “They act like grave robbers. When a colleague is in trouble, they are 
delighted in misfortunes of others.” “There was some kind of hysteria in the air; save 
yourself as best you can.” 
However, Professor Wiio was an authoritative person and his statement calmed the 
scandal. The headline of Ilta-Sanomat’s editorial on 4th April 1998 read: “The ‘black list’ 
raised a storm in a teacup” (”‘Musta lista’ nosti myrskyn vesilasissa”). Iltalehti made a 
final effort on 7th April 1998: “Professor Wiio has not even seen the study itself. The 
statement used by Liisa Jaakonsaari is cast in a suspicious light”. (”Professori Osmo A. 
Wiio ei ole edes nähnyt kohuraporttia. Liisa Jaakonsaaren käyttämä asiantuntijalausunto 
joutui outoon valoon.”)
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A final comment was published in Suomenmaa 16.4.1998 (a partisan newspaper of the 
Centre Party). The writer Pirkko Welin admitted in her column to being old-fashioned in 
her analysis of the black lists, that for her images and image-building should not be the 
main issue and what really mattered was unemployment and what would happen to it 
(Suomenmaa 16.4.1998). 
D: After the Typhoon – the media is never wrong
Minister Jaakonsaari was in the middle of a typhoon and tried to manage it by herself. 
According to the interview material, neither informal discussion in the Government nor in 
the Social Democratic Party was conducted during the typhoon. Minister Jaakonsaari did 
not have a conversation with Prime Minister Lipponen either. 
Minister Jaakonsaari informed the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group but no 
common strategy was planned for controlling the crisis. However, the Chief of 
Communication, Karri Varmo, was helping his Minister. Westlund summarizes the 
procedure: “Liisa was taking care of the matter. It might be that I asked in an assistants’ 
meeting what was going on” (”Liisa hoiteli hommaa tai asiaa ja saatoin ehkä 
erityisavustajapalaverissa kysellä, että mitä tälle on tapahtumassa”) (Interview with 
Westlund).
Nevertheless, Grey Eminence had its problems, too.  
“It is paradoxical. When the communication company is in the middle of a 
communication crisis, it is unable to act...We were quite helpless for a while.” 
(”Onhan tässä vähän surkuhupainen puoli, että kun viestintätoimisto joutuu 
kriisiin niin se ei itse pystynyt kauhean hyvin toimimaan kriisiviestinnässä (...) 
Kyllä me oltiin aika neuvottomia jonkun aikaa.”) 
(Interview with Iivari)  
Iivari was in the spotlight during the first days, but later became uninteresting. 
“It is clear now, thinking the matter afterwards, that we should have reacted 
together [with Liisa Jaakonsaari] and fast. But in this particular case, the Ministry 
of Labour was just a single case among others. There had already been already 
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other tabloid sales posters about me and my work. In a way there was some kind 
of exhaustion going on. I was afterwards very surprised that I really had the 
strength to go to my job every day on the Number 1 tram when a new terrible 
sales poster was published every day.”  
(”Näin jälkikäteen ajatellen meidän olisi pitänyt toimia yhdessä ja nopeammin. 
Mutta kun tämä työministeriön juttu oli vaan yksi juttu. Siinä oli ollut edellä tämä 
minun töistäni aikaisemmin, että oli aika monta lööppiä. Siinä oli jo sellaista 
uupumusta. Kyllä mä jälkeenpäin olen ihmetellyt, että kuinka mä joka aamu 
jaksoin ykkösen ratikalla mennä töihin kun joka päivä oli joku kamala lööppi.”) 
(Interview with Iivari) 
Ulpu Iivari continued her analysis blaming herself: 
“But I made one great mistake in all this. When you go to work in a consulting 
firm, you should act like a grey eminence. On the other hand our previous Chief 
Director, who actually hired me there, wished me to give some interviews. I did so 
and said what I was doing. Perhaps that awakened the sleeping bear, competitors 
and jealous people. Definitely, I should not have done that.” 
(”Mutta minä tein tässä kaikessa yhden suuren virheen. Kun menee tällaisiin 
töihin niin pitäisi todella olla grey eminence mutta toisaalta meidän edellinen 
toimitusjohtaja, joka palkkasi minut, toivoi, että minä antaisin haastatteluja. Minä 
annoinkin muutaman haastattelun siitä, että mitä minä teen. Ja ehkä se sitten 
herätti nukkuvan karhun ja kilpailijat ja kadehtijat. Sitä ei varmaankaan olisi 
pitänyt tehdä.”) 
(Interview with Iivari) 
Consulting firms in general were dissatisfied with the unpleasant publicity which could 
harm their future business. Their work had been evaluated in unfavourable light (IS
31.3.1998). The scandal affected Grey Eminence particularly harmfully, as the company 
does not exist anymore. The publicity was too much for a lobbying firm.  
AA: You said Grey Eminence does not exist anymore? 
UI: No, not anymore. The firm changed its name and now it has finished its 
activities totally. But in reality this was the reason why the company fell. 
(AA: Niin sanoit, että Grey Eminenceä ei enää ole olemassa?  
UI: Ei. Sehän vaihtoi sen jälkeen nimensä ja nythän se on loppunut kokonaan. 
Mutta kyllähän se tähän kaatui se toimisto käytännössä.)
(Interview with Iivari) 
Nevertheless, Ulpu Iivari did two things. She had asked the Data Protection Ombudsman 
to study the matter to clarify whether the value-index was appropriate or not, and the 
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Ombudsman’s Office later gave its decision that no inappropriate lists or registers had 
been made and that the list which analyzed journalists’ attitudes was not an improper 
register according to the legislation. In addition she informed the League of Journalists 
about the study. Ulpu Iivari also asked MP Anneli Jäätteenmäki to pay a visit to Grey 
Eminence to see with her own eyes the work done in the company. 
“It took quite a while before she finally came. When she did, I introduced our 
activities to her, we had some coffee and very nice time together and finally 
Anneli said with a smile that the elections were coming.” 
(”Hänellä kesti aika kauan ennen kuin hän lopulta tuli. Sitten hän tuli, minä 
esittelin toimintaa ja juotiin kahvia ja meillä oli oikein mukavaa ja lopuksi Anneli 
sanoi hymyillen, että vaalit ovat tulossa.”) 
(Interview with Iivari) 
It is quite obvious that the political system has learned to use scoops and scandals in its 
competition for political power and media attention. The competition is not only between 
various political groups but also between party colleagues. As Sennett (1978) noted, 
politics is a zero-sum game, whatever power a politician gains attracting interest will 
lessen the interest of the public in other politicians. In this particular case – as also in the 
case of Sonera – the failure of one politician will mean a possibility for another.  
Some of Jaakonsaari’s party colleagues, like Minister Kalliomäki and Minister Backman, 
argued in favour of consulting work and its importance in clarifying messages and, in that 
sense, defended her; others were critical. For example the Vice President of the Social 
Democratic Party, MP Antero Kekkonen, gave a statement (Demari 3.4.1998) where he 
expressed his disappointment at such lists and was afraid of negative influence on party 
support. Kekkonen is a former journalist and that is perhaps a reason for his reactions. 
The same worry about support for a particular party was expressed also in the case of 
Sonera. This is very natural: a party’s support is linked directly to its power.  
However, the typhoon was much more suitable for the opposition. The Government had 
made a commitment to halve unemployment and had not succeeded in doing so. First, 
there were confused statistics, and the Government was in fact accused of reducing 
unemployment with the help of the statistics. Secondly, it appeared that some kind of 
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attempt to influence voters through consulting or by image-building was going on and, on 
top of it all, Ulpu Iivari had made money from it. Yet the actual scandal was about the 
freedom of the press – one of the corner-stones of our democracy. There was a serious 
threat that the scandal would expand towards a final explosion, had not Professor Wiio’s 
interview changed the drama, so that in the end it just faded out. 
What were actual reactions of the media? Is there a need for media critique in this 
particular case?  According to Harri Skog:  
“My first consideration was that certainly journalists felt themselves insulted. 
Indeed, media has quite sensitive toes. Apparently it is the case that only the 
media is capable of evaluating the activities of our society but if anyone tries to 
evaluate their action in any way, with different criteria, it is suddenly seen as a 
process leading to a closed society or something like that. The critique had 
nothing to do with original motives of the evaluation process. In that sense I have 
an unpleasant impression of that process. I experienced the case very negatively 
from the point of view of our Ministry.” 
(”Jotenkin minä itse ajattelin ensin niin, että kyllähän toimittajat tietenkin 
loukkaantuu. Että aika arat varpaat medialla. Ilmeisesti on niin että vain media 
voi arvioida yhteiskunnassa tapahtuvaa toimintaa mutta jos heidän toimintaa 
arvioi tällä tavalla eri kriteerein siinä nähdään hyvin äkkiä, että ollaan menossa 
johonkin suljettuun yhteiskuntaan tai johonkin muuhun. Sillä ei ollut enää mitään 
merkitystä missä tarkoituksessa se arviointi oli tehty. Siinä mielessä minulle jäi 
hyvin ikävähkö kuva siitä prosessista. Koin sen hyvin negatiivisena koko meidän 
ministeriön näkökulmasta.”) 
(Interview with Skog)  
Liisa Jaakonsaari said: 
AA: What is your opinion, since you also know the media world: if democracy 
has to be open to critique and judgement, and politics always has to be open to 
judgement, why should just the media be defended from critique? 
LJ: It is a very serious problem, indeed. Much more media critique is needed. First 
of all I have a feeling that this is a problem in a small nation, where we do not 
have many channels and communication routes. It was very obvious in this case 
that the electronic media was very aggressive, whereas the Sanoma Group was 
calm and neutral, and that affected a lot. They were not involved with the same 
chase. 
(AA: Mitä ajattelet kun tunnet myös media maailmaa, että jos demokratiassa pitää 
olla avoimia kritiikille ja arvostelulle ja politiikassa ollaan koko ajan avoimia 
arvostelulle niin miksi juuri media olisi suojattu kritiikiltä? 
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LJ: Se on erittäin kova ongelma. Mediakritiikkiä pitäisi olla paljon enemmän. 
Ennen kaikkea minusta tuntuu, että se on pienen maan ongelma kun täällä on 
vähän kanavia ja väyliä. Tässähän oli oikein silmiinpistävää se että sähköinen 
viestintä oli aggressiivinen mutta Sanoma oy:llä oli rauhallinen ja neutraali 
suhtautuminen ja se vaikutti erittäin paljon. Että ne eivät lähteneet tähän 
samaan.)
(Interview with Jaakonsaari) 
The exposure of the consultant work was a scoop for Iltalehti. “The Black List” as a 
concept was also the creation of Iltalehti. The slogan was so good that it survived despite 
the fact it never existed in its original meaning.  
However, neither the labour market policy nor the advisors’ report was the focus of 
attention. The scandal affected the Ministry negatively, according to the interviewees. 
Any positive feedback achieved earlier was ruined. None of the journalists or members of 
Parliament contacted the advisors to find out the facts of the original report or the role of 
the consulting firm. When the second wave of the reform began a few years later, no 
consulting help was used, and risks were minimized avoiding public debate. As one of the 
interviewees said: “Perhaps this all happened because of our Viking heritage. If 
somebody’s head stands out above the others, it should be cut.” 
The political scandal really was a typhoon – a sudden storm which swept over the public 
sphere. Those who observed it hardly remember the case but those who were in the 
middle of the crisis experienced it in a very shocking way, especially those who were not 
used to living public life. Nothing remained the same. 
10.4. The Media Response 
The Ministry of Labour collected the press reviews from various newspapers during the 
period 25.3.-16.4.1998, totalling 67 articles, excluding Minister Jaakonsaari’s own 
column, plus some small comments related to news in Finnish newspapers. The case was 
widely aired also on radio and television, but this material is excluded except for the 
transcript of Professor Wiio’s interview.  
The newspapers have been classified in a similar way to that used in the other cases.   
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TYPE OF NEWSPAPERS
15 %
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12 %
HS Group
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Provincial
Partisan
Figure 12 
n=67
The Sanoma Group published 10 articles whereas Almamedia Group published 24, and 
the provincial papers 26. Minister Jaakonsaari lives in the northern city of Oulu and 
newspapers in the northern parts of Finland published 14 articles, about half of the 
regional total. The political press published eight articles, of which Demari two, Kansan
Uutiset two and Suomenmaa four. Newspapers published in the northern and middle parts 
of Finland are generally considered closer in alignment to the Centre Party, although they 
are classified neutral non-partisan papers. 
It is quite clear that this particular case was the scoop of Almamedia and Iltalehti was 
very active. Provincial newspapers were excited about the case, too. While most of the 
provincial newspapers are close to the Centre Party, the tension between the Government 
and the opposition was very clear and, by attacking Jaakonsaari, MP Anneli Jäätteenmäki, 
representing the opposition, achieved some publicity. 
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TYPE OF ARTICLES (BLACK LIST)
58 %
12 %
23 %
7 %
News
Editorials
Comments
Cartoons
Figure 13 
n=67
The types of the articles were classified into four categories: news, editorials, comment 
and cartoons. Provincial newspapers published more comment than other papers. 
The content of an article was divided into three parts. The first section consisted of 
expressions that were related to the research work done by the consulting firm, Grey 
Eminence. This section can be interpreted to be a structural. The second category was 
expressions that were related to Minister Jaakonsaari, that is semantics. The third section 
consisted of various people quoted in the article. The topic of the quotation was also 
classified. The following messages or arguments were found: the study is a threat to a free 
press; there are improper party connections, i.e. favouritism can be found; the price of the 
research is too expensive; there were attempts to hide things; the purpose of the study is a 
political manoeuvre; the competence of the Minister is challenged. Also the general 
attitude of the articles was classified: positive, negative or neutral. The general attitude 
was negative, particularly in comments and editorials. News could be characterized as 
neutral.
Various messages or arguments were represented in an article. The percentages of the 
arguments are following: 
• evaluation of journalists is a threat   76% 
• favouritism     37% 
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• the study is too expensive   24% 
• there were attempts to hide   15 % 
• it is a political manoeuvre      12% 
• the competence of the Minister    7% 
The plot of the scandal changed during the controversy. First the outcry concerned the 
price of the study. It was also considered as an attempt to manipulate public opinion in 
order to lobby success for the Government in its employment policy. Favouritism was 
another of the key arguments, as well as attempts to hide secret documents. Once the 
secrecy of the report’s contents had been broken by Iltalehti, the scandal became more 
serious: an important element of the moral ethos of Finnish society, freedom of the press, 
was under a threat.  
Nine editorials were written about the matter; four of them were editorials of the northern 
newspapers (Ilkka, Karjalainen, Kaleva and Lapin Kansa), both tabloids are included, 
too. It is worth mentioning that major newspapers like Helsingin Sanomat, Aamulehti or
Turun Sanomat had no editorials on this issue. The Editor in Chief of Aamulehti wrote a 
comment of his own about the matter which can be interpreted as more negative than 
positive. The finding might be that among the provincial press the case was seen as being 
more important than it was in national press. 
The turning point of the case was the television interview given by Professor Wiio 
2.4.1998. On 3rd April his statement was reported, commented and even analyzed. From 
4th April the scandal was more or less over. 
The main arguments of the editorials (2-3.4.1998) were: 
• the research work is expensive 
• the research should be public 
• there were improper party connections 
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• the black list is to be condemned 
• the Minister Jaakonsaari’s capabilities are suspect 
The main arguments after 4.4.1998 were: 
• the research was expensive and irrelevant 
• it is a sensitive matter to evaluate the work of journalists 
Comments (17) on the daily news were published in all major newspapers. The comment 
written by Minister Jaakonsaari is excluded from the material analyzed. The main 
arguments during 27.3-3.4.1998 were: 
• there were improper party connections 
• an attempt to evaluate the work of journalists is reprehensible 
• black lists do not belong in a democracy 
The main arguments after 4.4.1998 were: 
• the quality of the research was poor 
• black lists do not belong in a democracy 
• bad governance can lead to the use of consulting firms 
The general approach was negative all the time. The content of the news was more 
negative before the press conference of 2.4.1998. The interview given by Professor Wiio 
was also a turning-point towards more neutral reporting. Between the lines there were still 
questions asked about whether Minister Jaakonsaari was a competent politician and there 
was speculation in some of the headlines about whether it was her turn to leave the 
Government. The reporting was, however, gender neutral with a few exceptions. 
The newspapers asked opinions of MPs representing various political groups, and these 
reflected the newspapers’ expectations, being critical of the consultants’ work. Some 
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researchers were also interviewed whose comments were mainly neutral. Professor Wiio 
was mentioned in eight articles in which he argued in favour of media studies in order to 
get information on the media’s response.  
Photographs
There seem to be three photographs which were commonly used during the controversy, 
along with many typical portraits. In the first phase of the storm nearly all newspapers 
used a photograph taken by Martti Kainulainen, who represents the agency Lehtikuva 
(Pressphoto) owned by the Sanoma Group.  
Photograph 4. 
In this picture Minister Jaakonsaari is surrounded by the journalists interviewing her, her 
mouth is open, and the angle of the photograph is unfavourable to her. She seems to be 
blockaded. The photo is taken in Parliament, where she is on her way to the Plenary 
Session but is forced to answer some questions. The door behind her is open. She is trying 
to get her message across with help of her hands. Minister Jaakonsaari is morally under 
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pressure from the media. The media acts like watchdogs which are awake and ready to 
criticize those who have the power. Minister Jaakonsaari is not prepared and it seems that 
she is surprised by the questions put to her. The text under the photo is: “Minister of 
Labour Liisa Jaakonsaari did not admit on Wednesday that the Ministry of Labour had 
collected black lists of journalists.” (”Työministeri Jaakonsaari ei myöntänyt 
keskiviikkona ministeriön keränneen mustia listoja toimittajista”) (Keskisuomalainen,
2.4.1998).
For me the punctum is in Jaakonsaari’s eyes but also her hands. She is obviously nervous 
and perhaps frightened. The image is that she is hiding something and tries desperately to 
explain. While the angle of the photo is unfavourable to her, it strengthens the impression 
that she is in serious difficulties and is hard-pressed by the journalists. This image is the 
message. It also serves the main message of the media coverage that Minister Jaakonsaari 
is hiding something, and there are some immoral party links between Jaakonsaari and 
Iivari.
Kainulainen’s photograph was followed by a picture taken by Markku Ulander, also of 
Lehtikuva. Minister Jaakonsaari is photographed from behind. Her handbag is on her 
shoulder, and there seem to be some papers inside it. Her head and shoulder are leaning to 
the right, implying that the bag must be heavy. She is walking towards the unknown. The 
shadows of the photo are exciting, and it is not possible to see the kind of surroundings 
she is in. In reality she is in the House of Parliament that is normally a setting of power 
and influence.  
The caption reads: “How did it happen like this? The day of Minister of Labour 
Jaakonsaari in Parliament was a long one. The press demanded her explanation about the 
list which became public yesterday” (”Näinkö tässä kävikin? Työministeri Liisa 
Jaakonsaaren päivä eduskunnassa oli pitkä. Lehdistö vaati häneltä selitystä eilen 
julkisuuteen tulleesta listasta”) (Ilkka.3.4.1998). Ilta-Sanomat published the same picture 
on 4.4.1998 with the text: “Labour Minister Liisa Jaakonsaari had to defend herself 
during the week. Is that the black list peeping out of her bag?” (”Työministeri Liisa 
Jaakonsaari joutui tällä viikolla puolustuskannalle. Pilkottaaako kassista musta lista?”). 
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Photograph 5. 
Here the punctum is Jaakonsaari’s handbag or briefcase. She is not carrying it like a 
powerful person. The briefcase symbolizes power, hiding secret information which is 
shared by few. Very often an assistant carries a Minister’s briefcase. But her bag is just a 
normal handbag, very familiar to women. Perhaps the bag hides some official material but 
also some personal things like a hairbrush, perfume. She seems to be tired and perhaps 
even beaten. Where is she heading? Is she going to resign? The image supports the text. 
The day has been long and she is forced against the wall and her destiny is open, 
darkened by a scandal. The connotative message of this particular photo is much stronger 
than the messages of the associated articles. 
The third photo used commonly comes from the press conference, and was taken by Päivi 
Peltonen, a Lehtikuva photographer. The photo is unary. Newspapers are full of these 
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kinds of pictures. Usually we do not pay any specific attention to them, since they involve 
politicians having their everyday conferences in their Ministries in sterile surroundings. 
An icon of the official domain is a palm tree. Minister Jaakonsaari is sitting behind the 
table with a young man, Kari Heikkilä, who is introduced as a new manager of Grey 
Eminence. The feelings of the new Director are perhaps uncomfortable. He has been 
appointed to his new position in the middle of a public debate related to his firm. He 
supposed to be invisible or at least more in the background, a true eminence grise. The 
appearance of both persons is serious and controlled. The caption is: “The Minister of 
Labour continued on Thursday her explanation about the list of journalists. The Manager 
of Grey Eminence Kari Heikkilä was also answering questions.” (”Työministeri Liisa 
Jaakonsaari jatkoi torstaina selvitystään toimittajalistoista. Vastaajana oli myös Grey 
Eminencen toimitusjohtaja Kari Heikkilä.”) (Etelä-Suomen Sanomat 3.4.1998). 
Photograph 6. 
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There is no special punctum in this photo. The image, however, is much more decisive 
compared with previous photographs. The environment underlines Jaakonsaari’s position 
as Minister. The power is now in her hands. The palm tree behind Jaakonsaari and 
Heikkilä and its shadow shaped against the pale wall underlines the formal atmosphere of 
the administration. She is mastering the situation. The connotative message underlines the 
message: everything is in control. 
10.5. Conclusions 
The Plot 
“How the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wing became a Typhoon” is a typical scandal; a real 
drama performed on a stage. Some of the features of this case give evidence about 
mediazation.  
First, major conglomerates compete daily in the sales of tabloids giving entertainment, 
exposing hidden secrets or watching the decision-makers. The framework of 
instrumentalism referred to earlier (Silva, 1995) claims that the interests of owners to 
produce profits is a relevant approach to analyzing media coverage, or that at least the 
social constraints of market realities, the framework of social construction, do the same 
thing. 
Secondly, Iltalehti was controlling the narrative: finding out about the consultant work; 
then demanding that it be published; exposing the reason for secrecy, the black list; and 
finally by defending the freedom of the press. Almamedia Group was conducting this 
case, whereas the Sanoma Group conducted the Sonera case. In other words, although 
scandals are not created by major conglomerates, they compete to find matters from 
which scandal can be developed. Very often hints for scandals are given by political 
competitors (who are usually opponents but may be also members of the same political 
party) or civil servants, both trying to influence the exercise of power. 
However, there are hardly any ideological or political motives, whatever political 
connections the conglomerates have. Almamedia belongs more to the right than the 
Sanoma Group, whose roots are in liberal tradition. One could argue that a scandal linked 
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to the Social Democrats is politically more suitable for Almamedia than for the Sanoma 
Group, but I would not argue in favour of conspiracy theory. The logic of journalistic 
competition is a more powerful factor than political passions. The scoops of competitors 
are not highlighted unless it is absolutely necessary.  
However, I would argue that the media is not neutral in their agenda-setting process based 
on this case. The media do not mirror the reality but instead filter and shape it. This can 
be seen in the articles published in provincial newspapers and particularly in the selection 
of photographs. Provincial newspapers actively gave room to the case and often the 
articles were emotionally loaded whereas the southern major newspapers did not pay so 
much attention to the case.  
The Actors and Information Flows 
In this drama there was a greedy consultant who happened to be a former top politician, 
though Ulpu Iivari wryly noted that it was the first time she had been called a top 
politician. She also felt hurt that she was accused of being greedy – and she had not been 
greedy at all, working for Grey Eminence which had invoiced the Ministry. Greed refers 
to a moral condemnation that was used also in the Sonera case. It is typical, according to 
Thompson (2000), that financial transactions and the exercise of power are more scandal-
sensitive, as was the case with Sonera.  
Ulpu Iivari made a decision soon afterwards to stand as a candidate for the European 
Parliament and she was elected. She described the motivation behind her decision: “But 
then I thought if I am going to be treated like a politician, I have to try to be a politician 
again.” (”Mutta sitten minä ajattelin, että jos minua kohdellaan poliitikkona niin 
pakkohan minun on vielä yrittää poliitikkona.”) (Interview with Iivari).
There was also a Minister who had, in her exercise of power, hidden things and had 
ordered “black lists” of journalists. She had tried to manipulate the image of her labour 
market policy in an immoral way. Her competence as a Minister was challenged. 
However, she took “responsibility” at the press conference, asking for the value index to 
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be called Liisa’s List. She was also lent a hand by Professor Wiio who was a neutral 
professional. The media storm affected her reliability and her reputation was damaged. 
It is difficult to say how much the notions of Pippa Norris (1997) are relevant in this 
particular case; she holds that in general women are seen less credible by the media. 
However, I would argue that the photographs are more effective in creating attitudes than 
news stories. In this specific case, the photographs were not favourable to Minister 
Jaakonsaari. 
Politics is the politics of trust as Giddens (1990) has put it. One of the interviewees said: 
“Those who disliked her now hadn’t liked her beforehand or afterwards either but joined 
in the nasty comments.”(”Ne ihmiset, jotka eivät nyt tykänneet hänestä aikaisemminkaan 
eivät tämän jälkeenkään tykänneet vaan osallistuivat vinoihin huomautuksiin.”)
Liisa Jaakonsaari summed up the consequences of the scandal:  
LJ: I do not know what the consequence of this matter was. But of course…I did 
not do well in the elections; I lost at least three thousand votes.
AA: Northern newspapers wrote a lot about this list. 
LJ: Yes. Of course this was central, but there were plenty of lies. If companies like 
Rautaruukki or Valio reduced their labour force, it was always asked why the 
Minister is not acting. Everything was my fault... First I thought it does not matter 
but then I noticed when it kept going on that our supporters, I mean members of 
the Social Democratic Party, started to believe these claims.  
LJ: En osaa sanoa tämän vaikutuksesta. Mutta tietenkin (...) minähän pärjäsin 
vaaleissa huonosti, meni ainakin kolmisen tuhatta ääntä... 
AA: Pohjoisen lehdet kirjoittivat paljon tästä asiasta. 
LJ: Niin kirjoittivat. Tietenkin tämä oli keskeinen, mutta sitten oli paljon 
valheellista. Jos vaikka Rautaruukki tai Valio lomautti niin aina oli, että 
työministeri ei tee mitään. Kaikki oli mun syytä (...) ensin minä ajattelin, ettei sillä 
ole hirveästi merkitystä mutta sitten minä huomasin, että kun se oli jatkuvaa niin 
se alkoi tätä omaa kannattajakuntaa siis sdp:n jäseniä, niin ne alkoi vähän 
uskoakin siihen. 
(Interview with Jaakonsaari) 
So far in this drama there have been only rogues, if the role of Minister Niinistö as a 
potential hero is considered minor (because of his disapproval of the use of the consulting 
services). The heroic politician in this case is without doubt Anneli Jäätteenmäki. She 
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demanded that the documents should be published and was worried about the use of 
taxpayers’ money. She also defended the freedom of the press. Anneli Jäätteenmäki used 
the opportunity offered by the media in her efforts to achieve publicity and to be a 
politician with a high moral profile – in which effort she was successful – as well as to 
gain power – in which she was also successful. She strengthened her position in her own 
party.  
Jäätteenmäki also had assistant heroes, ministers and parliamentary colleagues who 
expressed their disapproval. However, Minister Jaakonsaari was helped by an 
independent actor, Professor Wiio. Professor Wiio played the role of a knight to rescue 
the princess in trouble. Indeed, the characters could be from the traditional fairy stories 
analyzed by Apo (1986). 
The labour market policy was managed by the Ministry of Labour. The Government was 
informed and, in that sense, the formalities of democratic decision-making process were 
fulfilled. Yet there was an attempt to debate in Evening School, where Minister Niinistö 
made his arguments as well as Minister Jaakonsaari. The conflict between Ministers was 
never solved. The position of the reform in the strategy of the Government remained 
unclear and open. The prognosis of the reform’s success was doubtful. 
Indeed, I find it most significant that the Government did not engage with the reform 
politically. That was the first failure. The Government’s treatment of the issue was 
informative and did not try to share the common aim to halve unemployment and 
particularly to find new solutions for the long-term unemployed to re-enter labour 
markets. Minister Jaakonsaari was alone in lobbying for the new approach.  
In a way it is quite understandable that the administrators were tired of adopting new 
attitudes while the flood of new orders was still there. It is also understandable that public 
opinion was tired of new promises. Therefore a strong commitment by the Government 
was needed to motivate the teams at labour offices to accept new working methods. It 
emptied the political domain and was replaced by Minister Jaakonsaari’s personal efforts. 
The proposals were proposals among others prepared by the administration. In addition, 
 284
an attempt to crystallize the messages and get political support turned into a scandal 
which paralyzed the capacity of Minister Jaakonsaari to promote the reform.  
The case also confirms that the political decision-making process is indeed fragmented. 
Every Minister does her or his own work and has either success or failure. The 
Government Programme and its goals are negotiated at a common table but the resources 
are allocated separately. In this case the change in the service process was achieved but 
the core of long-term unemployment remained untouched.  
The cartoon made by Terho, in Helsingin Sanomat, summarized the case. A journalist in 
the form of a lemming interviews Minister Jaakonsaari in her office. Heavy black smoke 
is coming from the wastebasket and the remains of burned paper are on the floor. The 
question has already been put but the answer is hovering in the air. The text is: “Ah...the 
black list?” (Helsingin Sanomat 4.4.1998.) The message is very clear. Black lists existed 
though they have been destroyed and gone with the wind; the media is never wrong. 
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SILENT DEMOCRACY, NOISY MEDIA 
11. Findings 
My aim was to study Finnish democracy, particularly representative democracy, through 
four specific decision-making processes to reach generalized analyses: the EMU process, 
the WTO-policy adopted by Finland, the privatization of Sonera, and labour market 
reform. My interest was to find out who made the decisions, what were the information 
and communication (I&C) structures among the political elite, and what kind of public 
debate was stimulated in the public sphere by the political elite or by civil society. I also 
wanted to scrutinize the exercise of power in the context of globalization and mediazation 
in order to explore how these tendencies of modernity have influenced the political 
system and its argumentation. 
My major findings are: 
• there is “oligarchy” within oligarchy which means that a part of the political elite 
is excluded from the I&C structures; 
• globalization is seen as a given fact; it is neither analyzed nor challenged; the 
political elite has no other strategy than to be around the tables where the 
decisions are made; 
• mediazation is powerful and has effectively reformulated the public sphere; the 
media is able to change the plot without any internal checks or scrutiny; 
• the type of governance is pragmatic or technocratic instead of being political 
governance; 
• the public sphere is often left empty by the political elite; social partners or NGOs 
representing civil society are capable of modifying the political agenda; 
• democracy is silent:  information flows but no communication occurs; 
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• media is noisy rather than analytical, particularly in the case of scandals; rational-
critical debate is not demanded from the political elite. 
The Political Elite 
Ilkka Ruostetsaari (1992) has studied the core of the Finnish elite, identifying 997 people 
as members of this group in the whole of society. He categorized them into seven 
different categories of elite: political (129), administrative (208), business (199), social 
partners (204), media (120), science (120), and culture (107). This taxonomy follows a 
classic pattern of categorization (ibid., pp. 70-71). 
In Ruostetsaari’s research, the political sector consisted of Government (President and 
Ministers), Parliament (Speakers, Chairpersons and Deputies of Committees, leaders of 
political groups), party organizations including youth, student, and women’s 
organizations (leaders, deputies and party secretaries), and the councils of major cities 
(chairpersons). The administrative sector consisted of the leading officials of Government 
Ministries, the Bank of Finland and other state-owned institutions, the judiciary, the 
defence forces, the church, and municipalities. Ruostetsaari used formal positions within 
various sectors to define the structure of the Finnish elite, and in some cases members of 
the elite had positions across several sectors. 
In the following table, I have taken the taxonomy of the elite from Ruostetsaari’s research 
and compare his results to those derived from my own in order to understand how the 
power elite are seen through political action, utilizing a decisional approach. In other 
words, Ruostetsaari has counted the members of the elite based on their formal positions 
within social structures, whereas I concentrate on the elite who made the decisions and 
who really exercised the power, through specific political case-studies.  
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Table 3 
Categories of the Elite Ruostetsaari Alho 
Political 12 % 33 % 
Administration 
Science 
21 %
11%
40 % 
including researchers 
Social Partners 19 %   9 % 
Media 11 %   3 % 
Business 16 % 15 % 
Culture 10 %   0 % 
      n= 997            n=130 
From my study, the emphases within the structure of the Finnish elite are shifted from the 
scheme proposed by Ruostetsaari. I asked interviewees who had, in their own view, 
played a role in the four political decision-making processes detailed above. Compared to 
the general outlook of the Finnish elite, it seemed that both the political and 
administrative sectors played a far more active role than those in other categories. 
However, the actors of political parties or parliamentary groups were very seldom 
mentioned as key actors. Social partners did not appear to have had any significant role in 
any of the decision- making processes, and they are better characterized as lobbyists in 
the public sphere, as shown, for example, by SAK’s role in the WTO and EMU debate. 
Neither the science nor culture sectors were represented in the decision-making processes. 
However, in some cases there are actors who represent both the science and 
administrative elites, which does affect my findings. I identify these instances for 
example in the EMU and the Black List cases. 
Analyzing my interviews, I found the role of media to be more about mirroring or 
reporting decisions, filtering and shaping their mediatized representation, than acting as 
contributors to the debate, where they would give a context for facilitating argument and 
debate. I found the relationship between journalists and politicians to be distant. Specific 
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journalists were very seldom mentioned by name; the interviewees rather seemed to 
remember particular impressions refracted by the media when they tried to recall key 
plot-points and important phases of the decision-making process. This study supports 
Aula’s (1991) findings regarding the critical approach of journalists towards the exercise 
of power, and there seemed to be no trusted journalists participating in it.  
Since this study concentrates on political decisions it is not so surprising that the political 
actors dominate and that cultural figures, for example, are excluded. Evidently, also, the 
specific names and groupings are influenced by the choice of incident in this study, 
however, the principle of the limited nature of the decision-making core is nonetheless 
generalizable from these case-studies. 
Altogether 130 actors were mentioned in interviews across all four cases as it can be seen 
from the table above. Only 41 actors were mentioned more than twice. From the 
politicians, where the total number was 43, 19 were mentioned more than twice 
(excluding myself), in alphabetical order:  Esko Aho, Claes Andersson, Matti Aura, 
Pekka Haavisto, Tarja Halonen, Kalevi Hemilä, Liisa. Jaakonsaari, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, 
Antti Kalliomäki, Kimmo Kiljunen, Paavo Lipponen, Sauli Niinistö, Ole Norrback, Mauri 
Pekkarinen, Kimmo Sasi, Ulf Sundqvist, Erkki Tuomioja, Iiro Viinanen and Ben 
Zyskowicz. These can be called the inner circle or the core of the decision-making for 
these cases, while the rest form the outer circle of the decision-making. Only Prime 
Minister Lipponen and Minister of Finance Niinistö were mentioned in all cases.  
Figure 14 
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Minister Haavisto, Minister Kalliomäki, Minister Norrback and former Minister 
Sundqvist were mentioned in three cases. Former Prime Minister Aho, President 
Ahtisaari, Minister Andersson, Minister Halonen, Minister Jaakonsaari, MP Pekkarinen, 
Secretary of State Saari, former Minister Salolainen, MP Tuomioja and MP Zyskowicz 
were mentioned in two cases (I categorize Secretary of State Rauno Saari as a politician 
here, because his appointment was political, for a term of a government). All these 
politicians were Ministers or had been Ministers with the exception of MP Kiljunen and 
MP Zyskowicz. Ulf Sundqvist, former leader of the Social Democratic Party, was also a 
former MP and Minister. He was mentioned as an actor influencing matters from outside 
the present political elite, and not only because of a particular scandal related to him. He 
was also seen as an active policy-maker in the context of the EMU case. 
Among the civil servants and researchers, a total of 51, 19 were mentioned more than 
twice, forming the core of the administration: Lasse Aarnio, Kalevi Alestalo, Martti 
Hetemäki, Sirkka Hämäläinen, Samuli Haapasalo, Eino Keinänen, Sixten Korkman, 
Juhani Korpela, Rauno Niinimäki, Jukka Pekkarinen, Esko Rekola, Heikki Räisänen, 
Raimo Sailas, Harri Skog, Markus Sovala, Matti Vanhala, Karri Varmo, Osmo A. Wiio 
and Johnny Åkerholm. Secretary of State Raimo Sailas was mentioned in three cases, 
whereas Hetemäki and Erkki Virtanen were mentioned in two cases. Some of the names 
mentioned had a background in the science elite. 
Figure 15 
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From among the social partners, a total of 12, four were mentioned more than twice: 
Lauri Ihalainen, Per-Erik Lundh, Pertti Parmanne and Peter J. Boldt, who was also 
mentioned in two cases. All represent SAK (the Central Organization of Trade Unions). 
Those representing TT did not seem to be key actors based on interviews. From among 
business people (total 20), those mentioned more than twice were: Ulpu Iivari, Kaj-Erik 
Relander, Markku Talonen, Erkki Tuominen, and Pekka Vennamo. Ulpu Iivari is listed in 
this classification as a business person because the reference was associated with the 
scandal of the Black Lists, during which she was working in business. Among journalists 
there were four with multiple mentions, including Jyrki Raivio, who was mentioned in 
two cases as a journalist who had systematically followed both the EMU process and 
economic affairs, and Heikki Karkkolainen, who followed the WTO issue. 
My study suggests that the political elite consists of only a very few people. This 
suggestion confirms the claims of Weber (1978) and Schumpeter (1976) – that within the 
political elite itself there is minimal democratic participation. Also what Michels (1915) 
has shown to be “the iron law of oligarchy” seems to be valid in the light of my study. 
The study also suggests that the President of Finland is neither a key actor nor a person 
with whom the elite expects to discuss matters, though President Ahtisaari did take a 
public role in EU affairs, which is a field of shared competence in Finland. The practice 
of everyday political decision-making underlines the leading role of the government in or 
hegemony over EU issues. 
As a conclusion I can say that the decision-making elite in Finland consists of but a few 
politicians and civil servants. While the political elite, based on the four cases I reviewed, 
is formed around the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, it is they and the civil 
servants close to them who form the coalition of the real power elite. The interview 
material suggests that the core of this political elite – the Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance – take on their leading position because of their formal status, and consequently 
that the position of individuals within the power elite is based on status; it is not based on 
common discussion or dialogue.  
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In his book Political Elite Action, Strategy and Outcomes, Tom Moring (1989) reveals the 
authoritarian tradition of Finnish political life. Although his study concentrates more on 
the political elite’s internal relationships than its relations with voters or supporters, it 
buttresses my conclusion that that neither discourse nor communicative action are 
essential factors in giving a central position in the exercise of political power. I will 
concentrate on this latter argument in the following section. 
Information and Communication Structures 
On the surface, during the talks on accession to the EU the political leadership honoured 
Parliament’s decision to keep EMU as a separate issue, even though EMU was considered 
a logical consequence of EU membership. In reality, the commitment to join EMU was 
made among only a few actors without any open discussion within the political system or 
with the populace. An evaluation of the impacts of EMU was made two years after the 
actual commitment had been made, and Parliament took its decision three years after that 
commitment.   
It seems quite clear that in Finland, EMU was seen more as an issue of pragmatic or 
technocratic governance, and thus more relevant to political than economic argument. The 
exercise of power in June 1995 was neither transparent nor open, as is evidenced by the 
very limited public response. This is not to say that it was completely hidden. The 
decision was shared with the Grand Committee and was even reported to the public, but it 
was not defended by political leaders in public and was, in effect, left on the sidelines. 
In this case the public sphere remained empty of political arguments, so that the void was 
filled by SAK, which could use the opportunity to achieve its own goals as the pros and 
cons of EMU were being publicly evaluated. In this case SAK generated the rational-
critical debate and were supported by other NGOs. However, even this debate on the 
consequences of EMU began a year after the actual decision to enter EMU had been 
made.  
The reflexivity, outlined by Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994), can be recognized in the 
Government’s decision finally to study the impacts of EMU, which was a central demand 
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of the parliamentary groups and social partners, and in the agreement on buffer funds, 
which came from the Government and SAK. The citizens were in the end included to the 
extent of being given information and communication, but not by the state, rather by the 
civil society. 
In 1995 the media focused more on non-political technical details, reporting such matters 
as the preparatory work surrounding the issue and the question of whether Finland would 
be able to enter EMU or not. The media did not focus on the opportunities and dangers, or 
pros and cons, at least in the press-based media response collected here. If there was a 
political issue it was actually economic: the value of the Finnish markka and the timing of 
its entry into the ERM, and this reflected the interests of the Bank of Finland, which 
naturally stressed the decision’s economic dimensions.  
The politics of trust are an essential factor in analyzing the public debate; Prime Minister 
Lipponen’s contributions were highly respected and were not challenged. Sennett (1978) 
analyzes the erosion of public life through growing emphasis on a “star system” that 
seems to be apt in this case. The behind-the-scenes political power of Lipponen was 
strongest when he was the person to act, instead of his political organization, and when he 
limited his public exposure to maximize his power.  
Furthermore Giddens (1990) has underlined that a central characteristic of our life is 
“manufactured uncertainty”, which means that the origins of unpredictability have 
changed. Since there cannot be “experts of experts”, this leads us to the need for active 
trust, which in larger organizational contexts demands more opening up at the 
institutional level. In this case it was enough that the character of a political actor, Prime 
Minister Lipponen, was regarded as trustworthy. 
The formation of policy concerning the WTO was an “internal affair” for the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. The officials of the External Trade Department had the most appropriate 
skills and experience to shape Finland’s free-trade doctrine and at the same time to 
support the EU Commission and its policy. Bureaucracy as a “steel-hard-cage”, expressed 
by Weber (1978), seems to characterize the power-exercise in this particular case. 
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The Ministers for Foreign Trade had their own areas of interest and commitments, which 
also contributed to the shape of the doctrine, and they even made these agendas and 
initiatives public. However, these messages were not shared or defended by the 
Government in the public sphere. Particularly during Finland’s EU presidency, the elected 
political system was challenged to create public dialogue – but produced little response 
and rather mirrored the concerns expressed by NGOs. 
A pragmatic or technocratic orientation, as opposed to political governance, was central 
in trade policy, influenced by globalization, which is examined in following section. For 
example, the existing conflict between the interests of free trade and a protectionist 
agriculture policy was neither discussed openly nor resolved in the Government, while 
Parliament probably rationalized the suppression of these talks as a means of protecting 
food safety, an unspoken argument in favour of protectionism. The position of the WTO 
and its relations to other international organizations in global governance remained 
unclear, too.
This technocratic emphasis continued with the unfolding of Finland’s decision. Both the 
Cabinet Committee on EU Affairs and the Grand Committee were always informed, 
though response was weak. All the information was available, including the actual debate 
in other EU countries; however, free trade stayed outside the public sphere, remaining 
more a private and non-political issue, reflecting the long-established division between 
those matters regarded as being of public concern and those which were for private 
governance.  
Debate in the public sphere was eventually stimulated primarily by the NGOs’ opposition 
to the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and at the Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle, which took place during the Finnish EU presidency. This debate 
made trade issues more public and at the same time more political than before, so that 
articles and reports multiplied in the media. In fact, the anti-global movements and 
worldwide demonstrations were powerful in creating the political agenda for free trade, 
including the special Parliamentary organ that was established to follow WTO policy. The 
reflexivity of modernity was recognized: the risks of dealing with hazards and 
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insecurities. The doctrine of free trade in its classical industrial design was challenged but 
was not replaced with a new one by the political elite. 
The privatization of Sonera was controlled by the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. Minister Aura took a leading role in this matter without any significant 
discussion or response in either Cabinet or the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs. 
In fact, the privatization was part and parcel of the governing systems prevailing in 
Finland at the time, as elsewhere: to reduce government, on the one hand through 
deregulation and on the other through privatization, as examined by Rose (1999) and 
Kooiman (1993). Indeed, the role of government in telecommunications was diminished 
first by deregulation and later by privatization. 
The privatization of Sonera became more a pragmatic question than one of political 
governance. The most probable reason for this was the fact that Parliament had already 
accepted it in principle. The liberalization of telecommunications was also an important 
issue for Nokia, a factor that could be also discerned in Finland’s policy in the 1996 WTO 
negotiations in Singapore. However, regardless of this agreement on pragmatic 
governance, the speed and ease with which the privatization of telecommunications took 
place was a surprise for Minister Aura. Political concerns were more related to the public 
postal service, so that attention was focused more on the role of the nation state and its 
essential infrastructure than on privatization evaluated in the context of globalization. 
In the case of Sonera, the principles of privatization were formally decided collectively in 
Cabinet but not defended collectively in the public sphere when the premises were 
challenged by the media. The scandal around the privatization – a subplot of the narrative 
– was managed purely by the National Coalition Party (Conservatives). The actual 
decision to dismiss Pekka Vennamo was made by Minister Aura, but he had already been 
criticized by the Chairman of his own political party, Minister Niinistö. The Executive 
Committee of Sonera made the formal decision concerning the dismissal, but it was 
Minister Aura himself who informed his ministerial colleagues on the matter. Aura’s own 
resignation was a consequence of this process and was not discussed in the Government 
or with the Prime Minister.  
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The need for trust indicates the fact that the character of a political leader is important. 
The antithesis of trust is not distrust, but rather, a state of mind which could be best 
described as existential angst (Giddens, 1990). The process was a personal defeat for 
Minister Aura, who retired immediately on sick leave and left politics. The dismissal of 
Vennamo created holes within the prevailing power-structures in Sonera, which had 
serious consequences for the company later. I would argue that current political concerns 
were more powerful than concern for Sonera and its future. 
In fact, the scandal studied here was the first of several. Readers and viewers could follow 
the story’s new twists and turns, “where old certainties may suddenly crumble and new 
hypotheses emerge, and where the plot may occasionally become so thick that even the 
dedicated followers begin lose their way” (Thompson, 2000, p. 76).
After this specific scandal, all Sonera affairs were handled at the political level, including 
the principles of incentives offered to executives. A new and more detailed policy was 
even adopted by the Government based on an expert report, chaired by Secretary of State 
Raimo Sailas. However, the political elite has continued to follow the same model of 
behaviour at each new twist or turn: “We did not know.”  
Attempts to renew labour market policy were controlled by the Ministry of Labour and 
particularly by Minister Jaakonsaari. The political commitment to halve unemployment 
was a political promise with a high symbolic value. However, it never became a concrete, 
shared task across the Government. The improvement of the country’s employment 
situation was seen more as a consequence of correct or good economic policy than as an 
independent goal that encompassed various strategies, including a specific attempt 
actively to reduce long-term unemployment. The unemployed were treated more as 
objects than subjects. 
An instrument for measuring positive changes in employment, the so-called “Project 
Portfolio”, was created and coordinated by Secretary of State Rauno Saari, representing 
Prime Minister’s Office. The purpose of this Project Portfolio was to follow the 
legislation work done across the various Ministries that had links to the Government 
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Programme and its goal to “Halve Unemployment”. Although the instrument was suitable 
for observing results, however, it had no means by which to foster action by any of the 
various players, and it is ultimately evidence of fragmentation in the exercise of power. 
Some of the proposals related to the reform were politically controversial, so there was a 
particularly strong need for a powerful and shared commitment in order to achieve this 
significant goal of halving unemployment. At least there should have been, given the 
fundamental importance of employment in the Government’s political programme. The 
disagreement between Minister Niinistö and Minister Jaakonsaari – over providing an 
individualized service and incentives for unemployed people re-entering the job market – 
was never resolved in Cabinet through the political process. Rather, the solution was 
achieved within the budget negotiations which were chaired by the Ministry of Finance, 
so that in the end Minister Jaakonsaari had to take what Minister Niinistö offered. Prime 
Minister Lipponen considered himself a supporter of the Finance Minister’s views.  
The attempts to crystallize the reform’s key messages and evaluate their effectiveness 
changed the plot of labour reform into a scandal, starting from accusations of favouritism 
and improper financial transactions between the Ministry and Grey Eminence, and 
continuing as an issue of press freedom. Exposed first by the media, the management of 
the scandal was left in the hands of Minister Jaakonsaari. Significantly, her party did not 
seek to interfere with, or otherwise influence, the outcome of the case, unlike the case of 
Sonera where Minister Aura’s party was actively involved in image-management. 
However, an outside authority calmed the scandal, explaining that value-index-analysis, 
which had been interpreted as a black list of journalists, was in fact a normal method used 
in media studies. Unlike the Sonera scandal, this one just died away. 
What kind of information and communication (I&C) structures are there in the modern 
political system in the light of these four decision-making processes?  My conclusion is 
that information flows without any discussion, commitment or argument. Rather, it seems 
that the role of the Cabinet has evolved primarily in the direction of taking care of 
formalities as opposed to facilitating debate on key issues. Instead of action, documents 
are sent into “the machinery of the exercise of power”; they are generated, then pass the 
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preparatory committees, where informal decision-making commences. Next these 
documents make their way to the Cabinet meetings for cursory review. Finally they arrive 
in Parliament, where they are typically interpreted as delegated decisions that have 
already been made – most likely by professional administrators outside the elected 
political hierarchy. Indeed, information is received but it is not communicated.
All four decision-making processes were controlled by the delegated competent Ministry 
and introduced formally to the Cabinet. According to Garnham (1992), the institutions 
and processes of public communication are themselves a central and integral part of the 
political system.  Nevertheless, no communication seemed to cross the lines of 
demarcation between the various Ministries. As significantly, in none of these four cases 
was any real political commitment made by the Government. Political commitment is 
typically achieved through shared debate and actions, both of which should also be 
defended. It is, of course, possible that consensus can sometimes not be achieved; 
however, the common strategy adopted by the Government should be defended publicly 
not just passed through. 
It is worth emphasizing, in this particular context, that Beck (1992) evolved his analysis 
of individualization within an analysis of the changing labour market. It is not surprising 
that this same evolution is also reflected within “the political labour markets”. The 
tendency towards individualization is obvious also among the political elite, since every 
minister as an individual is trying to govern his or her political responsibilities alone, 
without any significant support either from his or her party group or from the Government 
as a collective body that shares the same strategy.  
Almost everyone in the political elite now makes the best effort to take care of his or her 
own interests, while simultaneously trying to manage their image within the new visibility 
and fragility of politics, as Thompson (1995) has underlined. Within the mediated 
version, politics offers entertainment, serving up the winners and losers of a particular 
political decision, perhaps a controversy, and giving at the same time a possibility for the 
public to share the same destiny as celebrities (Isotalus, 1998; Jallinoja, 1997). This 
contributes to competition between the media and politicians for the support of the 
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electors, which is one of the factors underlying the prevailing tensions between the media 
and the political system (Petersson, 1996; Karvonen, 1997).  
Over time politicians have lost much of the support which traditionally came from their 
political networks and instead they have become more dependent on the media. Political 
parties have become more rally-organizations than the original brains trusts, capable of 
analyzing challenges, typical of earlier politics. Nor is Government chaired like most 
advanced corporations, where the importance of I&C flows and the mode of information 
is acknowledged. 
Kooiman (1993) ponders the same issue of individualization within the added framework 
of diversity. Diversity gives a broader landscape and a greater impression of growing 
individualization, differentiation, specialization and variety in the modern world. In fact, 
this is a common feature of the exercise of power in Finland. My conclusion is that the 
political system is truly fragmented, and that individualization, differentiation, and 
specialization have strengthened this fragmentation. Based on the empirical material, the 
state apparatus is not governed by an executive body and rather governing is the complex 
result of exercising power, in which the competing centres of power are either individual 
Ministers or key civil servants.  
An example of this fragmentation is the lack of political commitment. One can ask how 
much this lack of political commitment is the result of a multi-party cabinet. Conflicting 
values and political goals may have affected the working style adopted by Paavo 
Lipponen’s Rainbow Coalition. Contentious issues are no longer put on the table, nor is 
the unity of the Government challenged or tested by its participants.  
With the case of EMU, political parties had publicly expressed different, even opposing, 
opinions concerning membership of EMU. These disagreements were not resolved but 
postponed into the future. SAK was actually a key in reaching a unified Government 
decision. In WTO policy, the protectionist interest of defending domestic agriculture 
conflicted with the policy articulated by the responsible Ministry, but was never brought 
out into the open by the Government. Labour reform and the conflicts surrounding it were 
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not resolved either, and instead left as a conflict between individual ministers. Whether or 
not this means that the political sphere is losing its utopian elements, which are both 
polarizing and creative, remains an open question. Nevertheless, such a state of affairs 
seems to be problematic, at least according to Beck (1992) and Habermas (1989). 
More importantly, the web of information and communication across the political elite 
excludes the majority of politicians, who are outside the core where power is exercised, as 
shown above. In this micro-world of the political system, the identity of the winners and 
losers of reflexivity (Lash, 1994) is dependent on their places in the mode of information. 
In the cases considered, a part of the Government was always excluded from the 
information and communication structures. Nor were information flows between the 
political elite and the electors optimized. 
However, individual ministers had their trusted advisors to represent their interests 
indirectly or in remote interaction. When the policy that is adopted by Government has 
been formulated and debated only by individual ministers and their advisors, this 
confirms the results of Ranki’s research (2000), that the Committee on Economic Affairs 
is not a place to make common strategies. 
According to Kooiman (1993), a dynamic approach to governance absolutely requires the 
process and evolutionary aspects of interaction. It also embraces the dynamics of 
interference, interplays and interventions. My study of the information flows reveals an 
emerging lack of interaction, that is to say communication within I&C structures, which 
has its implications in the lack of political commitment with regard to the decisions. 
Kooiman also demands that governance should be able to cope with uncertainty, 
instability, long-term perspectives, and broader orientations. In the Finnish context it 
seems that governance, as characterized by Kooiman, is not in practice; instead governing 
is a necessary layer added on to the administration of the country’s affairs, obliged by the 
demands of democratic decision-making. The model of governance is closer to the 
concept of democracy ideal to Schumpeter (1976).) 
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Democracy in Terms of Globalization and Mediazation 
I will now continue with a comparison of the arguments on globalization used in the cases 
of EMU and the WTO, followed by the comparison between the cases of Sonera and the 
Black Lists in the context of mediazation. The Sonera case has an additional global 
dimension and, therefore, some of the arguments used concerning Sonera are included in 
that analysis. 
Firstly, with respect to the actors, the core of the decision-makers is even smaller in 
global matters, which is actually not an unexpected conclusion. In the case of EMU, the 
Minister of Finance and his advisors made the decisions, while in that of the WTO, the 
Minister for Foreign Trade and his advisors were the key actors. In both cases, Finland’s 
policy was to support the EU Commission. An interviewee said: “But the matter [EMU] 
was neither discussed nor evaluated by our delegation” (”Mutta ei siitä meidän 
delegaattien sisällä keskusteltu tai arvioitu”). Another put it: “If the system is open and 
transparent, no decisions are made… We know that then the decisions are made by the 
country holding the EU presidency, the Commission and by the big guys” (”Jos systeemi 
on täysin avoin, siellä ei tehdä päätöksiä (…) Tiedämme, että silloin päätöksiä tekevät 
EU:n puheenjohtajamaa, komissio ja isot pojat”). Such opinions indicate that in global 
governance, the EU’s actors also considers economic affairs more private than public.
Concerning the public sphere, the argumentation seems to be produced by individual 
ministers, along with their ministry’s civil servants. Generally, if the arguments produced 
by the political elite are found in the public sphere, it is in a form mediated by the media, 
if they are ever expressed. However, the arguments that are articulated in the name of the 
Government are not always those that occurred in reality – unless silence can be 
interpreted as a policy formulation, since this has been a common practice, to judge from 
the four specific decision-making processes reviewed here.  
This explains the recent need to negotiate a more detailed Government Programme. The 
Programme indeed offers guidance to the political elite and gives a shared way of 
thinking to its members, but has tended to be more general than detailed, more neutral 
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than polarizing, and therefore gives little opportunity to analyze political aims and 
motivations – the logic of the decision-making.  
Also the political agenda has become shorter. The WTO was seen more as a new structure 
within which to reorganize the rules of free trade that had already been adopted during the 
GATT, than a fresh decision. In contrast, EMU indicated a new step, both towards 
entering global markets and deepening integration in Europe. EMU was a political issue, 
whereas the WTO a pragmatic matter.  
However, one argument – strengthening westward ties or a political rationale – was not 
expressed in public, either in Parliament or the media. It can be found between the lines 
and in the interview data. This is not to say that there was no coverage of this particular 
element of the debate in the public sphere; opposing voices did underline the political 
neoliberal and ideological nature of EMU and even of the WTO. However, the primary 
public rhetoric focused on the importance of influencing the policy-making of the EU 
through EMU, as well as the WTO.  
The common expression was that “we want to be seated around the table where the 
decisions are being made,” clarifying our interest in being in the core of EU countries. 
This doctrine – that is, specific set of beliefs and principles – impacted on the overarching 
EU integration policy adopted by Finland. However, Prime Minister Lipponen 
emphasized that the doctrine of being in the core of the EU was not in its final form when 
the issue of entering EMU became reality. Later it was an argument in favour of the EMU 
policy adopted by the Government. 
How or in what areas Finland would use its influence on EU policy was not articulated in 
1995. On the contrary, employment was a crucial element in the domestic debate related 
to EMU, since it influenced the conditions of economic and monetary cooperation, but it 
was never an issue promoted by Finland at EU level. 
At that time the EU was faced by the challenge of two alternatives for its development, 
deepening or enlarging. I would argue that Finland implicitly made its policy choice to be 
among those working for deepening of the integration by emphasizing its strong 
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commitment to EMU. Yet various strategies for developing the EU were analyzed in the 
Government’s Report on “Finland and the Future of Europe” introduced to Parliament in 
October 1996. Finland’s strategy was formulated as being a flexible policy including both 
deepening and enlargement processes.  
The liberalization of both capital markets and trade was seen by the political elite as a 
very positive matter and one to which great value was attached. By extension, the 
associated freedom of capital movements was seen as symbolizing a positive outcome for 
globalization. No arguments favouring limitations in capital mobility (viz Cohen, 1999) 
can be found in Finnish public debate, except Minister Norrback’s core message 
concerning rules in free trade being necessary to protect small countries and their 
interests.  
The privatization of Sonera was also motivated by the perceived positive consequences of 
liberalization. It emphasized the value of launching into the global market. As a result the 
balance of economic and political power shifted towards the employers and owners (viz 
Radice, 1999) without any significant resistance. During the economic recession, the 
proponents of “market forces” not only overwhelmed their foes (political regulation), in 
the process acquiring significant stature among the power centres of Finnish society, but 
also succeeded in legitimating their positions (viz Kantola, 2000). All this happened 
despite the fact that the priority of the economy over social issues within the political 
agenda is frequently challenged in public debate – an example of conflict between the 
values expressed in the public sphere and the political elite. 
Finland’s capacity to respond to global competition was also an important argument with 
respect to the debates over EMU, the WTO, and Sonera. Regional integration was 
considered to be necessary to competitiveness. On the one hand the EU, as a united trade 
block, could defend its commercial interests better within the Triad (North America, Asia, 
and Europe), and on the other, EMU could support Europe’s position in financial markets. 
Without such integration Europe’s position would definitely be weaker in global markets. 
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There is no doubt that the sovereignty of the nation state is being diminished. Indeed, 
nation states are undermined in the global economy because the relationship between 
communication and politics is traditionally located within the structure of the nation state. 
Yet according to the analysis and arguments used by the political elite, this was not 
considered to be problematic; on the contrary, globalization provided the necessary cover 
to justify the policy that had been adopted. Power had moved from a local to global basis. 
EMU and its convergence criteria were welcomed because they would guarantee a strict 
economic policy, and EMU made it possible to follow a policy line that would otherwise 
have faced internal political resistance. Again, this commitment was not reached through 
political debate within the public sphere but was rather a decision made by the elite. Once 
the convergence criteria were adopted as a goal, in order to justify the financial squeeze, 
all other aspects of economic policy had to be integrated with this goal. 
At this point what the opposition was more concerned about was the position of the nation 
state. This was the case particularly with respect to Sonera, where privatization and 
liberalization of telecommunications, as well as EMU, were seen as a threat to balanced 
regional development within a nation state. Similar arguments underlay demands to 
guarantee the financial resources for research; if Finland as a nation wanted to survive in 
global competition, innovation was essential. 
In the political argumentation it was emphasized that small countries such as Finland 
benefit from the protection of regional co-operation. In the same way, it was emphasized 
that small countries also benefit in terms of global competition by the rules created by the 
WTO. Globalization had, indeed, changed the world map. The aim of increasing the 
power and the competence of the EU to represent Finland’s greater interests in the areas 
of global trade and monetary policy was in keeping with this policy line centred on 
globalization.  
Clarkson (1998) argues that the WTO will diminish the competence of the EU, since, as 
new areas fall within the remit of the WTO, the EU will lose equivalent amounts of 
sovereignty over policy. However, within the public debate generated by NGOs’ 
arguments, new areas of free trade themselves, such as services and investments, can also 
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been seen as equally threatening to the sovereignty of the nation state. This was, for 
example, the reason behind the NGOs’ opposition to the MAI.
Borchardt (1991) argues that the demand for protection has throughout history been 
linked to employment and agrarian interests, and this was certainly true in Finland. Those 
who argued for special conditions for Finland’s participation in EMU emphasized the 
importance of putting the element of employment parameters among the criteria for 
convergence. This position no doubt also reflected the view that high unemployment was 
an obstacle to entering the euro zone or at least that participation would worsen 
unemployment, in other words, that membership of EMU was seen as premature.  
However, it was Finnish agriculture that managed to direct the debate on membership of 
the EU and also the country’s WTO policy. During the EU accession process, the focus of 
the public debate was on the agricultural subsidy package, not on EMU. Safe food and 
consumers’ safety were also arguments for protecting Finnish agriculture during the 
Millennium Round of the WTO. For example, the question of hormone-treated beef was 
linked to protectionist interests, a way of countering the endeavours of the U.S. 
Government to enlarge their market share in beef production.  
When thinking about the matrix suggested by Kaldor (2000), Finnish argumentation and 
public debate in the context of the globalization can be certainly located in the category of 
“cosmopolitan” and neoliberal category. There is a strong belief that free trade and free 
movement of capital will contribute to wealth, an argument that was particularly stressed 
by key politicians, economic experts, and corporate executives. Since Seattle it is possible 
that more “distributional” arguments have been in play and that the location of Finland 
within Kaldor’s matrix has changed. 
Nonetheless the media can change the political agenda. Firstly, in the case of EMU, the 
media created its own agenda, which emphasized that the decision to join EMU was 
premature. This is, perhaps, one of the reasons why the pro-EMU decision was neither 
announced nor defended by the core of the political elite. The Government’s decision to 
enter the euro zone in the first phase was much more comfortably left “behind the scenes” 
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than put into the public arena for debate, where it would have been very difficult for the 
Government to control. The media’s critical, even negative response became more 
positive when it became obvious that Finland would fulfil the convergence criteria, so 
that later the media mirrored the argumentation provided by the core of the political elite, 
“there is no alternative” (TINA), while the outer circle of the political elite could make its 
positive decision without fear of criticism.  
However, the media was clear in its call for analysis of EMU’s impact and actually 
changed the Government’s approach. Newspapers close to the opposition criticized the 
Government for its eagerness to enter the euro zone without having done sufficient 
studies about the premises and impacts of the euro area, and was accompanied by the 
more neutral press. EMU’s impact was made the subject of study by expert groups, 
enabling the decision to be defended on economic grounds as well as political ones. 
The Finnish media have not been particularly interested in the issue of free trade. Only a 
few journalists have followed the issues as they unfolded and major media conglomerates 
seldom sent their journalists to report on the WTO Ministerial Conferences. Even 
concerns regarding labour standards and poverty expressed by MPs when Finland ratified 
the WTO agreement were not mediated by journalists into the public forum. In 
comparison, the interests of the IT sector and Nokia were reported, as was the importance 
of free trade in the world economy. In this regard I would argue that the media mirrored 
more the interests of the economy than the concerns of politicians. 
The impact of mediazation can be seen clearly in the political scandals studied here, but 
also in more general terms. Once communication is globally mediated, freedom of 
assembly and freedom to impart and receive information have altered. Both are dependent 
on resources. This emerging potential for individual inequality, which is part of the 
spectre of globalization, should be one of the key concerns of any political system. In 
support of these concerns, I want to highlight the opinion of Barney (2000) that in the 
digital age “the tragic consequence of alienation from our rooted and meditative essence 
is participation in a public and collective life that elides the genuine essence of politics 
itself” (p. 267). The degree to which one has power is typically the degree to which a 
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person has access to information (viz Petersson, 1996; Lash, 1994). This underlines the 
notion that the winners and losers of reflexivity are dependent on their places in the mode 
of information instead of production, as was the case during the classic industrial age’s 
classes-in-struggle.  
The new ethos of journalism has its impact on what kind of debate is mediated into the 
public sphere and how. Editorial activity has become journalistic: the selection of 
material, the processing and evaluation of news has become more important than the lead 
article (viz Habermas, 1989). Journalists actually choose which issues and events will be 
covered and how they will be covered. A debate, giving an image of political conflict, is 
reported more often than the real impacts of the associated legislation, affecting 
everyone’s daily life. The passage and argumentation of the mass of legislation remains in 
the shadows. This tendency is very problematic because, when the media gives no 
emphasis to a particular subject, there can be no particular social learning about that 
subject among media consumers (viz Wanta, 1997). 
In the case of the actors, mediazation seems to increase their number whereas 
globalization seems to reduce it. Concerning the political scandals, studied here, the 
number of outside actors or actants is multiplied. Indeed, a key actor in a particular case is 
often portrayed with a countersubject, whose aim is to prevent the success of the actor 
and he/she may be helped by several assistants (viz Apo, 1986; Korhonen & Oksanen, 
1997). In the case of Sonera, Minister Niinistö had a dual role, while in general terms the 
political opposition was acting in the role of a countersubject. In the case of the Black 
Lists, MP Anneli Jäätteenmäki was a countersubject accompanied many others. In this 
case it was an outside authority, Professor Wiio, who calmed the public’s passions and 
caused the scandal to dwindle and vanish. 
Political scandals dramatically changed the structure of the narrative surrounding not only 
the Sonera case but also that of labour reform, giving evidence of the new fragility of 
publicity expressed by, for example, Thompson (1995, 2000). In the cases of EMU and 
the WTO policy no changes concerning the main plot happened because of the media, 
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which remained largely disengaged, and those changes that were made were stimulated 
by corporate bodies and NGOs. 
The success of Sonera’s privatization turned into failure with the dismissal of Pekka 
Vennamo, the resignation of Minister Aura, and a continuing vicious circle. In a similar 
way, with labour market reform, attempts to speak directly to the unemployed themselves 
through the media about tailor-made individual services provided by the Ministry of 
Labour turned into a scandal of favouritism and later into a threat to the freedom of the 
press. In both of these cases, what at first seemed like a success turned into failure 
because of a detail that was considered immoral and was exposed by the media.  
Mediated scandals have a certain temporal and sequential structure. They are stretched 
over an extended period of time and punctuated by the rhythms of the media, but they do 
not last forever. A scandal will always reach a point of termination at which stage one of 
the following denouements occurs: a confession, a resignation, the outcome of an inquiry 
or a trial or gradual vanishing (Thompson, 2000). These phases are also well known 
among the political elite, particularly when they are trying to limit the damage of a 
political scandal. Typically political scandals are managed by participating key actors 
who should not be, according to the rules of crisis communication, at the centre of the 
action but rather far from it. This loss of communal dependence can be interpreted as a 
consequence of the individualization and fragmentation of politics. In this model, 
everyone is out to win – or, in a crisis, trying to save his or her own skin.  
There are some types of societal standards which are more scandal-sensitive than others. 
In Finland most political scandals have related to financial transactions, and in origin this 
holds true for the cases considered here. In the examples used, Pekka Vennamo became 
rich and Ulpu Iivari’s firm was paid generously. It is also typical within the context of 
scandals that some non-participant expresses his or her disapproval of the act, as 
happened in both of the cases examined here.  
Political scandals affect the capacity of politicians to exercise power. Anyone who wishes 
to obtain political power or to exercise it must use symbolic power. Symbolic power 
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refers the capacity to intervene in the course of events, to influence the actions and beliefs 
of others and to create events.  Reputation is an aspect of this symbolic power and, along 
with credibility, is one of the most valuable resources a politician can have (viz 
Thompson, 2000; Brendan, 1992), and need to be cultivated and protected. Political 
scandals can be damaging for actual or aspiring political leaders.  As Thompson has put 
it: “To destroy or damage their reputation is to destroy or damage their credibility” (2000, 
p. 103). Therefore the reputation and credibility of non-participants should also be 
evaluated by the media and mediated into the public sphere, in order to insure that their 
intentions and motives are clear. Very often political scandals also reflect a power 
struggle within the political elite.  However, no due diligence of this kind is incumbent 
upon journalists and it is not part of the media’s general ethos, with some exceptions.  
Political scandals also change the political agenda and may even create a new one. The 
privatization of Sonera was a success, which had been motivated by the aim of 
liberalizing the telecommunications markets and of competing in global markets. 
However, the achievement was not one the political elite could defend publicly and was 
lost from view since the story instead evolved into one of failure because of the media’s 
moral condemnation. Efforts launched to clarify and simplify the complexity of labour 
market policy failed when both immoral party connections were exposed and the 
consultant company, along with Ulpu Iivari, were revealed to have been greedy.
The harmony and unity of a community can be maintained by allowing hidden hatred to 
burst out (Girard, 1977). In order to release this anger, victims or scapegoats are needed 
as targets. On the one hand the political elite protects its own unity; on the other hand the 
unity of society is protected with this ritual. In the Sonera case, Sonera’s CEO, Pekka 
Vennamo, was greedy in two ways. First, he was encouraged to be greedy by the state as 
owner, by taking a personal stake in the company’s success. This greed helped 
significantly to increase the share value during the sale of Sonera shares. However, he 
was suddenly identified as being too greedy when it emerged that he had bought shares in 
the name of his own investment firm. It is difficult to say where the line between proper 
 309
and improper greed lay. However, the revelation of Pekka Vennamo’s activity not only 
led to his dismissal, but also triggered the resignation of Minister Matti Aura.  
The proclamation of his greed was a creation of the media which demanded scapegoats 
and heroes. The political elite, in order to maintain their credibility in public, then 
seconded the media narrative with condemnation of their own. It was expected that the 
National Coalition Party would try to limit damage to itself and win the case in the public 
eye by claiming heroism on the part of its actors. Demari predicted the reaction of 
Minister Niinistö and some individual journalists offered other critical perspectives. In 
this sense a part of the media observed itself critically, but this could not change the 
drama of the case.  
The media coverage of the Black Lists scandal stimulated debate about freedom of the 
press. It is also typical of scandals that the plots and subplots vary. This question of 
freedom of the press can be seen within the context of the exercise of power and the 
balance of various power-centres in society, but also in the need of media watch. The 
relationships between those who have the power and those who watch the exercise of 
power have always been sensitive (viz Curran & Gurevitch, 1996). Moreover, the debate 
about the freedom of the press also reflected the importance of moral issues in society.  
In general terms, the media in Finland is functioning in the way liberal tradition suggests. 
Parliament, as idealized by Weber (1978) and liberal tradition in general, really is a forum 
within which to debate public policy. The formalities or procedures of democratic 
decision-making do provide an opportunity to debate during the readings or handling 
processes of particular legislation. Also the Question Hour has taken on a more important 
role in mediating the political debate to the public. However, both the Question Hour and 
the interpellation debates have altered their setting or appearance to make them more 
suitable for the expected needs of the media. This might also be true in general terms; if 
the media are more interested in political fights, they are given them; if their concern is 
human interest, they are also served.  
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The competition between the two major media conglomerates affected the chosen 
journalistic approach. If the case was a scoop of one particular media conglomerate, it 
was also the more active in its attempts to find interesting subplots and to create a 
dramatic setting. The news was served as entertainment to readers by identifying the roles 
of each actor. In political scandals the media took an active role in shaping the political 
agenda, so that the political elite were forced to respond to the moral challenges raised by 
the media. 
The Sonera scandal was Sanoma Group’s case, the Black Lists scandal was Almamedia’s 
case, and this was reflected in the media response. In the context of Labour Market 
Reform provincial newspapers were also active. This can be interpreted through the 
political setting: in the confrontation of the Government and the opposition, the provincial 
press was politically close the opposition, the Centre Party. However, the major 
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat kept a critical distance from the case, which helped the 
crisis to be managed. 
Once the plot was created by one particular media conglomerate it was followed by other 
media actors too. Very seldom were any critical remarks expressed. In that sense I would 
argue that the media’s self-criticism (viz Silva, 1995; Stenius, 1999) is not functioning in 
Finland. Occasionally some critical remarks are directed by one part of the media towards 
another (e.g. in the Sonera case) but this is not systematic. Therefore I would argue in 
favour of media watch groups. Media-watch is particularly required in the case of 
political scandals, where there should be a voice to ask the critical questions: what hidden 
interests behind the scenes might explain elements of the scandal.  
It also seems that the media thinks it has an important role as a guardian or at least 
observer of morality and that, through its watchfulness, it may change the type of 
governance. This kind of argumentation was strong among political journalists, that 
political scandals should lead to more moral governance. The paradox is that less is 
argued, less is advocated, more is in silence and more is just managed.  
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Photojournalism is a very powerful medium in the relations of politicians, media, and 
voters/citizens, creating images valuable to politicians in terms of credibility or its lack. In 
fact, the photograph is a message.  Those who take photos, choose them, decide on their 
arrangement and give them captions or commentary are using power. The value-added 
index of the particular article (a term used in content analysis) may be neutral, while the 
photograph chosen to illustrate the written text can have a very clear message. It is 
certainly evident in the case of the Black Lists that the photographs underlined the key 
message: black lists existed whatever Minister Jaakonsaari says. The photographs 
illustrating the Sonera case instead supported the image created by the National Coalition: 
Minister Aura has high morals, so that in political defeat, he leaves the stage. In political 
scandals the photographs form an essential part of the message provided by the media.  
“The action at distance” described by Thompson (1995) has influenced the rise of the new 
forms of media appearances that can also be seen in media strategies adopted by the 
political elite. Press conferences, for instance, are examples of indirect recipient address 
that can be controlled and mastered by the politicians. The surroundings of press 
conferences, being official spaces, underline the power and authority of an actor (viz 
Oksanen, 1992), while the messages provided to the media are also prepared with care. 
The photos published from the press conferences organized by Minister Aura (the Sonera 
case) and Minister Jaakonsaari (the Black Lists) underline the image of control. In 
contrast, Vennamo’s press conference in an unofficial and neutral conference room 
underlines the loss of the power. 
Public Sphere in Finland –Silent Democracy and Noisy Media      
Habermas’s idea of the public sphere was similar to that of the theatre (Fraser, 1992). In 
this theatre citizens can express and deliberate their common affairs. Most of all, the 
public sphere is an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction between those who are 
elected and those who are electors. In Finland access to this theatre is quite equal: we 
have public libraries, the use of Internet is high, and Finns are great readers. However, 
public spaces and their importance in creating a public domain have decreased, including, 
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for instance, the clubs and houses of the Labour Movement, the Farmers’ Associations 
and Youth Organizations (työväentalot, maamiesseurojen and nuorisoseurojen talot).
Habermas argues (1989) that the consumption of mass culture increases with wealth, 
status and urbanization. Through these transformations, the public sphere has become 
more of an arena for advertising than a setting for rational-critical debate. The process of 
both the commercialization and the commodification of the press has been accompanied 
by a decline in the political press. This has been the case in Finland. The two competing 
media conglomerates have had significant impact on the public sphere as the political 
press has declined in importance, at the same time as tabloidization has strengthened the 
commercial interests of the press. The long-standing journalistic ethos – of being critical 
towards those who have the power in society – has been challenged in contemporary 
societies by the essential new demands of commodification and commercial interests. 
Indeed, this evolution has emphasized the emergence of journalism’s role as being to 
offer an entertainment for its readers rather than to act as the voice of rational-critical 
debate.
There are two primary major models that embrace the notion of the public sphere: the 
market-based pluralist version and the state-dominated Marxist alternative. In 
“Communication and Citizenship” James Curran argues in favour of a third path in which 
there is an independence from both state and market forces (Dahlgren & Sparks, 1991). 
The third path seems to be in balance with the democratic public sphere meant by 
Habermas. Therefore it is also worth noting the role of the publicly owned Finnish 
Broadcasting Company, though the electronic media and its responses, including those of 
FBC, are not studied in my research. However, I find the role of the public 
communication services provided by the Finnish Broadcasting Company are essential 
with respect to promoting rational-critical debate in society following the argument of 
Habermas and Curran.  
The ever-mounting commercial interest of the media in offering entertainment, combined 
with the ever-evolving fragility of political decision-making due to its increased visibility, 
has led to an increase in leaks and scandals (viz Thompson, 2000). The increase in 
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scandals can at least partially be interpreted in terms of the shifting boundaries between 
the public and the private, a shift certainly catalyzed by the ever-expanding reach of the 
media.  
It is also said that political scandals can only arise in liberal democracies. For the media, 
the electors are both the recipients or audience and the consumers. As a result of 
competition between the various media, these consumers are offered the “products”, 
ideally tailored to their interests or, as Isotalus (1998) has emphasized, consumers are 
offered those media “products” that the media assumes the consumers are interested in. 
For example, if the watchers of television programmes prefer short commentary or 
political conflict between debating political leaders instead of longer discussions on 
specific items, these products are provided. My argument is that the media has become 
noisy rather than analytic, in an effort to please as opposed to an attempt to inform. But 
the question remains: if the media is a true mirror of its society, how much of the 
emerging absence of analytical debate is the media’s fault? 
In the following table there are two axes: the horizontal x-axis represents the type of 
governance and the vertical y-axis, media publicity. The type of governance ranges from 
technocratic or bureaucratic governance to political governance. Media publicity – giving 
evidence about the rational-critical or at least public debate in the public sphere – ranges 
from minor to major. I have located the four decision-making processes into various 
quarters to characterize prevailing democracy in Finland in order to generalize. 
 314
Table 4 
Media Publicity 
Major
Type of Governance   
Technocratic   Sonera  Political  
Governance  Black Lists                                      Governance 
              EMU               
WTO
                               
               Minor 
Technocratic governance is close to Weber’s and Schumpeter’s idea of democracy. 
People are seen more as “producers” of governments and elections as a struggle for the 
mandate to rule. The government can rule without any specific obligation to justify its 
choice in the manner of exercising power. In the light of information flows and 
argumentation typically shared by those who exercise power, the ideas of Schumpeter are 
relevant in Finnish context. Technocratic governance also underlines the overwhelming 
capacity of the administrators, the steel-hard cage of bureaucracy. 
Political governance is closer to the ideas of participatory democracy, where the 
legitimization of power is achieved through communicative action, in other words, it 
underlines the constituted mode of governing through public debate. Political governance 
should also include the political commitment of the Cabinet as a collective at strategic 
level. Individual ministers are treated as political decision-makers, who on the one hand 
lead their ministries but on the other hand are politically responsible to Parliament, which 
is part of the democratic public sphere.  
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The concept of governability should be seen as a permanent balancing process between 
the needs of governing and the capacities of governing. The needs of governing are 
actually well-articulated problems and the articulation of a problem suggests the wish for 
a solution (viz Kooiman, 1993). Again the articulation of a problem underlines the 
importance of interactive, dialogue-oriented democracy. Giddens argues in favour of a 
dialogic democracy that could guide people’s day-to-day activities. Beck (1994) even 
claims that it is not possible to derive decisions from the party-political and corporatist 
superstructure and, at the same time, to demand reflexivity in modern societies.  In 
dialogic democracy, it is also sometimes possible that no consensus is achieved and when 
this happens, to maintain order within the system, mutual tolerance is required.  
In the diagram, the vertical axis evaluates the transparency of the exercise of power. 
Media publicity can be major or minor, but media coverage as such does not make the 
exercise of power transparent, since transparency is dependent on the effectiveness with 
which the argumentation is mediated into the public sphere. 
The EMU and the WTO policy are located in the domain of technocratic (i.e. 
bureaucratic) governance as this was the style of decision-making. They also are 
positioned as lacking in significant media publicity or prominence, as the issue of EMU, 
and particularly Finnish trade policy, were never really treated as matters of public 
concern. Individual ministers took care of issues without any significant political 
commitment or involvement by the Cabinet. These cases offered no real opportunities for 
the media to benefit their commercial interests – to entertain or otherwise increase the 
consumption of media products, the sale of newspapers – so that they were given little 
prominence and were consequently achieved little penetration into the public 
consciousness.
By comparison, the privatization of Sonera and the issue of labour reform were 
transparent processes soliciting more considerable, major or “noisy”, coverage because 
both Ministers wanted publicly to advocate them. With regard to political structure, the 
Sonera case emerged first as an administrative rather than a political effort. The 
privatization of Sonera had been accepted in principle by Parliament, so that the process 
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of privatization was embedded within a detailed administrative plan consisting of set 
milestones which were not challenged or discussed by the Cabinet. As such it falls within 
the technocratic quarter.  
In the case of the Black Lists, the case was also managed by the ministry concerned and 
no common commitment by the political elite can be found. Therefore we can again 
assume a more technocratic rather than political style of governance, and we can locate 
the case in the same quarter as Sonera. However, Minister Jaakonsaari made some efforts 
to argue politically in favour of the labour reform in the public sphere. 
Unlike the issues of EMU and WTO, both the Black Lists and Sonera were affected by 
the power of the media, the consequences of transparency, and the fragility of visibility. 
Leaks and exposures led to political scandals. The damage from both of the crises was 
minimized, and never threatened the unity or the position of the Government, so the cases 
cannot be located on the side of political governance. I would argue that the new visibility 
of the exercise of power leads to the style of technocratic governance. 
Civil society (including an independent media and political parties) can also bring matters 
into the public sphere. At first glance, the power and status of NGOs and social partners – 
in other words union corporations – confirms the plurality of power centres within 
Finnish society, though these elements have not been in the focus of my primary studies. 
Social partners and NGOs intervene to help mediate the concerns of civil society within 
the public sphere. Both have an impact on the agenda-setting of politics, as can be seen 
particularly in the cases of EMU and the WTO. Unemployed people were not able to get 
their voice heard within the public sphere, while in Sonera’s privatization the small share-
holders were recognized via the media response. 
All the same, rational-critical debate does continue on certain issues within the public 
sphere, though quite often this debate has not been generated by the political system. The 
Finnish Parliament is a true arena of political debate, though, for those seeking out the 
actual debate within Parliament, the search is sometimes bewildered by the mass of 
information and talk. With respect to the role of the political process in political scandals, 
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it appears that it was the media that directed the narrative or the story-telling, while the 
political system merely reflected the media’s agenda, and deeper study only reveals an 
absolute minimum of rational-critical debate – if any at all. My conclusion is that 
democracy in Finland is silent.
My study has revealed that the political elite neither communicates nor interacts in a 
significant manner. My analysis of how the decisions are made only further confirms this 
- particularly with respect to a lack of interaction on their part, and I am not alone in this 
kind of conclusion (viz Soininvaara, 2002). This reveals a key issue: if those in the 
political elite are incapable of communicating among themselves, how can the common 
people realize the possibility of participating within a genuine rational-critical debate? 
How might they evaluate the various alternatives and make their political choices?  
Defending both parliamentary institutions and the constitutional rights of citizens is 
essential, but quite inadequate. The political elite, as an essential part of the political 
system, must participate in and enable the rational-critical debate in order to promote the 
rights of its represented citizens and to defend the public sphere as an arena of democracy 
as opposed to an apparatus of the state or economy. Based on my study, I would strongly 
advocate the importance of dialogue and mutual communication as means of giving room 
to the public sphere. While the technocratic approach remains so dominant, it strengthens 
the economy and the functioning of the state at the expense of the democratic public 
sphere.
I have come to two major conclusions from my study: ours is a silent democracy, ours is a 
noisy media. I argue in favour of political governance that is transparent. This of course 
brings with it the risk of political scandals and leaks; however, the fragility – and absolute 
strength – of political decision-making is both a fact and a consequence of modernity. 
Today’s public sphere, although not as ideal as that envisaged by Habermas, should guide 
the priorities of the political system to give true legitimacy to our democracy.  
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